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
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Une histoire en documents,
1909–2009

A History in Documents,
1909–2009

Affaires
étrangères et
Commerce
international
Canada

Foreign
Affairs and
International
Trade
Canada

Janice Cavell

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représentée par le Ministre des Travaux publics et Services
gouvernementaux, 2009.

ISBN 978-0660-64534-6
Catalogue No: FR5-43/2009

En vente chez votre libraire local ou par la poste auprès des
Éditions et Services de dépôt
Travaux publics et Services gouvernementaux Canada
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K1A 0S5

Téléphone: (613) 941-5995 Télécopieur: (613) 954-5779
Commandes seulement: 1-800-635-7943
Internet: <http://publications.gc.ca>

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ISBN 978-0660-64534-6
Catalogue No: FR5-43/2009

Available through your local bookseller or by mail from
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Ottawa, Ontario
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Préface

Le 1er juin 2009 a marqué le centième anniversaire d’Affaires étrangères et Commerce international Canada. Nous avons parcouru beaucoup de chemin depuis nos débuts modestes au-dessus d’un salon de barbier au centre-ville d’Ottawa. L’émergence du MAECI en tant que ministère moderne et dynamique constitue un exemple d’accomplissements que nous souhaitons communiquer à tous les Canadiens.

Lorsque les quatre colonies de l’Amérique du Nord britannique se sont unies afin de créer le Canada le 1er juillet 1867, l’avenir du nouveau pays était loin d’être assuré. Le Canada était indépendant sur le plan des questions nationales, mais la Grande-Bretagne avait toutefois conservé l’emprise de sa politique étrangère. Cependant, au cours du demi-siècle qui a suivi la création du ministère des Affaires extérieures, les dirigeants du Canada et ses habitants ont pris le contrôle tranquillement, mais de façon permanente, de leur politique étrangère ainsi que de leur destinée.

À mesure que le Canada s’affranchissait de son statut de colonie, le Ministère se transformait. Dans les années 1930, le Canada avait ses propres missions diplomatiques à Londres, Paris, Washington, Tokyo et Genève et il avait commencé à élaborer une démarche distincte à l’égard des affaires internationales. Après la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les femmes et les hommes qui travaillaient au Ministère ont créé un service extérieur compétent et mûr qui était capable, selon l’expression de Lester B. Pearson, de jouer dans la cour des grands. Après la fusion du Ministère avec le Service des délégués commerciaux en 1982, ses activités et son mandat ont pris de nouvelles directions. Son nom actuel témoigne de ces changements.

La croissance du Ministère au cours du dernier siècle est à l’image du rôle en constante évolution du Canada dans la communauté internationale. Notre histoire est le récit d’une adaptation aux nouvelles réalités de notre pays et du monde. Les documents du présent livre racontent une transformation que nous sommes fiers de célébrer.

Leonard J. Edwards, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Louis Lévesque, Deputy Minister of International Trade

Preface

June 1, 2009 marked the hundredth anniversary of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. We have come a long way since our modest beginnings above a barber shop in downtown Ottawa. The department's emergence as a modern, dynamic foreign and trade ministry is a tale of accomplishment that we wish to share with all Canadians.

When the four colonies of British North America united to create Canada on July 1, 1867, the new country's future was by no means secure. Though Canada was independent in domestic matters, Britain retained control over its foreign policy. But during the half century after the Department of External Affairs was created, Canada's leaders and its people quietly but steadily took control of their foreign policy and their destiny.

As Canada shed its colonial legacy, the department grew apace. By the 1930s, Canada had its own diplomatic missions in London, Paris, Washington, Tokyo, and Geneva, and it had begun to develop a distinctive approach to international affairs. After the Second World War, the men and women of the department created a mature and sophisticated foreign service that was capable, in Lester Pearson's words, of punching above its weight. Following the department's merger with the Trade Commissioner Service in 1982, its operations and mandate expanded in new directions. These changes are reflected in its current name.

The growth of the department over the last century has mirrored Canada's own evolving role in the global community. Ours is a history of adapting to new realities in our country and around the world. The documents in this book tell a story of transformation which we are proud to celebrate.

Leonard J. Edwards, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Louis Lévesque, Deputy Minister of International Trade

Introduction

Le premier volume de la série des *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada* a été publié il y a maintenant quarante-deux ans. Jusqu'à présent, vingt-sept volumes ont été achevés, ce qui couvre la période de la fondation du ministère des Affaires extérieures en 1909 jusqu'à 1960¹. Ils rendent compte amplement des questions politiques qui occupaient les diplomates au cours de ces années, mais inévitablement, faute d'espace suffisant, il a fallu exclure de nombreux comptes rendus fascinants qui montraient le côté plus humain de la vie au Ministère. Le présent livre combine certains des documents les plus intéressants et les plus évocateurs tirés des volumes publiés, d'autres articles plus personnels et colorés choisis dans la panoplie de documents conservés à Bibliothèque et Archives Canada, des dossiers des fonds d'archive plus récents, des dossiers encore conservés par Affaires étrangères et Commerce international Canada ainsi que quelques articles qui ont été publiés pour la première fois dans le magazine *bout de papier*.

La sélection a été difficile. Il serait impossible de regrouper tous les événements ou toutes les personnes qui ont joué un rôle important dans l'histoire du Ministère dans un seul volume qui ne serait pas trop long pour être publié. De plus, comme tant de diplomates canadiens sont également des auteurs doués, il a fallu omettre à contrecœur des dizaines de documents extraordinaires. Les documents choisis visent à illustrer la plus grande variété possible d'événements, de décisions stratégiques et de personnalités de la diplomatie canadienne. Ils donnent également un aperçu de ce qu'était réellement le travail à l'Administration centrale et dans les missions à l'étranger au cours du premier siècle du Ministère. En outre, il existe de nombreux comptes rendus de témoins oculaires concernant des personnes célèbres et des points marquants de l'histoire du monde. Les documents sont imprimés ici dans leur langue d'origine, en anglais ou en français.

Pour les personnes qui aimeraient en connaître davantage sur des épisodes particuliers, les volumes publiés des *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada* sont faciles à se procurer dans les bibliothèques universitaires, et bon nombre d'entre eux sont accessibles sur le site Web du Ministère. Les deux premiers volumes de l'histoire du Ministère, qui couvrent les périodes de 1909 à 1946 et de 1946 à 1968, ont été publiés en anglais et en français. La liste des sources à la fin du présent livre comprend les travaux primaires et secondaires consultés lors de la préparation des commentaires sur les documents, quelques autres histoires courantes ainsi que plusieurs mémoires de la première moitié du premier siècle du Ministère. Il n'a pas été jugé nécessaire de fournir une liste détaillée étant donné que la littérature sur la politique étrangère du Canada est riche et très vaste. Les lecteurs intéressés voudront peut-être consulter le chapitre

sur les relations étrangères et la politique en matière de défense de l'ouvrage *Canadian History, A Reader's Guide, Vol. 2: Confederation to the Present* (University of Toronto Press, 1994), rédigé par Doug Owsam. Les lecteurs devraient également savoir que de nombreux mémoires et d'autres livres de grand intérêt ont été publiés ces dernières années par d'anciens employés du Ministère.

En faisant les recherches nécessaires à la rédaction du présent volume, j'ai pu compter sur l'aide précieuse de Mark Eaton, qui a découvert bon nombre des documents imprimés à la dernière section. Greg Donaghy et Mary Halloran, qui travaillent actuellement au troisième volume de l'histoire du Ministère, m'ont donné des conseils de recherche inestimables en ce qui concerne les années au pouvoir de Trudeau et Mulroney. Drew Fagan, Graham Shantz, et Ariel Delouya ont appuyé le projet dès le début. Aline Géliveau a tapé le manuscrit et Gail Kirkpatrick Devlin a dressé la liste des personnalités. Ces deux dernières collaborent également à la production des volumes réguliers des *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada* depuis de nombreuses années, et je suis heureuse d'exprimer ma gratitude pour la constance et la qualité de haut niveau de leur travail. Le livre a été conçu par Gary Blakeley et Camilla Blakeley était responsable de la coordination éditoriale. Le service du Bureau de la traduction à Affaires étrangères et Commerce international Canada a produit le texte français des légendes et des textes secondaires. Je tiens à remercier spécialement René et François Cadieux, qui nous ont donné la permission de reproduire des extraits du livre de leur père, le magazine *bout de papier*, qui nous a permis de réimprimer des articles, et Laurel Parry, qui nous a fourni une version légèrement révisée de son article sur la vie en tant que conjointe d'un diplomate.

Enfin, je voudrais rendre hommage à tous les autres historiens qui ont rédigé des volumes des *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada* depuis 1967 : R.A. MacKay, Lovell Clark, Alex Inglis, John Munro, David Murray, John Hilliker, Donald Page, Norman Hillmer, Hector Mackenzie, Greg Donaghy, Ted Kelly, Donald Barry, Michael Stevenson et Kevin Spooner. Sans leur travail, le présent volume n'existerait pas.

Janice Cavell

Remarque sur les documents

Lorsqu'un document a déjà été publié dans un volume des *Documents relatifs aux relations extérieures du Canada*, le numéro du volume et le numéro du document sont indiqués.

Les documents de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada ont été tirés du RG 25 (dossiers du ministère des Affaires extérieures) ou des documents personnels des membres du Ministère. Le nom de la collection et le numéro du volume sont fournis pour chaque article; les documents du RG 25 ont également des numéros de dossier.

Les documents qui n'ont qu'un numéro de dossier, ou qui n'ont aucune référence, proviennent des dossiers conservés à Affaires étrangères et Commerce international Canada.

Introduction

It is now forty-two years since the first volume in the series *Documents on Canadian External Relations (DCER)* was published. To date, twenty-seven volumes have been completed, covering the period from the founding of the Department of External Affairs in 1909 up to 1960.¹ They amply document the political issues that occupied Canada's diplomats during those years, but inevitably, for reasons of space, many fascinating accounts showing the more human side of life in the department had to be excluded. This book combines some of the most vividly written and interesting documents from the published volumes, other more personal and colourful items selected from the wealth of material held at Library and Archives Canada, more recent records taken both from archival holdings and from the files still retained by Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada, and a few articles that first appeared in the magazine *bout de papier*.

The task of selection was a challenging one. It would be impossible to include every significant event or person in the department's history in a single volume of publishable length. Moreover, so many Canadian diplomats have also been gifted writers that dozens of wonderful documents had to be reluctantly omitted. The material chosen is intended to illustrate as wide a range as possible of events, policy decisions, and personalities in Canadian diplomacy, along with a sense of what it was actually like to work both at headquarters and at posts abroad during the department's first century. As well, there are many eyewitness accounts of famous people and major turning points in world history. The documents are printed here in their original language, whether English or French.

For those who would like to know more about particular episodes, the published *DCER* volumes are widely available in university libraries, and many can also be found in electronic form on the department's website. The first two volumes of a history of the department, covering the periods 1909–1946 and 1946–1968, have been published in both English and French. The list of sources at the end of this book includes the primary and secondary works consulted when preparing the commentaries on the documents, a few other standard histories, and several memoirs from the earlier half of the department's first century. No effort has been made to provide a comprehensive list, since the literature on Canadian foreign policy is both rich and very extensive. Interested readers may wish to consult the chapter on "Foreign Relations and Defence Policy" in *Canadian History, A Reader's Guide, Vol. 2: Confederation to the Present* (University of Toronto Press, 1994), edited by Doug Owram. Readers should also be aware that many memoirs and other books of great interest have been published in recent years by former members of the department.

In carrying out the initial research for this volume I had the able assistance of Mark Eaton, who discovered many of the documents printed in the last section. Greg Donaghy and Mary Halloran, who are currently working on the third volume of the departmental history, offered invaluable research tips for the Trudeau and Mulroney years. Drew Fagan, Graham Shantz, and Ariel Delouya supported the project from the beginning. Aline Gélneau typed the manuscript and Gail Kirkpatrick Devlin produced the list of persons. Both Aline and Gail have worked on the production of the regular *DCER* volumes for many years, and it is a pleasure to acknowledge the consistently high quality of their work. The book was designed by Gary Blakeley; Camilla Blakeley was responsible for editorial coordination. The Translation Bureau at Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada provided the French captions and ancillary texts. Special thanks are due to René and François Cadieux for permission to include extracts from their father's book, to *bout de papier* for permission to reprint articles, and to Laurel Pardy for providing a slightly revised version of her column on life as a diplomatic spouse.

Finally, I would like to pay tribute to all the other historians who have edited *DCER* volumes since 1967: R.A. MacKay, Lovell Clark, Alex Inglis, John Munro, David Murray, John Hilliker, Donald Page, Norman Hillmer, Hector Mackenzie, Greg Donaghy, Ted Kelly, Donald Barry, Michael Stevenson, and Kevin Spooner. Without their work, this volume would not exist.

Janice Cavell

A Note on the Documents

When a document has previously been published in a *DCER* volume, the volume number and document number are indicated.

Documents from Library and Archives Canada have been taken either from RG 25 (records of the Department of External Affairs) or from the personal papers of department members. The collection name and volume number are provided for each item; documents from RG 25 have file numbers as well.

Documents with only a file number, or no reference at all, are from the records held at Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada.

Le gouverneur général Earl Grey, qui a fortement appuyé la création du ministère des Affaires extérieures.

Governor General Earl Grey, who supported the creation of the Department of External Affairs.

SOURCE: WILLIAM JAMES TOPLEY.
BIBLIOTHEQUE ET ARCHIVES CANADA/
LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA, PA-042405





Première Partie

1909–1945

Part One

1909–1945

Edward le marquis de Minto
ambassadeur à John A. Macdonald
Par des correspondants
britanniques négociateurs du
Traité de Washington, 1871.

Edward the Marquis of Minto
Ambassador to John A.
Macdonald as one of the British
commissioners negotiating the
Treaty of Washington, 1871.

SOURCE: BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA/ LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
C-002422

Joseph Pope.

SOURCE: WILLIAM JAMES TOPLEY
BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES CANADA/
LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA, PA-110845



Section 1

La fondation du Ministère

Joseph Pope entame sa carrière à la fonction publique en 1878. Après avoir été nommé sous-secrétaire d'État en 1896, il est chargé d'une bonne partie de la correspondance portant sur les relations extérieures. Il joue également un rôle majeur dans la préparation de la cause du Canada concernant le dossier de la frontière avec l'Alaska. Ces expériences le rendent profondément conscient de la nécessité de créer un ministère dédié aux questions de politique étrangère. En mai 1907, il prépare le mémoire suivant à l'intention des Commissaires du Service civil. Pope – un impérialiste convaincu – ne voyait certainement pas la création d'un nouveau ministère comme un moyen d'accroître l'autonomie du Canada dans les affaires internationales. Au contraire, sa principale préoccupation était la recherche d'une plus grande efficacité.

Le mémoire de Pope n'impressionne guère les Commissaires du Service civil. Cependant, son idée ravit tant le Gouverneur général, Earl Grey, que l'ambassadeur britannique à Washington, James Bryce. Ce dernier, dont le travail englobe aussi de nombreux dossiers canado-américains, déclare « qu'on ne saurait exagérer les inconvénients du système actuel, ou plutôt de l'absence de système. » Grey se dit en accord avec cette déclaration dans une lettre adressée au secrétaire aux Colonies, Lord Elgin.

The Founding of the Department

Joseph Pope began his career in the civil service in 1878. After being appointed Under-Secretary of State in 1896, Pope was in charge of much official correspondence dealing with external relations. He also played an important role in preparing the Canadian case on the Alaska boundary question. These experiences made Pope keenly aware of the need for a department dedicated to matters of foreign policy. In May 1907 he prepared the following memorandum for the Civil Service Commissioners. Pope – a dedicated imperialist – certainly did not see the creation of a new department as a way to increase Canadian autonomy in international affairs. Instead, his main concern was greater efficiency.

Pope's memorandum made little impression on the Civil Service Commissioners. However, his idea was taken up with enthusiasm by both the Governor General, Earl Grey, and the British ambassador in Washington, James Bryce. Bryce, whose work included many Canadian-American issues, observed that "the inconveniences of the present system or rather want of a system can hardly be overstated." Grey expressed his agreement with this view in a letter to the Colonial Secretary, Lord Elgin.

Ottawa, May 25, 1907

... The preparation of dispatches is a technical acquirement, attained only after special study of the questions involved, and by assiduous practice in drafting. It may happen, it must sometimes happen, that the official to whom ... Imperial dispatches are referred (for it cannot be expected that a busy minister has time to attend to such matters personally, calling for much study and a large acquaintance with intricate details), while fully competent to deal with the merits of the question in its present aspect, is not familiar with the past history of the controversy or skilled in the framing of state papers. There are, moreover, certain questions which relate partly to one department and partly to another, so that it may not be easy to tell at first sight to whom a new dispatch should be referred. The earlier communication may have related to one department, and a later dispatch on the same subject to another. Neither department having any knowledge of what has been referred to the other, the consequence is that both departments, *quoad* this particular subject, are working more or less in the dark.

In the early years of Confederation, when these questions were few, the inconvenience of which I speak was not so greatly felt, as the Prime Minister of the day kept them pretty much in his own hands; but, with the growth and development of the Dominion, this is no longer possible.

The practical result of the system in vogue is that there does not exist today in any department a complete record of any of the correspondence to which I have alluded. It has been so scattered, and passed through so many hands, that there is no approach to continuity in any of the departmental files. Such knowledge concerning them as is available, is, for the most part, lodged in the memories of a few officials. I fear too that, in Downing Street, Canadian dispatches are noted for diversity rather than for elegance of style. As the Dominion grows, this state of things must always be getting worse. If some reform is not soon effected, it will be too late. Even now, I am of opinion that it would be an extremely difficult task to construct from our official files anything approaching to a complete record of any of the international questions in which Canada has been concerned during the past 50 years....

My suggestion is that all dispatches relating to external affairs should be referred by the Privy Council to one department, whose staff should contain men trained in the study of these questions and in the conduct of diplomatic correspondence. These officials should be in close touch with the other departments, from which they could draw all necessary information, the raw material, as it were, of their work; but the digesting of this information and its presentation in diplomatic form should rest with them, through, of course, the same channels as at present, for in this suggestion there is no thought of change in that regard. Every effort should be made to collect from the beginning all papers bearing on the questions I have indicated, from the office of the Governor General, the Privy Council office, the various departments and the Foreign and Colonial Offices. I wish most earnestly to impress upon all concerned that, if this work is not soon systematically begun, it will be too late. The few men throughout the service conversant with these questions are growing old, and must soon disappear. So far as I know, they will leave no successors. Much of the early history of these subjects, so far as Canadian records are concerned, will thus be lost.

I recommend that a small staff of young men, well educated and carefully selected, be attached to the department whose creation I have advocated, and that they be specially trained in the knowledge and treatment of these subjects. In this way we shall acquire an organized method of dealing with international questions which at present we wholly lack.

Joseph Pope

Ottawa, March 23, 1908

Lord Grey
(Gouverneur général) à
Lord Elgin (secrétaire aux
Colonies)

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, DOCUMENTS DE LORD GREY,
VOLUME 14, NO 181

Lord Grey
(Governor General) to
Lord Elgin (Colonial
Secretary)

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
GREY PAPERS, VOLUME 14, NO. 181

My Dear Elgin,

... There is no Department, no official through whose hands all matters dealing with external affairs must go. Consequently there is no record, no continuity, no method, no consistency.... We have only three men in the Government Service who have any knowledge of details connected with Canada's foreign relations. One drinks at times, the other has a difficulty in expressing his thoughts, and conversation with him is as difficult as it is to extract an extra tight cork, and the third is the Under Secretary of State, Pope – a really first class official. Not a day should be lost in putting him in charge of a Department of External Affairs under Sir Wilfrid Laurier, and in a short time he would be able to train one or two young men who would take up his work after he has gone. He would have the papers on every question in good shape. Sir W. Laurier's work would be ever so much facilitated, and Canada would be prompt and satisfactory to deal with, instead of the swollen impossible cork, the extraction of which almost bursts a bloodvessel.

Yours ever,
G.

Section 2

Les locaux à bureau et les passeports

Le ministère des Affaires extérieures est créé le 1er juin 1909, et Pope en est le premier sous-secrétaire. D'abord installés au-dessus de l'échoppe d'un barbier à l'angle des rues Bank et Queen, les bureaux du Ministère déménagent à l'Édifice de l'Est, sur la Colline du Parlement, en 1914. Pope joue un rôle effacé dans la formulation des politiques, étant plutôt occupé à remédier au manque d'espace pour les bureaux, à gérer l'augmentation constante des demandes de passeport et à régler une foule d'autres problèmes qui ressemblent étrangement à ceux avec lesquels le Ministère se débat encore aujourd'hui.

Office Space and Passports

The Department of External Affairs was established on June 1, 1909. Pope was the first Under-Secretary. The department's offices, initially located over a barber shop at the corner of Bank and Queen Streets, were moved to the East Block of the Parliament Buildings in 1914. Pope played little role in the formulation of policy, dealing instead with inadequate office space, a growing number of passport applications, and a host of other problems uncannily similar to those which still trouble the department today.

L'administration centrale du
Ministère a occupé l'édifice de
l'Est du Parlement de 1914 à
1973.

The East Block of the Parliament
Buildings served as the
department's headquarters from
1914 until 1973.

SOURCE: BLAKELEY WORDS+PICTURES



Ottawa, December 24, 1918

Dear Mr. Rowell,

Although most unwilling to trespass upon your time with departmental matters which could possibly be postponed, I feel it incumbent upon me to draw your attention, as Acting Minister, to the great and growing inconvenience this Department is being subjected to owing to lack of office space. This has been increasingly marked by reason of delays which are taking place in the issue of passports, and the consequent dissatisfaction existing among Members of Parliament and others. While in the majority of cases their dissatisfaction is unreasonable, there is just enough ground for their complaints to lend colour to the criticism which reaches me from time to time. The average Member of Parliament does not know, and probably is not interested to know, that whereas not a great while ago the Department issued about forty passports a month, we are now dealing with nearly three thousand applications in the same space of time, or more than seventy times the number for which our arrangements were originally adapted. My passport office is away from the Department proper, lodged in the attic at some distance from my office and that of Mr. Walker, and highly inconvenient of access to the general public who have business there. It would greatly promote the expeditious issue of passports and public convenience if the staff could be brought together and accommodated with adjoining rooms on the second floor, in direct communication with the Under-Secretary and the Assistant Under-Secretary. There are a number of rooms along the corridor, opposite the office of the Solicitor General, which adjoin my Department and which should be attached to the Department of External Affairs. Last Winter they were occupied by Victory Loan young ladies of very youthful appearance, who, it strikes me, might just as well do their work anywhere else. If this Department is going to continue, it must eventually possess these rooms, for no expansion is possible on the other side, where we abut on the offices of the Governor General, and they in turn touch the Privy Council Office.

As I think I verbally explained to you, no provision for its *habitat* was made for this Department on its establishment, and its accommodation has always been markedly casual and inadequate. This inadequacy has recently been tensified [sic] by the fact of its having become the sole Department of the Prime Minister, yet nothing is being done to provide for this increased importance. There are four Departments – I may call them the ceremonial Departments, – which stand in an intimate relation towards each other and should be closely associated, that of the Governor General, the Privy Council, the External Affairs (presided over by the Prime Minister) and the Secretary of State of Canada. These Departments should always be grouped together. As my Department now stands, I have not room enough to conduct public business as it should be carried on, and the Parliamentary Under-Secretary has to seek quarters elsewhere, besides which, nine officials on the pay roll of this Department form the staff of the Prime Minister. In the event of changes, which are always possible, involving the return of these clerks or some of them, I have actually no place for a single one within the limits assigned to me. I feel this is not as it should be, and that it is my duty from time to time to call the attention of the Government to a condition of things which seriously hampers the present usefulness of the Department of External Affairs, and threatens even greater disabilities in the future...

Yours very truly,
Joseph Pope

Section 3

Le Canada et la Première Guerre mondiale

Le gouvernement du Canada ne joue aucun rôle dans la décision prise par la Grande-Bretagne d'entrer en guerre en 1914. Néanmoins, le prince Arthur, fils de la reine Victoria et duc de Connaught, qui était alors gouverneur général, est en mesure de confirmer à son neveu le roi George V que « du Pacifique à l'Atlantique, le Canada est uni dans sa détermination à défendre l'honneur et la tradition de notre Empire ». Ottawa offre promptement d'envoyer des troupes pour contribuer à l'effort de guerre. Le personnel des Affaires extérieures s'habitue alors rapidement à travailler de longues heures et à gérer des problèmes nouveaux et complexes.

Le ministère des Affaires extérieures est d'abord placé sous l'autorité du secrétaire d'État. En 1912 cependant, le nouveau premier ministre, Robert Borden, décide d'exercer lui-même la fonction de ministre des Affaires extérieures. Loring Christie se joint au Ministère en 1913, et devient rapidement le plus proche conseiller de Borden en ce qui concerne les relations avec le gouvernement impérial. Dès 1916, Borden et Christie sont déterminés à renforcer l'influence du Canada à Londres, en raison des sacrifices faits par les troupes canadiennes. Dans ses rapports sur les voyages qu'il effectue à Londres en avril 1917 et juin 1918, Borden se dit fier des réalisations canadiennes et déclare qu'il n'entendait pas « mâcher ses mots » dans ses discussions avec les politiciens britanniques.

Canada and the First World War

The Canadian government played no role in Britain's decision to go to war in 1914. Nevertheless, the Governor General, Queen Victoria's son Prince Arthur, Duke of Connaught, was able to assure his nephew King George V that "Canada stands united from the Pacific to the Atlantic in her determination to uphold the honour and tradition of our Empire." Ottawa promptly offered to provide troops for the war effort. External Affairs staff soon became accustomed to working long hours and to dealing with new and complex problems.

The Department of External Affairs was initially placed under the authority of the Secretary of State. However, in 1912 the new Prime Minister, Robert Borden, decided to act as his own foreign minister. Loring Christie joined External Affairs in 1913, and he quickly became Borden's most trusted adviser on relations with the imperial government. By 1916 Borden and Christie were intent on gaining a greater voice for Canada in London in exchange for the sacrifices made by Canadian troops. Borden's reports on his trips to London in April 1917 and June 1918 reveal his pride in Canadian achievements and his determination not to "mince matters" in his discussions with British politicians.

Le Premier ministre Robert
Borden en compagnie de
Winston Churchill à Londres,
1912.

Prime Minister Robert Borden
with Winston Churchill in
London, 1912.

SOURCE: BIBLIOTHEQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA / LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
C 002082



Sir George et Lady Perley
visitant un hôpital, 1917.

Sir George and Lady Perley
visiting a hospital, 1917.

SOURCE: BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA / LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
PA-022671



Telegram

Ottawa, August 4, 1914

Please communicate following to War Office: Great exhibition of genuine patriotism here.

When inevitable fact transpires that considerable period of training will be necessary before Canadian troops will be fit for European war, this ardour is bound to be dampened somewhat.

In order to minimize this, I would suggest that any proposal from you should be accompanied by the assurance that Canadian troops will go to the front as soon as they have reached sufficient standard of training.

Arthur

Telegram

London, August 8, 1914

Londres) au Premier
ministre Robert Borden

SOURCE: VOLUME 1, DOCUMENT 58

Had interview this morning with Kitchener who wishes personally and on behalf of War Office express his very grateful and sincere thanks for Canada's splendid offer troops.

George Perley (Acting
High Commissioner,
London) to Prime
Minister Robert Borden

SOURCE: VOLUME 1, DOCUMENT 58

Hopes you can send him full division of twenty to twenty five thousand.

Says he can use all you think best to send. His appointment as Minister War has given highest satisfaction.

Perley

Telegram

London, April 23, 1917

Robert Borden
George Foster

SOURCE: VOLUME 1, DOCUMENT 480

Robert Borden
to George Foster

SOURCE: VOLUME 1, DOCUMENT 480

[For] Foster. Arriving in London on the afternoon of February 22nd, I was immediately called into consultation with the British Government respecting important matters including certain questions connected with the submarine campaign and from that day to the present my colleagues and I have been most actively and insistently engaged in the duties for which we crossed the Atlantic. On account of the delay in arrival of the representatives from the other Dominions, we did not begin the formal meetings of the War Conference as soon as anticipated but in the meantime we attended the War Cabinet, took up important questions with various departments of the British Government and visited the troops in France and at Shorncliffe, as well as many hospitals. Matters of importance in connection with the Canadian Expeditionary Force were also necessarily discussed with Sir George Perley during this period which was also utilized in examining at the offices of the War Cabinet documents and reports connected with the subjects which were to come under consideration. I have visited all the important camps in England except that at Hastings which I hope to see before my return and everywhere I found the troops in excellent physical condition undergoing efficient training and in fine spirit. The great achievement of Canadians in capturing Vimy Ridge which had been unsuccessfully attacked on several occasions has aroused a universal tribute of admiration not only in the United Kingdom but in France and Italy. The conditions in all hospitals which I visited were excellent and I have not heard a single complaint from any of the wounded or convalescent. The deliberations of the Imperial War Cabinet are of course secret but I may say that we have had continually under consideration matters of vital importance touching the prosecution of the war, the co-operation of the allied nations therein, the effect necessary to achieve victory, the terms upon which peace may be made and exceedingly important questions as to reconstruction after the war including the conversation, development and utilization of the natural resources of the Empire and the safeguards to be adopted against the economic war which Germany intends to wage after the cessation of hostilities. Questions which have arisen with neutral nations by reason of the submarine campaign and otherwise additional precautions rendered necessary by submarine activities, the provision of tonnage by construction and purchase and necessary restrictions of imports to provide for requisite food supply of the United Kingdom and allied nations have also been under discussion. In fact almost every question connected with the prosecution of the war has been brought under consideration at one or other of the vari-



Le premier ministre Robert Borden (assis, quatrième à partir de la gauche) à la Conférence impériale de la guerre, Londres, 1917.

Robert Borden (seated fourth from left) at the Imperial War Conference in London, 1917.

SOURCE: BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES CANADA / LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA, C-000241

ous meetings and we have been placed in possession of the confidential and secret reports of the Imperial General Staff and of the Commanders-in-Chief in the various theatres of operations as well as the naval advisers of the Admiralty. Latterly, important questions have been assigned to sub-committees of the Cabinet on each of which Canada is represented. The consideration of these questions involves the examination of an enormous mass of reports and documents as they are often of a complex difficult character and thus have been studied by departmental committees in whose reports much important and valuable information is to be found. Military and naval reports from various theatres of operations and telegrams to the Foreign Office from all parts of the world as to matters of international concern run into hundreds each day. These are all collected in the office of the War Cabinet. Besides the work of the Imperial War Cabinet the Canadian Ministers have been in attendance in the Imperial War Conference which meets on alternate days and which has under consideration questions of the highest importance touching the relations and co-operation of the Mother Country and the various Dominions in the prosecution of the war and during the period of reconstruction. Among such questions are the constitutional development of the Empire, the arrangement for common defence, co-operation in facilities of transportation and communication, suitable arrangements for care of the graves of those who have fallen in the Empire's defence, co-operation as to necessary restriction of export to enemy countries, conservation and utilization of natural resources for national purposes, new considerations with regard to naturalization, migration within the Empire and numerous other matters of common concern....

Borden

London, June 15, 1918

Ni
Robert Borden

SOURCE - VOLUME 1, DOCUMENT 341

We arrived in London at three o'clock on Saturday the 8th instant and were met by Kemp and Perley and by representatives of the British Government. That evening I had a long talk with Kemp as to the Overseas Force and I realise more fully than before the great difficulties with which he has contended and the really fine results which he has accomplished.

SOURCE - VOLUME 1, DOCUMENT 341

Sir Clifford Sifton, who called on me a few days afterwards, and who was much concerned as to the conditions of the organisation here, told me that Kemp has managed wonderfully well and that his administration has been good.

On Sunday we took up work of immediate urgency; and in the afternoon I attended a Memorial Service at St. Columba (Church of Scotland). There was a very representative gathering and about two hundred Canadian soldiers were present whom I inspected after the service.

On Monday I had an interview with Long as to the arrangements for the Conference and, in the afternoon, a long interview with Lloyd George as to the military situation and the work of the Cabinet. On that and other days I also discussed the military situation with General Smuts.

We attended the first meeting of the Cabinet on Tuesday and the Prime Minister made a very important and impressive statement which did not minimize the difficulties and even the danger of the present situation. By reason of information which reached me from various sources I thought it desirable to send for General Currie who came to town on Wednesday and with whom I discussed the campaign of last year, and especially the German offensive during the past three months. The report which he gave me was very depressing and I am convinced that the present situation is due to lack of organization, lack of system, lack of preparation, lack of foresight and incompetent leadership. If the British Army Corps had made the same preparation to meet the German offensive as did General Currie and the officers and men of the Canadian Forces, the German offensive could not possibly have succeeded as it did. Their losses would have been so appalling that they would have been obliged to stop. The British offensive of last year was obviously a mistake. Robertson and Haig urged it against the protests of the Cabinet. I have read the records of the Cabinet meeting of 21st June, 1917, at which Lloyd George examined with great ability the reasons pro and con and stated the opinion of the Cabinet that no such offensive should be undertaken. He said, however, that they must be guided by their military advisers and would defer to them if, after hearing all that was urged, they still thought the offensive should be undertaken.

It will be remembered that the Canadians took Passchendaele at a cost of 16,000 men. At the end of the offensive Currie tells me, and I believe he is right, that it had no useful result, as the British Army immediately went on the defensive and the campaign ceased for the year. No advantage in position was gained and the effort was simply wasted.

Currie reports that the conditions in front of Passchendaele, when the Canadian Corps were ordered to take it, were simply indescribable. I cannot enter into the particulars which I placed before the War Cabinet on Thursday, but when you hear them you will realize that we are being defeated by our own methods.

The Canadian Army Corps is admittedly the most formidable striking force in the allied armies. Probably it is the best organized and most effective unit of its size in the world today. It has come on wonderfully since last year and this is due not only to the courage, resourcefulness and intelligence of the men, but to the splendid and unremitting work of the officers, and to Currie's great ability. I believe he is the ablest Corps Commander in the British Forces; more than that I believe he is at least as capable as any Army Commander among them....

It appears that the younger members on Haig's staff recommended, in November last, that ten Corps Commanders should be dispensed with and replaced. They were kept on during the winter and about the time the offensive began eight of them were relieved. The British higher command believed that the Germans would not undertake an offensive. Three days before it began the Chief Intelligence Officer gave the Canadian Corps a tip that they need not expect an offensive from the Germans. Currie told me that the reports of the Chief Intelligence Officer at British Headquarters were so useless and misleading that when he recognized the signature he always tore them up and threw them into the waste-paper basket without reading them.

Of course there are many British Divisions well organized, highly trained and competently led, but there are enough otherwise to enable the Germans to strike, and the Germans always know just where to strike.

At Passchendaele last autumn, Currie refused to fight under Gough as he considered him incompetent.

I went into all these and many other matters on Thursday in the War Cabinet and although I spoke with restraint I did not mince matters. Apparently I gave no offence as Lloyd George told me it was a memorable speech and gave me his congratulations, as did Walter Long and other Ministers. All the representatives of the Overseas Dominions who were present expressed themselves, either openly or privately, as grateful for the service that I had done in taking up the matter and speaking plainly....

One could almost weep over the inability of the War Office and even of the Admiralty to utilize the brains of a nation at a time when brains are most needed. At the War Office they restricted brilliant men who enlisted in the new Army to the rank of Brigadier General in order that professional soldiers might not have their careers interfered with. I attacked this in the Cabinet on Thursday and said that it amounted to scrapping the brains of the nation at a time when they were most needed....

Section 4

La Conférence de paix de Paris

Malgré la ferme détermination de Borden à faire en sorte que le Canada soit représenté à la Conférence de paix, le pays ne possède pas encore une expérience suffisante des affaires internationales pour que sa délégation ait une influence majeure sur les résultats des pourparlers. Néanmoins, les rapports envoyés à Ottawa depuis Paris s'avèrent une relation intéressante de ce grand événement historique et de la première véritable incursion du Canada dans le vaste monde de la diplomatie.

The Paris Peace Conference

Despite Borden's firm determination that Canada should be represented at the Peace Conference, the country did not yet possess enough experience of international affairs for its delegation to have any significant impact on the outcome. Nevertheless, the reports sent back to Ottawa from Paris are an interesting record of this key historical event and of Canada's first real step into the wider world of diplomacy.

Paris, January 15, 1919

SOURCE : VOLUME 2, ANNEXE

SOURCE : VOLUME 2, ANNEX

1. This memorandum covers the period from arrival in Paris on the evening of Saturday 11th January to the afternoon of Wednesday the 15th January.
2. Sir Robert Borden was accompanied to France by Mr. Christie, Colonel Biggar, Mr. Dafoe, Major Asselin and Mr. Boyce....
4. On Sunday [January 12] there was an informal conference between representatives of the five Great Powers. Great Britain, France and Italy were represented by their respective Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers or a representative of the Foreign Office; the United States was represented by the President and by the Secretary of State; Japan was represented by the Japanese Ambassador and another delegate. This meeting was held for the purpose of considering proposals with respect to procedure, representation and subjects to be discussed and determined at the approaching Peace Conference. A discussion as to the terms upon which the Armistice should be extended was brought forward and consumed a good deal of time but was eventually referred to the Supreme Allied Council at Versailles. The question of representation was discussed at some length and strong objection was taken on behalf of the United States to the proposed representation of the British Dominions. President Wilson took a somewhat decided stand but spoke with every respect for the Dominions and with much appreciation of their war effort. His objection was based on the view that if Canada and the other Dominions had the same representation as Belgium and the other small Allied nations they would stand in a much better position than Belgium as they would be backed by the British Delegation of five, the most powerful in the Conference as he expressed it. Moreover the result would be to give the British Empire five chief delegates entitled to sit at every meeting of the Conference and twelve delegates from the Dominions, making a representation of seventeen in all. President Wilson was, however, willing to agree that each of the British Dominions should be entitled to one representative whose status should be the same as that of the representatives of Belgium. Secretary Lansing was somewhat arrogant not to say offensive and desired to know why Canada should be concerned in the settlement of European affairs. Mr. Lloyd George replied that they believed themselves to have that right because some hundreds of thousands from the Dominions had died for the vindication of public right in Europe and that Canada as well as Australia had lost more men than the United States in this war. Clemenceau was very sympathetic with the attitude of the Dominions. Lloyd George declined to withdraw his proposal for representation of the Dominions and announced that he would consult the Dominion Ministers on the following day.
5. The foregoing incidents were reported to Sir Robert Borden on Sunday evening and he called a meeting of the Dominion Ministers at 10:15 preparatory to a meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet which was fixed for eleven on Monday morning. At this meeting of the Dominion Ministers it was agreed that they should stand together and insist upon representation equal to that of the smaller Allied nations. It was considered that this was a real test of their status as autonomous nations of the British Commonwealth.
6. At 11 o'clock [January 13] such members of the Imperial War Cabinet as were present in Paris assembled: Mr. Lloyd George, Mr. Balfour, Mr. Bonar Law, Mr. Montagu and the



La Conférence de paix de Paris,
1919.

The Paris Peace Conference,
1919.

SOURCE BIBLIOTHEQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA / LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA
C 000242

Prime Ministers of the Dominions together with Sir Joseph Cook and General Smuts. Mr. Lloyd George reported in detail the discussion at Sunday's Conference of the Allied Powers. Sir Robert Borden took strong ground in maintaining that the decision of the Imperial War Cabinet should be carried out. He emphasized the strong insistence of public opinion in Canada upon this recognition as the very lowest that could be expected; and he declared himself unable to give any satisfactory explanation to the Canadian people if Canada should be put on a lower level in point of representation than Belgium or Serbia. He was at first supported by the other Prime Ministers but eventually they yielded ground with the net result that a decision was noted to the effect that the Dominions would each accept one representative subject to further arrangements as to the establishment of a panel from which the five delegates representing the British Empire should be selected. Sir Robert Borden did not conceal his belief that this arrangement would have serious consequences to Canada and he emphasized this view in a subsequent conference with Mr. Lloyd George at luncheon.

7. A further conference of the five Great Allied Powers was held on Monday afternoon at which the discussion on this subject was resumed. Mr. Lloyd George renewed his argument on behalf of the Dominions and emphasized their extreme disappointment at the proposals which had been put forward on Sunday. He quoted certain remarks made by Sir Robert Borden at the meeting of the Imperial War Cabinet. In the end President Wilson proposed that Canada, Australia and South Africa should each have two representatives and that New Zealand should have one. This proposal was accepted. Newfoundland is not to have any special representative but its Prime Minister may be included in the panel with the other Dominion Prime Ministers.
8. On Monday evening Mr. Dafoe drew up a despatch which was cabled to Canada on Tuesday morning and which embodied the arrangement above set forth. It is anticipated that at least one and sometimes two or three Dominion Prime Ministers will be members of the Delegation representing the Empire at all meetings of the Peace Conference. Sir Robert Borden would prefer that not more than two or at the outside three British Ministers should be named delegates upon the total representation of five, leaving the remaining two or three delegates as the case may be to be selected from the panel. This question has not yet been finally determined.
9. Mr. Lloyd George fought strongly for adequate representation of the Dominions and his vigorous efforts to that end are thoroughly appreciated....

Paris, February 22, 1919

SOURCE : VOLUME 2, ANNEXE

1. This memorandum covers the period from Thursday afternoon, 13th February, to Saturday morning, the 22nd February....

SOURCE: VOLUME 2, ANNEX

19. The Naval and Military Authorities are strongly of opinion that the present disposition of the Germans is to accept whatever terms may be imposed unless, of course, those terms are so oppressive as to drive them absolutely to desperation, in which case they may possibly throw up their hands, decline to sign peace on the terms proposed, and inform the Allies that they are at liberty to occupy Germany and to take such other steps as they may deem proper. On the one hand there is the danger that Germany may become reorganized so quickly as to create a menace in the early future, especially if her government should establish a *rapprochement* with a new and stable democratic government in Russia. On the other hand there is the danger that Germany may become so disorganized as to yield to the influence of Bolshevism and imperil the future of the other European Nations and possibly of the world.
20. The French and Italians are very insistent in maintaining territorial claims which will possibly create difficulty. Friction may also develop with respect to the claims for an enormous indemnity upon which a strong difference of opinion is likely to arise.

Paris, May 10, 1919

SOURCE : VOLUME 2, ANNEXE

SOURCE : VOLUME 2, ANNEXE

1. This memorandum covers the period from Saturday evening, May 3rd, to Saturday evening, May 10th.
2. The early part of the present week was taken up with the final consideration and revision of the Treaty of Peace. On Sunday [May 4] it was understood that there would be a Plenary Conference on Wednesday, [May 7] and that the Treaty would be delivered to the Germans on Thursday. It appears, however, that on Monday morning the Germans announced their intended departure as they had been waiting at Versailles for more than a week. Accordingly matters were hastened forward as the situation was one of great urgency. A meeting of the British Delegations was held on Monday afternoon at six o'clock and lasted until eight. Mr. Lloyd George attended this meeting for the first time in many weeks and gave to us a resumé of the Treaty as it would be presented. He announced that a Plenary Conference to consider the Treaty as a whole would be held on Tuesday afternoon at three o'clock, and that the Treaty would be presented to the Germans on Wednesday afternoon at three o'clock in the Palais Trianon at Versailles....
5. The scene at Versailles when the Treaty of Peace was presented to the German Plenipotentiaries was very impressive.... The impression produced by the speech of Count Brockdorff-Rantzau was very unfortunate, both from the German standpoint and also from the standpoint of the Allied nations, as it indicates that any proposals put forward by the Germans for a modification of the Peace Terms will probably be couched in such *maladroit* terms and presented in so offensive a manner as to render their consideration almost impossible. Sir Robert Borden is convinced, however, that the seeming impertinence of Count Brockdorff-Rantzau in remaining seated during the delivery of his speech, was due to his physical condition, as he is on the verge of nervous collapse and he almost fainted during a conference with respect to the arrangements for Wednesday. If he had made an apology or explanation of this character he would have aroused sympathy instead of a strong antagonism which was awakened by the course he pursued. At the conclusion of the Conference, President Wilson said to Bonar Law, "I see that today's proceedings have produced upon you the same effect as upon me." Bonar Law asked him why, and the President said: – "I see that your face is flushed, and the blood went to my head more than once during that speech."
6. There is a perceptible air of relief among the delegates and the chief advisers and experts, upon whom the pace has been killing during the past four or five weeks....

Section 5

La Société des Nations

The League of Nations

[Geneva,] November 20, 1920

Dear Mr. Meighen,

I propose to send you a weekly letter giving a brief outline of the work and atmosphere of the First Assembly of the League of Nations.

The Canadian delegation had a most pleasant trip from Quebec to Liverpool and arrived in London on the afternoon of Wednesday the 10th, fortunately in time to be present at and participate in the ceremony of the burial of the Unknown Warrior in Westminster Abbey on the anniversary of the Armistice. It was an occasion never to be forgotten and we were fortunate, as I said, in being in London for it. The day was beautiful and the crowds in attendance along the route of the procession and in Whitehall where the cenotaph had been erected were immense. The occasion was remarkable for the extreme simplicity of the proceedings and the deep and profound sympathy manifested by the enormous number of people who participated.

The King himself, with uncovered head, awaited the body of the unknown soldier at the foot of the cenotaph and deposited his wreath thereat, followed by Mr. Lloyd George and the Overseas Dominions in their order, each of which placed an appropriate wreath. During the two minutes when the vast crowd with uncovered heads observed the appointed silence, one could have closed his eyes and believed that he was entirely alone. The march from the cenotaph to and into the Abbey was attended with the same spirit of sympathy and silence and deep feeling. Altogether it was a most remarkable tribute to the sacrifices of the war, to the heroism of the common soldier and to the universal spirit of recognition which seemed to pervade all classes. For several days afterwards the pilgrimage to and past the cenotaph and to Westminster Abbey continued with the participation of people from all parts of the United Kingdom who came to mark their homage and recognition of the sacrifices made on their behalf.

On Friday morning the Canadian delegation left London in company with the other delegates from Great Britain and the Overseas Dominions and Dependencies and arrived in Geneva at 11 o'clock Saturday morning. Here we were greeted with unusually beautiful weather for the season of the year, bright and wonderfully mild. The delegation is fortunately situated in the Hotel de l'Écu, a genuine Swiss hotel, where the fare is homelike and the quiet and care everything that could be desired. We were afraid at first that our exclusion from the Hotel Beau Rivage where the other representatives of the British Empire are accommodated would be to our disadvantage, but it does not appear in the working out any serious hindrance, and from our hotel we are closer to the Halle in which the Assembly meetings are held and at the same time within a few minutes of those hotels in which other delegates are quartered and also the seat of the League itself.

The Government of the City and Canton of Geneva, as also of Switzerland, have spared no effort in the welcome and attention which they have given to the members of the Assembly. We found the Secretariat exceedingly well housed in the building purchased for the uses of the League and pretty well in order so far as preparations for the work was concerned. The Halle de la Reformation in which the Assembly meetings take place has been specially fitted for the occasion by the Swiss Government and is well arranged for such purpose, with ample accommodation for the press and public as well. The press is extremely well represented by



Assemblée générale de la
Société des Nations, 1926.

General Assembly of the League
of Nations, 1926.

SOURCE: YORK UNIVERSITY ARCHIVES

correspondents from all the different countries especially from the United States who have a corps of 20. The telegraph and postal facilities are excellent. One notes, however, that up to the present time the Canadian press have failed to put in an appearance. Correspondence has taken place with London and we have been promised correspondence and communications by representatives of the Canadian press in London.

The first meeting of the League took place on Monday last, November 15th, and was chiefly devoted to addresses by the acting President, M. Paul Hymans, who is the President of the Council of the League of Nations, and the President of the Swiss Federation, which addresses you will find in the detailed reports which I am enclosing. They were on the whole felicitous and encouraging. After that the Assembly proceeded to the election of a permanent President for its Session. A general consensus of opinion had been reached by which the Swiss who by virtue of the Assembly being held in their country would naturally have received the presidency, very graciously gave up that right in favour of Belgium, which had greatly desired to have the seat of the League at Brussels. The nomination of M. Hymans, representative of Belgium, by the Swiss delegation was very satisfactory to Belgium as a whole and was one of the many instances of courtesy and forbearance which have so far marked the workings of the Assembly.

The gathering itself was, as you may well imagine, a most impressive one. Forty-one nations in all were represented and the character and quality of the delegations seems to be of the best and wholly representative of the countries from which they come. On the whole it is a most remarkable Assembly of prominent members of the majority of the world's nations and the character and quality is heightened by the evident spirit of sympathy with the purposes of the League and an urgent desire to make the League everything that was contemplated in the Covenant and by the Peace Treaty in its establishment....

Whilst for purposes well known the different delegations within the British Empire meet for comparison of notes and for mutual conference, these meetings are very quietly carried out, and as the seating in the Halle d'Assemblée is arranged alphabetically, the different members of the Empire are separated one from the other so that there is no appearance of a solid block. Whilst we hope to get together on essential matters, there is no disposition to curtail the independent expression of opinion in respect to the Overseas Dominions....

Section 6

Autonomie au sein de l'Empire britannique

Les libéraux de William Lyon Mackenzie King sont portés au pouvoir lors des élections de décembre 1921. Un des premières victoires de King sur la voie d'une plus grande autonomie au sein de l'Empire est sa détermination à faire en sorte qu'un représentant canadien, et non l'ambassadeur de Grande-Bretagne à Washington, signe la Convention pour la conservation des pêcheries de flétan du Pacifique Nord (mieux connu sous le nom de Convention sur le flétan). Ernest Lapointe signe cet instrument au nom du Canada le 2 mars 1923.

Il est évident que Pope va bientôt prendre sa retraite, pour des raisons de santé. À la recherche d'un nouveau sous-secrétaire, King est profondément impressionné par le professeur Oscar Douglas Skelton, de l'Université Queen's. Skelton est fermement opposé à l'idée d'une politique étrangère commune pour les diverses nations de l'Empire britannique. King invite Skelton à se joindre à la délégation canadienne participant à la Conférence impériale de 1923, à Londres. King adopte les idées de Skelton, à la grande joie de ce dernier, et à la consternation des politiciens britanniques. Mais contrairement à Skelton, King a cependant toujours été convaincu que le lien avec la Grande-Bretagne était essentiel à la sécurité du Canada.

Autonomy within the British Empire

William Lyon Mackenzie King's Liberals came to power in the December 1921 federal election. One of King's first triumphs in achieving greater autonomy within the Empire was his insistence that a Canadian representative, not the British ambassador in Washington, should sign the Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean (more commonly known as the Halibut Treaty). Ernest Lapointe signed for Canada on March 2, 1923.

It was evident that Pope would soon retire due to poor health. Searching for a new Under-Secretary, King was deeply impressed by Professor Oscar Douglas Skelton of Queen's University. Skelton was firmly opposed to the idea of a common foreign policy for the various nations within the British Empire. King invited Skelton to join the Canadian delegation to the 1923 Imperial Conference in London. To Skelton's great delight and the dismay of British politicians, King adopted Skelton's ideas. However, King always remained convinced that the British connection was essential to Canada's security.

Le Premier ministre William
Lyon Mackenzie King

Prime Minister William Lyon
Mackenzie King



Telegram. Very Urgent

Ottawa, February 28, 1923

Mr. Byng of Vimy
Gouverneur général au

SOURCE : VOLUME 3, DOCUMENT 627

Halibut Treaty: The Full Powers issued to Honourable Ernest Lapointe in connection with proposed convention with United States for protection of Pacific Halibut Treaty have been duly received and transmitted to Mr. Lapointe, who is at present on his way to Washington.

My Ministers are of opinion that, as respects Canada, signature of the Treaty by Mr. Lapointe alone should be sufficient. They proceeded on this assumption in asking for full powers for Mr. Lapointe. Having so notified the British Ambassador at Washington, it was with some surprise that an intimation was received from Sir Auckland Geddes to the effect that he had been instructed by His Majesty's Government to sign the Treaty in association with Mr. Lapointe. Evidently it has been assumed by His Majesty's Government that such was the wish of the Canadian Government. The view of my Ministers, however, is that the Treaty being one of concern solely to Canada and the United States, and not affecting in any particular any imperial interest, the signature of the Canadian Minister should be sufficient, and they would respectfully request that His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington be instructed accordingly....

Byng of Vimy

Monday, October 9 [1923]

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, DOCUMENTS D'O.D. SKELTON,
VOLUME 11

O.D. Skelton Diary

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
SKELTON PAPERS, VOLUME 11

A notable day in the history of Canadian self-government and incidentally in my own. Mr. King returned to town rather late; I had my screed on Foreign Affairs all prepared, so after realizing [the] magnitude of job before him and availability of my MS. he decides to read the latter verbatim, adding a page of his own re Near East and omitting my references to Continental Europe. In full conference, after introduction by Baldwin, Mr. King proceeds to read my review ... [and he] end[s] with repeated assertion, must be separate foreign policy for each government, as much as separate domestic policy, under its own control; where common interests, cooperate to carry them out, after full consultation and explicit agreement, no blank cheques to British Foreign Office. Faces of British ministers a study as these heresies calmly and at length proclaimed in Downing Street itself; Curzon red-faced and shifting in seat, Baldwin screwing up eye and scribbling on pad; Amery hurt, Salisbury surprised, Devonshire asleep....

October 8, 1923

... In one sense we are prepared to agree that the policy of Great Britain is the policy of the British Empire, but what we want to know is how far the obligations arising out of that policy are material and how far they extend in reference to ourselves.... The British Empire ... is not a single community, homogeneous, concentrated, with uniform neighbours, problems, needs. It is a league of peoples plus an Empire; it covers all the Seven Seas; it includes communities of every conceivable stage of civilisation, every variety of resources, every range of neighbours, every combination of problems and interests. The more advanced of these communities have developed rapidly in numbers and trade and international intercourse; they have developed relations with other countries varying with their situation; they have developed distinct problems in external as well as in home affairs, a distinct national consciousness, distinct Parliaments and Governments to control their affairs. Some problems are distinct and primarily concern only one or a group of these Empire States; some are of common interest or common menace, and concern the whole Empire and it alone, some are of still wider implications and concern all or a great region of the world, whether organised in permanent Leagues of Nations or in temporary conferences, or not organised at all.

Given then these conditions – given wide scattered communities within the British Empire growing steadily in numbers, in intercourse with the world, and in the habit of self-government; given the growth of problems and difficulties especially with neighbouring countries; given the diversity of conditions and of interest and of knowledge which makes these problems in many cases distinct in each country – it is inevitable that each of these communities should seek to control those foreign affairs which concern it primarily....

A further questionable feature of the Empire one-foreign-policy theory is that it ignores the necessity for associating the Parliaments and peoples in the decision of foreign policy. Granted that a measure of secrecy is essential in the course of negotiations, granted that the conduct of affairs must rest largely with an experienced and specialised executive department, still it is true that it is not desirable for any Dominion or for the Empire that vital issues of foreign policy should be determined decisively in a small executive or Conference group. The problem of foreign policy is not settled when provision is made for bringing Prime Ministers together. Each Prime Minister must on important issues secure the backing of his Parliament and his people.



La délégation du Canada à la Conférence impériale de 1926 tenue à Londres. De gauche à droite : le ministre de la Justice Ernest Lapointe, le premier ministre et secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures W.L. Mackenzie King, l'industriel Vincent Massey et le haut-commissaire au Royaume-Uni Peter Larkin.

The Canadian delegation to the 1926 Imperial Conference in London. Left to right: Minister of Justice Ernest Lapointe, Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs W. L. Mackenzie King, industrialist Vincent Massey, and Peter Larkin, High Commissioner to the United Kingdom.

SOURCE: BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA/LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
C-001690

Section 7

Un premier différend sur la souveraineté dans l'Arctique

Les fonctionnaires canadiens soupçonnent, avec raison, que les explorateurs américains Donald MacMillan et Richard Byrd entendent déposer une revendication territoriale lors de leur expédition de 1925 dans l'archipel Arctique. Heureusement, le Canada venait récemment d'asseoir sa souveraineté sur la région en y envoyant des patrouilles et en y établissant des postes de la Gendarmerie royale du Canada. Cela est porté à l'attention du gouvernement américain dans une note diplomatique transmise par le truchement de l'ambassade de Grande-Bretagne à Washington. Le département d'État décide alors de ne pas autoriser MacMillan et Byrd à déposer de revendications au nom des États-Unis. Cependant, les deux explorateurs avaient omis de demander le permis exigé par la loi canadienne. Lorsqu'ils rencontrent une patrouille canadienne dirigée par George P. Mackenzie, Byrd prétend à tort qu'il a un permis. Le département d'État n'a pas répondu à la note canadienne concernant cet incident. Plusieurs documents portant sur l'expédition MacMillan-Byrd ont été publiés dans la série *Foreign Relations of the United States*; la note rapportant le mensonge de Byrd n'y figure toutefois pas.

An Early Dispute over Arctic Sovereignty

Canadian officials correctly suspected that American explorers Donald MacMillan and Richard Byrd planned to make territorial claims during their 1925 expedition to the Arctic archipelago. Fortunately, Canada had recently asserted its sovereignty through patrols and the establishment of Royal Canadian Mounted Police posts. This was brought to the attention of the American government by a diplomatic note (conveyed through the British embassy in Washington). The State Department decided not to authorize MacMillan and Byrd to make claims on behalf of the United States. However, the explorers failed to apply for the permit required by Canadian law. When the Americans encountered a Canadian patrol led by George P. Mackenzie, Byrd falsely claimed to have a permit. The State Department did not reply to the Canadian note on this incident. Several documents on the MacMillan-Byrd expedition were printed in the series *Foreign Relations of the United States*; however, the note describing Byrd's lie was omitted.

No. 627

Washington, June 15, 1925

Immediate

Sir,

I have the honour to inform you that the Government of Canada have reason to believe, from statements which have lately appeared in the press, that a scientific expedition, commonly referred to as the MacMillan expedition, organised under the auspices of the National Geographical Society with the co-operation of the United States Navy, will shortly be leaving for the far North for the purpose of exploring and flying over Baffin, Ellesmere, Axel Heiberg, and certain other islands within the northern territories of the Dominion.

As you are doubtless aware, posts of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police have been established in Baffin and Ellesmere islands and other sections of the Canadian northern territories, in addition to which Police patrols through the Arctic islands have created depots of provisions at various centres. There are also a number of Hudson Bay Company posts in existence at island and mainland points.

In these circumstances, and although the Dominion Government have received no intimation from the Government of the United States regarding the route of the MacMillan expedition or of the intention of the members thereof to carry out explorations through and over Canadian territory, they have requested me to inform you of their readiness to furnish the expedition with the necessary permits for an exploring and scientific expedition entering Canadian northern territories, and possibly desiring to fly over Baffin, Ellesmere and the adjoining islands within the boundaries of the Dominion. Legislation formally requiring scientific and exploring expeditions to secure such permits before entering any part of the Canadian northern territories was enacted by both Houses of Parliament this month.

I would also take this opportunity of assuring you of the Canadian Government's readiness to afford the MacMillan expedition any assistance within the power of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and the other Canadian officers in the north. In this connection, I would add that the Dominion Government, S.S. *Arctic* will sail at an early date on her customary northern patrol and will carry Royal Canadian Mounted Police details and reliefs. This vessel will touch at various points and will visit the police and trading posts on Ellesmere Island.

I have etc.

H.G. Chilton

Ottawa, December 9, 1925

Sir,

With further reference to Mr. Chilton's despatches No. 2831 of the 16th June and No. 299 of the 3rd July, 1925, on the subject of the MacMillan Arctic Expedition 1925, I would request Your Excellency to bring to the attention of the Secretary of State of the United States the following facts which have been reported by the Officer in Command of the Canadian Government Ship *Arctic*.

SOURCE VOLUME 3 DOCUMENT 548

That vessel on her annual patrol to the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, was at Etah, North Greenland, on the 19th and 20th of August last. The MacMillan Arctic Expedition, to which was attached a United States Naval Aeroplane Unit under Commander R.E. Byrd, United States Navy, had preceded the Canadian Expedition to that port. The steamship *Peary* and the auxiliary schooner *Bowdoin* carrying the MacMillan Expedition was found at anchor in that port on the arrival of the *Arctic*.

SOURCE VOLUME 3 DOCUMENT 548

Mr. G.P. Mackenzie, in command of the Canadian Expedition, was informed by Commander Byrd that the flying unit under his command had made a number of flights over Ellesmere Island and had landed stores for flying purposes at Flagler and Sawyer bays on the east coast of Ellesmere but that, owing to ice conditions, it had been found unfeasible to effect a landing on the west coast of Ellesmere or on Axel Heiberg Island. Mr. Mackenzie, knowing that, up to the date of his departure from Quebec for the North, no permit to fly over the Canadian Arctic Archipelago had been granted the MacMillan Expedition or any person attached thereto, sent his Secretary, Mr. H.E.R. Steele, to Commander Byrd to inform him that if he had not obtained such permit he (Mr. Mackenzie) would on behalf of the Canadian Government issue one to him. Commander Byrd informed Mr. Steele that he did not think that they had a permit: that he would ascertain definitely from Commander MacMillan and, if he found that no permit had been secured, he would come aboard the *Arctic* in a short time and formally apply for one.

Within the hour he came on board the *Arctic* in full uniform and was received by Mr. Mackenzie. He thanked Mr. Mackenzie for the offer of a permit made through his Secretary, Mr. Steele, and stated that he had just taken the matter up with Commander MacMillan; that Commander MacMillan had stated that he was already in possession of a permit from the Canadian Government to carry on flying operations over Ellesmere and other islands in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago; that such permission had been granted subsequent to the departure of the MacMillan Expedition to the North and that the granting of the permit had received publicity in the press.

Mr. Mackenzie told Commander Byrd that so far as he knew no such permission had been granted but that there was a possibility that his Government had omitted to inform him or that, as the radio on the ship had not been working satisfactorily, the message might have failed to come through. First Officer of the *Arctic* L.D. Morin, who was also on deck, heard this conversation. However, Mr. Mackenzie called him over and, after repeating the substance of Commander Byrd's statement to Officer Morin in Commander Byrd's presence, asked Commander Byrd whether his summarization of the conversation was correct. Commander Byrd replied,



La délégation canadienne
en route vers la Conférence
impériale de 1923, à Londres.

Canadian delegation en route to
the 1923 Imperial Conference,
London.

SOURCE: BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA/ LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA.
C-002132

"Yes, That is correct." In the presence of Commander Byrd, Mr. Mackenzie then told Officer Morin that he regarded the statement as of importance and requested him to make note of the same.

The Government of Canada has never received an application by the MacMillan Expedition or any person attached thereto for permission to carry on flying operations over the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, as provided by the Air Board Act, and no such permit has ever been issued, nor has any application been received or permit or license been issued to enter said archipelago for scientific purposes as provided by the Northwest Territories Act...

I would request Your Excellency to have the goodness to draw the attention of the United States Secretary of State to the apparent failure on the part of the Expedition to observe the requirements of the Canadian laws.

I enclose, for convenience of reference, copies of the laws in question, together with copies of three affidavits taken by Messrs. Mackenzie, Morin and Steele.

I have etc.

Byng of Vimy

Section 8

Expansion du Ministère

Pope prend sa retraite en 1925, et Skelton est immédiatement nommé sous-secrétaire. À l'époque, le ministère des Affaires extérieures a encore une envergure modeste, et son influence sur les décisions stratégiques est limitée. Skelton entreprend alors d'en faire un véritable ministère des affaires étrangères. Le premier concours pour le recrutement d'agents du service extérieur a lieu en 1927. Les femmes en sont exclues. Les candidats retenus sont E. D'Arcy McGreer et J. Scott Macdonald. L'examen de 1928 permet à Lester Pearson, Norman Robertson, Hugh Keenleyside, Kenneth Kirkwood, Keith Crowther et Paul-Émile Renaud de faire leur entrée au Ministère.

Expansion of the Department

Pope retired in 1925, and Skelton immediately became the new Under-Secretary. At the time, External Affairs was still a small department with limited influence on policy decisions. Skelton set out to transform it into a true foreign ministry. The first competitive examination for foreign service officers was held in 1927. Women were not eligible. The successful candidates were E. D'Arcy McGreer and J. Scott Macdonald. The 1928 exam brought Lester Pearson, Norman Robertson, Hugh Keenleyside, Kenneth Kirkwood, Keith Crowther and Paul-Émile Renaud into the department.

Ottawa, June 20, 1927

List No. 357

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 2961, DOSSIER 45

Advertisement

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 2961, FILE 45

The Civil Service Commission announces open competitive examinations for the following positions:

Second Secretary (Male), Department of External Affairs, \$3,120

12515. A Second Secretary (Male), for the Department of External Affairs, Ottawa, at an initial salary of \$3,120 per annum, which will be increased upon recommendation for efficient service at the rate of \$120 per annum until a maximum of \$3,720 has been reached.

Duties.— Under direction, to assist in preparing reports on inter-imperial and international questions and communications with governments and Canadian representatives abroad; as required, to study and analyze phases of the imperial and foreign relations work of the Department of External Affairs, and to report thereon; to be in responsible charge of a major sub-division of the imperial and foreign relations works or of a particular field, and to prepare correspondence appertaining thereto; to keep in touch with all matters affecting international relations between countries assigned to a sub-division and Canada, and to report upon development; and to perform other related work as required.

Qualifications required.— Education equivalent to graduation from a university of recognized standing, preferably with specialization and post graduate training in political economy, political science, or international law; some knowledge of international relations and diplomatic procedure; some knowledge of modern office practice; preferably a knowledge of two modern languages in addition to the language in which the examination is written, one of which shall be French or English and the other either German, Spanish or Italian; exceptional ability to prepare concise and lucid memoranda and reports; integrity, tact, perception, good judgment, and good address. While no definite age limit has been set for this competition, age may be a determining factor in making a selection.

Nature of Examination.— Part 1: Questions on International Law and Affairs, Weight 3; Precise-writing, Weight 2. Part 2: A rating on Education and Experience will be given from the sworn statements, supporting documents and other evidence submitted by applicants, Weight 5. Optional subjects, for which bonus marks will be given, French or English and either Spanish, German or Italian. Only candidates who qualify in the written tests will be admitted to Part 2 of this examination. Successful candidates will also be subject to an oral examination. A fee of \$2.00 must accompany each application, except in the cases of candidates who have been on active service overseas.

An eligible list, valid for one year, may be established as a result of this competition.

Civil Service of Canada

Examination For Second Secretary,
Department Of External Affairs

International Law And Affairs
July, 1927. Time: 3 hours

Note.— Answer six questions, selecting two from each of Parts A, B, and C.

A.

1. State the methods of territorial acquisition, with illustrations from the development of Canada and the United States.
2. Write notes on the following:
Pacific blockade;
Double nationality;
Diplomatic immunities;
Maritime territorial limits.
3. Discuss the bearing of the European War on the following phases of international law:
Contraband of war;
Treatment of private enemy property in belligerent territory;
Permissible weapons and methods of warfare.

B.

4. "The post-war trend toward dictatorship has merely revealed the bankruptcy of democracy." Discuss this statement.
5. Discuss *either* Economic Factors in Foreign Politics or Occupational Representation.
6. Compare *either* the constitutions of two new states of Europe *or* treaty-making procedure in any two countries.

C.

7. Discuss the following aspects of the League of Nations:
The mandate system;
Article 10 of the Covenant;
Composition and powers of the Council.
8. Discuss two of the following topics:
The work of the International Joint Commission;
Foreign privileges in China and the Nationalist programme;
The Protocol of Geneva.
9. Write brief notes on the following:
Dawes payments, Monroe doctrine, Drago doctrine, Polish corridor, Little Entente, Lausanne, Mosul, Thoiry, Ruhr, Corfu, the Saar, Hankow, Shantung, Tacna-Arica.

Section 9

Le Ministère au féminin

Si le groupe des agents du service extérieur est alors exclusivement masculin, deux femmes occupent néanmoins à cette époque des postes de grande influence au Ministère. Agnes McCloskey est à l'emploi du Ministère depuis 1909. D'abord dactylographe, elle met à profit son talent pour les chiffres et devient la chef comptable du Ministère. Ceux qui veulent obtenir des ressources financières ou un remboursement rapide de leurs dépenses de voyage et autres apprennent qu'il vaut mieux être dans ses bonnes grâces. La secrétaire de Skelton, Marjorie McKenzie, titulaire d'une maîtrise en français et en allemand de l'Université Queen's, a des opinions bien arrêtées sur les questions de politique étrangère, et Skelton respecte son jugement. Elle n'hésite jamais à critiquer soit le style, soit le contenu des rapports écrits de ses collègues masculins. Cette liste de ses fonctions, écrite en 1936, montre l'importance du rôle qu'elle joue dans le choix et l'organisation des informations soumises au sous-secrétaire.

Women in the Department

Though there were no female foreign service officers, two women did achieve positions of considerable influence within the department. Agnes McCloskey had worked at External Affairs since 1909. Originally a typist, she used her talent with numbers to become the department's chief accountant. Those who wanted financial resources and prompt reimbursement for travel or other expenses learned that it was wise to conciliate her. Skelton's secretary, Marjorie McKenzie, had a master's degree in French and German from Queen's. McKenzie had strong opinions on foreign policy matters and Skelton respected her judgement. She never hesitated to criticize either the style or the content of her male co-workers' written reports. This list of her duties, written in 1936, shows what an important role she played in selecting and organizing the information that was placed in front of the Under-Secretary.

The work I have been doing consists mainly of:

- (1) Opening mail addressed to Dr. Skelton by name, except envelopes marked "Personal" or "Private." Examining these letters. Getting the previous papers when required before putting them before Dr. Skelton. Transferring them to some other officer if they deal with some question within that officer's field and obviously do not need to be seen first by Dr. Skelton. Ticketing them for some other officer and placing them before Dr. Skelton if, while falling within another officer's field, they seem of a nature which Dr. Skelton should see.

I have also tried to keep a record of letters transferred to other officers, for Dr. Skelton's information and in order to be able to trace such letters if necessary. This, however, requires more time than is available to any one attempting to do the work I have attempted, I think.

- (2) Filing Dr. Skelton's personal papers and other papers he keeps in the filing cabinets in his room.

The cabinets marked "New Files" are the ones to use. Those marked "Old Files" contain old papers (all, I think, previous to 1928) which I have not had a chance to transfer to the new files. The card index to the files is on top of the cabinets. The new files are divided into seven parts, indicated by Roman numerals, as follows:

- (i) Countries, in alphabetical order.
- (ii) Imperial Affairs.
- (iii) League of Nations matters.
- (iv) Other international questions and conferences not classifiable under the heading of any one country.
- (v) Departmental affairs.
- (vi) Letters from persons, and institutions, classified in alphabetical order under the name of the person or institution.
- (vii) Matters of personal interest to Dr. Skelton, such as educational questions, personal business, etc.

Each of the seven parts is further subdivided.

The first two drawers of the card index contain a list of all the files in order, one card for each file. The other drawers contain the card index proper.

- (3) Marking headings on the clippings, and sending them to the file room to be filed....
- (4) Opening the packet of Foreign Office prints which comes in the Dominions Office bag. Each packet contains two sets of prints (duplicates). One set goes to the Governor General, and the other is retained by us. Sometimes the packet also contains Committee of Imperial Defence prints. If so, they go to the Deputy Minister of National Defence by hand, in two envelopes, the inner one marked "Secret," along with the mimeographed schedule listing them, which can usually be detached from the schedule listing the Foreign Office prints. We keep the other copy, and only the Foreign Office prints go to the Governor General.

Agnes McCloskey et une autre
employée au travail, 1943.

Agnes McCloskey and another
female staff member at work,
early 1943.

SOURCE: YOUSUF KARSH, BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET
ARCHIVES CANADA/ LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES
CANADA, PA-187411



Our set of the Foreign Office prints and Committee of Imperial Defence prints is placed in Dr. Skelton's room, in the "Despatches" basket, for him to look at. When he is through with them, or if he does not get a chance to look at them within a few weeks, they should be distributed to other officers of the Department for information and return. The officers to which each print should be sent depends on its subject. Committee of Imperial Defence prints go to Mr. Christie only, or in his absence to Mr. Robertson. European and Near East affairs have been going to Messrs. Christie, Robertson, Macdonald, and Allard. Far East goes to Dr. Keenleyside. United States and Latin America go to Mr. Beaudry and Dr. Keenleyside. League of Nations matters might go to Mr. Christie, Mr. Robertson, and Mr. Macdonald. Mr. Robertson sends a good many of the prints he receives to Col. Crerar for reading and return.

On the schedule, after each print, I mark the initials of the officer or officers to whom it has been sent. When the print is returned from any officer I check off the initials of that officer. When all initials have been checked off it shows that the print has finally been returned to me for filing.

The schedules are filed in the "New Files," file no. IV-8. in chronological order. The prints themselves have been filed in the large steel cabinet with steel curtain, against the wall. They are filed according to continent and country, in labelled drawers. The Committee of Imperial Defence prints are also there....

- (5) Preparing a Weekly Review of External Affairs for Dr. Skelton's examination and possible submission to the Prime Minister. Carbon copies may be found in the new files, file no. IV-7. Perhaps this could be made a cooperative job in future, notes being prepared by the various officers on subjects connected with their own fields.

O.D. Skelton en compagnie de
l'une de ses premières recrues
du Ministère, M. Lester Pearson.

O.D. Skelton with one of his
early recruits to the department,
Lester Pearson.

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Section 10

Le représentation à Washington

En 1920, Pope suggère à Meighen que le Canada doit, pour des raisons pratiques, avoir son propre représentant à Washington. Forts du précédent créé par l'État libre d'Irlande, qui vient tout juste d'être formé, King et Skelton établissent en 1926–1927 une légation canadienne dans la capitale américaine, comme mesure d'affirmation de l'autonomie nationale. Vincent Massey est nommé chef de la nouvelle mission – en grande partie parce qu'il est suffisamment riche pour donner, à ses propres frais, les réceptions auxquelles on s'attend dans le monde diplomatique. Massey présente ses lettres de créance au Président Calvin Coolidge le 18 février 1927. Quelques mois plus tard, l'arrivée imminente d'un ministre américain à Ottawa amène les autorités canadiennes à se demander s'il faut ou non suivre le protocole britannique au moment d'accueillir son premier diplomate étranger.

Representation in Washington

In 1920, Pope suggested to Meighen that for practical reasons Canada should have its own representative in Washington. Following the precedent set by the newly formed Irish Free State, in 1926–27 King and Skelton established a Canadian legation in the American capital as an assertion of national autonomy. Vincent Massey was appointed to head the new mission – in large part because he was wealthy enough to entertain in the expected style and pay for it out of his own pocket. Massey presented his letter of credence to President Calvin Coolidge on February 18, 1927. A few months later, the imminent arrival of an American minister in Ottawa raised the question of whether Canada would follow established British protocol as it welcomed its first foreign diplomat.

Ottawa, December 15, 1920

Dear Mr. Meighen,

SOURCE : VOLUME 3, DOCUMENT 31

The approach of the period in which the departmental estimates are prepared, brings up the question of what I may term the outside service of the Department of External Affairs, in respect of which I would take the liberty to offer a few observations....

SOURCE: VOLUME 3, DOCUMENT 31

I have been going between Ottawa and Washington for upwards of twenty years, and am, therefore, more or less familiar with the mode of communication between the two governments. The movement for special Canadian representation in Washington had its origin in the dissatisfaction arising from the extreme difficulty of getting things done under existing methods. This is partly to be ascribed to the United States system of government, with their sharp division between executive and legislative functions, which they are sometimes disposed to play off, one against the other, almost indefinitely....

The second cause of ineffectiveness is to be found in the Embassy methods, which is primarily due to the fact that the staff there is perpetually changing. I doubt whether there is a man at the Embassy today who was there eighteen months ago. The consequence is that there is no traditional or continuous treatment of subjects by them. A clerk is sent out from the Foreign Office to Washington. He may be and often is an excellent man, but totally unacquainted with Canada and its affairs. He sets to work, learning rapidly, it may be, but just as he is beginning to be at all familiar with our business and with the American methods in the State Department and elsewhere, he leaves Washington for another post and his successor has to begin all over again and so it goes on. Now, much of our business with the United States Government is of a practical character, not calling for the exercise of high diplomacy. If we had a man in Washington permanently who would grow familiar with the ways of the American officials and with the class of questions with which he is called upon to deal on our behalf, he could dispose of our affairs, I will not say with promptness and despatch, for these words are unknown in Washington, but as quickly and expeditiously as is possible in dealing with the United States State Departments. I believe there would be no difficulty in our Government nominating to such a post on the [British] Embassy staff a Canadian with the rank of Minister. He would be virtually independent of the Ambassador, while enjoying the prestige of connection with the Embassy, but really going his own way. Somewhat such during the war was the position of Sir Richard Crawford, who was styled "Commercial Adviser" to the Embassy, with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary in the diplomatic service. He had his office in the Embassy, but transacted business with a free hand direct with the United States officials. The late Sir Cecil Spring Rice, speaking to me a few days before he died, told me that from the point of view of the Ambassador, he thought the plan I am here suggesting quite feasible.

At present the routine in the transaction of Canadian business is something like this. The Ambassador, or sometimes the Counsellor acting in his stead, has periodically a business appointment with the State Department. He takes with him a list – sometimes a long one – of subjects to discuss with the Secretary of State, relating, it may be, to interests specially affecting the United Kingdom, others touching France, Mexico, etc., and among them certain pressing Canadian questions. He is ushered into the Secretary of State's presence, leaving perhaps several foreign

diplomats waiting in the ante-room their turn to an interview. His visits are thus generally more or less hurried. He cannot do adequate justice to our business in the limited time at his disposal. I would have a Canadian Minister at the Embassy wholly devoted to Canadian affairs. He should communicate directly with the Department of External Affairs at Ottawa. When he proceeds to interview the Secretary of State or make his rounds of the public departments, he should be charged with nothing but Canadian business. He should have all these affairs in his own hands. By concentrated attention to his duties and with a little practice he would discover numerous short cuts in the way of doing business with the public departments in Washington, and he would be in this happy position that while ordinarily acting directly and independently, governed only by the instructions of his own Government, he could, whenever he thought it desirable so to do, invoke the prestige and influence of the Ambassador in support of his position.

Another feature of this plan is the comparatively slight cost it would entail. While the Minister should be paid an adequate salary, he would not need to keep up a separate establishment with all its attendant expenses. A small staff consisting of a good understudy, a couple of clerks and a messenger would, I should think, be sufficient for the present....

Yours sincerely,
Joseph Pope

**George, by the Grace of God, of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland
and of the British Dominions beyond the Seas King, Defender of the Faith, Emperor of India,
etc., etc., etc.,**

To the President of the United States of America, Sendeth Greeting:

Our Good Friend!

SOURCE : VOLUME 4, DOCUMENT 15

We have judged it expedient to confer the rank of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary upon Our Trusty and Well-beloved the Honourable Charles Vincent Massey, Member of Our Privy Council of Canada, with the especial object of representing in the United States of America the interests of Our Dominion of Canada.

SOURCE: VOLUME 4, DOCUMENT 15

We request that You will give entire credence to all that Mr. Massey may represent to You in Our name, especially when he shall assure You of Our esteem and regard, and of Our hearty wishes for the welfare and prosperity of the United States of America.

And so We commend You to the protection of the Almighty.

Given at Our Court of Saint James, the Seventh day of December in the Year of Our Lord One thousand Nine hundred and Twenty-six, and in the Seventeenth Year of Our Reign.

Your Good Friend,
George R. I.

Downing Street, March 19, 1927

My dear Skelton,

We recently had an enquiry from the Department of External Affairs at Dublin whether it was possible to obtain from the Foreign Office the full details of the customary ceremonial in London when a foreign representative presents his credentials to the King. The Foreign Office suggested that the best course would be to send to the Department of External Affairs a copy of the Regulations approved by His Majesty for observance when a new foreign minister is received, and a reply was sent to Dublin accordingly. I enclose a copy of the Regulations referred to.

SOURCE : VOLUME 4, DOCUMENT 25

The question presumably was raised in connection with the appointment of a United States Minister at Dublin and, as it seemed possible that the information given might be of use in connection with the appointment of the United States Minister at Ottawa, we thought that you might be interested to have it.

Yours sincerely,

E.J. Harding

SOURCE : VOLUME 4, DOCUMENT 25

Reception of a Foreign Minister Presenting Credentials

The Minister drives to the Grand Entrance in his own carriage. He is met at the Grand Entrance by the Marshal of the Diplomatic Corps, and conducted to the Hall, where he meets the Master, or Deputy Master, of the Household, and is by him taken to the Bow Room.

Here he meets the Permanent Under Secretary of State, the Lord in Waiting, the Groom in Waiting, and the Equerry in Waiting.

The Under Secretary of State having taken His Majesty's commands, the Minister is conducted by him and the Lord in Waiting to the Presence, and announced by the Marshal of the Diplomatic Corps.

The Lord in Waiting and the Marshal of the Diplomatic Corps withdraw.

At the conclusion of the Audience, the Minister is conducted to the Hall by the Master of the Household, and to his carriage by the Marshal of the Diplomatic Corps.

Ottawa, April 8, 1927

My dear Harding,

Many thanks for your letter of March 19th containing a copy of the Regulations approved by His Majesty for observance when a new foreign minister is received. This will be extremely helpful when Mr. Phillips arrives, though I am afraid it will be necessary to improvise one or two Lords in Waiting, to say nothing of the Marshal of the Diplomatic Corps.

SOURCE : VOLUME 4, DOCUMENT 26

Yours sincerely,

O.D. Skelton

SOURCE : VOLUME 4, DOCUMENT 26

La légation canadienne à
Washington.

The Canadian legation in
Washington.

SOURCE: BIBLIOTHEQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA/ LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
PA 127561



Telegram

Ottawa, May 19, 1927

Please advise Mr. Phillips most convenient time arrival June first would be by Canadian National arriving here eleven fifty-five standard or twelve fifty-five Ottawa time.

Prime Minister, Under-Secretary, Governor General's Secretary and Consul-General will meet train.

Prime Minister wishes Mr. Phillips to join him at lunch Laurier House immediately and His Excellency the Governor General will receive him at Government House at three quite informally.

Will be pleased to place one of Minister's cars at his service. Please advise what other members in party.

SOURCE : VOLUME 4, DOCUMENT 27

SOURCE: VOLUME 4, DOCUMENT 27

Telegram

[Washington,] May 19, 1927

Your telegram 19th May information has been conveyed to Mr. Phillips. He will arrive 1st June by Canadian National at 12.55 Ottawa time as suggested and will be pleased to lunch with Prime Minister at Laurier House. As regards procedure reception by Governor General I understand that State Department and others here would not understand reason for any departure from procedure usually followed when U.S. Ambassadors and Ministers present credentials. On such occasions Envoys to be presented wear Evening Dress as this is prescribed uniform for American Diplomats and is accompanied by members Staff similar attire. From what I have heard very important that such details should be observed. Mr. Phillips plans to arrive in Ottawa in Morning Coat and silk Hat and assumes there will be sufficient time after lunch to change to Evening Dress and arrive Government House at three. Mr. Phillips will be accompanied to Government House by two Secretaries who will have arrived in advance and will stay Chateau Laurier. Mrs. Phillips will not be with him on this visit to Ottawa. Further telegram Mr. Phillips information should arrive before Saturday morning my letter on above subject should reach you tomorrow.

Telegram

Ottawa, May 20, 1927

Your telegram May 19th regarding arrival Mr. Phillips.... As regards uniform it was not intended in statement that Governor General would receive him at Government House quite informally to imply informal dress. His Excellency remarked yesterday he would probably wear frock coat and it is quite understood that United States Minister will follow prescribed uniform of evening dress. It is possible it may be more convenient to set hour for reception at Government House at 3.30 or four but that will be intimated later. In any case it can be arranged to make necessary change at Laurier House before proceeding to Government House. His Excellency and Prime Minister are in Toronto until Tuesday.

Ottawa, May 23, 1927

My dear Mr. Massey,

SOURCE : VOLUME 4, DOCUMENT 31

SOURCE : VOLUME 4, DOCUMENT 31

... The use in my telegram of May 19 of the words "quite informally" was unfortunate, though it has unduly alarmed the guardians of propriety in the State Department. I was quoting His Excellency's words with reference to the procedure he intended to follow when the new Minister was introduced to him, and the phrase was used relatively to the procedure followed on presentation to the King. His Excellency and I had gone through the memorandum which I had secured from the Foreign Office in this respect, and had concluded that it was obviously unsuited to Canadian purposes, and that it would be pretentious to attempt to follow it verbatim. There was no thought of not providing in detail for the conveyance and introduction of the Minister and his staff. I am sorry I used these words, which out of their spoken context seem to have given a wrong impression, but I think I could have assumed that, even if the United States State Department might fear that the Viscount Willingdon, formerly Governor of Bombay and Governor of Madras, would fail to see that the ceremony was carried through with all due propriety and respect, at least the Canadian Legation would have taken it for granted.

I had discussed with His Excellency before his departure for Toronto the procedure to be followed. The final details will be settled upon his return from Toronto on Wednesday. I shall be glad to send you a copy of it for transmission to Mr. Phillips, and I shall go over the details with Mr. Moffatt when he calls. We of course have no intention of submitting it for censorship by the United States State Department. It is not considered essential that our procedure under the circumstances here should follow that of the State Department, any more than that it should follow that of the Foreign Office.

I may say that His Excellency informed me that he had obtained from the King a short message of good will which he will read to Mr. Phillips in addition to replying in the usual way to the Minister's address.

Yours sincerely,
O.D. Skelton

P.S. Our republican friends seem always to have been punctilious on such matters. If you have a moment to spare, look at Foster's *Century of American Diplomacy*, page 32. It is doubtless a necessary preoccupation, though personally I wish more of their time might be given to such questions of diplomatic procedure as remembering that His Majesty's Government in Canada is not a branch of His Majesty's Government in Great Britain....

Section 11

Paris et Tokyo

King and Skelton decided not only to open but also to multiply the Canadian missions abroad. In particular, they decided to open legations in Paris and Tokyo. King travelled to France for the opening of the Canadian legation in Paris, in October 1928. Philippe Roy, who had been the Canadian commissioner in Paris since 1911, became the first Canadian minister plenipotentiary. Louis Desjardins, the wealthy lawyer, was appointed counsellor. The mission in Tokyo was headed by Sir Herbert Marler, who, like Massey, was a wealthy man. However, not all members of Marler's staff had private means on which to draw. The first secretary, Major Karamyshev, was obliged to write to Skelton about the difficulties caused by his

Paris and Tokyo

King and Skelton decided that more Canadian posts were needed. In particular, they decided to open legations in Paris and Tokyo. King travelled to France for the opening of the Paris legation in October 1928. Philippe Roy, the Canadian commissioner in Paris since 1911, became the first Canadian minister plenipotentiary. Louis Desjardins, the author of the following letter, was appointed counsellor. The mission in Tokyo was headed by Sir Herbert Marler, who, like Massey, was a wealthy man. However, not all members of Marler's staff had private means on which to draw. The first secretary, Major Karamyshev, was obliged to write to Skelton about the difficulties caused by his

La légation canadienne à Paris.

The Canadian legation in Paris.

SOURCE: BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA/ LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA.
PA-127556



[Paris,] October 6, 1928

My dear Doctor,

The P.M. has left at noon for London. You will be interested in knowing that Sir William Tyrell came to the Gare du Nord to see him off.

This coming week, relieved as I will be of the most important functions, I expect to devote myself to the organisation of our work.

Sunday last, I was invited by Mr. Roy to accompany him to Rambouillet. We drove with the chef du Protocole, M. de Fougères down to the chateau where the President M. Doumergue was expecting the new minister for Canada.

They both had a short private conversation after which the President invited us to visit the apartments of Marie-Antoinette and of Napoleon. He himself led us through the salons and rooms beautifully ornamented and panelled and recalled, in a most familiar and interesting manner, the various historical events which took place within these walls.

Then, Mr. Roy proceeded, escorted by M. de Fougères and by myself, to l'Arc de Triomphe for the ceremony – a most impressive one, – at the cenotaph of the Soldat inconnu.

The Reception at the Legation was a great success. At about six o'clock, one could hardly move and reach a glass at the buffet. A real jam. Mrs. Roy had decorated the rooms with marvelous chrysanthema and roses. And the visitors unanimously expressed their satisfaction and surprise. They apparently had not expected such a decor.

The same night, the P.M. offered a dinner at the Crillon and made a very adroit speech especially when he praised the high qualities of the British Ambassador who was among his guests. He laid a special emphasis on the effect of the establishment of the Legation, saying that it would bring into a closer contact our Government with that of Great Britain.

Sir William Tyrrell and Mr. Roy both declared, in the course of their remarks, that not only were they going to be colleagues but friends.

At France-Amérique, the next day, we were invited to a dinner and a reception.... For about fifty minutes, Mr. King spoke with great ease ... I appreciated above all his very appropriate remarks on our political development and on the special relations between the members of the so-called British Empire.

André Siegfried who was sitting beside me and a member of the French Parliament, both told me that it was a very illuminating statement. There was a dominating national note mixed up with that of loyalty and cooperation.

Siegfried told me that he had met you and expressed the desire to see you when he goes to Canada.

The French papers during the last weeks, published on our country enthusiastic articles. I expect to send you a selection of the best and most interesting ones in a few days.

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA. RG 25, VOLUME 2960, DOSSIER 29

SOURCE : LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 2960, FILE 29

Mr. Roy is writing to you about the office and the personnel.... Miss Pouliot wrote me again about the possibility of her engagement here. If you are agreeable to her coming to Paris, you may perhaps communicate with her (509 Cumberland St. Ottawa) and see how it can be arranged. She would, I am sure, fill the post at our complete satisfaction. She is very reliable and more of the intellectual than of the flapper type....

We have so far only one bilingual stenographer and I am afraid she is more unilingual than bilingual. Her French – although fair – is sometimes a bit staggering....

Receive, my dear Doctor, for yourself and Mrs. Skelton our best regards.

Yours faithfully,
Jean

Tokyo, March 12, 1930

Dear Dr. Skelton:

Your despatch which referred to salaries and allowances (among other things) arrived in Tokyo the day after Mr. Marler left for China, and I do not believe that it will be possible for him to make any comment on it until after the end of the fiscal year. Under the circumstances I have decided that I should explain to you as accurately as possible the situation which led Mr. Marler to make the recommendations which he included in his December report. The following paragraphs apply equally to Langley and only less definitely to Kirkwood.

The crux of the situation is this: in spite of every effort at reasonable economy I have had to spend – since being appointed to Tokyo – over \$1500 more than I have received. This has, in part, been due to expenses incidental to the change of residence, but in addition to these extras I have been going definitely behind a small but very definite amount each month. It is not, I hope, necessary to assure you that this is not due to extravagant expenditure. Mrs. Keenleyside and I have refused fully one-third of all invitations that we have received because we could not see our way clear to return the proffered courtesy. Our house costs us less than that occupied by any other first secretary in Tokyo – even less than is paid by Langley. In spite of this we have paid an average of £360 monthly for rent, light, and heat. In every respect our expenses have been reduced to the minimum sum required to maintain the necessary appearances and a very moderate degree of comfort.

Under the present financial arrangement it is quite impossible even to consider leaving Tokyo for Karuizawa during the summer. Yet a summer, in Tokyo, especially for children, is something that no foreigner cares to contemplate. As things are now there would seem to be only two feasible alternatives: either to give up our present house, take small Japanese quarters and refuse all social engagements, or, have Mrs. Keenleyside and the children return to Vancouver where they could live on part of my salary while I could make out on the remainder here. Neither of these solutions is desirable, but either is preferable to a continued expenditure beyond my income.

It must also be noted that the continued rise of the value of the Yen has been increasing our difficulties; there has been a change of 13% to 15% since last May when I first arrived.

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 2961, DOSSIER 46

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 2961, FILE 46

Le solarium de la légation
canadienne à Tokyo.

Sun room in the Canadian
legation, Tokyo



It was the situation outlined above that led to Mr. Marler's recommendations on behalf of Langley, Kirkwood, and myself, and we had hoped that the retro-active feature of the proposal would enable us to recoup, to some extent, our past borrowings from our savings.

I am exceedingly sorry to have been forced into the writing of this letter. My work during the past eighteen months has been so enjoyable and so unvarying has been the kindness that I have received from you as head of the Department, that it is most distasteful to me to be forced to adopt the role of a complainant. Nothing but the economic impossibility of the present situation could have brought this about.

With sincere regards,
Keenleyside

Section 12

Des idées pour l'avenir

Le gouvernement libéral est défait en juillet 1930, et King, remplacé par R.B. Bennett au poste de premier ministre. Bennett ne partage pas les vues de King sur l'élargissement de l'autonomie canadienne, et la dégradation de la situation économique le rend de moins en moins enclin à suivre le programme de King concernant l'expansion de la représentation canadienne à l'étranger. Le mémoire suivant, rédigé quelques mois après l'entrée en fonction du nouveau gouvernement, est cependant intéressant, car il exprime les aspirations de Skelton et de certains autres membres du Ministère. D'autres professent toutefois des avis différents. Et même après le retour de King au pouvoir en 1936, Loring Christie fait valoir que le Canada doit adopter une approche modeste dans le domaine des relations internationales.

Ideas for the Future

The Liberal government was defeated in July 1930, and King was replaced as Prime Minister by R.B. Bennett. Bennett did not share King's goal of increasing Canadian autonomy, and the worsening of economic conditions increased his reluctance to follow King's pattern of expanding Canadian representation abroad. The following memorandum, written a few months after the new government took office, is nevertheless of interest as an expression of the aspirations harboured by Skelton and some members of the department. Others, however, expressed different views. Even after King returned to power in 1936, Loring Christie argued that Canada should take a modest approach to international relations.

Le Premier ministre R.B. Bennett en compagnie des politiciens britanniques Stanley Baldwin et Anthony Eden, 1932.

Prime Minister R.B. Bennett with British politicians Stanley Baldwin and Anthony Eden, 1932.

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Ottawa, December 27, 1930

Canadian Representation Abroad

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 792, DOSSIER 428

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 792, FILE 428

Canada has a Foreign Service only in a very limited sense of the expression. Her Diplomatic Service exists, but is still very small. She has no Consular Service, and the gap deserves the more attention because of the important nature and greatly varied functions of that Service. Her Commercial Diplomatic Service can hardly be said to have any existence as a constituted body in spite of the presence of a Commercial Secretary at Washington and of another at Tokyo. Her Foreign Commerce Service which consists of one element only – the Trade Commissioners – is well organized and, at the moment, is the most extensive of all classes of Canadian representatives abroad....

The Diplomatic Service is charged with promoting safeguarding and defending the interests and the good name of the country which it is created to serve. Its first duty, therefore, is to promote the national interests or, in other words, to cultivate friendly relations. However vague this function may appear to be in the popular mind, it represents an important reality which every Department of State and well informed Government readily understand. The object of diplomacy is, not the staging of social magnificence, but the promotion of common interests....

When one thinks of Canada, one of the largest countries in the world, growing in population and rapidly expanding in commerce, industry and trade, with many interests placed in other lands and so many treaties of every nature, multilateral and bilateral, creating great obligations between her and numerous nations in every part of the globe, – the country of the future – one cannot help being surprised at the paucity of her agents, diplomatic or otherwise, abroad, at least where some of her interests may lie. As pointed out before, her diplomatic representation is constituted by 2 Ministers, 1 Chargé d’Affaires, 1 Advisory Officer, 1 Counsellor, 3 First Secretaries, 3 Second Secretaries and 3 Third Secretaries, all of which make 3 Legations and a Semi-Diplomatic Post at Geneva.... Canada’s Diplomatic Service should be enlarged and properly manned without delay....

In uninformed circles, one sometimes hears the objection according to which a Diplomatic Service is a costly enterprise. It is so in itself, but not only is the enterprise on the one hand, indispensable and, on the other, of a general value which may be estimated much higher than any money spent on it, it is true also that every country finds the means of getting the money back through charging Consular fees. In other words, the Consular Service, which forms an essential annex to the Diplomatic Service, collects enough revenue to cover the expenditures in its own service and the expenditures in the Diplomatic Service. For example, the budget of the United States Consular Service closes each year with a surplus, after covering expenditures in both services....

[Ottawa,] March 28, 1938

Pending National Defence and External Affairs Debates

As regards the central aim, my own impression is that the Prime Minister might usefully keep on with what may be called the deflationary doses.

The somewhat inflated condition afflicting Canada, or at least many Canadians, is due partly, I suppose, to ideas surviving from colonial days and partly to certain later magnifications of our possible role in the League as both Small Power and part of a Great Power. While our realities fix us as a Small Power and though our actual equipment is as yet not even up to that, there remains a considerable itch for such Great Power luxuries as "prestige," "vital interests" all over the map, and so on – in short, the champagne appetite with the beer pocket book. The primary objective in all this sphere must be national unity, and I feel steady doses of deflation are good for that.

As to specific points, I can only think of variations of old themes on two or three points. (I recall hearing a story that one day Balfour, impatient at somebody who seemed to think there was always a "foreign policy" available, ready to be pulled out of a pigeon hole, like a blue print and specifications, retorted: "England never has had a foreign policy, has no foreign policy, and never will have a foreign policy.") ...

It has to be faced that the Great Powers command the overwhelming share of the existing resources, equipment and power of the world, all of them now having vast and steadily increasing armaments; that this is avowed by them more and more explicitly as shaping their calculations of policy; that it is the complex of these arms and what they regard as their "vital interests" that determines policy. The influence which a small country, or all of them together, can exert upon events when such forces are at work, either in the "peace-time" period, or if the forces should clash, must obviously be regarded as severely limited. The temptation to make declarations may be great, but are they not often an emotional outlet and therefore a luxury?

Another aspect of this: as regards relationships between separate peoples we have seen from the experience of the British Commonwealth that responsibility for managing or intervening in the affairs of other regions, apart from the question of moral justification, will at least not be effectively or usefully exercised unless it is coupled, not only with power, but also with knowledge and interest. Canada has very limited power for such a role and as yet very limited equipment for really knowing other regions; while our interest in other regions in the way of investment, colonisation and outposts is practically negligible. (The trading which we do through the ordinary import and export facilities – banking, consular, shipping and so on – which are open to all countries, great and small, seems a very different thing.)

Other small countries carefully observe this order of calculation in determining their attitudes, particularly the European ones who ought to know, and many of them, according to their geographical position and good sense, have kept themselves afloat and prosperous for a very long time indeed.

(*Note:* All this is perhaps summed up in an aphorism attributed to the late Lord Salisbury: "Never let your diplomacy outrun your resources.") ...

Section 13

Immigration en provenance d'Extrême-Orient

La question de l'immigration de source orientale a longtemps été difficile pour le Canada, surtout en Colombie-Britannique. L'immigration en provenance du Japon est limitée par un accord entre les deux pays; en 1925, Mackenzie King presse le gouvernement japonais d'appliquer avec plus de rigueur les quotas convenus. C'est d'ailleurs largement à cause de la question de l'immigration que le Canada ouvre une légation à Tokyo. Cette dernière s'occupe aussi de l'immigration provenant d'autres pays d'Extrême-Orient. En 1930, Marler préconise que les épouses chinoises des citoyens canadiens soient autorisées à entrer au pays.

Immigration from the Far East

The question of Oriental immigrants had long been a difficult one in Canada, and especially in British Columbia. Immigration from Japan was restricted by an agreement between the two countries; in 1925 Mackenzie King pressed the Japanese government to enforce the agreed quota more effectively. It was largely because of the immigration issue that the Tokyo legation was established. The legation also dealt with immigration from other Far Eastern countries. In 1930 Marler urged that the Chinese wives of Canadian citizens be allowed to enter the country.

Ottawa, April 2, 1925

SOURCE : VOLUME 3, DOCUMENT 702

SOURCE : VOLUME 3, DOCUMENT 702

The Prime Minister informed Mr. Matsunaga that he had asked him to call in order to discuss further the necessity of negotiations for restriction of Japanese immigration. He reminded Mr. Matsunaga that it had been understood as the result of restrictions agreed upon in 1923 that there would be a substantial reduction in the total immigration of Japanese into Canada. This had not taken place and in fact the numbers had distinctly increased, particularly of women and children. This was a very serious side of the question, since the children were in many cases 16, 18 and 20 years old, practically ready to enter the labor market, and since the coming of the wives of laborers in such large numbers would mean a substantial increase to the Japanese population. It had been stated in the House of Commons last session that negotiations for further restriction would be continued. This had not yet been done, but the matter was now urgent. The action of the Legislature of British Columbia, the many questions asked in the House of Commons on the subject of Japanese immigration, and recent activities on the part of the Conservative and Liberal members from British Columbia made it clear that a strong demand for vigorous action was to be expected. The Prime Minister declared that he would greatly deplore seeing this question made an issue in any general election, and trusted that it would not be necessary for the Canadian Government to pass legislation itself to effect the restriction, as they would much prefer that action should come through the Japanese Government itself. In case, however, this latter course was not found possible, the Canadian Government would have to consider itself free to enact new legislation or to apply its general immigration regulations to Japanese as well as to other immigrants. If the necessity arose it would abrogate the Lemieux Agreement, though it did not consider the application of the general immigration regulations to Japanese citizens was inconsistent with that Agreement.

The Prime Minister stated further that in order to ease these negotiations the Japanese Government should undertake to issue no further passports for some months to come. In the negotiations which were about to open up he considered that the question of restricting the entrance of women and children would be of most importance and that in this connection it might possibly be arranged by the Japanese Government to notify in future single immigrants that they would not be entitled if returning to Japan from Canada to take a wife and family back with them.

Mr. Matsunaga stated that the reference to women and children raised a new issue. He did not see how the Japanese Government could completely stop the issue of passports without creating a great sensation in Japan. He undertook to cable at once to his Government the circumstances of this interview and to impress upon them the importance of making concessions to avoid public agitation and drastic legislative action.

O.D. Skelton

Tokyo, October 11, 1930

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to your despatch No. 109 of the 27th of August 1930, regarding the rules governing the exclusion from Canada of the wives, of Chinese origin, of Canadian citizens. I have noted that the existing restrictions were adopted after full consideration as a part of the general policy governing Oriental immigration, and that although the question of Chinese immigration in general has already been the subject of certain preliminary discussions, there seems little likelihood of immediate revision of the present policy.

In view of the fact that this matter has been, and will probably again be taken under serious consideration at Ottawa, I venture to set forth herewith certain reflections which appear to me to be worthy of examination.

I need not, I presume, reiterate previous assurances as to my entire approval of the broad lines of Canadian policy with reference to immigration from the Orient. As I have previously stated, in my humble opinion it is not desirable from the point of view either of Canada or of Japan that a large Oriental population should be allowed to congregate on the Pacific Coast of the Dominion. Nevertheless, I cannot avoid the conclusion that the growing importance of China, both in diplomacy and trade, may possibly render inevitable the supersession of certain details of our prevailing immigration practice. It is not wholly reasonable to anticipate that the most friendly relations with the Republic of China can continue indefinitely on the present basis. Can the Republic be expected long to remain content while its Nationals are subjected to a positive discrimination by the government of another power? And particularly in the case of China, where our present policy is directed not only against Chinese Nationals, but against Canadian Nationals of Chinese race.

In this connection I am, of course, aware that the *Immigration Act* declares that "A woman who has not been landed in Canada shall not be held to have acquired Canadian citizenship by virtue of her husband being a Canadian citizen." This provision of the Immigration Act, however, is not enforced even in the case of Japanese, who are otherwise subject to severe restrictions. You will recall that I was instructed on this point in your comprehensive *Despatch No. 29 of the 27th of September, 1929*, in which you wrote, "The Legation will also grant a visa to immigrant wives, and children under eighteen years of age, who are British subjects under the provisions of the Naturalization Act, on satisfactorily establishing that the applicants are British subjects and the wives and children under eighteen years of age of persons of Japanese race and Canadian citizenship (either by birth or naturalization), and who are legally resident in Canada. *Persons in this class, being British subjects, are not subject to the numerical restrictions imposed on Japanese subjects...* In this connection it may be noted that the wife of a British subject is deemed to be a British subject." In the *Canadian Nationals Act*, moreover, it is stated clearly that the "following persons are Canadian Nationals, viz.:

- (a) Any British subject who is a Canadian citizen within the meaning of the Immigration Act:
- (b) *The wife of any such citizen.*

Finally, it is declared in the Naturalization Act that "The wife of a British subject shall be deemed to be a British subject." In view of these facts is it improper for me to say that in the cases under discussion we are discriminating against our own Nationals solely on the grounds of their racial antecedents – and that this discrimination is uniquely applied to those Canadians of Chinese origin?

In view of the rapid development of a national consciousness among the people of China I cannot doubt that within the next few years we may find it expedient to conclude some special immigration agreement with China, as has already been done in the case of Japan. When that time arrives we will no doubt be able to secure our present objectives, but without offence to the dignity of a sovereign state.

Recognising this development as most likely I am impressed with the importance of assuring (and it is, I am confident, the desire of the Government) that our present definitely discriminatory policy shall be enforced with a minimum of injury to the sensibilities of the Government and the people of China. If we hope to retain Chinese good-will, should our practice exceed in severity the regulations enforced by other states with an interest in Oriental exclusion similar to our own?

In the past the United States of America, as well as Canada, has excluded from its shores not only all immigrants of Chinese origin and nationality, but women of Chinese origin and United States nationality. I have been informed on reliable authority, however, that legislation is now pending in Congress which if acted upon, will alter this situation by admitting to the United States of America, on a non-quota basis, the wives, of Chinese origin, of United States citizens. It is not, I presume, necessary to point [out] that the United States as a result of its espousal of the "Open Door" policy, of its attitude in regard to the Boxer indemnity, and on other well-recognized grounds enjoys a favoured position in the esteem, and in the markets, of the Chinese Republic. It would be a misfortune if the advantages already enjoyed by the United States were, by our own action, to be further augmented.

Under these circumstances, and I do not believe that I have over-emphasized the existing and proximate situation, I cannot avoid the conclusion that it would be to the material advantage of Canada If our present policy with reference to the wives, of Chinese origin, of persons of Canadian nationality, were to be altered to remove the existing and unique discrimination against the dignity of a great and friendly nation. In view of the possible action of the United States the wisdom of devoting serious consideration to this proposal becomes even more apparent.

May I, therefore, with all respect recommend this problem to your thoughtful examination and express the hope that action may not be long delayed.

I have etc.

H.M. Marler

Section 14

Prélude au conflit

À la fin des années 1930, le Canada ouvre des missions en Belgique et aux Pays-Bas. Skelton veut qu'on fasse de même en Australie, en Nouvelle-Zélande, en Afrique du Sud, au Brésil et en Argentine. Il rejette par ailleurs, ce qui a de quoi étonner, la proposition faite par Christie d'ouvrir aussi des bureaux diplomatiques en Allemagne, en Italie et en Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques. Le Canada n'a donc aucun observateur officiel dans ces pays alors même que la guerre menace. Une lettre de 1934 adressée par Thomas (« Tommy ») Stone à Skelton constitue un des rares témoignages directs d'un diplomate canadien sur l'Allemagne nazie. Stone, qui occupe le poste de deuxième secrétaire à la légation du Canada à Paris, rédige ce rapport de sa propre initiative. Rien n'incite à croire cependant que Skelton s'est laissé influencer par ce document. Stone avait épousé une riche Américaine et, à Paris, « ses réceptions sont plus somptueuses que celles de son chef, le ministre ». Selon Benjamin Rogers, un collègue de Stone, Skelton voit donc ce dernier comme un « playboy ». Trois ans plus tard, l'annexion de l'Autriche par l'Allemagne fait l'objet d'un rapport de Hume Wrong, le représentant du Canada auprès de la Société des Nations.

Prelude to Conflict

In the late 1930s, Canadian posts were established in Belgium and the Netherlands. Skelton also wanted missions in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Brazil, and Argentina. Astoundingly, he opposed Christie's proposal for representation in Germany, Italy, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Canada thus had no official observers in these important spots as war approached. A 1934 letter from Thomas ("Tommy") Stone to Skelton provides one of the few first-hand accounts of Nazi Germany by a Canadian diplomat. Stone, who held the position of second secretary at the legation in Paris, made this report on his own initiative. There is no indication that Skelton was influenced by it. Stone had married a wealthy American woman, and in Paris he "entertained more lavishly than his chief, the Minister." According to Stone's co-worker Benjamin Rogers, Skelton therefore thought of Stone as a "playboy." Three years later, the German annexation of Austria was the subject of a despatch from Hume Wrong, the Canadian representative at the League of Nations.

Loring Christie, qui a rejoint les rangs du Ministère en 1913 en tant que son premier conseiller juridique.

Loring Christie, who joined the department in 1913 as its first legal adviser.

SOURCE YOUSUF KARSH, BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES CANADA/ LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA, PA-17453



Paris, April 10, 1934

My dear Dr. Skelton,

I feel that it might interest you if I supplement my last letter of March 8th from Warsaw by a brief note to you giving you my impressions of Germany. I arrived in Berlin from Danzig on March 11th and remained there until March 20th. After spending 2 days in Dresden I returned to Vienna where I had my car and from there I motored to Paris, via Nuremburg, Rothenberg, Stuttgart, Karlsruhe and Strasbourg.

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 2961, DOSSIER 34

Nazi Germany is the only Germany I have seen. To say the least, it is an incredible country. The organization, the disciplinary measures, the slogans, the uniforms, the rules and regulations which are being imposed upon a people who are showing themselves more and more each day completely susceptible to a unanimous acceptance of fanatically nationalistic and selfish ideas, leave one gasping. However much one may have read about Hitlerism and its absurdities one is astonished to find how true are the most fantastic account of the country under the present régime. While it is true that there is a certain amount of private criticism of the actions of some members of the Hitler cabinet, and in particular Messrs. Röhm, Göring, and Göbbels, still behind what these men and their chief stand for there is as far as one can see, unanimous support. I met in Berlin two or three friends whom I had not seen for 2 years or more. When I was last with them, they were reasonable minded young men of fairly large vision, appreciative of the difficulties which were being created by their own country in matters of international cooperation, and the sort of chaps one could sit with and discuss in a completely objective manner over a glass of beer, international and national problems. Now, it is impossible to talk with them. I am not exaggerating when I say that the atmosphere which they create is that of a fanatical revivalist meeting. In fact, my impression everywhere in Germany was of crowds of sort of dancing dervishes, far advanced in a religious orgy. In all their actions from the most insignificant, such as the greeting of a friend in the morning, to the most important, such as the conduct of the foreign policy of their country, they seem to have lost all sense of reason and proportion.

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOL. 2961, FILE 34

The streets of Berlin are full of a succession of parades and men in uniform. I saw several shops whose sole purpose was to sell and instruct in the use of gas masks. On the Unter der Linden is a War Museum, one window of which contains a relief map of Europe with the lost parts of Germany prominently indicated. In each country on the map are placed small figures to represent its armed forces. Poor little Germany stands in the middle with a mere 100,000 men, while surrounding her are Belgium, England, France, Italy, even Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Russia each having armies of millions and all with their faces turned towards her, waiting expectantly for the command to attack. The inside of the Museum is devoted to war reliques of such a character as to enhance the heroism of war and the glory of dying for the Fatherland, and to reduce to a minimum any idea of its horrors....

When speaking with Germans, I always asked them at some stage whether Hitler is really in favour of peace, followed by the question, is Hitler in absolute control of the present government. Both of these questions received immediate affirmative answers. Then I asked why then does Hitler allow Göring and Göbbels to make the war-like speeches which they do and which have such a disastrous effect on public opinion in the rest of the world. To this question they have



Mackenzie King à Berlin, 1937.

Mackenzie King in Berlin, 1937.

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no definite answer. They explain that Göring and Göbbels are demagogues by profession, that it is in the ability to incite mobs that their genius lies, that for this reason it is hard to keep them in control, that these are the men who have fought with and for Hitler since the beginning and that actually getting rid of them would be out of the question. But, says the German, why will not public opinion in foreign countries realize that this use of aggressive patriotism is merely a political trick and that it really does not represent the views of the country. I would answer always that this is very difficult to believe, even when one sees Germany at close quarters, and how much more difficult then for world opinion to believe that the view expressed by the very founders of the new Reich are not the views of the country generally, and more particularly since their expression continues to prove so useful as a political trick? I feel most definitely that in the mind of every German is a growing conviction that sooner or later, and probably sooner, the country will have to resort to war, in order to make for itself by force a position in Europe and to acquire for itself territories in Europe of a size and importance commensurate with the real grandeur of the great, pure Germanic race.

This conviction is growing rapidly and it is encouraged and strengthened directly or indirectly by every move made by the present régime. As the present time it may yet be stopped in its strides

if Germany could be definitely persuaded that the other important Powers in the world – and particularly France and the British Empire – were unanimous in their resolve and united in their effort to do away with this war-menace. But first of all, naturally, this unanimity and united effort must be found. In my opinion, if it is not found within at the most a year or eighteen months, the Germans will have gone so far along the road which they are now following that not even Hitler with his strength and in the country and with all the desire in the world to do so, could bring them back.

A word about the press. If you take any ten German newspapers for comparative reading you will find them as alike as ten peas. Domestic news of every description is most efficiently controlled. Expression of only one opinion is allowed viz., that the Germanic race is the chosen people; that Hitler is its glorious leader chosen and appointed by some sort of divine intervention and that it is he whom the race must follow to reach eventually the great destiny reserved for it. I had a long talk one evening with the editor of one of the largest papers, the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, who confessed to me that the circulation of every paper in Germany was falling off discouragingly and that being an editor under this régime was really not very interesting. Most Germans admit that to get either domestic or foreign news they must take in some foreign paper. The foreign news in the German press is a pitiful farce. It is meagre and thoroughly censored and never occupies a prominent place except when some story like the Austrian or the French riots can be conveniently or advantageously distorted.

The anti-semitic movement appears to be as strong as ever, particularly in the country. In Berlin, although there was the other day a demonstration against the showing of a film in which Bergner, a Jewish actress, played the leading role, two or three Jewish conductors and several singers have been taken back at the Opera. The demonstration against Bergner has an amusing explanation. Göring and Göbbels, as you perhaps know, are deadly rivals and at present are apparently not on speaking terms. Göbbels, as Minister of Propaganda allowed the Bergner film and Göering, as Minister of the S.A. (Sturmabteilung) organized himself the demonstration against it. In the country and the small towns, particularly Saxony, Northern Bavaria and Wurtemberg, evidences of anti-semitism are to be seen everywhere. Motoring through one notices that at the entrance to almost every town there are signs (similar to our “Rotary Club” signs reading “Welcome to Hicksville - Come Again”) reading “Jews unwanted” or “Jews not welcome.” In the towns most cafés and restaurants have the sign “No Jews allowed” posted in some conspicuous place. Such slogans as “Tell me where you buy and I will tell you who you are” and “German people buy in German stores” are printed on big streamers and stretched across the main street of almost every small town. On the backs of private automobiles one sees glaring red and white posters pasted reading “The Jew has been the cause of all our misfortune” and “Germany for the Germans and not the Jew.” (These, as well as most slogans, are quotations from Hitler’s book *Mein Kampf*.)

I heard expressions of satisfaction from all sides in Berlin that Lord Tyrrell was finally leaving Paris. Because of his pro-French views and because of his wide sphere of influence in this country he is considered by the Germans as a greater menace to their policy than any other living person. I must confess that before I travelled in Germany, I used to think that the Ambassador’s opinions concerning the menace of the new Germany were exaggerated, but I do not believe this any longer. I dined and had a long talk with him the other night and he expressed the view that

the only thing which could save Europe from a catastrophic war and the world from a plunge into the worst chaos that it has ever known is Anglo-French agreement backed by imperial unity and the closest possible cooperation of the United States. I thoroughly realize the difficulties which lie in the way of achieving these three things, but I fully share Lord Tyrell's views. With regard to Anglo-French agreement, this seems at the moment to be a little closer than it was fourteen days ago. There seems to be no doubt that British public opinion is awakening to the fact of the German menace particularly from the air. I know that Mr. Eden was astonished by what he found in the way of air armaments and plans for air armaments during his recent visit in Berlin – which visit has been compared to Lord Haldane's trip to Germany in 1912. As a direct result of this it looks as if the Government in Great Britain are preparing to go farther than they have ever considered doing towards offering France, in some form or other, the definite guarantees of security upon which she has been so long insisting.

By the next bag we hope to send you a complete review of the present status of the question of disarmament, or, as it is more generally being described now, the question of the limitation of armaments.

Yours sincerely,
Thomas A. Stone

Despatch 119

Geneva, March 21, 1938

Sir,

In continuation of my despatch No. 111 of 15th March 1938, I have the honour to report that during the days which have passed since the extinction of Austrian independence, Geneva has remained a political backwater. No proposal has been made to the Secretary-General that the Council should be convened, and the Mexican Government alone has addressed to him a protest against the inertia of the League. The Austrian permanent delegate, Baron von Pfiügl, who has represented his country in Geneva since 1920, immediately resigned his post before he received instructions to hoist the swastika flag...

SOURCE: VOLUME 6, DOCUMENT 870

It would be hard to exaggerate the apprehension which has pervaded Geneva since the events of 12th March. At first it looked as though it might be possible to regard the *anschluss* as an isolated affair, to be deplored, it is true, because of the methods employed, but by its consummation removing a dangerous cause of instability in Central Europe. Not many took this position, and it is harder to maintain now than it was a week ago. For the incidents of the past week tend to support the contrary view that the *anschluss* is part of a larger programme, the execution of which must involve the gravest risk of hostilities on a continental scale. One must hope that the prophets of disaster are wrong; but they have the floor in Geneva, and in trying to sum up opinion I can find very little to relieve the gloom....

SOURCE: VOLUME 6, DOCUMENT 870

... [T]hat trouble may soon be expected in Czechoslovakia is deduced more from the change in tone of the leaders of the Sudeten-Deutsch than from any fresh statements by the Czech Government, or by the Governments of other countries. The German Government has gone

out of its way to give assurances of its peaceful intentions toward Czechoslovakia, but they are paying the price of their previous behaviour in finding little credit for their assurances. The Czech Government is understood to be ready to make further concessions to the German-speaking population. Yet the feeling is abroad that the German pincers may close on Czechoslovakia at any time and that of all the danger spots of Europe this is the most explosive.

On all sides one hears, with an almost frightening unanimity, that on a clear and resolute stand by the British Government rests the hope of European peace. It is natural that Mr. Winston Churchill's speech in the House of Commons on 14th March should receive great attention and commendation in Geneva. There is considerable expectation, perhaps in part the product of wishful thinking, that either the present British Government or a reorganised Cabinet including Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden will adopt the policy advocated by Mr. Churchill of a vigorous return to Geneva as the best and most honourable method of seeking to restore some sort of balance in Europe. It is admitted, of course, that such a policy involves grave risks, but it is argued that the risks are not so great as the continuance of the present uncertainty, and that if new commitments are to be given, they will be most effective if given inside the Covenant....

One distressing aspect of recent events seems likely to grow in importance. Persons returning from Austria add unpleasant details to the accounts in the press of the measures being taken against Austrian Jews and political dissidents. There has been already a certain amount of illicit emigration across the strict frontier control which was organised immediately after the German troops arrived in Austria, and this seems likely to increase as the Nazi policy of depriving Austrian Jews of their positions and of much of their property progresses. With the growth of anti-Semitism in Poland and Rumania, the problem of Jewish refugees seems destined to become more difficult than ever.

I have etc.

H.H. Wrong

Section 15

La Tchécoslovaquie et la Pologne

En septembre 1938, Vincent Massey, alors haut-commissaire à Londres, fait parvenir à Mackenzie King un compte rendu de son entretien avec le Premier ministre britannique Neville Chamberlain concernant la crise provoquée par les visées de l'Allemagne sur la Tchécoslovaquie. Skelton est de ceux qui ont approuvé l'accord de Munich ayant par la suite mis un terme à cette crise. Il espère ainsi éviter une guerre à laquelle le Canada se sentirait obligé de participer aux côtés des Britanniques.

Tout au long des années qui précèdent immédiatement la guerre, Skelton voit la situation politique internationale surtout sous l'angle des effets qu'elle peut avoir sur les relations du Canada avec la Grande-Bretagne. Et même si le ministère des Affaires extérieures n'a pas la capacité voulue pour infléchir d'une quelconque façon les discussions sur la montée du fascisme, Skelton est profondément contrarié de voir que la Grande-Bretagne a décidé d'abandonner sa politique d'apaisement sans avoir consulté Ottawa. En août 1939, il déclare que « la première victime de cette guerre est la revendication du Canada à contrôler lui-même sa propre destinée ». Cette déclaration témoigne à l'évidence de son solide patriotisme, mais elle traduit aussi, surtout en rétrospective, sa vision assez limitée des affaires mondiales.

Czechoslovakia and Poland

In September 1938, Vincent Massey (then the High Commissioner in London) sent Mackenzie King an account of his conversation with British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain about the crisis over German ambitions in Czechoslovakia. Skelton was among those who approved of the ensuing Munich agreement. He hoped to avoid a war in which Canada would be expected to fight at Britain's side.

Throughout the pre-war years, Skelton evaluated the international political situation mainly in terms of its likely effect on Canada's relationship with Britain. Although the Department of External Affairs did not possess the capability to contribute in any significant way to diplomatic discussions on the rise of fascism, Skelton profoundly resented the fact that Britain's decision to drop its policy of appeasement was made without consulting Ottawa. His statement in August 1939 that "The first casualty in this war has been Canada's claim to independent control of her own destinies," is certainly clear evidence of his strong patriotism but, particularly in retrospect, it shows a rather limited outlook on world affairs.

London, September 26, 1938

I have just been with the Prime Minister for three quarters of an hour and heard from him intimate account of his efforts since Berchtesgaden conversations. My impression is that he and his Government feel that they have exhausted every possible means of avoiding catastrophe and that they are none too confident that it can be averted.

SOURCE : VOLUME 6, DOCUMENT 897

Was struck by point in Prime Minister's statement when he said although he had been inclined at first to be impressed by view that German proposals for occupation of Sudetenland were largely a matter of method, he had come to the conviction that there was more in it than that. If matter was merely one of method why was Hitler so determined not to modify terms? Prime Minister is convinced that proposals reveal ambitions more far-reaching than Hitler has been prepared to admit. The Prime Minister said his final efforts to avert war, namely, Sir Horace Wilson's visit this afternoon to Berlin, had not met with encouraging results from what he had heard from Wilson on the telephone a few minutes before. Wilson, however, has apparently a further appointment with Hitler tomorrow morning. I asked the Prime Minister if he thought an offer of mediation by Roosevelt would serve any good purpose even if one expects Hitler to refuse it. He said he would be quite ready to invite Roosevelt to (offer?) his services if he thought there was the slightest chance of Hitler's acceptance. Lord Halifax, who was present, felt such an offer might be useful even if it were refused by Hitler in moral effect it would have generally. Such an offer would come as a natural sequel to excellent message Roosevelt sent to Hitler today. Ends.

SOURCE : VOLUME 6, DOCUMENT 897

Massey

October 3, 1938

After The Munich Agreement

It will be many years before a complete balance-sheet of September 1938 can be drawn up: probably all the chief actors will be dead by then and all the world but a few historians will be too busy with fresh troubles to bother about such far-off quarrels and near-battles long ago. But even now a few preliminary and personal opinions may be expressed.

SOURCE : VOLUME 6, DOCUMENT 903

SOURCE : VOLUME 6, DOCUMENT 903

1. *It is well that peace has been preserved.*

Whatever criticisms may be made of Chamberlain's and Daladier's course, surely we must recognize that they, and particularly Chamberlain, worked for peace and achieved it. I have personally never doubted that a peace such as could *now* be obtained would be bought at a great price, – that the repressive policy adopted by France for a dozen years after 1918 and the fumbling of British policy in the years just before and after Hitler's coming to power made it impossible now to achieve a good peace suddenly. But I have also believed that even a bad peace, which might pave the way for a good peace, was better than a preventive war; that no one could forecast the outcome of another European or world war, but could be certain that the horrors and suffering of such a war would begin where the last war left off; that the objects of the war would have little relation to the results, and that liberty and democracy would have

little chance of survival in such a death grapple. I therefore am glad that Chamberlain strove for peace so pertinaciously, that he never lost his temper or his head, and that he was man enough to continue working for peace when many in England were shouting war and it would have been easy and popular (for the moment) to have taken up that cry himself. He has done a good job.

2. The settlement is not one to be proud of in itself.

It would be foolish to overlook the weaknesses of the present settlement. We cannot deny that force and bluff have triumphed; that Hitler has won by threats and a show of force more than many rulers have won by war; that his position in his own country has been strengthened and his megalomania nourished by this last proof of his irresistible will; that Poland has been encouraged to make a still more contemptible raid; that only Hitler's brittle promises stand in the way of further domination of the Danube; and that it will be a long time before any small country in Europe again places any shred of confidence in a pledge from France or advice from England....

3. There is, however, a chance of a wider appeasement.

Chamberlain has gambled on being able to persuade Hitler and Mussolini to rest content with their laurels. He is probably less confident now than before he met Hitler and realized his abnormal nature. But there is a good chance. September scared every country and every ruler, dictator or democratic. The universal outburst of relief, which the bellicose in England say amounted there to hysteria, was too great and too revealing of how little heart there was for war, to be easily forgotten. The dictator countries realized they had no friends anywhere – even though few of their critics were prepared to fight. It may be that the triumphs and the parades of this year will banish Hitler's and Germany's inferiority complex, or revenge obsession. It may be Mussolini will realize that the Rome-Berlin axis is grinding only for Hitler's mill. Time has been won for reason....

6. Chamberlain's commitments for the future.

Mr. Chamberlain did make commitments at Munich not for the war that didn't happen last week, but for the war that may happen later. He agreed, as foreshadowed in his House of Commons speech of last week, to join in a four power guarantee of the territorial integrity of what will remain of Czechoslovakia. This is a very serious extension of British liabilities. Mr. Baldwin declared Great Britain's boundary lay on the Rhine; Mr. Chamberlain has now extended it to the Danube. Presumably Canada will not be asked to join in the guarantee; but presumably also Mr. Chamberlain, unless corrected, will continue to assume that we would be bound nevertheless: as he calmly indicated in his September 28th speech, we would be bound by his actions now – “a step involving the whole British Empire in war.” And even if Chamberlain would be cautious, for his own country's sake, in carrying out these commitments, his time may be short, and a Churchill or a Duff Cooper may succeed.

Clearly if the European situation has been cleared up, however unsatisfactorily, the British Commonwealth situation has not. Our position remains ambiguous and dangerous. It is not easy to effect a clear-cut solution at present, but one thing is certain, the generation of young Canadians now developing a political interest, irrespective of race, will not stand permanently for their destinies being determined by irresponsible bodies in London.

August 25, 1939

Canada and the Polish War

A Personal Note

Europe is on the brink of war and Canada is apparently preparing to join in the stampede over the edge. A conflict may possibly be averted by a Polish retreat, but that will not alter the facts as to the potential attitude of Canada or the diplomatic methods of Britain. I wish therefore to record at this stage some brief personal observations on the situation.

First:

The first casualty in this war has been Canada's claim to independent control of her own destinies. In spite of a quarter century of proclamation and achievement of equal and independent status, we have thus far been relegated to the role of a Crown colony. We are drifting into a war resulting, so far as the United Kingdom's part is concerned, from policies and diplomatic actions initiated months ago without our knowledge or expectation.... If war comes in Poland and we take part, that war comes as the consequence of commitments made by the Government of Great Britain, about which we were not in one iota consulted, and about which we were given not the slightest inkling of information in advance. The British Government with bland arrogance has assumed that whatever its policy, whether it be appeasement or challenge, pro-Russian or anti-Russian, pro-Italian or anti-Italian, a Western European policy or an Eastern European policy, we could be counted on to trot behind, blindly and dumbly, to chaos. It was one of the more modest members of the Chamberlain family, Austen, who, in speaking of the Locarno Agreement in 1935, expressed agreement with the view that formal consultation in Councils or otherwise with the Dominions would hamper Britain: she could go ahead in the assurance that if Great Britain got into peril, all the Dominions would stand behind her.

Sir Austen's view may be right as regards the present instance. Wide sections of Canadian opinion are prepared to accept the Polish policy and its consequences. This is partly due to a strange combination of forces in Canada. Imperialists and Communists have joined collective sanctionists and refugee sympathizers in acquiescing in the British course; London and Moscow, Geneva and Jerusalem have been our capitals rather than Ottawa. Many have accepted the clichés about freedom which are conveniently ignored when Britain does not consider her interests are involved, and are pressed with all the conviction of moral and gentlemanly superiority when they are considered involved. Impetus has been given by the genuine hatred of Hitler and of what he and his Nazi gangsters stand for. I fully share the detestation of Nazi and all other totalitarian barbarism. Sentiment as well as reason leads me to wish to see Britain retain as strong and secure a place in the world as actual realities make conceivable. I have therefore no exception whatever to such factors entering into the deciding of Canadian policy, along with equal consideration of the special factors in Canada's North American position. My objection is to our fate being determined without any participation or agreement on the part of the Government of Canada in the commitments made, being determined by policies and decisions of other governments without even the polite formality of consultation. Whatever the outcome of this war, if it comes, and whatever portion of our present civilization and freedom and our present empires

and maps of Europe, survive it, it might at least be assumed that this subordinate relationship will not survive. (But we assumed this in 1919).

But it is not merely a question of Canadian interests or Canadian independence. It is a question of British competence, of the wisdom of the guides who have assumed control of our destinies. Does the record of London policy give ground for the policy of "Trust Mother"?

People in Canada are shouting "Stand by Britain" without pausing to consider where she stands and how long she can stand there. There [sic] are shouting "Stop Hitler," without pausing to consider if it is wise to be maneuvered into fighting him in his own back yard, into choosing the very field where he is strongest and Britain and France are weakest....

These hurried comments are far from a complete or balanced survey. If war comes, we must all in our several ways do our utmost to ensure victory and what lies beyond victory, but nothing is to be gained by glossing over the failures and follies of recent months.

Section 16

Le déclenchement de la guerre

Le déclenchement de la guerre est un processus complexe qui implique de nombreux facteurs. Les tensions politiques, les intérêts économiques et les rivalités nationales jouent un rôle crucial. Les événements déclencheurs, tels que l'assassinat de l'archiduc, peuvent servir de catalyseur à une escalade qui mène à un conflit mondial. Les alliances militaires et les politiques de diplomatie influencent également le déroulement de la guerre.

The Outbreak of War

The outbreak of war is a complex process involving many factors. Political tensions, economic interests, and national rivalries play a crucial role. Triggering events, such as the assassination of the archduke, can serve as a catalyst for an escalation that leads to a world war. Military alliances and diplomatic policies also influence the course of the war.

Estoril, June 22, 1940

My dear Doctor Skelton,

I thought that the Prime Minister and yourself might be interested in reading an informal account of some of the highlights of our errant life since the invasion of Belgium.

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHEQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA. RG 25. VOLUME 2960. DOSSIER 29

A formal and complete despatch is in the course of preparation but it may not be ready for some time yet due to the daily handicaps under which we are working.

During the three days following the invasion, we remained in Brussels and carried on our work. On the morning of the third day, May 12th, the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs advised all the Foreign missions that they should leave the city and proceed to Ostend.... I decided to leave Brussels by automobile....

SOURCE : LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA.
RG 25. VOLUME 2960. FILE 29

At Ostend, the Foreign Office services, which arrived the same day, commandeered rooms and private homes for the use of diplomats. The latter however refused to occupy them as they were found to lack the most elementary comfort, facilities such as telephone, and in some cases essential furniture, such as beds, tables or chairs. I decided together with my diplomatic colleagues to put up at a hotel and found rooms at the Osborne Hotel directly on the beach.

My first preoccupation was to secure the means of communicating by telephone with my Chancery at Brussels and with the Canadian Legation at Paris. I obtained a private line into my room and the necessary authorization from the military and postal authorities for official calls. I also installed a radio receiving set to keep abreast of the news in the total absence of newspapers. My colleagues, less prompt, were not as fortunate and my room soon became a gathering place for diplomats of various nationalities anxious to use the means at my disposal for keeping in touch with the outside world. These facilities enabled me to carry on my work more or less normally and among other things to ensure the evacuation of certain of our nationals who did not reveal their presence in Belgium until this very late hour. This was the case for instance of a number of Clarisse nuns who were in a convent at Wavre....

We did everything we could in the greatest confusion and in the most indescribable state of disorganization. This went on until the night of May 15th-16th during which Ostend was the object of a very severe bombing by German aircraft. The first bombs were dropped in the late afternoon apparently to cover mine laying operations in the port.

The explosions became more frequent and stronger during the night and our hotel was considerably damaged by the explosion of a mine which was dropped by mistake on the beach directly in front of the hotel.

The whole business was a perfect nightmare, due to the fact that, on the sea-shore, there were no cellars and no shelters of any sort.

The next morning, we heard that the British subjects, over a thousand, who had been embarked on three ships, had been bombed and machine gunned. The waters were infested with mines and the passengers were finally disembarked, put on board trains bound for Dieppe and Lettave, through Rouen. This journey was interminable and fraught with every possible danger,

because of the enemy air activity and the congestion of the railways. Their final departure from Dieppe and Lettavrre was effected under the same appalling conditions.

This cured us for all time of any desire of having recourse to official means of evacuation.

It became quite obvious that Ostend was no longer safe and, in any case, our hotel had become uninhabitable. Moreover the Dutch army having capitulated, it was to be expected that the German troops in Holland would soon force their way to Antwerp, Bruges and Ostend in order to prevent the retreat of the Belgian forces. These had been already beaten on their first and second lines of defence and were in danger of a rear attack from the German troops which on the 14th, had broken through the French front on the Meuse.

In complete agreement with the other Foreign missions and on the pressing advice of the Belgian Government, I decided to leave Ostend....

The flow of refugees at that time had about reached its height. The roads were congested in the extreme by military and civil refugees. No attempt was made to control this jam....

We set out for Paris, a distance of about 150 miles. We hoped to arrive in the evening for dinner. This was too optimistic. We had no idea even then of the complete rout in which we were to be imprisoned. After the first seven hours we had covered approximately thirty miles, in spite of the facilities which the military authorities endeavoured to give us. Motorized troops coming in the opposite direction could not fight their way against the flow. Our fate was not as bad as that of those in front and behind us in the column who were machine gunned by German aircraft. We were between Abbeville and Neufchatel for a considerable time while both those cities were being destroyed.

At dusk, it became obvious that we could not proceed any further. The motors of our cars were over-heating. We had no food nor water. We were extremely tired due to lack of sleep during the past seven days.

We took a by-road leading into a small forest near a village called Menonval. We found a few farms but had much trouble in convincing the peasants that we were not parachutists. We were finally allowed to sleep in the barns where a good many other refugees had already taken shelter. The night was cold. The sound of gun fire and explosions could be heard all through the night. Our sleep was brief and uneasy. At daybreak we left and soon discovered that if we were ever to reach Paris we should have to go to Dieppe. A look at the map will show what a round about course we were forced to steer.

Dieppe was sighted at about six o'clock in the morning. It had not yet been bombed but was due to be heavily attacked that same day. I consulted the British military authorities regarding the best route to follow to Paris and, through them, secured gasoline....

The military news were far from encouraging. Colonel Vanier was very anxious that we should not remain in the Capital longer than necessary. I found that the Belgian Government had selected Le Havre as their next quarters and, at about five o'clock, I left for Cabourg.

During our very short stay in Paris, we were able to convert the whole of our Legation's funds from belgas into French francs, to give instructions to the Canadians we had evacuated from Belgium, to leave instructions for our future cooperation with our Paris Legation. The time at our disposal was partly taken up by an air raid which lasted an hour....

The caravan set out again towards the South. It was enlarged by the addition of my wife and children who had preceeded us in Normandy.

On reaching Poitiers, we found it submerged by Belgian and French refugees from the North. The hotels were overflowing with people and in order to be able to sleep under cover that night I had to enlist the assistance of the "Prefet de la Vienne" who commandeered a farm house for us, six miles out of Poitiers. This dwelling was in deplorable shape and a few days of strenuous work were needed to clean and equip it with the bare necessities of life.

The Belgian Government dribbled in but experienced great difficulties in finding quarters. The "Chef du Protocole" who arrived the same day as we did with his invalid wife, had to sleep for two successive nights in a stable.

Much of our time was devoted to finding food, gasoline, wood, coal, etc.... There was no running water in the house but a first class pump stood in the middle of the court. An empty hot house was transformed into a bath room by painting the windows with blue paint, and a round tin tub was installed therein. We left to the sun the heating of the water.

The closest contact was maintained every day with the Belgian Government. New arrangements were made with the military and civil authorities for our free communications by telephone and telegraph.

I got on very friendly terms with local Mayor, Secretary-General of the prefecture, Military authorities, who offered us the most cordial assistance. So much so that my British, Portuguese and Yugoslav colleagues called on me for facilitating their own establishment in the vicinity.

The announcement, on May 28th, of King Leopold's capitulation caused deep sensation and distress among Belgian officials.... I came to the conclusion that it was desirable to send my wife and children to Canada....

I conferred with the Belgian Foreign Minister and with some of my colleagues who shared my views that it would be wise to explore the Bordeaux region in advance so as to secure accommodation. This part of France was already overpopulated, the flow of refugees from the Paris region was increasing terrifically, the food was getting scarce, the supplies of gasoline precarious. It was intimated that the Belgian Government's next move would be towards Bordeaux.

I was offered by a Canadian friend the use of his chateau on the condition that I would occupy it at once so as to prevent its being commandeered by the military authorities for their own use.

After giving the whole question the most serious consideration and having made all necessary arrangements to continue my contacts with the Belgians at Poitiers, I moved to Chateau

Lascombes, accompanied by the Portuguese Minister to Belgium, the property of Brigadier-General Brutinel...

On the morning of the 14th June, Colonel Vanier telephoned me that he was arriving that very same day from Pernay, near Blois, where he had established his Legation after the evacuation of Paris. Their party included close to thirty people and I was requested to find accommodation for them that night. This was no mean job in a country where every available space was occupied.

Through the good offices of the Mayor of Cantenac, near Margaux, to whom I finally had to apply after exhausting every other possibility, I was able to secure three empty houses, previously reserved by the French authorities. Rudimentary furniture was commandeered at my request and installed in these houses. Rations were put in every house so that, on their arrival, late that night, they found room and food. The Mayor was good enough to put up Mrs. Archer, Madame Vanier and her daughter as well as Colonel Vanier in his own house.

We spent most of the night installing the occupants of each of the cars as they arrived, in their respective quarters, Cantenac being located two miles away from Lascombes.

Their journey was arduous and this is not surprising as the train which left Tours at about the same time as they did, with French Government officials on board, reached Bordeaux twenty-four hours later. This does not constitute a record however as there is the instance of a train loaded with the families of Belgian officials which left Ostend the day following our departure and had not yet been heard of three weeks later.

This is a good example of the danger attendant upon last minute evacuation of civilian population. Our British colleagues whose habit it is to always to wait another day have paid a heavy price for their tardiness: Sir Lancelot Oliphant is now a prisoner in Germany together with his military attaché. The same fate befell Scarlett, Second Secretary of the British Embassy in Brussels, Mackenzie, the Assistant Commercial Attaché as well as the whole staff of the British Consulate at Lille...

Yours very sincerely,
Jean Désy

London, October 9, 1940

My dear Dr. Skelton,

This letter is not destined to my Chief, but to the man who has for over fifteen years honoured me with his friendly confidence. It has no other purport but that of giving a picture of my life which you are entitled to have. Should anything happen to me that would prevent me from making these confidences verbally to you I should reproach myself for not having disclosed in writing some incidents of my private life. This is not done in the way of a complaint, but as a sincere explanation.

Apart from the political accidents of European politics which are known to you and which as you know have affected me, there are other accidents which have not left me indifferent.

For the last two years I have had no respite and no rest. It was first the events leading to Munich that kept us on the spring, or moving from Paris to the Hague and Brussels. During the three months that preceded our establishment in the Low Countries, my wife had been seriously ill. She was then expecting our little Jean-Louis. For nearly three months she was forced to stay in bed, unable to eat anything, and for weeks was artificially fed. It was under these trying conditions that we prepared our moving from Paris, started our hunt for houses and visited Brussels and the Hague with a view to finding suitable quarters. The period during which we had to establish simultaneously our two Legations was not an easy one. We incurred difficulties with the personnel as well as with all the craftsmen "corps de métier" with whom we had to discuss and whom we had to supervise, etc. When the house at the Hague was practically finished and rendered gently [sic] habitable, my wife went to the clinic, where she spent the last month of her pregnancy. We were then in Brussels and the repairs in the house were not completed. Painters, plumbers, carpenters, were still all over the place, from the attic down to the reception rooms, and our things were still unpacked and every time we wanted to find anything we had to open a case which always proved to be the wrong one.

Jean-Louis was born, and a few weeks later my wife was transferred to the Hague, and there a tragedy broke upon us. This beautiful and healthy creature whom you know worried me to such an extent that I had to call, in the middle of the night, a doctor friend of mine from Paris, who had treated her during the early part of her pregnancy. My wife showed evident signs of nervous depression. For days in succession she would be weeping for no reason whatever – because the new-born was in perfect health. Then all of a sudden it came to her mind that this child would be stolen away from her, or killed, either by the tradesmen or domestics. We reached the conclusion that this nervous excitation was the reaction of nine months of physical strain. The doctor came promptly from Paris, thoroughly examined my wife in the course of the night and the next morning she was taken to Divonne-les-Bains for a cure. I was left at the Hague in charge of a three weeks old baby, and combined for a month my duties as a nurse and as the head of a dual mission. Then the war broke out. I got very nervous about Corinne and managed to have her come by one of the last planes from Zurich to Rotterdam. She returned in perfect health, and the cure has been in every respect final.

SOURCE: BIBLIOTHEQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA. RG 25, VOLUME 2960, DOSSIER 29

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOL. 2960, FILE 29

Our autumn was an extremely busy one, with functions of all sorts at the Hague, and the moment we had finished in one country we started afresh in the other one. When we got to Brussels we unpacked our things, finished decorating the house, and started our social life, entertaining three times a week either at lunch or at dinner twenty persons, and receiving in the afternoon up to three hundred persons. At the New Year we returned to the Hague for the purpose of widely opening the doors of our Legation. We met, as I reported to you with a very severe automobile accident, from which we escaped by a miracle. This accident happened at 11 o'clock in the morning, and at 7.30 the same evening we attended an official dinner in the Hague. I reported to you at the time the very trying weeks that I had to go through in Holland and the wrong diagnosis of angina pectoris made by a Dutch doctor. When I returned to Brussels I felt relieved when my doctor told me that I was suffering from nervous troubles, due to surmenage. These troubles are still recurring occasionally.

Hardly four weeks before we were invaded we had another very hard blow. Corinne was taken to the clinic and operated on following a miscarriage. She happily recovered very fast.

I will not surprise you in saying that I have known little of the advantages of my dual mission and that, on the contrary, I have experienced most of the disadvantages.

Since May last there has not been much chance for me to take any real rest. If at times I have been physically idle I never was morally nor sentimentally in a position to relax. I need hardly mention to you how I felt when I had to part with my wife and children. Of course that was the only sensible thing to do – of course that was the only course to be followed – of course that was the only acceptable solution, but nevertheless I did suffer very deeply and I do continue to suffer from the separation both as a father and as a husband. So much the more because day after day I have the acute and persistent sensation that my presence here is worthless, that my mission has practically come to an end, and that I can render no service of any value either to my country or to my own family.

May I be permitted to tell you how terribly I miss my wife and my children, especially when I consider that I am losing once and for all the joy and happiness of noticing Mariel's and Jean-Louis' daily progress, the awakening of their minds, the charming and touching manifestations of their gentle souls. That will never come back, and it is a part of their life that will remain unknown and closed to me. I am even convinced that my son will not recognise either my face or my voice when I see him again, and that for days I will remain a stranger to him. I refrain from doing anything more than mentioning the sadness of being away from Corinne who has shown so generously her courage, her devotion and her love. This, my dear Dr. Skelton, is the background of my official life, and I thought I owed it to you to describe it in very plain words.

Could I add that I obviously misread and misinterpreted the information contained in your telegram No. 49 to the effect that "the whole situation will be considered when Vanier arrives and instructions sent." I got the impression that you required Vanier's advice to settle my case and to dispose of me when as far back as the end of June I proposed to you to return for consultation. I felt somewhat shocked by the idea that somebody else (and it happened to be Vanier) should be asked to give his advice in a case where I was primarily concerned. You know that I consider Vanier as one of my best friends. We were brought up together, and both our mothers were



Le haut-commissariat du
Canada, Trafalgar Square,
Londres.

The Canadian High Commission,
Trafalgar Square, London.

SOURCE: BEDFORD AND STRAID,
BIBLIOTHEQUE ET ARCHIVES CANADA,
BRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA, PA-127557

friends from childhood. I dictated the telegram referred to in your letter of the 26th September as a protest against such a procedure and I wished this telegram to be a statement of my case, nothing more and nothing beyond. I was ill, miserably ill, and obviously my thought was wrongly expressed and my words went beyond my intentions.

Our quarter of London seems to be receiving more than its share of bombs and shells. Last night, for instance, our hotel seemed to be the centre of the target of the German bombers. During the night of Sunday while no bombing took place it seemed as if something had gone wrong and our sleep was somewhat disturbed by the absence of noise!

The day and night bombing of London is by no means a joke. Five, six, seven and even eight alerts during the day time, and at night the warning sounds at about 7.30 and the "all clear" between 5 and 6 the next morning. In the London area the damage is extensive and heavy. The loss of life and casualties up to this date amount respectively to 9 thousand and 14 thousand. The danger is real and continuous.

I wish you could see the hundreds of invalids, women and children forming a queue in front of the entrances of the tube stations as early as 5 p.m. so as to secure a space on the pavements of the platforms, where they can spend the night. The question of shelters for a few hundred thousands of people who have no means of protecting themselves and their families against air raids is still being discussed after over one year and a half of war. Some of the surface shelters built at great cost by the Government are unused by the population because they afford no safety.

As far as I am concerned I have definitely given up sleeping in the shelter amid snorers of all types and grades and exposed to all the floating microbes of this Supersalvation Army Refuge. I sleep, or try to, in my own bed. The risk of receiving a shell or a bomb is smaller than that of contamination or of acquiring lumbago in the underground dormitory.

Can you imagine how the Prime Minister of Great Britain can state – to console the population of this country – that the Government had anticipated 3,000 killed and 13,000 wounded in a single night! And in spite of these tragic anticipations the proper precautions have not been taken to afford the population any proper shelter.

I quite agree that it seems very egoistical to talk of one's misfortunes and little miseries. If I have made this confession which I hope you will understand and forgive – it is with the simple view of explaining to you, in a most confidential and private manner, my present state of mind as a man whom you have considered, outside of our formal relations, with a sincere and human kindness for which I shall always be grateful.

Yours very sincerely,
Jean Désy

Section 17

L'Accord d'Ogdensburg

Avec l'arrivée de la guerre, les bonnes relations personnelles entre Mackenzie King et le président américain Franklin D. Roosevelt revêtent une grande importance. Le 17 août 1940, King et Roosevelt se rencontrent à Ogdensburg, dans l'État de New York, et conviennent de plans pour la défense conjointe de l'Amérique du Nord. Pour les documents portant sur les autres discussions entre Roosevelt et des fonctionnaires canadiens, voir DRREC, Volume 8, documents 42, 43, 56, 84, 85, 94 et 106.

The Ogdensburg Agreement

With the coming of war, the good personal relationship between Mackenzie King and American president Franklin D. Roosevelt became of great importance. On August 17, 1940, King and Roosevelt met at Ogdensburg, New York, and agreed on plans for the joint defence of North America. For records of other discussions involving Roosevelt and Canadian officials, see DCER Volume 8, documents 42, 43, 56, 84, 85, 94, and 106.

Ottawa, May 30, 1940

William Lyon
Mackenzie King
to Winston Churchill

SOURCE : VOLUME 8, DOCUMENT 49

William Lyon
Mackenzie King
to Winston Churchill

SOURCE: VOLUME 8, DOCUMENT 49

- Most Secret and Personal. Begins. I thank you for your most secret messages and especially for the frank and thorough analysis of the present situation and of alternative policies under consideration by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. I need scarcely say that the Government and people of Canada are more determined than ever to lend every assistance in their power to the allied cause. I recognize that your discussion of alternative policies deals only with contingencies, but they are contingencies in the light of which decisions cannot too quickly be reached. I notice in particular that in considering possible courses of action, you naturally assume that much will depend upon the measure of assistance you may be able to count upon from the United States, and the time within which that assistance can be given.
2. As Lord Lothian no doubt informed you, I had opportunities for intimate personal conversations with the President at the time of my recent visit with him at Warm Springs and later with the President and Mr. Hull at Washington. I have since kept in as close personal touch with each as circumstances have permitted. Like you, I believe that both the President and Mr. Hull are anxious to assist the allied cause to the extent of their power. They have, however, been, as you also are aware, handicapped in their efforts by political conditions, particularly the state of public and Congressional opinion, and by the lack of preparedness in some particulars of the United States itself to meet a situation which hitherto had not been considered a serious possibility.
 3. In all the conversations I have had with both the President and Mr. Hull, I have not hesitated to stress how extremely important it was to the allied cause, that every possible assistance should be given, as quickly as possible, particularly in the way of planes and credits...
 7. The following may, I think, be regarded as expressing accurately how the President views the situation and what he believes would prove to be the most effective means of achieving the defeat of the enemy, if it should prove impossible for the Allies to withstand the German attack during the present summer. If what the President has in mind should appear to you to provide a basis for further discussion, he and Mr. Hull would immediately take up the matter with you through the usual channels.
 8. The President feels it would be unwise to ignore the grave possibility of the war taking such a turn as would result in France being overrun and Britain so situated that she would not be able to continue to repel mass attacks from the air. As long as there is any possibility of successful defence, the British fleet should be left in action. If the British Isles can withstand the air bombardment, it is possible that a blockade of the Continent and the Mediterranean can be made so effective that Germany and Italy can be defeated. If it became apparent, however, that hope of continued successful resistance was gone, the President fears the United Kingdom in such case might be called on to make a hard choice between a cessation of hostilities based on surrender of the British fleet and parts of the outlying Empire on terms which the Germans might or might not observe, or prolonging the war with a merciless attitude on the part of Germany.

9. The United States cannot, it is considered, give immediate belligerent aid. If, however, Britain and France could hold out for some months, aid could probably then be given. If further resistance by the fleet in British waters became impossible before such aid could be given, the President believes that having ultimate victory for the allies and the final defeat of the enemy in view, it would be disastrous to surrender the fleet on any terms, that it should be sent to South Africa, Singapore, Australia, the Caribbean and Canada. He would also deem it wise that in such a contingency, that vessels which cannot be moved, should be destroyed, especially naval ships under construction, and that the same steps should be taken with regard to merchant marine. It would be equally desirable to save as many merchant craft as could be sailed away.
10. Were this course adopted, the United States would assist immediately by opening its ports to the British fleet in so far as this could be done under the most liberal interpretation of International Law to permit of repairing, outfitting and provisioning of the fleet. The United States would do its best to help in the building up of bases at Simonstown, Singapore, Halifax and elsewhere. It would extend the provisions for the defence of the Western Atlantic, and its fleet would hold the Pacific and especially defend Australia and New Zealand against Japanese or other attacks. As soon thereafter as grounds could be found to justify direct and active American participation (and neither Mr. Roosevelt nor Mr. Hull believes that this would be more than a very few weeks), the United States would participate in a stringent blockade of the Continent of Europe to be enforced by a naval cordon drawn from Greenland to North Africa and by naval units based in the Indian Ocean....
14. I have continued to present to the President and Mr. Hull as strongly as I could the view that aid given now, even if not as adequate as it might be later, would be decisive in maintaining the Allied and particularly French morale, in deterring Italy and preventing the development of a position which it would be increasingly hard to change.
15. On this point the President and the Secretary reiterated their belief that much as they would like to be able to do so, it was not possible to give immediate direct military aid beyond what I have stated....

W.L. Mackenzie King

[Ottawa,] August 19, 1940

O.D. Skelton à William
Lyon Mackenzie King
SOURCE : VOLUME 8, DOCUMENT 90

Attached is a copy of the telegram to Mr. Churchill as sent last night.

It was certainly the best day's work done for many a year.

O.D. Skelton to William
Lyon Mackenzie King
SOURCE: VOLUME 8, DOCUMENT 90

It did not come by chance, but as the inevitable sequence of public policies and personal relationships, based upon the realization of the imperative necessity of close understanding between the English-speaking peoples.

O.D.S.

Telegram

Ottawa, August 18, 1940

Most Immediate. Most Secret and Personal. Following from Prime Minister for Mr. Churchill, Most Secret and Personal. Begins.

1. You will have seen statements given by the President to the press Friday at noon. At two o'clock, same day, the President telephoned me personally from Washington inviting me to dine with him and spend Saturday night aboard his train near Canadian border.
2. We met at seven o'clock last night. Secretary of State for War Mr. Stimson was also present with the President. Conversations began before dinner and after dinner continued till nearly midnight. This morning (Sunday), with the President and Mr. Stimson, I attended military service Pennsylvania Regiment. I said good-bye at noon and have just reached Ottawa on return.
3. The President gave me full account communications between you and himself of which I had already been fully advised by you. I found both the President and the Secretary of War greatly pleased at outcome of conversations with yourself and quite obviously anxious to render all assistance possible.
4. I have President's authority to let you know he hopes to be able to arrange, before present week is out, to begin supplying you with destroyers and to let you have fifty in all. Arrangement proposed is to have destroyers brought to Halifax or one or two other Canadian ports by United States seamen, there to be delivered to us on your behalf. They require crew of 130 but skeleton crew of 70 should be sufficient for taking destroyers across Atlantic. President emphasizes importance, if possible, of having men selected to take ships across who would likely man them permanently and thus save time in accustoming crew to their use. They will not have anti-aircraft equipment.
5. The President hopes to arrange all this without necessity of having special authorization from Congress. He feels that by being supplied with bases on Atlantic Islands, he is obtaining a defence *quid pro quo* which justifies him in letting you have destroyers which some might otherwise feel should be kept for American use....
8. The President is also arranging to have you supplied with twenty motor torpedo boats, this to be effected in another ten days. The boats are not as yet finished but as soon as they are, the President proposes to have them stricken from the United States navy list as being

La Conférence de Québec,
1943. Assis, de gauche à droite:
Mackenzie King, Franklin
Delano Roosevelt et Winston
Churchill.

At the Quebec Conference,
1943. Seated, left to right:
Mackenzie King, Franklin
Delano Roosevelt, Winston
Churchill.

SOURCE: BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA/ LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
C-001700



too small and will place orders for larger size for United States. The twenty would then be available for purchase from contractors by the United Kingdom.

9. The President also hopes to let you have ten flying boats, five being big navy planes and five, big army planes. These will ostensibly be for experimental purposes, in other words to test out their usefulness in active operations. They will be without bomb sights. They will be flown across the sea under their own power. The President suggested British crews ought to learn how to fly them over, or possibly American civil pilots might be engaged for this purpose.
10. The President believes he can also let you have 250,000 rifles. It is almost impossible, however, to supply ammunition. The President also informed me that he has been able to secure for you 150 to 200 aircraft supplied with engines which were ordered for Sweden.
11. The President will take up direct with your Government matters pertaining to bases in colonies including matters pertaining to Newfoundland. As you are aware, Canadian government is already assisting in defence of Newfoundland and is, at the moment, contemplating additional large expenditure for developments there. There will probably be necessity for co-operation between the three governments in matters pertaining to that island.
12. As regards Canada, results of the conference with the President can best be given in the following joint statement agreed upon between the President and myself to be released at nine o'clock tonight:

The Prime Minister and the President have discussed the mutual problems of defence in relation to the safety of Canada and the United States.

It has been agreed that a Permanent Joint Board on Defence shall be set up at once by the two countries.

This Permanent Joint Board on Defence shall commence immediate studies relating to sea, land and air problems including personnel and materiel.

It will consider in the broad sense the defence of the north half of the Western Hemisphere.

The Permanent Joint Board on Defence will consist of four or five members from each country, most of them from the services. It will meet shortly.

13. The wording of the jurisdiction of the Board has purposely been so framed as to permit of joint action of Canada and United States in defence of Pacific as well as Atlantic coasts. The personnel of the Joint Board will include senior officers of both United States and Canadian defence services with one civil authority on each side. The first meeting of the Joint Board will be held in Ottawa probably before end of present week. We will not either sell or lease land but will work out jointly naval and air facilities and may arrange to permit manoeuvres by American army in say parts of Nova Scotia or New Brunswick, and similarly manoeuvres of our military forces in the State of Maine.
14. The President has agreed to let us have some guns and some other necessary equipment. He is quite agreeable that four or five of the fifty destroyers should be made available to Canada if really needed for such purposes as convoying out of Halifax, etc. I, however, have agreed to leave to you final word in disposition of any of the fifty destroyers to be supplied.
15. In conversations with the President and Mr. Stimson, I stressed the fact that Canada viewed so strongly the significance of the conflict in the United Kingdom area as constituting the first line of defence of this continent that we had parted not only with our own destroyers and aircraft to the extent we had but were also allowing you to retain guns which some time ago we had ordered for Halifax. I also mentioned the extent to which we had been assisting with ammunition and told the President of Canadians serving in Newfoundland, Iceland and Bermuda. He had not known of Canadians being also in Iceland...
17. The President tells me he is having a very difficult time with Congress. He, himself, looks very well and is in splendid spirits. I am convinced that outside the British Commonwealth, you have no truer friends or stronger allies than are to be found in the President and Secretary Stimson.
18. I strongly urged upon the President the utmost expedition with respect to all matters referred to in this communication. Ends.

Section 18

À Londres lors du Blitz

Lester Pearson a fait parvenir à Skelton le récit détaillé suivant de la vie dans la Maison du Canada lors des attaques aériennes allemandes à Londres. Bien que la Maison du Canada n'ait pas été directement touchée, nombre d'immeubles voisins ont subi d'importants dégâts. Au cours des raids aériens, le personnel du haut-commissariat poursuivait son travail, sauf si les guetteurs sur le toit signalaient l'approche d'avions. Les employés dont la maison avait été détruite ou endommagée dormaient dans l'abri antiaérien de l'immeuble. Ce fut une période stressante aggravée par la séparation des familles: même la femme et les enfants de Pearson étaient rentrés au Canada au début de la guerre.

In London during the Blitz

Lester Pearson sent Skelton this detailed account of life at Canada House during the German air attacks on London. Although Canada House itself was not hit, many nearby buildings suffered severe damage. During air raids, the high commission staff kept at their work unless planes were spotted by observers on the roof. Some whose homes had been destroyed or damaged slept in the building's air raid shelter. It was a stressful time, made worse by the separation of families: Pearson's own wife and two children had returned to Canada at the beginning of the war.

London, October 29, 1940

Lester Pearson
(premier secrétaire,
haut-commissaire
à Londres)
à O.D. Skelton

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 2961, DOSSIER 52

Dear Dr. Skelton,

I have been trying to find time for some days to write you about developments over here and how we are attempting to adjust our arrangements at Canada House to meet them. These developments, of course, arise primarily out of the intensive air warfare over London, both by night and by day. This in turn necessitates modification of customary working and living arrangements.

Lester Pearson
(First Secretary, High
Commission, London)
to O.D. Skelton

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 2961, FILE 52

So far, Canada House has been fortunate. We have had two high explosive bombs – both at night – so near that it is surprising they did not shatter parts of the building. But they have only smashed some of our windows and thrown parts of the road on the roof! One bomb landed on the pavement behind the Sun Life. It was a large one, made a big crater and broke the water mains, so that our Shelter, which is in the Sun Life Building and underneath the ground level, was soon flooded. This occurred in the middle of the night and caused, I understand, some of the Senior Officers at Military Headquarters, as well as some of our own employees who were sleeping in the Shelter, to leave in a manner which, in the case of the “brass-hats” at least, was characterised more by speed than dignity. Thanks to the Canadian Engineers, the water was pumped out in 3 or 4 days, the wreckage cleaned up, and the Shelter made fit for use again. In a sense this experience was comforting; the wall of the building stood up well to the explosion; furthermore, the time taken to flood the Shelter after a large water-main was broken shows we are in no danger of being drowned there.

The other close bomb landed about 20 yards in front of my window, between Canada House and the Canadian Pacific building on Cockspur Street. I don't know yet why it didn't knock in at least a part of our building, as it made a large enough crater in the street. It appears, however, that it went down very deep and exploded in such a way that the blast was almost entirely underground. We are not complaining about that! In addition, there is a bomb crater further down by Nelson's Column, and the other morning we were rather surprised when, out of the blue sky, a heavy one went off just by the National Gallery. That broke a few more of our windows.

There has not, however, been any interruption or dislocation of work; how long our good luck in this regard will last is problematical....

I think that, on the whole, ... so far as working arrangements are concerned, we can face the future with equanimity, and that no matter what happens, we will be able to carry on the work of the Government with reasonable efficiency. Incidentally I might add that we have not spent an unnecessary penny on these arrangements. In this regard I can assure you we compare favourably with Military Headquarters, who have spent thousands of pounds on their emergency accommodation arrangements. This, however, is not the only respect in which we feel the distinction between ourselves and the Military next door....

Of course our work is interrupted during the day by alarms – in fact this letter has already been the victim of such an interruption, and I have just returned to continue it from our Shelter. In the early days of bombing, we issued orders that when the sirens were sounded all employees on the top and most vulnerable floor were to go to the Shelter and a proportion of those on the

lower floors. This, however, caused altogether too much interruption in our work, and in co-operation with Canadian Military Headquarters we have now a new system in effect. When the sirens sound, roof-spotters, one of them from Canada House – we all take this duty in turn – go on duty at once and all other employees remain working. If the roof-spotters see enemy planes approaching, or hear gun-fire or bombs in the neighbourhood, they press a button which sounds an alarm throughout the building. On this second alarm all employees go to the Shelter. This means that now we spend about four-fifths of the time during a raid at work. However, this system is not altogether satisfactory, since the Germans have started sending over single aeroplanes in day-light who take advantage of cloud and mist, glide down from a great height and drop bombs without any warning of any kind. Two or three times in the last week – and in fact only half-an-hour ago – our first warning that the second alarm was necessary took the form of a bomb whistling down from the air. I am afraid there is no completely satisfactory solution for this problem, but we do our best to reconcile the necessity for carrying on our work with a reasonable regard for the safety of personnel....

The Military authorities next door have been very co-operative in putting at our disposal beds, blankets and mattresses which can be used by those of our staff who cannot get home at night.

The strain naturally is beginning to tell – on some more than on others – and we are attempting to relieve it by making it possible for employees to be sent at intervals for a week's rest to Whitfield. It is our intention that Whitfield – which is certainly a haven of peace and quiet – should always be available to employees and their wives and families as a sort of Rest Home when it is not otherwise in use. There is a housekeeper there and a cook; ample sleeping accommodation and other facilities are available, so it would seem only sensible to take advantage of this situation. At the moment there are 5 members of our staff on leave there, and one of the charwomen. There will be more going this weekend. They meet their own expenses, when possible, so there will be no extra charge to the Government. If they cannot meet the charge which we make – 35£ a week for room and board – some of us who are more fortunate in that respect will look after them. I am thinking particularly of the charwomen, all of whom come from the East End and are having a pretty terrible time. We intend to see that they all get – with their children if they desire – a fortnight's rest in the country in the next few months. This will not involve any expense, as only one woman will leave at a time and the others will be only too glad to do her work while she is away, as they know that they too will be given a holiday shortly....

This has been a long and rambling letter, but will, I hope, give you some impression of conditions at Canada House at present.

Yours sincerely,
L.B. Pearson

Section 19

Un nouveau sous-secrétaire

La charge de travail accrue et la pression causées par la guerre s'avèrent fatales pour Skelton. Il meurt d'une attaque cardiaque au volant de sa voiture alors qu'il revient à l'Édifice de l'Est après le déjeuner, le 28 janvier 1941. Il a soixante-deux ans. Il est remplacé par Norman Robertson, qui a raconté, dans une lettre à ses parents, comment le décès de Skelton l'avait affecté.

A New Under-Secretary

The increased workload and strain caused by the war proved fatal to Skelton. He died of a heart attack at the wheel of his car while returning to the East Block after lunch on January 28, 1941. He was sixty-two years old. His replacement was Norman Robertson, who recounted his feelings about Skelton's passing in this letter to his parents.

Norman Roberston.

3/ LIBRARY AND ARCHIVE / 1 CANADA



[Ottawa,] January 30, 1941

Dear Mother & Dad,

As you have probably seen from the newspapers we have had a pretty terrible week. Skelton had more of the qualities of greatness than anybody I've ever known and his death has left us all pretty badly shaken up. The request to try and carry on in his shoes came therefore as rather staggering and frightening. How things will work out it is of course impossible to say. The present arrangement is temporary and probationary – as everything should be in war time.

The job is a big one and calls for a number of qualities I simply have not got – however we shall see what can be done. My senior colleagues without exception will be helpful – the P.M. is encouraging – but I dislike very much assuming so much responsibility in unfamiliar fields – and my inability to organize my own work is an ominous note for a department desperately in need of organization. Policy is not such a worry as personnel and the two questions are unfortunately not separable as matters stand....

This afternoon we went to the funeral – fifty miles out in Pakenham – bleak little country cemetery on the coldest the day of the year ... [T]echnically I suppose I have made a good promotion but feel pretty bleak and miserable about it.

Love

N.A.R.

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, DOCUMENTS DE NORMAN
ROBERTSON, VOLUME 2

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
ROBERTSON PAPERS, VOLUME 2

Section 20

Une Europe libérée

Même s'il n'a pas formellement rompu les liens avec le gouvernement français pendant le régime de Vichy, le Canada n'a aucun représentant en France entre 1940 et 1944. Le ministre, Georges Vanier, était revenu au Canada, tandis que Pierre Dupuy était devenu chargé d'affaires à Londres. En octobre 1944, Tommy Stone remet le rapport suivant sur son voyage dans les zones récemment libérées. Sa tournée l'avait mené à Paris, où la légation se préparait à rouvrir ses portes.

In Liberated Europe

Though Canada did not formally sever relations with the French government during the Vichy regime, there was no Canadian representative in France between 1940 and 1944. The minister, Georges Vanier, returned to Canada; Pierre Dupuy acted as chargé d'affaires from London. In October 1944 Tommy Stone made the following report on a trip through the recently liberated areas. His journey included a visit to Paris, where the legation was in the process of re-opening.

London, October 28, 1944

Thomas Stone

Norman Robertson

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 2961, DOSSIER 34

11-10-1944

to Norman Robertson

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 2961, FILE 34

My dear Norman,

I had meant to get a letter off to you before now in continuation of my note to you of October 25th to give you some further accounting of my peregrinations in Belgium and France....

I had forgotten what a Flemish city Ghent is – more so now than before, I was told, as the Germans encouraged the removal of all signs on the streets and in shop windows in French. The shop windows, I might say, contained things which have not been seen in England for four years and which are very difficult to procure at home – things like electric curling irons, electric hot points, radio sets and spares therefor. No, repeat no, meat shops were open in any part of the city. There was fruit and vegetables in abundance at prices considerably cheaper than London prices in the case of such luxuries as peaches packed in cotton-wool and hothouse grapes. Trams are running apparently frequently and regularly. The electric tram line between Brussels and Ghent is, I believe, almost back on schedule. Every tram is packed like a box of sardines. The front – or at least, the artillery – is only about 17 miles from Ghent and one hears guns all night long.

I left Ghent by motor on Thursday evening and arrived in Brussels in time for dinner with Pierre Dupuy and Charles Hebert. Brussels is cold. The lights come on at dark. There are not as many trams running (I would judge) as in Ghent. Traffic on the streets is fairly heavy but mostly military cars, and the number of pedestrians is legion. All restaurants are now closed and I am told that most of the shops are running half time because of the lack of money in circulation, due to the recent financial decrees.

Dupuy is working under extremely difficult conditions. His office is his bedroom and his secretary, Miss Atkins, is in bed with flu (but in another room!) He was going on a further hunt for apartments on the afternoon of the day I left – Friday the 20th.

On the morning of Friday 20th I went to see the Canadian Military Headquarters, but unfortunately Beaumont was away. They fixed me up with a plane, however, that afternoon. I then went to see Jacques de Brabant at SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force) headquarters – I wrote you about him in my previous letter. Actually, Helmsley, Bryan, Dupuy and I had lunch with him just before my departure.

I took off from Brussels at about two o'clock and arrived in Paris, Le-Bourget, where Saul Rae met me in a driving rainstorm. I made the flight with General Maclure and I had an interesting talk with him on the way over. His organisation is closing up shop in Paris in the very near future.

Paris at the moment is a city of incredible contradictions. The shop windows are exciting, but there is nothing in the shops. The children on Sunday afternoon in the Avenue Foch looked about as healthy as children in England. On the other hand, Madame André Siegfried (I spent Monday morning with Siegfried) is just recovering from a very serious bone disease which results from malnutrition.

I saw a great many people, and on Monday afternoon I went with Vanier to the Quai d'Orsay when the Provisional Government was recognised and, although I did not see the actual handing over of the notes, I derived a certain pleasure from being close to the event towards which I have done a little work during these many years.

Georges Vanier (extrême droite) et d'autres représentants du Canada déposant une couronne de fleurs au pied de l'Arc de Triomphe, Paris, octobre 1944.

Georges Vanier (far right) and other Canadian officials laying a wreath at the Arc de Triomphe, Paris, October 1944.

SOURCE: JACK H. SMITH, BIBLIOTHEQUE ET ARCHIVES CANADA; LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA PA 163058



The Embassy offices are reasonably adequate but, as is every place else in Paris, are cold. The Embassy itself is very much too much French-Canadian – a situation which everyone hopes will be repaired in the not too distant future. On the administrative side Saul and Orkin are, as you no doubt have realised, the only two English-speaking Canadians. One or two people actually remarked on this while I was there.

The problems of installation and billeting – all the problems which arise out of being general nursemaid to a crowd of incredibly helpless adults which Saul has to face – are quite unbelievable. Someone asked me in Paris, “Qu’est-ce que les diplomates font?” After having seen the Legation in Brussels and the Embassy in Paris I replied, “Les diplomates s’installent.”

The Vaniers, as you know, are living at the Vendôme. Saul has a room at the Westminster. He also has one foot in an apartment which formerly belonged to Lady Mortimer Davis, and which has now been requisitioned but which I think he will never be able to swing financially. The trouble is that finances do not mean much. One either gets things for next to nothing or one pays through the nose. A meal at the Maison des Alliés costs anything up to 400 francs without wine. A cocktail costs anything up to 75 francs and a glass of champagne up to 100 francs. In the wine shops, I am told that one can buy for much less.

I had lunch on the Sunday with friends who have been working in the Resistance and, as I said above, I spend Monday morning with André Siegfried. It is a very odd feeling talking to people whom one knows to be very intelligent and normally up with, and sometimes ahead of, current events (like Siegfried) suddenly to run up against a complete blank. One makes a reference or starts to discuss a

subject and is amazed to see a look of absolute incomprehension on the face of one's vis-à-vis. Siegfried was so thirsty to know what was going on outside that I had a very difficult time getting him to talk about French affairs at all. During the course of my long conversation with him I occasionally had the impression that our roles were reversed and that I was the professor and he the student. I think I was in rather good form because of the inspiration which came from meeting someone (as happened to me quite often in both Brussels and Paris) who was so deeply glad to see me. (In Brussels, for instance, I saw Elizabeth de Ligne, now Comtesse de Limburg-Stirum, who did a magnificent job on the escape routes and who, through over-confidence, walked straight into a trap and was clapped into gaol a little over six months before the liberation. In gaol she was with three other women in a cell 2½ x 4 metres and was exercised ten minutes a week. She was put on the last train carrying political prisoners out of Brussels to Germany when a major in the Gestapo, probably knowing who she was and hoping to make some slight investment against the future, opened the door and let her out. When I called to see her it was as if the heavens had opened and showered her with blessings. As a matter of fact, the reception given to the troops in Brussels was, as far as I can see, the most enthusiastic that they have received anywhere. The best story of it that I have heard is that of Pierre Lefevre, the B.B.C. fellow, who is a little tiny man. When asked what the reception was like in Brussels, he said "Cela a été merveilleux. J'ai été violé trois fois en vingt quatre heures.") ...

I had intended coming back from Paris on Monday but no planes were flying because of the weather. I caught a plane on Tuesday and arrived at Croydon in the afternoon, just before the fog closed in.

Yours ever,
Tommy

Section 21

Préparation à l'après-guerre

Malgré tous ses immenses talents, Skelton n'a pas le sens de l'organisation et de l'administration. Le Ministère est dirigé dans une atmosphère de laissez-faire, selon la manière dont chacun assume ses responsabilités. Les problèmes sont réglés au fur et à mesure qu'ils se présentent, et non en fonction d'un plan préétabli. Avec l'accroissement de l'effectif, le système devient de plus en plus lourd. Dans son rapport de 1942, Hume Wrong note « l'inefficacité, la frustration et l'irritation » que cela provoque. Il est alors évident qu'il y aura une expansion majeure après la guerre, et que des réformes s'imposent sans tarder. La réorganisation est menée en 1945.

Alors que la guerre tire à sa fin en Europe, le premier ministre King, ainsi que Robertson, Pearson et Wrong se rendent à San Francisco pour la conférence de fondation des Nations Unies. D'Ottawa, le conseiller juridique John Read fait parvenir à Robertson le rapport suivant sur les « faits et gestes » du Ministère et ses préparatifs en vue du jour de la victoire en Europe. Comme le note Read, le Canada hésite d'abord à participer à l'occupation de l'Allemagne. Il faut attendre à l'automne 1945 pour que le gouvernement King accepte finalement d'établir une mission militaire à Berlin.

Getting Ready for the Postwar Era

For all his immense talents, Skelton was weak in the areas of organization and administration. The department was run in a laissez-faire manner, depending on each individual to assume and carry out the responsibilities necessary to his or her job. Problems were dealt with as they arose, not in accordance with a pre-existing plan. As more staff were added, the system became increasingly unwieldy. In this 1942 report, Hume Wrong noted the resulting "inefficiency, frustration and irritation." It was clear that there would be considerable expansion after the war and that reform was badly needed. The reorganization was carried out in 1945.

As the war in Europe drew to a close, Prime Minister King, Robertson, Pearson, and Wrong travelled to San Francisco for the founding conference of the United Nations. From Ottawa, legal adviser John Read sent Robertson this report on "the doings of the Department" and its preparations for VE Day. As Read noted, Canada was initially reluctant to participate in the occupation of Germany. Only in the autumn of 1945 did King's government finally agree to establish a military mission in Berlin.

[Ottawa,] December 18, 1942

Note de Hume Wrong

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 788, DOSSIER 408

Memorandum by

Hume Wrong

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 788, FILE 408

Administration of Department of External Affairs

There is general agreement that the administrative machinery of the Department needs as a matter of urgency to be completely overhauled and reshaped. Not only do the present methods place a crushing load on the Under-Secretary with which he is unable to cope in addition to his other pressing duties, but also they are so inadequate that they lead to constant inefficiency, frustration and irritation inside the Department itself and in many of the offices abroad. Before changes of importance are made it is desirable that plans should be developed setting forth an adequate system of administration on lines likely to endure for a considerable period. Current practices reflect the conditions of a number of years ago. The pattern has not been changed to fit the great increase in the number and size of our administrative problems. We need to devise a new pattern cut to fit our present size and capable of expansion and adjustment as conditions change. This must be done even if it involves uprooting some members of the department from their old established routines. I submit below my suggestions.

1. There should be appointed an Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs in charge of an Administrative Division of the Department and with no other duties. He should be appointed with the intention of keeping him permanently in Ottawa. He should deal directly with the Prime Minister on administrative questions requiring the Prime Minister's approval. It should be laid down as a rule, admitting no exceptions, that all administrative matters are taken up through him and are not brought directly to the Under-Secretary.
2. The Administrative Division should be composed of four or five sections responsible to the Assistant Under-Secretary. I am not competent to suggest how these sections should be organized in any detail. One section should deal with records and correspondence, another with accounting, a third with personnel and space and a fourth with telegrams, ciphers, etc. It would be desirable to include with one or other of these sections, for administrative purposes, the library, translation, supplies, equipment of offices abroad and so on. Personnel administration will need special attention because of the variety of problems presented in Ottawa and in offices abroad....
4. The immediate task of the proposed Assistant Under-Secretary would be to organize the Administrative Division on the lines suggested in paragraph 2. This, however, would not go to the root of the problem for what is now needed is a far-reaching and comprehensive review of administrative policy in all aspects of the department's activities. There would be a transition period during which the Administrative Division should be occupied mainly with administrative matters in the narrow sense. Simultaneously an effort should be made to undertake a general review and to formulate plans designed to guide the practice of the Department for years ahead. We shall never get rid of improvisation; to do so would mean inflexibility. We should, however, lay down our policies and codify our practice. There is need for an immediate review of salary scales throughout the Service and of allowance scales abroad. There is need for incorporating in a single document the procedures followed in all important aspects of departmental business. There is need for drawing up general

Un bureau gouvernemental
travaillant à Ottawa,
février 1946

A typical crowded government
office in Ottawa, February 1946.



rules governing transfers and promotions. In particular there is an immediate need for an exhaustive study of the effects of the regulations freezing promotion and similar wartime restrictions on the capacity of the Department to perform its functions.

5. Another aspect of departmental organization which requires careful survey is the capacity of the present staff to perform the work which they should be doing. This involves consideration of recruiting several new officers for the department and additional clerical personnel. It also involves examination of the allocation of work within the Divisions and between the Under-Secretary's Office and the Divisions. It involves difficult problems of adjustment in rank and pay between permanent officers and wartime importations. Consideration should also be given to the relative ranks and salaries of the senior officers in the Department and some of those stationed abroad. It can scarcely be denied that the responsibilities of some senior officers in Ottawa are greater than those of some Chiefs of Mission whose rank and pay are higher....

H.W.

Ottawa, May 3, 1945

Dear Norman,

I had thought that we might attempt to send you a biweekly report on the doings of the Department. . . . We have been very busy since you left. The situation is very complicated by reason of the need for keeping three offices in balance – San Francisco, the Acting Secretary of State for External Affairs, and the Acting Prime Minister. The matter is further complicated by the fact that there is no definite centre of responsibility in Ottawa on the administrative side, and we have been compelled to make a patchwork solution of that problem, Arnold [Heeney] and myself acting as a sort of unofficial team. The nominal head of things for post-war arrangements is of course Coleman, who is, as you know, admirable in every respect provided that there is no need to assume a risk or to do anything very active.

Our arrangements for the Italian surrender fizzled out pretty badly, owing partly to timing and partly to CBC red tape, and partly to the fact that the Conservative papers are dominated by the Election and have some doubts as to whether our friend Alexander is an orthodox P-C.

Our arrangements for VE Day are very well settled and I think should work reasonably well. We have prepared our statement on surrender terms, and note that you have reluctantly agreed in the deletion in the report of the difference of opinion between Ottawa and the Big Three on the point. I may say that my own very strongly expressed views were due to some extent to the fact that George Glazebrook and Fred brought some pressure on me again and led me reluctantly to return to the point. Arnold also feels very strongly that we should let the matter rest until Kennedy raises it in his next book. There is a point further that never was discussed before, namely, that the position upon which we were insisting involved by implication the acceptance of a very large responsibility for the long-term government of Europe, which was inconsistent with the very strongly-held views of our Acting Minister that we should bring the boys back home as fast as possible. In any event, we are waiting until there has been publication of the Instrument of Surrender, whether bi-lateral or multi-lateral, and we shall then put forward the statement from the Acting Prime Minister, and I think that in its present form it is admirable.

It would help a lot here at Ottawa if your colleagues would keep in mind the change in time. The top secret and most immediate stuff from San Francisco arrives around about eleven o'clock at night. This involves keeping the Code and Cypher room up for two or three hours unnecessarily. It involves bringing back stenographic staff in the Deputy's office, and above all, it puts a very heavy and probably unnecessary burden on the Acting Prime Minister, who, I should say offhand, is certainly the most heavily-loaded human being in Canada. I have not mentioned Arnold, but even he has been suffering badly from the strain. Personally I am managing to survive without much trouble, having adopted the expedient of sleeping on the sofa in your office. My own suggestion would be that where matters in their very nature would need to be dealt with by Mr. Ilsley personally, an attempt should be made to get the telegrams to Ottawa not later than 8 p.m. Ottawa time.

The Department was thrilled to learn that one of its members shared with the Italian surrender, fall of Berlin and the surrender of Hamburg, the front place in the CBC broadcast and in the

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 2960, DOSSIER 23

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 2960, FILE 23

headlines of Canadian papers. Little did we think that it would be Charles [Ritchie] from Halifax who would bring fame to Canada at San Francisco. Having in mind the almost certain quarantine of the whole Canadian delegation and possibly even the 25 delegations that are housed in the St. Francis Hotel, people are speculating in Ottawa as to whether he was deliberately exposed to the measles by orders of the Prime Minister. It is generally thought that a quarantine holding some at any rate of the Canadian delegates at San Francisco until after the Election, would be a very smart piece of political manoeuvring.... We should like to get a lowdown, bottom secret, highly personal report on the whole business. We all think here that this should be charged against Charles' statutory holidays, not against his sick leave, but feel we are bound to leave that matter until you return....

My short stay here of two weeks has convinced me that something serious ought to be done about the position of the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs. In two weeks I have used three months' ration, out of which personally I got a total of two drinks. I do not see how it would be possible to carry on this job effectively without the equivalent of at least five permits and the expenditure of approximately \$25 a month on liquor alone, and considerably more on other things. There is something fundamentally wrong when a situation exists in which it would not be possible for anybody but Hume or myself to take over in this office for a period of a month or six weeks without financial catastrophe. I am very firmly of the opinion that the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs as such should receive treatment not fundamentally different from that which we accord to the Canadian Ambassador to Peru, including Customs privileges attendant to the office. I do not think that these privileges and allowances should go beyond the Deputy Head of the Department. I think, however, that the person stepping in as Acting Deputy should be treated on the same basis as a Chargé d'Affaires. I am bringing this matter to your attention not in any sense by way of complaint. In any event I think that it is most unlikely that the reform, if any, would ever reach a situation in which it would involve any benefit to myself. I do think, however, that the office should be treated with some respect.

You are doubtless familiar with the practices of our local beer, wine and grog shops. At approximately 10.45 in the morning it is the practice to hang out a card on which is printed "No More –. Daily quota sold out." We are thinking of installing a reform during your absence, where there will be hanging on the rail in front of Miss Rump's seat of authority a sign which will be put there on the second of the month or third as the case may be, similar to the cards to which reference has been made, – such notification to be supplemented by an official notice from the Dean of the Diplomatic Corps – with the substitution of the word "month's" for "daily." ...

Yours sincerely,
John Read

Section 22

Plus d'uniformes

Skelton n'a jamais été entiché par l'idée de l'uniforme diplomatique, mais dans les années qui précèdent la guerre, de nombreux représentants canadiens le portent. Parmi ceux-là, on retiendra surtout Massey et Marler, qui, tous deux, tirent grande fierté de leurs uniformes raffinés et galonnés d'or. À compter de 1944 toutefois, le sentiment généralisé au Ministère est que les uniformes ne sont pas nécessaires. Il reste néanmoins quelques défenseurs de la tenue diplomatique formelle, notamment Warwick Chipman, alors ambassadeur au Chili. Howard Measures, Chef du Protocole, leur réplique que l'uniforme est « un luxe et une relique de la diplomatie d'avant-guerre dont le Canada, dans son rôle actuel et futur en tant que jeune et dynamique nation du Nouveau Monde, peut très bien se passer ». En outre, avec l'inévitable expansion du service diplomatique après la guerre, la fourniture « d'accessoires ornementaux » pour chacun coûterait beaucoup trop cher. Bien que jamais interdit, le port de l'uniforme tombe graduellement en désuétude. Il en est de même, au grand désarroi d'au moins un représentant canadien, en ce qui concerne la remise de décorations comme le O.B.E. (Ordre de l'Empire britannique).

No More Uniforms

Although Skelton had never favoured the wearing of diplomatic uniforms, in the pre-war years many Canadian representatives chose to do so. Most notable among these were Massey and Marler, both of whom took evident pride in their elaborate gold-braided uniforms. By 1944, however, there was a widespread feeling in the Department that uniforms were unnecessary. Among the few defenders of formal diplomatic dress was Warwick Chipman, then the Ambassador to Chile. Howard Measures, the Chief of Protocol, replied that uniforms were “a luxury and a relic of pre-war diplomacy which Canada, in its present and future role as a young and energetic nation of the New World, can very well do without.” Besides, with the inevitable expansion of the diplomatic service in the post-war world, the provision of “ornamental accessories” for everyone would be far too costly. Though never formally banned, the uniforms were quietly dropped. So, to the dismay of at least one Canadian official, was the granting of decorations such as the O.B.E. (Order of the British Empire).

Le personnel de la légation
canadienne à Tokyo, 1929.
De gauche à droite: Kenneth
Kirkwood, Hugh Keenleyside,
Herbert Marler, J. A. Langley

Staff of the Canadian legation
in Tokyo, 1929. Left to right:
Kenneth Kirkwood, Hugh
Keenleyside, Herbert Marler,
J.A. Langley



Uniforms of One Kind or Another

... Uniforms of one kind or another, like the poor, are always with us. In childhood one puts on different uniforms for every sport. I have spent my life as a lawyer doing my work in a uniform before uniformed courts. The same applies to the Church and, of course, to our Universities. None of us gets a degree without wearing a uniform on the appropriate occasion. The very young men who will have to be looked to as recruits for our diplomatic and consular services will have just shed a uniform. There can be no doubt that in the University, in the Church, and at the Bar, uniforms have made for dignity, decency and decorum ... It is hard to see why something that human nature has always regarded as valuable in other walks of life, from the lightest to the most serious, should come under adverse criticism only in the case of diplomatic representatives. It is interesting to note that the country from which the objection mostly comes is a country which is always inventing uniforms for unofficial bodies, as witness such bodies as the Shriners.

In any event, the question will always be, not as between a uniform, but as between an appropriate and an inappropriate uniform. The evening dress that has to be worn by the United States diplomat on certain state occasions is a uniform. I know from conversations with several who have had to wear it in broad daylight that they certainly do not consider it a fitting uniform. Nor, it may be added, is there anything particularly democratic about it. It is, in my opinion, an atrocity...

JOURNAL EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
OCTOBRE 1967

REVUE EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
OCTOBRE 1967

November 25, 1946

Attention: L.B. Pearson, Esq., O.B.E.

Sir, I have the honour to
Acknowledge your dictations,
In your despatch two fifty-six,
Concerning decorations.

When first I was an F.S.O.
"Third Sec." the designation's,
I thought "Some day my chest will show
Some simple decorations."

As "Second Sec." I carried on,
More work and more vexations,
Sustained by thoughts that to be won
Were various decorations.

The years went by, I was a "First."
I had no more vacations.
My high ambition still I nursed
Some rows of decorations.

As Counsellor I counselled well
And hid my palpitations.
"How near" I thought, "no one can tell
Those glamorous decorations."

And so, as slow I struggled through
External's permutations,
I saw myself in distant view
Bedecked with decorations.

Through thick and thin, as near or far
Were my perambulations,
I hitched my wagon to a star
And other decorations.

But as I neared the goal apace,
And told all my relations,
External sent a blunt ukase
"You'll get no decorations."

"We'll put you in no Honours List
With flattering citations.
We think your name will not be missed
No stars – no decorations!"

"Nor will it help you to ally
With foreign delegations.
The rigid rule will still apply
No stars – no decorations!"

I have the honour, Sir to be
(Quite without berations,
C.M., C.B., O.B.E.,
Or other decorations)

Your very humble (sir, that's me)
Accept felicitations,
Obedient servant, (you'll agree)
Bereft of decorations,

Alfred Rive
Not very High Commissioner

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, DOCUMENTS DE LESTER
PEARSON, VOLUME 12

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
LESTER PEARSON PAPERS, VOLUME 12



Deuxième Partie
1946–1967

Part Two
1946–1967

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C-022719

Secretary of State
Dean Rusk, 1954.

1954. The United States
at the United Nations.
1954.



Section 23

Les Nations Unies

La première Assemblée générale des Nations Unies se tient à Londres, au début de 1946. Wrong y représente le Canada. Il envoie les « impressions personnelles » suivantes à Pearson, le nouveau sous-secrétaire. Plus tard dans l'année, une analyse des objectifs et tactiques des Soviétiques est préparée à l'intention des futurs délégués canadiens. Malgré les problèmes posés par la guerre froide, le Ministère espère que l'ONU pourra devenir « un instrument efficace pour la promotion de la stabilité, de la prospérité et de l'égalité. »

The United Nations

The first General Assembly of the United Nations was held in London early in 1946. Wrong was the Canadian representative, and he sent the following "personal impressions" to Pearson, the new Under-Secretary. Later in the year, an analysis of Soviet aims and tactics was prepared for the use of future Canadian delegates. Despite the problems posed by the Cold War, the Department hoped that the U.N. could become "an effective instrument for promoting stability, prosperity and equality."

Ottawa, February 27, 1946

Impressions of the First General Assembly of the United Nations

SOURCE : VOLUME 12, DOCUMENT 426

SOURCE : VOLUME 12, DOCUMENT 426

1. This memorandum contains some personal impressions of the meetings of the General Assembly and the Security Council which have just ended in London. It is not a record of the meetings but an attempt to describe the atmosphere which prevailed and the political factors which gave the proceedings the form that they took...
18. One effect of the establishment of the United Nations seems to be for encouraging the creation of blocs. These represent in some cases definite spheres of influence, notably the Soviet group, and in other cases little more than electoral arrangements. In large measure this is inevitable in the Assembly, and as the membership increases in size the tendency will grow stronger. This is a consequence of the equal voting power in the Assembly and its committees of all states large and small. When the Liberian vote can cancel out that of the Soviet Union, the Soviet delegation is almost bound to seek to secure its proper weight by attaching to itself as many other delegations as it can. This sort of development was not unforeseen during the discussions leading up to the signature of the Charter. It will be very apparent when the admission of new members becomes a live issue, which will probably be in September. For instance, the Soviet Government is likely to agree to the admission of a neutral state such as Switzerland, Sweden, Ireland and Portugal only if agreement is given to the simultaneous admission of an ex-enemy state of Eastern Europe such as Roumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. They already made an effort in London to strengthen their own group by securing the immediate admission of Albania.
19. To turn to the operations of the Security Council, perhaps the most vivid impression left on the mind of one who was present at most of its meetings as an observer is that it is unrealistic to talk of the Security Council as though it possessed in fact, in the language of Article 24 of the Charter, "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security." The Security Council, indeed, has so far shown itself impotent to take positive action to settle disputes peacefully under Chapter VI of the Charter and, therefore, still more to enforce its decisions under Chapter VII.... As every dispute of importance directly or indirectly involves one of the great powers, it is not too much to say that the present role of the Security Council is to be an additional means of publicly exposing differences between the great powers....
21. In conclusion, it can be said that in dealing with matters without substantial political or propaganda importance the meetings in London showed that the machinery of the United Nations under the Charter could be operated with reasonable efficiency and dispatch. When such matters came before the Assembly a majority opinion could be secured which, in spite of bloc pressures, represented a sensible decision hammered out by the normal democratic process of debate. When political issues came before the Security Council no such decisions could be reached, even though the discussion had shown that a substantial majority of the members were in favour of an agreed outcome. It would be unwise in present circumstances to attach serious importance to the Security Council as a guardian of world peace, or to consider the obligation under Article 43 to make special military agreements with the Security Council as much more than a formal duty. (I understand that the Military Staff Committee, which met in private, operated in a more constructive atmosphere and made good progress at its initial

Hume Wrong.

SOURCE: OFFICE NATIONAL DU FILM
DU CANADA/ NATIONAL FILM BOARD
BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES CANADA/
LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA, C-045196



sessions; its recommendations, however, will have to be accepted by the Security Council). What took place in London has shown that the General Assembly and in particular the Security Council can be and are being used as instruments in the war of nerves, especially by the Soviet Government. It is debatable whether the advantages of open discussion of issues dividing the Great Powers outweigh the disadvantages caused by the public fixing of positions on delicate questions, with the consequence that the area of negotiation is reduced. The Security Council was not meant to be an agency for the prosecution of psychological warfare or an arena for gladiatorial contests between national champions. Without a great alteration, therefore, in the attitude towards each other of the great powers – and it should be emphasized that this alteration is required not only on the part of the Soviet Government – the first meetings of the Security Council and the Assembly leave open the question whether the establishment of the United Nations has in fact furthered its primary purpose – the maintenance of international peace and security.

H.H. Wrong

Ottawa, October 21, 1946

Part One

The Use of the General Assembly for Propaganda Purposes

1. The U.S.S.R., at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco, resisted the conception that the Assembly should provide a forum for the free discussion of the affairs of the world. They wanted severe limitations put on the powers of the Assembly to discuss and to recommend. They did not succeed in their efforts, and their representatives immediately adjusted themselves to the new situation. The Soviet Government had not wanted the kind of Assembly set up by the Charter, but, since this was the kind of Assembly which had been set up, it decided to use it for all it was worth as an instrument of Soviet foreign policy.
2. Although there do not exist in the Soviet Union political institutions in which there is free and unfettered discussion, Soviet leaders are experienced in using such bodies for their own purposes. Communist representatives in national legislatures, in trade unions, in popular front organizations and in democratic parties, have been accustomed to using the meetings of these bodies as platforms for propaganda; they have perfected the technique by which a small, highly organized and able minority can secure key positions – and perhaps eventual control – of an organization by willingness to attend long and frequent meetings, by wearing the opposition down by tedious procedural debates, and by never admitting defeat. The Soviet Union is now treating the General Assembly of the United Nations as it treated these other bodies in the inter-war period.
3. The Assembly contains a well-organized, able and vociferous Communist minority, which uses the procedures of the Assembly to the utmost for purposes of propaganda in an effort to depict the Soviet Union as the defender of coloured peoples, dependent peoples, small countries, organized labour and (at times) ex-enemy peoples. At the London meeting of the Assembly, the Soviet bloc used every artifice to debate these issues and to force them to a vote. They did not appear to mind being defeated, but they wished to make all delegations go on record on the proposals to which they attached importance. Their arguments often were addressed not so much to the delegates in front of them as to the outside world. Through their own channels of propaganda, they have since made use of the position taken by the various delegations in London....
6. Soviet propaganda is often irresponsibly opportunistic. But it would be a mistake to oppose that kind of irresponsibility with an equally irresponsible policy of toughness for toughness' sake. There is no merit in opposing Soviet views merely because they come from the U.S.S.R. Such a policy would only aggravate the feeling of the Soviet states that they are being treated as suspects and outcasts. This feeling will be strongly held in any event and cannot be removed except by the most abject renunciation of all principles held by the Western nations. Nevertheless, only harm will be done by irritating Soviet susceptibilities unnecessarily. What is called for is positive argument based on facts (which the Soviet Union frequently distorts), on democratic principle and values, and on the purposes and principles enunciated in the Charter of the United Nations. Firmness, fairness and honesty are the tactics best calculated to meet the situation....

SOURCE: VOLUME 12, DOCUMENT 431

SOURCE: VOLUME 12, DOCUMENT 431

Part Two

The Building up of The United Nations as an Effective Instrument for Promoting Stability, Prosperity and Equality

...

22. There is always a tendency in international bodies to avoid decision on controversial problems by establishing new committees or commissions for the purpose of study and report to a later session. This practice is often useful and indeed essential. It presents, however, in present conditions, special dangers. A novel feature of postwar international planning has been the conclusion of agreements to establish a wide range of new international organizations, at the same time retaining nearly all those in existence before the war except the League of Nations itself. Each of these international organizations in turn operates through a series of commissions and committees. Their multiplication has already confused even the best informed people and has bewildered the public in general. As the chances of eventual success of the United Nations must depend on continued public support and understanding, it is important that great care should be exercised in the reference to specially created bodies of problems on which the Assembly has not been able to reach agreement.
23. The United Nations, fifteen months after the signature of the Charter, is very much on trial and its interests would not be served by concealing the disappointment caused by its operations. Some of the specialized agencies which are related to the United Nations such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the International Aviation Organization, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the World Health Organization, have indicated a broad promise of future usefulness. (Almost all these organizations have made progress without Soviet membership and with a minimum of fruitless debate). The Security Council, on the other hand, has lamentably failed so far in taking any constructive steps toward the discharge of the vital functions entrusted to it. In the minds of responsible people the question must now be present – although it has not yet been asked publicly by any national leader – whether it is worthwhile to continue the drama of frustration which the proceedings of the Security Council have presented from its first session in London in January onwards. It must be recognized that there is no chance of amending the Charter soon, and also that, even if it were possible to amend the Charter so as to constitute the Security Council on a more effective legal basis, in the present state of strained international relations between the great powers this would make little difference. The central difficulties in the operations of the Security Council – difficulties present also in the operations of the other organs of the United Nations – do not stem from constitutional defects in the Charter. They arise because the practice currently followed, not only by the Soviet Union and its satellites but also by other governments, is not in accord with the purposes and principles on which the Charter is based. For the effective operation of the United Nations, therefore, what is needed is a marked alteration in the climate of international relations....

Section 24

L'Europe après la guerre

Le nombre de missions du Canada à l'étranger augmente rapidement après la guerre. En Europe, beaucoup d'entre elles sont établies dans des conditions très difficiles. En mai 1947, Kenneth Kirkwood arrive à Varsovie, qu'il décrit comme une « ville frappée par la tragédie » et où « la dévastation et la détresse dépassent l'entendement ». Il ne parle pas polonais, et n'a même pas, au tout début, un adjoint familier de cette langue. Dans ses rapports, il parle de sa recherche, longue et frustrante, d'un logement convenable et de produits alimentaires. En 1949, un membre de son personnel tombe malade, souffrant de « problèmes rénaux, apparemment causés par une carence en vitamines ». À la même époque, Charles Ritchie constate lui aussi que le logement à Paris est également un problème. Ses difficultés sont beaucoup moindres que celles de Kirkwood, mais il en fait néanmoins une narration ponctuée d'un inoubliable humour.

Europe after the War

There was a sharp rise in the number of Canadian posts abroad after the war. Many of those in Europe were established under conditions of considerable difficulty. Kenneth Kirkwood arrived in Warsaw, which he described as a “tragic city” of almost unbelievable “devastation and hardship,” in May 1947. He spoke no Polish, and at first did not have a Polish-speaking assistant. His reports chronicle his long and frustrating search for suitable living quarters and food supplies. In 1949 a member of his staff fell sick with “kidney trouble, apparently influenced by lack of vitamins.” At the same time, Charles Ritchie found that housing in Paris was also a problem. His trials were far less severe than Kirkwood's, but he recorded them with unforgettable humour.

Warsaw, June 30, 1947

Kenneth Kirkwood
(ambassadeur à
Pologne) à Lester
Pearson (sous-secrétaire
d'Etat aux Affaires
extérieures)

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 666, DOSSIER DU
PERSONNEL, VARSOVIE

Kenneth Kirkwood
(Ambassador in Poland)
to Lester Pearson (Under-
Secretary of State for
External Affairs)

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 666, STAFF FILE, WARSAW


Dear Mike,

In a concurrent despatch I am reviewing the Consular and Immigration work that has preoccupied this office in the past two months. I am pointing out that it is too onerous for one person, unblest with a knowledge of Polish, to cope with efficiently.

In the belief that the first few months here were to be exploratory, I have – partly through adventitious circumstances – carried on alone. I am now hoping to add at last Miss Zawisza to my staff; she has a reputation of being a first-rate general office secretary. I propose testing out her abilities as a consular clerk, before further increasing the staff here. Although further clerical assistance will doubtless be ultimately necessary, to relieve me for wider activities, I feel that, rather than opening a full-strength Mission all at once, a gradual expansion is perhaps the best arrangement, although it places a heavy strain on myself. The Poles, however, (as I was told last night by a Canadian friend) have expressed dismay and surprise that a new Mission of the importance of Canada should be limited to but one person instead of being a full-size Mission with Minister and entourage and imposing quarters. They have a much more ancient conception of Diplomacy and its concomitants. In any case the non-arrival of office supplies and typewriters, etc., for the past two months has effectively delayed the usefulness of any clerical assistant up to now, and has limited all my work to a dilapidated portable of my own.

I am pointing out in my despatch that my work here has so far been confined to that of a small but hard-pressed one-man Consulate. I do not think that this was the primary purpose in opening a diplomatic Mission here. The excellent Letter of Instruction prepared for me envisaged a great deal more general diplomatic (including cultural and political) effort, in study and reporting, based on as wide contacts as possible....

The disposition of Parliament to restrict Canadian diplomatic heads of Mission to hotel rooms instead of Legation or Embassy houses is, in my opinion, an unfortunate misapprehension of the implications of diplomacy, resulting from uneducated public opinion in Canada. A lot more must be done at home to create an understanding and appreciation of the diplomatic business – which is something more than merely having a niggardly pro forma representation, having a small consular office, and occasionally showing our flag. The Canadian public, which went to war when Poland was assaulted, and which has shown its interest and sympathy toward Poland in extensive relief contributions, and which is now interested in immigration of homeless Polish expatriates, must be made to realize both the political importance of a diplomatic Mission and its good-will objectives and potentialities. The public, proud of Canada's international prestige and leadership, surely would not like to realize that our Mission here is inferior in rank and size to the smallest Legations in Poland – those of Luxembourg, Denmark and Austria, each of which has a Minister, with some clerical staff, even though with no Secretaries. But as long as we have a reluctant and unimaginative Parliament and public, and at the same time a serious shortage of diplomatic personnel, it will be necessary to confine the work of the Mission to a very narrow scope.



I shall carry on my Mission here to the maximum of my strength and facilities; but as you know, physical environmental difficulties, coupled with the time-honoured and incorrigible slackness in providing equipment and supplies, must be overcome, in addition to the general diplomatic tasks that are to be met either single-handedly or with a minimum of staff. I am confident that the three hotel rooms now utilized as a Legation and Chancery can serve to meet our needs for the next half year at least; but they will be inadequate if we are ultimately to take a more serious and influential position in this danger-zone area of Eastern Europe. When that time comes, I believe that we should lift our representation here to the status of an Embassy, corresponding to that in Greece and now proposed for Turkey, and at the same time show our importance in world affairs and our regard for Poland by appointing an Ambassador to this post – untrammelled with excessive (but largely futile) visa work.

In view of the importance and political significance of Poland in the Europe scene, with West and East coalescing or colliding at this historic meeting ground and danger-point, I am inclined to think that a greater emphasis should be placed upon this Mission than upon those of some of the less important countries where we have placed Ambassadors or Ministers with larger staffs. I hope that in time this aspect, after the first exploratory months, will be practically considered. We have a large capital of good-will here which could be usefully exploited if given the means and occasions, without being buried in routine consular duties.

I shall send you further comments and views as we develop this Mission here and extend, as I hope, our activities to a wider compass of diplomatic business.

With best personal regards,

Yours sincerely,
K.P. Kirkwood

[Warsaw,] May, 1950

Note non signé

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 666, DOSSIER
DU PERSONNEL, VARSOVIE

Unsigned memorandum

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 666, STAFF FILE, WARSAW

The Question of Premises in Warsaw – A Review

1. When it was decided in January 1947, to open a Mission in Warsaw, Brigadier Drury, Head of UNRRA, was asked to reserve his suburban villa for the future Legation. This he was unable to do; the U.S. Air Attaché took it, until, some 2½ years later, he himself was evicted by the landlord who wanted the villa for his own use.
2. In March 1947, just before leaving Canada for his Warsaw post, Mr. Kirkwood was promised that the Department would assist in renovating any suitable house in ruined Warsaw; or if no building could be found, the Department would provide a pre-fabricated wooden house, as had been provided at Nanking. Mr. Monette actually commenced drawing plans of the proposed pre-fabricated house should it be found necessary.
3. On arrival, on May 2nd, 1947, Mr. Kirkwood found a suite of rooms in the damaged Hotel Bristol, then still under reconstruction. The Department felt that this was sufficient.
4. For the next fifteen months he explored the city for prospective premises, all partly ruined, and recommended numerous of them to Ottawa. (Later, almost all of these same buildings were restored and occupied by other diplomatic Missions). In June 1947 and August 1948 the Department finally advised Mr. Kirkwood to desist in his efforts, as rebuilding of damaged properties was not desired.
5. Mr. Kirkwood then continued searching for rentable premises already rebuilt and renovated. A number of them were found. They all entailed a large down-payment (to reimburse the landlord for his initial costs of restoration), together with a rent-free leasehold of about 10 years. It was estimated that the initial down-payment required to buy the lease, would, if amortized over a period of 3 to 5 years be equivalent to the current rental being paid at the Hotel Bristol, after which the Canadian Government would have premises rent free for the remainder of the ten year lease. Treasury Board objected to a ten year leasehold.
6. The Department finally made it clear that *no* capital outlay or down-payment would be considered, and asked Mr. Kirkwood to search for premises or apartments without required down-payments and on only year-by-year lease. These are difficult enough to find even in Ottawa; in Warsaw, 70% devastated, it was almost impossible.
7. Meanwhile the space occupied at the Hotel Bristol for office and staff expanded to a total of 11 rooms costing [blank]....

Paris, March 23, 1948

Dear Mike,

... The sanitary arrangements in the house have all the peculiar charm and interest of French attachments in the best homes of France. There is a mystery about French baths, w[ater] c[loset]s and bidets. These objects of glistening white porcelain seem to have been installed as a matter of fashion in some period in the 1920s. Their installation was purely for prestige purposes and not for use. This at once becomes evident if you try to use them. For example, no hot water comes out of the taps despite the fact that they are heated by a circular gas contraption (alarmingly labelled Vesuvius). I asked our landlady why there was no hot water even after one had risked one's life by igniting this device, and she blandly replied that in the winter the water was cold but in the summer naturally it was warmer. This seemed at the time a self-evident proposition and I felt that I had asked a foolish question. On reflection, however, I feel there must be a catch in it somewhere. My own method of washing is to sit in the bath while my man-servant pours vats of boiling water taken off the stove over my person. This I believe to be quite customary among the *samurai* in Japan. I have no idea how Sylvia [Madame Ritchie/ Mrs. Ritchie] manages ...

The furnishing and interior decoration of our house is in the style of the First Empire and it contains a number of relics of our landlady's grandfather, a Marshal of Napoleon. The most interesting of these is a moustache comb presented to him by Napoleon personally and with which I have personally combed my own moustache. Delightful as these period relics are, I am still looking forward to the possibility that the Department will be able to despatch to us our personal effects, for which we have now been waiting for more than two months, as it would be quite a pleasant change to have something about the house which dates from the last century of progress. Unfortunately, we have not inherited the Marshal's war chargers, so that until our car, which is also being despatched to us by a kindly Department, arrives we have no means of transport.

Despite the bizarre elements in our home life, we are very pleased with existence in Paris and, insofar as is possible for a hard working and conscientious public servant like myself, we are enjoying life. Not a hard word has passed between my wife and I since our marriage day except that she once asked me whether I always left my clothes lying in heaps upon the floor. I said that I always did, that my late father always had, and that my dear brother always does. She seemed to accept this as being in the Nature of Things.

Our love to yourself and Maryon. I do hope that we may see you both in Paris before the year is out. That would be a real cause for rejoicings.

Yours ever,
Charles

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHEQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, DOCUMENTS DE LESTER
PEARSON, VOLUME 12

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
LESTER PEARSON PAPERS, VOLUME 12

Section 25

Immigration après la guerre

Les fonctionnaires canadiens veulent faire de leur mieux pour aider les Européens de l'Est qui ont été déplacés et craignent de rentrer chez eux pour des raisons politiques. Mais ils veulent aussi faire en sorte que seuls les hommes et les femmes en santé, vaillants et prêts à effectuer des travaux manuels pour subvenir à leurs besoins soient autorisés à immigrer au Canada. Ce mémoire de 1947, où les éventuels immigrants sont évalués selon des stéréotypes nationaux et raciaux, fait peine à lire aujourd'hui.

Postwar Immigration

Canadian officials wished to do their best for the displaced persons of Eastern Europe, many of whom feared to return to their homes for political reasons. However, they also wished to ensure that only healthy, hardworking men and women, willing to do manual labour if necessary to support themselves immediately after their arrival, would be allowed to immigrate to Canada. This 1947 memo, with its evaluation of prospective immigrants in terms of national and racial stereotypes, makes painful reading today.

Ottawa, February 12, 1947

International Obligations Arising from the Refugee Problem

I. Dimensions of the Problem

1. It is impossible to give an accurate estimate of the total number of refugees and displaced persons, as the refugee population is a shifting and uncertain one and documentation is often very faulty. However, it is safe to say that there are now nearly 3,000,000 people in the world who are homeless or stateless, and who will require international assistance in their re-settlement or repatriation. Of these, about 1,500,000 are in the Far East – Chinese taken from their homes by Japanese occupation forces, and now wishing to be repatriated. They constitute a special problem – the figure is by no means certain, nor have definite plans on an international basis yet been made for dealing with them. The other 1,500,000 are in Europe or the Mediterranean area. About 700,000 of them are refugees from before the recent war, that is, Spanish Republicans, German Jews and Social Democrats, Nansen refugees, persons who, in the main, are the particular concern of the Inter-Governmental Committee on Refugees. This leaves a balance of about 800,000 people who make up the new European refugee problem. They are the present inhabitants of U.N.R.R.A. [United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration] camps, or they receive aid from U.N.R.R.A. in a manner that puts them on the roster of that organization. They are the residue that remained when the great post-war movement of repatriation had been completed. In the main they are Poles, Yugoslavs, Ukrainians and Baltic peoples who, for fear of persecution on political grounds, are unwilling to return to their countries of origin. It is this group whose situation is the most urgent of all, and whose fate will be the first consideration of any new body (such as the International Refugee Organization) which may be set up....
9. While every effort is being made to repatriate these people by U.N.R.R.A. and by the military authorities, the fact must be recognized that, on the whole, the population of the D.P. camps in Germany consists of political irreconcilables who absolutely refuse to return to their former homes. This is particularly true in the case of the Baltic peoples and the Yugoslavs. In the case of the Poles, who have recently been singled out for the greatest pressure to accept repatriation, particularly in the United Kingdom zone, a considerable amount of further repatriation may be possible.
10. Nearly all observers agree that the Baltic peoples (particularly the Latvians and Estonians) are the best material in the camps, from the standpoint of possible emigration. They are regarded generally as the most hard-working, conscientious and resourceful group; however, they contain a high proportion of professional men – lawyers, doctors and teachers – whose resettlement abroad may be difficult. Yet there has been no disinclination by these Baltic white-collar people to do manual work if such will expedite their resettlement.
11. In general, the Ukrainian D.P.s (most of whom formerly lived in the eastern half of pre-war Poland) are considered the next best group after the Baltic peoples. They are largely industrious, conscientious peasants, very religious and without much initiative. While these docile qualities have made the Ukrainians well liked by the occupation authorities, it seems

doubtful that they would prove more valuable citizens to a country such as Canada than would the Jews or Poles, both of which groups are regarded as the "problem children" of the camps, but who generally have much more initiative and intelligence than the Ukrainians.

12. With the termination of U.N.R.R.A.'s displaced persons functions now fixed for June 30th, 1947, the I.G.C. [Intergovernmental Committee] is taking over an increasing amount of the work in the D.P. camps formerly done by U.N.R.R.A. Besides this, the military occupation authorities, upon whom the main responsibility will rest until the I.R.O. [International Refugee Organization] comes into existence, are making definite plans of their own....

VI. *Conclusion*

20. It is apparent that the problem of these nearly one million persons in the D.P. camps of Europe can only be solved through re-settlement in countries who are willing and capable of receiving them as immigrants. Only a fraction of these people will accept repatriation and their prolonged stay in the D.P. camps will merely further demoralize them. Canada's interest in this problem derives, therefore, both from our position as a logical country of reception rather than from our membership in various international bodies operating in this field.
21. One further factor, of course, is that there is a great difference in the quality of the D.P.s themselves as prospective immigrants. If, for example, the Canadian Government were to decide that the best course was to admit a fairly large group of Baltic D.P.s to Canada, it would be imperative to act quickly in order to meet competition from other countries of reception. Consistent with our internal housing conditions and other such limiting factors, it seems essential therefore that Canada should take the earliest possible action in this field, both for obvious humanitarian reasons, and in order to obtain the best potential immigrants for assimilation as future Canadians.

H.H. Carter

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Section 26

Le Canada et la doctrine Truman

L'énoncé de la doctrine Truman en 1947 force le Canada à envisager sa propre politique de la guerre froide. Dans cette dépêche qui a pesé lourd, Dana Wilgress fait observer que le Canada devrait, en général, suivre la doctrine Truman; cependant, il craint les éléments les plus anticommunistes des États-Unis. Il note aussi que « la paix britannique du XIXe siècle devra être remplacée plus tard au XXe siècle par la paix américaine. Vu notre proximité avec les États-Unis, cela pose toutes sortes de problèmes pour nous. »

Canada and the Truman Doctrine

The formulation of the Truman Doctrine in 1947 forced Canada to consider its own Cold War policy. In this influential despatch, Dana Wilgress observed that Canada should generally follow the Truman Doctrine; however, he feared the more extreme anti-Communist elements in the United States. Wilgress also noted that "the Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century is to be replaced in the later twentieth century by a Pax Americana. On account of our proximity to the United States this gives rise to all sorts of problems for us."

Despatch G.1.

Geneva, April 25, 1947

Sir,

...

2. In his letter of March 31st Mr. Pearson asks for a full account of my views on recent developments in the Soviet Union and in the relations between the Soviet world and the Western world. He points out that the new "Truman doctrine" and other recent developments will make it necessary for Canada to reconsider some of the basic principles governing our foreign policy...
4. For a long time it has appeared to me, as I have repeatedly stated in despatches sent from Moscow, that the Western powers were making a mistake in choosing Eastern Europe as the testing ground for the clash between Western and Soviet policies. Not only did the balance of power situation make it impracticable for us to exert any real influence in opposition to the Soviet Union, but also we were leading the Soviet Government to think that we wished to gain a foothold in the very security belt which they had been able to establish as a result of the war. Our continued interest in Poland and Roumania made the Soviet Government believe that we were anxious to deprive them of some of the fruits that had fallen into their lap.
5. From the point of view of Soviet policy, their dominance of Poland and Roumania is vital, not so much for security reasons in themselves as for the reason that these two countries provide the bridge with the outer ring of the Soviet security belt. The Soviet Government feel that they must exert the dominating influence over Poland because this country connects them with Germany. To a less important extent Roumania is vital because it provides the connection with Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.
6. The attempt to influence the situation in Poland and Roumania by boycotting their governments was bound to fail. In the first place, it was not possible for the United Kingdom and the United States to counteract effectively the influence of the neighbouring Soviet Union. In the second place, the boycott could not be maintained indefinitely because our own interests demanded that we should not cut ourselves off too completely from these countries.
7. British, and also American, policy in respect of both these countries has been to support political elements hostile to the Soviet Union. By our continued pressure for implementation literally of the Yalta formula on free and unfettered elections, we have given the Soviet Government reason to believe that we wish to see in power in Poland and Roumania governments which would not be friendly to the Soviet Union. This would be, in Soviet eyes, tantamount to depriving them of any sphere of influence in Eastern Europe and would confine Soviet influence to the borders of the Soviet Union.
8. This does not mean that we should support the Communist-dominated regimes now in power in Poland and Roumania, because this would only lead us into becoming the dupes of those governments. The correct policy, rather, should be to recognise as inevitable the

SOURCE : VOLUME 13, DOCUMENT 225

SOURCE : VOLUME 13, DOCUMENT 225

fact that, contrary to the wishes of their peoples, Poland and Roumania are likely to have, for some time to come, governments in which Soviet influence will be predominant. Our attitude towards these governments should be that of mild tolerance.

9. This implies extending help to Poland and Roumania in their efforts to reconstruct their economies. In extending help of this kind, it is most important that we should take care to avoid giving the appearance of competing with the Soviet Government for the favour of the Polish and Roumanian Governments, because it would be out of the question ever to undermine Soviet influence by these means. Rather, our objective should be the negative one of preventing accusations being levelled at the Western powers of denying economic assistance to these countries for political reasons.
10. There is, however, a selfish reason for extending help to these countries to get on their feet in that by so doing we make them less dependent upon the Soviet Union. We enable them to maintain those ties with the West which the peoples of these countries are so anxious to preserve. We create a healthier atmosphere in which it is more difficult for Communism to take root.
11. It is true that by following such a policy we are helping to strengthen allies of the Soviet Union in the future struggle for world supremacy. This is offset by the fact that the strength of Poland and Roumania can be only a fraction of the military economic potential of the Soviet Union and its satellites taken as a whole. On the other hand, this factor is a reason for not being too lavish in the economic assistance which we render to these countries. In other words, we should take care to see that our economic assistance is confined as much as possible to that which can be justified on a financial or commercial basis. Any appearance of subsidizing these countries would be as fatal as the past policy of ostracizing them.
12. What I have just stated in regard to Eastern Europe applies in some degree also to our relations with the Soviet Union. Here too we should endeavour to follow a course which is neither that of excessive flattery nor that of excessive ostracism. I was struck, on my recent visit to Moscow, by the complaints of Russians that we were exercising economic pressure on the Soviet Union. It would be a grave mistake to follow the policy advocated by Mr. Wallace and endeavour to win over the Soviet Government by means of generosity. The Soviet leaders would take full advantage of this policy of appeasement and would use our generosity to make themselves stronger for the future struggle. At the same time, we should not refuse to do business with them simply because we disapprove of their general policy. The co-operation should be on a strictly commercial basis, free from the taint of political considerations.
13. On my recent visit I was impressed by the deterioration in the general economic position of the Soviet Union since I left Moscow last June. Not only was this the result of the calamity suffered in the poor harvest of last year, but also of a general disruption of the economy owing to the strains to which it had been put by the war. There has been a wearing-out of industrial and transport equipment. Most marked of all is the general weariness both of the Soviet people and of their leaders. Apathy is the only word which can describe the attitude of the Russian people to-day.

14. All of this goes to confirm more strongly than ever my belief that the Soviet Government would never undertake the risk of provoking a major war until the Soviet Union is much stronger economically than it is to-day. I am also coming more and more to believe that a feeling of frustration is growing up not only among the Soviet peoples but also among the leaders and that before many decades have passed we will find a petering out of that dynamic force to which the Revolution gave vent.
15. If we view the "Truman doctrine" in this light we really have little to fear from the consequences of that policy, provided it is not pushed to too great an extent and provided we do not lose our heads. The chief danger is that some of the proponents of that policy seem so bent on humiliating the Soviet Union that before long a feeling of sympathy for that country may gain support and this may lead to another of those marked reversals of United States policy that are such a danger to the world.
16. Undoubtedly the "Truman doctrine" will bring us into still greater dependence upon the United States and to this extent away from the United Kingdom. It is really the coming into being of that "Atlantic Community" envisaged by Walter Lippman in his book on "United States War Aims." The Atlantic Community envisaged by Lippman was one dominated by the United States but in the same benevolent fashion as the world susceptible to sea power used to be dominated by Great Britain. In other words the Pax Britannica of the nineteenth century is to be replaced in the later twentieth century by a Pax Americana. On account of our proximity to the United States this gives rise to all sorts of problems for us and it makes it necessary for us to subscribe to the main lines of United States policy. Hence, in our relations with the Soviet Union, we have no alternative other than to accept and follow the "Truman doctrine." ...

I have etc.

L.D. Wilgress

Section 27

Derrière le rideau de fer

En 1950, les fonctionnaires des Affaires extérieures sont convaincus « d'être ... engagés dans une lutte à finir qui, de guerre froide, pourrait très rapidement se transformer en une guerre ouverte ». Certains estiment que, en raison des restrictions que les pays du Rideau de fer imposent aux diplomates étrangers, l'ouverture de missions là-bas est une perte d'argent. En réponse, J.A. McCordick avance cette fascinante analyse des avantages obtenus par ceux qui ont vécu derrière le Rideau de fer.

Behind the Iron Curtain

By 1950 External Affairs' officials were convinced that they were "engaged in ... a life and death struggle which could suddenly pass from the present so-called 'cold' stage into [a] 'shooting' war." Some felt that, due to the restrictions placed on foreign diplomats in Iron Curtain countries, posts there were a waste of money. In response, J.A. McCordick offered this fascinating analysis of the benefits gained by those who had lived in "Transcurtainia."

[Ottawa,] February 28, 1950

Usefulness of Iron Curtain Missions

SOURCE - VOLUME 16, DOCUMENT 7

In your notes on the question of our maintaining missions in Eastern Europe you laid considerable stress on the missions' importance as training centres. I am in full agreement. In fact I think that the unique training they provide is one of the chief justifications for their maintenance. This aspect of the missions' usefulness has perhaps tended to be overlooked; furthermore it is not easy to turn it into an effective argument in making a public case for keeping the missions. But even if the training aspect may never be one of our main weapons of defence against public criticism I think it should assume a more prominent role in our Departmental deliberations.

SOURCE - VOLUME 16, DOCUMENT 7

The main elements in the missions' usefulness as training centres seem to me to be:

(1) We are engaged in world wide resistance to Communism and Soviet imperialism, a life and death struggle which could suddenly pass from the present so called "cold" stage into "shooting war." Surely no effort should be spared to ensure that Canada possesses a cadre of specialists who know the enemy as well as he can be known in present circumstances. Present circumstances do permit us to send people behind the "Curtain" and, in spite of all the restrictions and frustrations experienced there. I am convinced that the most accomplished, profound and intuitive "book student" of Marxism Leninism Stalinism and Soviet imperialism will correct, enrich and deepen his understanding of his subject by a sojourn at a mission in a Communist capital. He will emerge from this experience much better able, on return to his own country, to advise and enlighten his own Government.

These observations are, I believe, shared by most people who have served in a "Curtain" country. We bring back some of the "Curtain" with us: there is a veil through which we find it difficult to transmit exactly the atmosphere, the "feel" and hence a complete picture of Transcurtainia to those who, no matter how percipient, have not passed through the same ordeal. Conversely, there is an immediate spiritual entente between those even total strangers meeting for the first time who have served at a "Curtain" post. We are all aware of the formidable "semantic barrier" which separates us from adequate intellectual intercourse with the few Eastern European Communists (without any Western intellectual training) who are willing to discuss problems freely. There are also one or two semantic hurdles which must be taken by those who have served in Transcurtainia in their efforts to present an accurate picture to their compatriots who have not. It seems to me to follow, therefore, that we need more interpreters of the "Curtain" whose combined efforts will throw increased light on the "Dark Side of the Moon"....

(3) In spite of all restrictions, all curbs on personal contacts, those who serve in Transcurtainia absorb a great deal of useful not exactly information but rather comprehension. It is a process which might be called "spiritual osmosis", a trans membranous seepage of "feel" and "intuition" into the brain. All this may smack somewhat of the mystic, but I bring it back to the practical by adding that an indispensable instrument in this process is some knowledge of a Slav language not perfection or fluency, but just some familiarity. I am quite sure the "osmosis" I speak of works far better with a tincture of linguistic catalyst.



À Crimée, 1955. De gauche à droite : John Watkins (ambassadeur du Canada auprès de l'URSS), Dmitri Chuvahin (ambassadeur soviétique au Canada) et Lester Pearson.

In the Crimea, 1955. Left to right: John Watkins (Canadian ambassador to the U.S.S.R.), Dmitri Chuvahin (Soviet ambassador to Canada), Lester Pearson.

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(4) In your notes you also mentioned that officers going to Eastern Europe should have some previous experience abroad, a good knowledge of Communism and an analytical approach to which I can only add: amen!

(5) I would like however, to repeat some of my views on why reporting from Eastern Europe is not voluminous, but has a peculiar value. The "Curtain" missions have less information to work on. A "monolithic" instead of a diversified press; few personal contacts; excessive supervision by the local security organisations; rigid laws against espionage in which the terms "economic" and "military" are interpreted to cover the entire life of the country all combine to put relatively little local material on an FSO's desk. But the very secrecy, the Byzantine atmosphere of intrigue under the facade of the monolithic state, make it a far more essential and incidentally difficult task to assess situations, interpret events and forecast developments than in a Western country. The press, being state controlled and inspired, assumes an importance peculiar to

Transcurtainia. It's as though our editorial pages were issued by Cabinet. Every comma must be noted, and the process becomes a form of textual criticism more closely related to the labours of Shakespearian or Biblical scholars than to those of press observers in the West. Small omissions from or additions to statements made to U.N. or the Marxist Stalinist classics assume disproportionate significance. Nothing seems obvious any more, so that conclusions must be held in the tentative stage longer than normal while the problem is probed and discussed till far into the night with one's Western colleagues. On top of this there is a constant flood of rumours, many inspired, most of them fantastic, but still not to be ignored for they occasionally provide the shaft of light for which one has long sought in vain to illuminate a dark corner of a problem.

All this drudgery must be completed before a serious analytical despatch can be put into final form and sent to the hungry Department, which even then may be disconcerted by the number of "ifs", "buts" and "mights".

In short, without wishing to abuse the word, reporting in this area becomes a form of intelligence work. This applies especially to economic reporting: official secrecy obscures the whole economic scene, but by careful collation and interpolation of painstakingly collected newspaper and periodical clippings, vague official statistics and miscellaneous information, pieces can gradually be fitted into a jigsaw puzzle until in many cases the outlines of a picture emerge.

J.A.M.

Section 28

Les trésors artistiques polonais

The Polish Art Treasures

[Ottawa,] February 23, 1961

The Return of the Polish Treasures

SOURCE - VOLUME 27, DOCUMENT 514

In September 1939, devoted employees of the museum at the Royal Wawel Castle in Krakow, Poland, moved certain of the priceless treasures from the museum for a hurried flight to refuge from invading armies, a flight which eventually brought them to Canada for safekeeping.

SOURCE - VOLUME 27, DOCUMENT 514

2. Some of the items were returned to Poland shortly after the end of the war. Some of the remainder were eventually deposited in a branch of the Bank of Montreal in Ottawa, while the rest were first entrusted to a religious order in the Province of Quebec and subsequently transferred on Premier Duplessis' authority to the provincial museum in Quebec City. Since neither portion was under federal control, the Canadian Government took the view from the beginning that it had no responsibility in this matter. Nonetheless the Polish Government maintained that the Canadian Government was responsible and made persistent representations, both through normal diplomatic channels and at international conferences. While disclaiming any responsibility, the Government of Canada listened carefully to the Polish representations, in the knowledge that, whoever was responsible, this was the most important and difficult problem in Canadian-Polish relations.
3. Since Gomulka's resumption of power in 1956, Polish Government policies and actions have differed in many ways from those of the Soviet Union, and Western attitudes toward Poland, including those of Polish émigrés in the West, have gradually altered. The Canadian Government in these circumstances felt that the return of the treasures, or a part thereof, would have a beneficial effect on the domestic situation in Poland and would at the same time contribute to an improvement in Canadian-Polish relations. Thus the Government was satisfied that a settlement could be reached for the return to Poland of the several items which had been deposited in the Bank of Montreal in Ottawa. Although the Department of External Affairs was able to facilitate this settlement, it came about chiefly because a substantial portion of the Canadian Polish community had altered its earlier stern opposition and concluded that the treasures should return to Poland. This part of the treasures was handed over to representatives of the Wawel Museum who took them back to Poland in January 1959.
4. Following this partial success, the Polish Government renewed its efforts to obtain the return of that part of the collection which remained in the provincial museum in Quebec City. Representations continued to be made in familiar terms to the Canadian Government until late in August 1960 when, following a disturbing interview between Premier Lesage and the Polish Consul General in Montreal (covered more fully below), the Polish Chargé d'Affaires indicated that the Polish Government was wearying of quiet negotiation on this subject which seemed to be quite fruitless, and would shortly be forced to revert to an earlier suggestion that the problem be brought before the International Court. It was also implied that the Polish Government would raise this matter forcefully at the UNESCO General Conference, the venue of public Polish complaints in the period 1949-52.
5. After Mr. Duplessis' death in 1959, it had generally been thought that a satisfactory

settlement of this question would soon be found since his “personal” opposition to the return was assumed by everyone to have been the main obstacle. However, although it became apparent that Mr. Duplessis’ successors, Mr. Sauvé, then Mr. Barrette and Mr. Lesage, did not share Mr. Duplessis’ personal sense of responsibility for the treasures, and in fact publicly stated shortly after taking office that they wished to find a solution as quickly as possible, they were not long in realizing that the problem could not be solved so easily. Their open-mindedness on this question was not sufficient: as Mr. Lesage stated in September 1960, “the modalities for their return are not as simple as we thought they would be.” It is in the search for and finding of these “modalities” that the Department of External Affairs made its most significant contribution to the solution of this problem.

6. On the occasion of a consistory held in Rome in the autumn of 1957, Cardinal Wyszyński discussed the treasures with Cardinal Léger and apparently told him that he would welcome their return to Poland. This position was later confirmed in a letter in which Cardinal Wyszyński expressly stated that the treasures belonged to the Polish Church, and requested the assistance of the Quebec hierarchy in obtaining their return through religious channels. (The text of this letter came into the Department’s hands only in November 1960). It had been known to the Department since late in 1959 that Cardinal Wyszyński’s position on this question had advanced somewhat, and speaking from the balcony of the Archbishop’s Palace in Gniezno on April 26, 1960, the Cardinal made an important statement which confirmed this publicly. In part he said, “the bishops, meeting in plenary conference, have declared themselves in favour of these treasures being returned to the Wawel. All the belongings of the nation which constitute its property should be restored to the homeland, returned to the place for which they were meant. The treasures of the Wawel should be placed in the Wawel.” In this statement, significantly, he neither claimed that the treasures belonged to the Church nor set any conditions as to the means to be employed in accomplishing their return.
7. Although this pronouncement was given little publicity, it nevertheless became known to the Polish community in Canada and encouraged its leaders in the new position they had adopted, by a unanimous resolution of the Canadian-Polish Congress executive in November 1959, in favour of the immediate return of the treasures to the Wawel Museum. Cardinal Wyszyński’s public statement was also brought to the attention of the Polish “Executive” in London, the more significant and responsible of the two successor groups to the Polish Government-in-exile. It was later learned that this declaration had removed one of the main objections of the “Executive” to the return of the treasures from Quebec to Poland.
8. Although Cardinal Wyszyński had concluded his statement of April 26 by saying expressly that “this opinion of the episcopacy has been stated by me in a special letter addressed to the episcopacy of Quebec,” the hierarchy in Quebec did not receive a special letter, and was therefore not aware that Cardinal Wyszyński’s position as expressed in his letter to Cardinal Léger of November 1958, had evolved to the point where he would now approve of the treasures being returned to the museum and not to the Church, and through representatives of the museum instead of his own emissaries. Thus, when the Government of Quebec was considering the means by which it might solve this problem, it was faced with conflicting

evidence. The Polish state claimed ownership of the treasures and had provided the Quebec Government, through the federal government, with extracts from the inventory book at the Wawel Museum showing how each item of the collection had been acquired. On the other hand, according to the latest information in the hands of the Roman Catholic Church in Quebec, the treasures belonged to the Polish Church and should be returned to it.

9. In August 1960, the Polish Consul General in Montreal paid a courtesy call on the new Premier, during which he asked about the treasures. Mr. Lesage suggested that the treasures might be returned through the Polish Church and handed over to emissaries of Cardinal Wyszynski. This proposal came as a great surprise to the Polish authorities who found it utterly unacceptable, as they had been careful to ensure that this achievement would not be credited to the Polish Church. In later consultations in Ottawa, Mr. Lesage indicated that his proposal had been based on his understanding of the views of the Polish Church.
10. In order to arrange a satisfactory technical setting, the Department had earlier secured from the Polish authorities their agreement that the transfer, if accomplished, could be made to representatives of the Wawel Museum, rather than to government officials. The Poles, moreover, agreed to hold Quebec free of all responsibility for any damage or deterioration which might have occurred. This information was conveyed to the successive Premiers of Quebec. Now, however, since the chief problem seemed to be the lack of a full understanding in Quebec of the revised position of the Polish Roman Catholic hierarchy on this question, the Deputy Under-Secretary, on the Minister's instructions and in strictest confidence consulted Cardinal Léger. When the discrepancy between Cardinal Wyszynski's 1958 letter and his public statement of April, 1960 was pointed out to Cardinal Léger, he suggested that it would be helpful if our Ambassador in Warsaw could get in contact with the Cardinal and establish his present wishes.
11. On the Minister's instructions, the Canadian Ambassador in Warsaw on November 7 approached Professor Makarczyk, a senior member of the Znak Catholic parliamentary group, which has been Cardinal Wyszynski's political arm. Through this intermediary, the Ambassador sought and obtained a statement of the Cardinal's current views on the treasures problem in the form of a letter to Cardinal Léger. The Canadian Ambassador in Warsaw was informed orally of the contents of this letter: Cardinal Wyszynski continued to favour the return of the treasures; return could be effected through representatives of the Wawel Museum, and the Cardinal did not consider it necessary to have representatives of the Polish Church associated with the Wawel representatives. He indicated, however, that it would be desirable to have a representative of the Canadian Roman Catholic Church present at the handing over of the treasures to the museum representatives. The Polish authorities were aware of this intervention by the Canadian Ambassador, but raised no objection.
12. In due course Cardinal Wyszynski's letter was delivered to Cardinal Léger and it was confirmed to the Department that this letter removed any reservations the Canadian Roman Catholic hierarchy had about the treasures' return. Occasion was also taken by the Department at this time to convey Cardinal Wyszynski's views, and the hierarchy's reaction, to the Premier of Quebec.

13. Shortly afterward, the Premier of Quebec asked the Department to inform the Polish authorities that the Quebec provincial museum would be prepared to receive representatives of the Wawel Museum in Quebec City in order to effect the transfer to them of the treasures stored in the museum.
14. Late in December 1960, a delegation of experts and technicians, led by the Director of the Wawel Museum of Krakow came to Canada. Following a careful and detailed examination of the treasures, which confirmed that they had been well cared for and were in excellent condition, documents were exchanged on December 31 transferring the custody of these priceless objects to the Wawel delegation. Apart from the documents covering the transfer itself, the Polish Government gave a written undertaking to release Quebec from all responsibility in this matter. The packing was completed and the treasures began their journey home during the evening of January 2, 1961.

Despatch 22

Warsaw, January 12, 1961

Polish Treasures: Foreign Minister's Luncheon

SOURCE : VOLUME 27, DOCUMENT 515

The Polish treasures are now approaching the shores of Poland aboard the *Krynica*. As mentioned in our telegram under reference Foreign Minister Rapacki, in honour of this great event, today invited all the officers of the Canadian Embassy to luncheon. The place selected for the occasion, which must be unique in the annals of our diplomatic relations with countries of the Socialist camp, was the Diplomatic Club at the Palace of Jabonna on the outskirts of Warsaw...

SOURCE: VOLUME 27, DOCUMENT 515

2. The Palace of Jabonna, once a principal residence of the Poniatowski family, but much restored since the war, is a splendid but somewhat cold building. Normally, those members of the Diplomatic Corps who frequent it take their meals in a rather cozy restaurant which has been installed in the vaulted cellars. The luncheon in honour of the Canadian Embassy took place, however, in one of the largest and most beautiful rooms on the ground floor. It was evidently Mr. Rapacki's wish, in his choice of setting for the luncheon, and in the preparation of the courses and wines that were offered, to confer a special lustre on the occasion. I do not remember, in the nearly two years I have served here, an official occasion which had been prepared with greater care and delicacy. It says a great deal for the circumstances of the luncheon that we soon forgot our rather aloof surroundings. All the Canadians who were present agreed with me that the luncheon counted among the most enjoyable we had any of us attended in Poland, and I am glad to report that the cheerful appearance and conversation of our Polish friends proved that they shared our feelings to the full...
4. After luncheon we adjourned to another equally large and splendid room in the Palace for coffee. There I had an opportunity for a long and most cordial conversation with Mr. Rapacki on which I am reporting separately. As I rose to go he detained me, saying that a further little ceremony awaited us. At that moment the Chief of Protocol appeared before us, and

presented me with a gift which touched and delighted me. It is a handsome commemorative album, bound in leather with the Piast eagle in silver on the front cover, and inside the cover a silver plaque with the following inscription:

À SON EXCELLENCE
MONSIEUR L'AMBASSADEUR G.H. SOUTHAM
AVEC MES COMPLIMENTS LES PLUS SINCÈRES

A. RAPACKI
VARSOVIE, LE 12 JANVIER 1961.

Each page bears a Karsh photograph of one of the Polish treasures, and a very sumptuous display it is. Since it is unlikely that I shall ever again in my diplomatic career have to deal with so passionately interesting a question as that of the Polish treasures I doubt that any souvenir that awaits me in the years ahead will have quite the sentimental value for me as this Rapacki album.

G.H. Southam

Section 29

Défense commune

Les relations entre le Canada et les États-Unis prennent une nouvelle importance après la Deuxième Guerre mondiale. La puissance britannique est clairement sur le déclin, et le continent nord-américain est menacé par une possible attaque de l'Union soviétique – attaque qui viendrait vraisemblablement par l'Arctique canadien. La défense conjointe est donc un point de discussion majeur dans les années qui suivent immédiatement la guerre. (Pour un récit plus détaillé des discussions décrites dans le mémoire de Pearson en date du 23 décembre, voir *DRREC*, Volume 12, document 998).

Joint Defence

Relations between Canada and the United States took on a new importance following the Second World War. British power was clearly in decline, and the North American continent was menaced by the possibility of attack from the Soviet Union – an attack that would most likely come by way of the Canadian Arctic. Joint defence was a key topic of discussion in the immediate post-war years. (Readers interested in a more detailed account of the discussions described in Pearson's December 23 memo should see *DCER*, Volume 12, document 998).

Arnold Heeney (gauche) et
Lester Pearson, 1949.

Arnold Heeney (left) and Lester
Pearson, 1949.

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Ottawa, June 12, 1946

Re: Defence of North America; Canada–U.S. Joint Planning

SOURCE : VOLUME 12, DOCUMENT 958

Lyon Mackenzie King

SOURCE : VOLUME 12, DOCUMENT 958

1. You will remember that on May 9th last the Cabinet, on the recommendation of the Permanent Joint Board on Defense, approved the revision of the existing Canada-U.S. joint plan for the defense of North America. Since that date, Canadian and U.S. military and civil representatives have been at work with the object of producing for their respective governments a joint appreciation and joint plan upon which defense policies can be based and joint projects undertaken.
2. This planning is now taking shape. At meetings with our officers held in Washington May 20th to 23rd, the U.S. representatives submitted a draft appreciation which had previously been approved by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. This was amended somewhat to meet points raised by the Canadians and is now before our Chiefs of Staff. It is to be followed by a draft joint plan.
3. The conclusions of the draft appreciation are grave. They may be modified somewhat by the Canadian Chiefs of Staff but they are unlikely to undergo any material alteration before being submitted to the government.

Very briefly the conclusions are as follows: Estimated capabilities of the only potential aggressor (unnamed), taken with possible developments in long-range guided missiles and the atomic bomb make it unsafe to assume that North America will be free from attack for more than five years – beyond 1951. Such an attack could not assume the proportions of invasion by substantial sea-borne land forces until a later date, but the danger within this short period is of an order as to call for the construction of an “early warning” system and other installations in the Arctic regions before long, the North being the vulnerable aspect of North American defense.
4. The nature of the draft joint plan which will follow is forecast in the draft appreciation. It will clearly involve heavy expenditures of money and effort on the part of Canada or the United States, or both jointly. Its nature had already been forecast in numerous unrelated requests from U.S. authorities for permission to establish weather stations and the like in Northern Canada, and for the undertaking of exercises and experimental projects of varying magnitude.
5. There is no doubt that, from several points of view, these developments will constitute one of the most difficult and serious problems with which the government will have to deal, within the next few years. The initiative has been wholly that of the United States but our own military advisers will certainly, on purely defense grounds, reach similar conclusions. They may feel, however, that, on all the evidence, we have more time than U.S. authorities have estimated. It is, I think, likely that the importance which the U.S. government attach to acceptance and implementing of joint plans will be emphasized by an approach on the highest level.

In these circumstances, the government will probably have to accept the U.S. thesis in general terms, though we may be able to moderate the pace at which plans are to be implemented and to some extent the nature of the projects which are to be undertaken....

A.D.P.H[eeney]

[Ottawa,] December 23, 1946

Defence Discussions with the United States

1. In accordance with instructions from the Cabinet, discussions were held with a delegation from the United States on December 16 and 17 in Ottawa on the subject of Joint Defense planning. I attach a record of these talks which was prepared by the Canadian delegation; it has been discussed with the United States Embassy who agree that it represents an accurate account of the topics covered in the talks. By way of supplementary comment you may find the following notes to be of some value.
2. The United States delegation made a very good impression. They were well informed, reasonable and moderate in their approach to the problems discussed. There was no effort on their part to over-emphasize dangers or underline necessities. They gave a well-balanced and carefully worked out statement of the facts as they appeared to them, and allowed us to draw our own conclusions.
3. The most frank and cordial atmosphere prevailed throughout. There was no attempt on the part of the United States representatives to present demands or to insist on certain things being done – an attitude that has some been ascribed to them in speeches and articles. Happily, it is some' years since there has been any table-pounding in defense discussions between the two countries. It would be fair to say that while the United States representatives were naturally anxious to see the principles of a joint defense program agreed, and the program itself initiated, they were fully aware of the political and practical difficulties for Canada in embarking on any such program. They recognized that because we are a much smaller country than the United States and because most of whatever is done will take place on our own territory, it is harder for Canada to reach decisions in these matters than for the United States. The examination given to each problem was frank and thorough and few differences in viewpoint appeared as to the steps which should be recommended. General Lincoln who had not previously taken part in any Canada-United States meetings privately told the United States Ambassador afterwards that these talks had been a revelation to him of profitable and constructive discussion.
4. It was made quite clear to the United States representatives from the beginning that these talks were purely exploratory on the official level and that no commitment implied or expressed would result from anything that was said. Our sole object was to have an exchange of views which might put each delegation in a better position to advise their Government of what action, if any, was required in respect of the matters under discussion.

SOURCE : VOLUME 12, DOCUMENT 999

SOURCE: VOLUME 12, DOCUMENT 999

5. *Soviet Foreign Policy*

The meeting was fortunate in having present Mr. George Kennan of the State Department, one of their leading experts on the U.S.S.R., whose knowledge is extensive and whose judgments give the impression of being carefully considered, sensible and to the point. He holds in high regard the views of the Canadian Ambassador in Moscow, Mr. Wilgress, and it is clear that these two observers are agreed on most important points with regard to Soviet policy. There was general agreement with Mr. Kennan's view that if the western democracies demonstrate a reasonable degree of firmness and military strength, there is no need to be too pessimistic about the future. Without such firmness and strength one could only anticipate continued Soviet expansion which might well lead eventually to a world war. The Soviet Union, however, can be "contained" by non-provocative defense measures and by diplomacy based on firmness and fairness. This would strengthen the hands of those elements in the politburo which want an understanding with the West. Weakness on our part would merely weaken the hands of this group since it would only encourage the messianic zeal of the more doctrinaire communists and the more aggressive nationalists. The only arguments which the moderates can use successfully are that the West is strong and that its policies are supported by that strength. If they are given these arguments there is some chance that these moderates can discredit their more ardently expansionist comrades and bring about a long period of peace. It is important, of course, that western strength should be clearly non-provocative and non-aggressive and that whatever steps are taken to maintain it should be treated unsensationally, as normal and matter-fact developments.

6. *United States Strategic Concepts*

It is worth noting that in these defense discussions the representatives of the United States emphasized that their main objective in any future war would be to develop the maximum fire power at the greatest effective distance away from North America. They do not wish to be regarded as unduly "continental-defence-minded". They believe that the strategic offensive remains the best defense. But since such a strategic offensive cannot be undertaken unless the home base and its productive capacities are secured, it is of vital importance that this should be done. Twice in our lifetime the aggressor would have succeeded if that "home base" had not remained inviolable....

General Henry, in an attempt to strike a balance between defensive and offensive requirements, gave his views in the following terms. He appreciated the importance to the Canadian Government and people of deciding whether Canada could plan effectively for continental defense and still have forces available to fight overseas. It was his opinion that in any war which might develop in five or six years, the threat to the physical security of North America would be so slight as to necessitate the tying down of relatively few of Canada's forces. It should therefore be possible to use almost all of these in any way desired by the people and Government of Canada. After five or six years, because of technological developments, we could expect a greater threat to North American security, to insure against which would call for a higher proportion of total Canadian resources, primarily air forces....

Section 30

La création du Commonwealth moderne

En 1948, Pearson se retire de la fonction publique et se lance en politique. Il est immédiatement nommé secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures. Les Canadiens étaient déjà très attachés au Commonwealth, et depuis longtemps. Dans les années qui ont suivi la guerre, cette association internationale prend encore plus d'importance, comme contrepoids aux liens continentaux unissant le Canada et les États-Unis. Le premier défi de taille à avoir menacé son existence est l'indépendance de l'Inde. Pearson joue un rôle décisif dans la décision de garder l'Inde au sein du Commonwealth en tant que république. Pour une narration plus détaillée des discussions tenues le 23 avril 1949, voir *DRREC*, Volume 15, document 805.

The Creation of the Modern Commonwealth

In 1948 Pearson resigned from the civil service and entered politics. He was immediately appointed Secretary of State for External Affairs. Canadians had long felt a strong sentimental attachment to the Commonwealth. In the post-war world, this international association took on added importance as a counterweight to the continental ties joining Canada to the United States. The first major challenge to its continued existence came with Indian independence. Pearson played a key role in the decision that India could remain in the Commonwealth as a republic. For a more detailed record of the discussions held on April 23, 1949, see *DCER* Volume 15, document 805.

[London, April 1949]

Notes on visit to London, April 19th–30th, 1949

Tuesday, April 19th

I had lunch today with Sir Norman Brook, who brought me up to date on the thinking here in regard to the Indian problem. There has been little change from the views he expressed on behalf of the U.K. Government in Ottawa some weeks ago. However, there has apparently been a strengthening of the feeling in certain quarters that India *must* be kept in the Commonwealth, even as a Republic. They have given up the idea of two types of membership in the Commonwealth, and rightly so, but feel that, while Nehru is not willing to accept the Crown as the source of allegiance, he may be willing to accept the Crown as, to use Sir Norman Brook's phrase, "Head of the Commonwealth". I told him that I did not like this phrase much, as the word "Head" might be misinterpreted, but I thought that the idea was a good one and adequate as a basis for Indian membership. There may however, be some difficulty with other Dominions who wish to go further in keeping the Crown as the link through common allegiance, and also with South Africa. If this idea is carried out, there may have to be some kind of declaration of continuing membership emerge from this meeting, and also some alteration in the King's title. Norman Brook said in regard to the latter, that they have in mind something like, "George VI, of Canada (United Kingdom, Australia, etc. as the case may be), the other Monarchies (Nations) (Realms) of the Commonwealth, King, Defender of the Faith, Head of the Commonwealth". This of course is awkward, but something like this may be worked out....

Thursday, April 21st

We had our first meeting at 10 Downing Street, but it took the form of a preluncheon sherry party, a sort of get-together to establish the social basis on which our political work is to rest. It was very friendly and informal, and after fraternizing inside, we went into the garden where we were photographed and movied by a battery of cameras. Afterwards we motored to Buckingham Palace for luncheon with the Royal Family, all of whom, except Prince Charles, were present! As it was Princess Elizabeth's birthday it was a nice combination of gold plate Royal formality and friendly family atmosphere. I had words with the King and Queen, the Princess and Queen Mary, and a long chat with the Athlones who took me in charge as a fellow-Canadian.... So far as I was concerned, Queen Mary stole the show, and it was quite startling to see her begin the smoking at lunch by putting her cigarette in a long holder which she proceeded to tip at a rakish angle. I think that the Eastern Prime Ministers were suitably impressed by the Palace atmosphere.

Afterwards we went into the grand drawing room and were again photographed in various poses and groups. It was a relief to note that even the Buckingham Palace press photographer is as irreverent and tyrannical as members of his craft invariably are. He pushed the Royal Family around like ordinary beings. When one group seemed to be too stiff, he tried to make us unbend by announcing that we were not a very handsome looking crowd and therefore if we talked and smiled it might minimize our defects and make a better picture. The King emitted quite a guffaw at this sally at which moment the photographer snapped his camera....

Lester Pearson et Jawaharlal
Nehru, premier ministre de
l'Inde.

Lester Pearson and Indian
prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru.

UNICAN CAMFRON BIBLIOTHEQUE
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CANADA PA.206457



I had a good talk with Nehru and got the impression that he will do his part to make this Commonwealth conference a success by accepting the King in some form as the symbol of our association. He has a very cultivated mind, a very subtle one, but is not the sort of person one can get to know easily on first meeting.

Friday, April 22nd

We had our first formal meeting at 10 Downing Street. Attlee opened by stating the problem in very mild and sensible terms, and then called on Nehru ... We then spoke in turn, everyone expressing a keen desire to continue the Commonwealth association, although the Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers were obviously worried about the effect of the admission of a Republic on public opinion in their own countries....

This evening I phoned Tommy Lascelles to see if he could dine with me as I thought it would be a good thing to pass on the sentiments of this morning's meeting and get the reaction of the Palace. I told him that there was every likelihood of India accepting recognition of the King as a symbol of our association and Head of our Commonwealth, and that on the other hand, the rest of us were willing to accept India as a Republic in the Commonwealth on the above basis. I wondered how the Palace would take this. Lascelles thought that this was a very wise and important solution and that the King would be pleased. He said that they had been looking into the question of

inclusion of a Republic in an association of monarchies and found that it had been done in the Holy Roman Empire in connection with the Republics of Danzig and Lubeck! It is a good thing to know that the Palace is not going to put any obstacle in the way of our solution....

Tuesday, April 26th

We met again at 11 a.m.... and reached agreement on nearly all of the disputed points....

Wednesday, April 27th

We met at 10.30 to put the finishing touches to our work ...

Peter Fraser then began to throw some more fat into the fire by asking the meeting in general and Nehru in particular to define what each meant by Commonwealth cooperation. Peter had been muttering for some days that he was determined to thresh out this matter, and he certainly did so at this time. Nehru, who was put on the spot, made a brilliant reply, arguing that there could be no cooperation except for constructive and peaceful purposes, and that it was not enough to build up a Commonwealth defence bloc and hope to check Communism in that way. I have seldom listened to a more impressive dialectical statement. Nehru certainly has a magnificent mind. At one earlier meeting, when our second draft was being read, he had taken exception to the last sentence which had been included, at my suggestion, by our small drafting group, and which read, "Accordingly the United Kingdom, etc . . . declare that they remain united as free and equal members of the Commonwealth of Nations, which has proved its value as a[n] instrument for free cooperation in the pursuit of peace, security and progress." Nehru was quite blunt in saying that he was not willing to admit that the Commonwealth had in fact proved its value in this regard on all occasions in the past, and certainly had not always done so in India. Therefore it had been Nehru who had insisted that the last lines be changed to read, "they remain united as free and equal members of the Commonwealth of Nations, freely cooperating in the pursuit of peace, liberty and progress." No one objected to this, in fact most of us thought it better, even I who had been responsible for the earlier words. Nehru returned to this theme in what was possibly the last and certainly the best statement of the Conference, when he outlined what he considered to be the purpose and value of the Commonwealth in the world; especially in its relation to nationalist movements in Asia....

Saturday, April 30th

Looking back, it was certainly an interesting, and, I think, a momentous conference. We have avoided a break in the Commonwealth which *might* have been the beginning of its end, and we certainly have established a new basis which *may* be the beginning of something very important and far reaching....

L.B.P.

Winston Churchill et Louis St.
Laurent au Château Laurier,
Ottawa, 1952.

Winston Churchill and Louis St.
Laurent at the Chateau Laurier,
Ottawa, 1952.

SOURCE: W. M. NOICE, BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET
ARCHIVES CANADA/ LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES
CANADA PA 148521



Section 31

Conversation avec Winston Churchill

Il y a une certaine similitude entre les deux hommes, mais il y a aussi une grande différence. Churchill était un homme d'action, un homme qui a fait son nom par ses actes. Il était un homme de guerre, un homme qui a vécu les moments les plus difficiles de l'histoire de son pays. Il était un homme qui a su faire face à l'adversité avec courage et détermination. Il était un homme qui a su trouver le moyen de vaincre l'ennemi. Il était un homme qui a su faire de son pays une grande nation. Il était un homme qui a su faire de son époque une époque de gloire. Il était un homme qui a su faire de son nom un nom qui sera toujours associé à la grandeur de son pays.

A Conversation with Winston Churchill

There is a certain similarity between the two men, but there is also a great difference. Churchill was a man of action, a man who made his name by his deeds. He was a man of war, a man who lived through the most difficult moments of his country's history. He was a man who knew how to face adversity with courage and determination. He was a man who knew how to defeat the enemy. He was a man who knew how to make his country a great nation. He was a man who knew how to make his era an era of glory. He was a man who knew how to make his name a name that will always be associated with the greatness of his country.

[Ottawa,] December 9, 1951

Discussions with Mr. Churchill

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, CAHIERS DE LESTER
PEARSON, VOLUME 13

I had lunch with Mr. Churchill today at Chequers during which, and afterwards, we discussed many things. The only other persons present at the lunch were Mrs. Churchill and his Private Secretary.

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
LESTER PEARSON PAPERS, VOLUME 13

The Prime Minister looked old and tired, at least until the luncheon got well under way when he revived and became his normal, sparkling and dramatic self, under the influence, not of my company, I suspect, but of his own natural reaction to an audience, assisted somewhat by champagne, burgundy, port and quantities of brandy. I did my best to keep up with him, in this latter respect at least, but when he suggested after lunch that we now have a scotch and soda, I gave up.

The Prime Minister had much to say about Canada, his memories of the Quebec Conferences, and of Mr. Mackenzie King. He painted a glowing future for our country, even predicting that the centre of power would one day move to the northern half of the American continent. He felt that we would be well advised, however, to maintain a strong connection with the U.K. and the Commonwealth, and cling to the old traditions which would help stabilize our national development. In this respect, he confessed that he had been bitterly disappointed when "Rule Britannia" was ruled out of the Canadian Navy, and he begged me to do something about that when I returned to Canada. He said it was the only request he made of me! To reinforce it, he recited all the verses of "Rule Britannia," and inspired by this, went on to recite several Harrow patriotic songs he had learned sixty years ago. He admitted that Great Britain was not now the powerful country she once was, and probably would not be so again, but she was still the centre of great authority, and he felt that Canada would not be making a mistake in maintaining her historic relationships with London and the past. Of course, Mr. Churchill is still romantic about the past, and in every subject that we discussed, this romanticism cropped up....

We then got on the subject of Korea. Mr. Churchill gave me a graphic lecture on the unimportance of Korea strategically, as a finger pointed into the Pacific which could not be divorced from the hand behind it, but which, indeed, could always be broken by air and naval power, irrespective of who occupied it. Nevertheless, the Korean operation had been abundantly justified, not so much by its affirmation of the principle of collective security, as by the impetus it had given the United States to re-arm. The giant had been roused. He agreed, however, that the operation should be liquidated as soon as possible as the equipment going into Korea would certainly be of greater use in Europe for the preservation of the peace.

He proposed to see General MacArthur when he went to the United States (unless President Truman demurred), and it was clear that whatever he may have thought of General MacArthur's policy, he had a considerable admiration for him as a dynamic, dramatic person....

Adverting to Russia, he felt that the danger period would be during the next year or two when we were getting strong, Russia would not, he thought, deliberately provoke a war, but might blunder into one through a miscalculation....

I then brought up the question of his forthcoming visit to North America. Mr. Churchill admitted that he did not know the President very well, though they had got along admirably together at Potsdam until "electoral exigencies" had intervened, and also that on the train to Fulton they had sat up two nights until 2.00 a.m. playing poker. He then sent for and read to me a telegram which he was just about to send to the President, outlining the arrangements that were proposed for the visit to Washington, and asking whether they were satisfactory. He said in this telegram he would like to make one major speech, and was not sure whether he should call it "Review of the International Position" or "Christmas Day in the Work House." He thought that the latter might be more appropriate from a United Kingdom Prime Minister, but he was willing to leave the matter to the President. This telegram was in Mr. Churchill's best style and the old gentleman chuckled a good deal over it. (Eden then told me the next day that these jocular references had been deleted from the telegram before it was sent.)

Mr. Churchill expressed some worry about certain aspects of U.S. policy toward Europe, and he hoped that his trip would be helpful in that it would give him the opportunity to talk to Mr. Truman and others about these worries. The only purpose of the trip, he emphasized, was to establish a good personal and official basis for relations in the years ahead. He realized perfectly that no great decisions were possible, or even desirable, during the visit.

He then expressed keen pleasure at the visit he would be making to Ottawa subsequent to his sojourn in the United States, and added, somewhat to my surprise, that he thought he would go to Toronto also and take a degree at the University there, the name of which escaped him for the moment. The Prime Minister is, indeed, getting old...

About 3.30 Mr. Churchill decided that it was time for a nap. So, in his boiler suit, cigar in mouth, and glass of whiskey in hand, he walked to the door with me and said a cheerful good-bye.

L.B.P.

Herbert Norman (gauche) et
le général Douglas MacArthur,
Tokyo, 1947.

Herbert Norman (left) and
General Douglas MacArthur,
Tokyo, 1947.

SOURCE BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
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Section 32

Le Canada et la guerre de Corée

La guerre de Corée (1950–1953) rend la perspective d'un conflit nucléaire horriblement réelle. Cette note de Pearson au secrétaire d'État américain John Foster Dulles (l'homme à qui on doit l'expression « politique de l'abîme ») explique clairement les vues du Canada sur la question. Pour la réponse des États-Unis, voir *DRREC*, Volume 16, document 183.

Herbert Norman entre aux Affaires extérieures en 1939. Fils de missionnaire, Norman est né au Japon et parle couramment le japonais. Pendant l'occupation américaine de ce pays, il est conseiller auprès du général Douglas MacArthur. En 1951, il rédige une analyse hautement critique du discours au Congrès dans lequel MacArthur – récemment relevé de son commandement par le président Harry S. Truman – cherche à justifier ses actions en Corée.

Canada and the Korean War

The Korean War (1950–1953) made the possibility of nuclear conflict terrifyingly real. This memorandum from Pearson to American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles (the man who coined the term “brinkmanship”) clearly expresses Canada's views on the matter. For the American response, see *DCER*, Volume 16, document 183.

Herbert Norman joined External Affairs in 1939. The son of a missionary, Norman was born in Japan and spoke the language fluently. During the American occupation of Japan he served as an adviser to General Douglas MacArthur. In 1951, he wrote a highly critical analysis of the speech to Congress in which MacArthur – recently relieved of his command by President Harry S. Truman – attempted to justify his actions in Korea.

Washington, December 4, 1950

Following is text of revised memorandum, Begins: The military authorities may argue that the atomic bomb is just another weapon. But, in the minds of ordinary people everywhere in the world, it is far more than that and has acquired an immensely greater intrinsic significance. The anxiety with which the possibility of the use of the bomb, by either side, is regarded has been strikingly and increasingly evident of late among our friends in Europe and in Asia. This is the main reason for the appeal, even in free countries, of the cynical Communist "peace" campaign.

2. The psychological and political consequences of the employment of the bomb, or the threat of its employment, in the present critical situation would be incalculably great. The risk of retaliation, to which our allies in Europe feel themselves to be exposed, would affect materially their will to resist, and even the consideration of the possibility of atomic war in Asia, when our defences are still weak, cannot fail to stimulate the tendencies toward "neutralism" which the development of strength and unity on our side is beginning to overcome.
3. The strategic use of the bomb against Chinese cities might conceivably change the course of military events in Asia now, but at the risk of destroying the cohesion and unity of purpose of the Atlantic community. Certainly its use, for a second time, against an Asian people would dangerously weaken the links that remain between the Western world and the peoples of the East.
4. The atomic bomb is the most powerful deterrent element in the arsenal of the free world. To what extent this is because of actual military potential, to what extent to psychological factors, it is impossible for us, and probably for anyone, to know. The effectiveness of the bomb as a tactical weapon cannot be fully appreciated. The very uncertainty of its capabilities in the tactical role must add materially to its deterrent value. Once it has been used tactically, however, much of its force as a deterrent may disappear, unless its use for this purpose has proven overwhelmingly successful.
5. The Canadian people would hold their Government responsible for making the Canadian views known to the United States before the atomic bomb were to be used. This is especially true in present circumstances because of the United Nations character of the operations in Korea.
6. Furthermore, in atomic matters, the Canadian Government has, from the beginning, been a partner in the tripartite cooperation which stemmed from the Quebec Agreement between President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill in 1943. Mr. Mackenzie King was associated with the joint declaration of November, 1945, by the heads of three Governments directly concerned. Through its membership in the Combined Policy Committee, the Canadian Government has continued to assist in the development of our joint resources of raw materials and of scientific knowledge. Canada has made a direct contribution to building up the atomic stockpile. Although the modus vivendi of the Combined Policy Committee concluded in January, 1948, does not include, as did the Quebec Agreement, the clause providing for prior consultation,

SOURCE : VOLUME 16, DOCUMENT 177

SOURCE : VOLUME 16, DOCUMENT 177

Réception de l'avis officiel à l'occasion de la signature de la Convention d'armistice en Corée, le 26 juillet 1953. De gauche à droite : Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., Lester Pearson et Dag Hammarskjöld.

Receiving official notification of the signing of the Korean armistice, July 26, 1953. Left to right: Henry Cabot Lodge Jr., Lester Pearson, Dag Hammarskjöld.

SOURCE: BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES CANADA/ LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA, C-76068



the Canadian Government would be inevitably involved, and in a specially close sense, in the consequences of the use of the atomic bomb.

7. The mass intervention of the Chinese Communists in Korea may lead to the third world war. In the present critical military situation, those who have their own men engaged (and this applies, of course, particularly to the United States) are obviously entitled to have full consideration given to the use of every available means of supporting the ground forces fighting under the United Nations command. This is natural and inevitable. But, before a decision of such immense and awful consequence, for all of us, is taken, there should be consultation among the Governments principally concerned. Ends.

[Ottawa,] April 24, 1951

A Consideration of General MacArthur's Address to Congress (April 19)

SOURCE : RG 25, VOLUME 6031,
DOSSIER 50293-40

...

SOURCE: RG 25, VOLUME 6031,
FILE 50293-40

2. From the point of view of political tactics the speech was skilfully devised. The opening paragraphs are somewhat overpowering for those who do not believe that the United States Constitution represents the final consummation of all human wisdom. These paragraphs, however, were well designed to stir the emotions of a vast audience, and as it were, cast upon the speaker the toga of a Roman statesman whose sonorous appeals to Roman tradition and greatness established the well-known tactic of putting the opposition in the position of seeming to represent an alien cause. One comparison which, on listening to General MacArthur, came immediately to mind was the speech of Mark Antony in "Julius

Caesar” over Caesar’s body where repeated disclaimers of any appeal to partisanship led into most inflammatory words....

4. One omission in the speech, coming from the recent United Nations Commander-in-Chief, is particularly striking. That is the absence of any mention of the United Nations and its relations to the aggression in Korea. This omission could well have arisen from the basic consideration of a speech shaped in the first instance for an American audience, yet, somehow, it is hard to believe it was a mere oversight. In private conversation he has commented that the United Nations command was in fact a legal fiction; he was still a United States officer taking his orders from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. There was nothing cynical or improper in these remarks and therefore they should not be considered as in any way directed against the concept of the United Nations. Nevertheless, it would, suggest that he feels himself bound primarily by United States rather than United Nations interests, Although cordial and friendly to representatives and officers of Allied armies, General MacArthur has something in common with that section of the United States press in whose vocabulary the word “foreign” is meant to hold a peculiarly pejorative sense. In private conversations, General MacArthur has expressed a rather contemptuous opinion of nations whose policies were not always in accordance with the General’s views. It will be noted that in the speech he makes the point that his critics are chiefly foreign.
5. On the subject of his political philosophy, it might be pertinent to refer to one of his most stubbornly held opinions which, while not clearly enunciated in the speech, nevertheless underlies some of the thinking behind it. It is that Oriental peoples are characterized by a respect bordering on awe for military power....
6. ... One rather suspects that the General himself entertains a very genuine respect for power in its most dramatic forms. His whole career personifies it and doubtless he assumes that others are as deeply impressed by it....
11. It is not a congenial task to set down in this fashion the controversial and, so it seemed, misleading judgments and theories of a man of great gifts and proud accomplishments. Unfortunately, his recent line of action and the reckless course of his policy have given rise to misgivings among his friends and admirers. A cursory review of his character, his habit of mind, and more recently his strategic concepts, indicates that at a critical moment such as this his leadership could become disastrous. He has withal made himself an easy target for the Communist propaganda attack that the United States is bent on war. Even at this late date we may hope that he has read enough history to have pondered the fate of other distinguished generals who, senescent, entered the political arena so that the lustre of their name was tarnished....

Section 33

Les Commissions sur l'Indochine

En 1954, le Canada accepte de siéger aux Commissions internationales de surveillance et de contrôle au Laos, au Cambodge et au Vietnam. Cela ouvre une nouvelle ère dans les responsabilités internationales du pays. Comme le note Pearson dans ses instructions au premier commissaire pour le Vietnam, Sherwood Lett, « il n'y a aucun précédent pour vous guider ». Lett ne tarde pas à se rendre compte que les difficultés du service en Indochine sont telles qu'il faut exclure toute affectation prolongée là-bas.

The Indochina Commissions

In 1954, Canada agreed to serve on the International Commissions for Supervision and Control in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. This marked a new departure in the country's international responsibilities. As Pearson noted in his instructions to the first Commissioner in Vietnam, Sherwood Lett, there were "no precedents in Canadian experience to guide you." Lett quickly realized that the hardships of serving in Indochina were such that long tours of duty must be ruled out.

Ottawa, August 24, 1954

Dear Mr. Lett:

You have been appointed Canadian representative on the International Supervisory Commission for Vietnam, which has been established in accordance with the terms of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam which has concluded at the Geneva Conference on Indochina on July 20, 1954. As you know, the Commission commenced to function at Hanoi, on August 11, and since that time Mr. R.M. Macdonnell has been acting as the Canadian Commissioner on the Vietnam Commission. It would be appreciated if you would proceed to Hanoi as soon as possible to take up your duties, at which time Mr. Macdonnell will go to Phnom Penh to assume his functions as Canadian Commissioner on the International Supervisory Commission in Cambodia.

2. The task you will be undertaking on behalf of Canada of participating in the supervision of the cease fire in Vietnam, will be an extremely important and difficult one, and one for which there are no precedents in Canadian experience to guide you. You may rest assured, however, that you can count on the full cooperation and assistance of this Department. We will provide you with the best military and civilian advisers available, as well as the best possible facilities to enable you to do your task effectively.

Geneva Conference

3. Canada did not participate in the Geneva Conference on Indochina at which the agreements for the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were drawn up. Canada was not a party to the agreements nor to the conference declaration issued by the Geneva Conference powers at the time the agreements were concluded. We have no responsibility for the content of the agreements nor for their execution or enforcement. The texts of the agreements have been passed to us by the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference without gloss or interpretive comment, and we have been assured that there were no verbal or secret understandings concerning the interpretation of the agreements between the parties concerned. You may, therefore, take them at their face value.
4. You may have received various impressions concerning the significance of the agreements in relation to the future course of events in Southeast Asia. Our own appreciation of the situation in Indochina at the time of the Geneva Conference was that the French military hold on northern Vietnam was slipping rapidly, and that the French-sponsored government of Vietnam had not achieved the degree of popular support essential for stability or for its continued effectiveness. We considered that proposals for military intervention by other powers to restore French military control were foredoomed to failure, and that attempts to bolster the Vietnamese Government by such military intervention might well have led to the outbreak of wider international hostilities.
5. Accordingly it is our view that the cease-fire agreements - while unsatisfactory from many points of view - were the best obtainable in the circumstances, since they were based on political and military realities. Whatever their defects, the agreements, if properly implemented, would prevent Laos and Cambodia from falling under Communist domination



Membres de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle au Laos, 1955.

Members of the International Commission for Supervision and Control, Laos, 1955.

SOURCE: BIBLIOTHEQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA/ LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
PA-146521

in the immediate future and would make possible a build-up of military and political resistance to further Communist encroachment in Vietnam south of the demarcation line....

Considerations Which led to Canadian Participation

6. Canada's collective security responsibilities in Southeast Asia are confined to those that arise from membership in the United Nations. While the principle of collective security on a regional basis is applicable to Asia as to other areas, we have emphasized that a NATO pattern pact might not fit the facts of Southeast Asia. Nor have we given any encouragement to the idea of Canadian participation in such a pact. We have no special regional interests in Indochina, and few contacts with it which would warrant taking on special commitments at this time outside the United Nations. Australia and New Zealand, without any other regional commitments such as NATO and with interests and obligations already accepted in that area, are in a somewhat different position. Canada's acceptance of the invitation to participate in the supervision of the cease-fire agreements was dictated simply by the Government's desire to contribute by this kind of service to the establishment of peace and security in Southeast Asia. Moreover, the invitation was accepted only when it was clearly understood that the Supervisory Commissions would have no executive responsibilities with respect to the

cease-fire agreements, and that Canadian acceptance did not involve us in any obligations to guarantee or enforce the agreements. These responsibilities and obligations are those of the Geneva Conference powers who have accepted them....

- 12 While it will no doubt be assumed – and correctly – that Canada’s representatives on the three Commissions will reflect a Western outlook in their approach to the problems which the Commissions will have to solve, it is important that they should at all times do their utmost to maintain an attitude of judicial impartiality in the performance of their duties. We have no particular axe to grind in Southeast Asia, and are fortunate in having no history of unpopular policies or attitudes there in the past....

Relations with the Indians

17. The Indian representative will be the Chairman of the Vietnam Commission, and your relations with him, and the relations of your staff with his staff both at the headquarters and on the inspection teams, will be of the utmost importance. Canada enjoys extremely good relations with India, based on our common membership in the Commonwealth, our common heritage of British institutions and a deep feeling of mutual respect. I am sure you will make every effort to continue this well-established tradition.
18. It will be desirable for you to understand and respect - even if you may not always approve - the main points of Indian foreign policy, which differ radically in many important respects from our own. The principal features of this foreign policy are non-alignment in the cold war between East and West, the strengthening and expansion of a “peace area” in South and Southeast Asia, vigorous, sometimes almost irrational opposition to “colonialism” and a sanguine acceptance of the optimistic interpretation of the Chinese Communist revolution. In ultimate objectives Indian policy does not differ radically from our own, in the sense that we both wish to avoid a general war and to see formerly dependent peoples achieve independence and free, as opposed to Communist, self-government. Our differences lie mainly in the means by which those ends are to be achieved. In this respect the Indians are strongly opposed to a Southeast Asia Defence Organization, which conflicts with their policy of non-alignment and the extension of their “peace area”; they are inclined to accept Communist China’s assurance of good will more readily than we are, and they are inclined to view with hostile suspicion the motives which lie behind French and American policies in Asia.
19. In your informal contacts with your Indian colleague there should be no need for you to try to “sell” Canadian policies and attitudes nor to apologize for them. We would hope that India’s experience in dealing with the Poles and with the local Communists will lead them to take a more sympathetic attitude towards policies supported by our allies and ourselves. You may also have opportunities to impress on the Indians that Senator McCarthy and Hollywood are not the only manifestations of the American way of life....

Relations with the Poles

21. Poland has no independent foreign policy: your Polish colleague on the Commission, therefore, will be acting in the interests of the USSR, Communist China, and the Viet Minh, probably in that order. These interests will not necessarily be identical. It is reasonable to assume

that the USSR and Communist China both consider it in their interests at the present time to see that the cease-fire agreements are not upset, since, by negotiating these agreements they have successfully eliminated the threat for the time being of further American military intervention on the Asian mainland. Also they can be said to contribute to a relaxation of international tension which the Communists may hope to exploit in other ways. It may, nevertheless, be in the interests of the Viet Minh to violate the terms of the cease-fire agreements since the agreements, if successfully implemented, will prevent them from taking over the whole of Indochina as they had hoped to do. Both the USSR and China will probably be prepared to wink at such violations, unless or until a continual display of bad faith by the Viet Minh shows signs of seriously alienating the Indians; or otherwise interfering with the designs of Moscow or Peking. When this point is reached, China and the USSR may seek to restrain the Viet Minh.

22. All this suggests that the Polish representative may put on a devious performance on the Commission. He may combine a show of cooperativeness with varying degrees of obstruction, deceit and bad faith.
23. Nevertheless, you will wish to do your best to establish good working relations with your Polish colleague. Unnecessary or avoidable friction between yourself and him will only render the task of the Commission and particularly the Indian Chairman the more difficult. The Pole may use abusive phrases in referring to your views. This is the ordinary – though not invariable – practice of Communist negotiation. Experience has shown little is gained by meeting them on that level. Firm but polite replies, the exercise of restraint and the display of courtesy and good humour will make a more effective impression on your Indian colleague and possibly even on the Pole! It is Indian support you should seek to win in these circumstances rather than a propaganda or polemical victory over the Communists....

Yours sincerely,
L.B. Pearson

Hanoi, January 14, 1955

Tour of Duty for Canadian Personnel – Indo-China

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 6667,
DOSSIER 12130-A-40

To assist your advance planning, I have set out below the factors which, from our point of view, might be taken into consideration in determining the tour of duty for External Affairs personnel in Indo-China.

2. The question of health is of greatest importance. The heat and humidity of Indo-China, which in South Vietnam and Cambodia is constant throughout the year, is extremely uncomfortable and fatiguing to Canadians. Disease is everywhere, and unhygienic practices in the preparation of food, and the absence of sanitation as a whole greatly aid the task of germ-laden mosquitoes and flies. Furthermore, it is difficult to tell in advance who will stand this sort of climate, and in fact nearly everyone suffers at one time or other from mild dysentery and skin ailments.
3. Under good urban conditions, say in Hanoi or Saigon, with no pressure of work, life can be pleasant and an assignment of two years, as is usual in our posts in other tropic or iron curtain countries, is quite acceptable. (We need not mention that we in North Vietnam are living in the first iron curtain, tropic post.)
4. If, however, the pressure of work is heavy, as it undoubtedly is with us, an 18–24 month assignment is not practicable. We feel that this pressure is likely to be maintained for some time to come, partly because it is inherent in the work of the International Commission and partly because the staff we now have represents the bare minimum. In addition, many External Affairs personnel will receive arduous assignments both in the field and at Vientiane and Hanoi, where avenues for relaxation are non-existent and fatigue is more rapid. As a consequence, it is necessary to establish a short tour for Indo-China and desirable to provide a reserve group for replacement. We have not asked for a reserve civilian group because our staff is small and there has been a shortage of available personnel throughout the Department. Nevertheless, we must (1) prepared to act quickly in the case of fatigue or illness by providing for leave, hospitalization, or evacuation to Canada, and (2) have a short tour of duty. In support of the above argument, I attach a recent paper prepared by our medical officer for Major-General McGill on length of service in Indo-China.
5. I do not think that a short tour of duty need affect the efficiency of the Delegation. Certainly continuity in officers is an important thing when conducting delicate negotiations not only between the two sides, but also among the members of the Commission themselves. But continuity at the cost of health is inefficient and I think quite unwarranted. Later I may make a recommendation whether any of my political officers be replaced during the period that the Commission is in the process of moving to Saigon, say July–September, 1955.
6. As for timing replacement to seasonal variation, the weather is extremely hot in Saigon and Phnom-Penh throughout the year. Therefore the consideration that personnel be replaced during the cool season only arises in the case of Vientiane and Hanoi, where relatively few External Affairs personnel will be after August 1955.

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 6667, FILE 12130-A-40

7. The other delegations share our concern that the tour of duty should be short. The Poles have now decided that personnel will be rotated every six months and the Indians, who first contemplated a two-year posting, have settled on a one-year tour for all their staff. Both delegations are considerably larger than ours and the Indians also have a large number of guards and signals personnel to provide logistical support for the Commission.
8. Nevertheless, it is no doubt true that assignments differ greatly throughout our three delegations. To our personnel in Hanoi, life in Cambodia is pleasant and Saigon is a veritable paradise. On the military side assignments vary more and personnel are rotated frequently within Indo-China. Again, some adapt well to the climate or are fascinated with the opportunity afforded to observe the civilization of Cambodia or life in a communist state; while others react violently to the heat or find the tasks which the Commission must undertake a strain on nerves and a test of conscience. Therefore, while one may say that a certain tour is desirable, we must permit sufficient flexibility to allow for the adjustment of the individual. However, I am not unmindful of the expense involved in a policy of frequent rotation.
9. I would recommend, therefore, that the minimum tour of duty in Indo-China be kept short. Based on experience to date, I suggest nine months in the case of civilian officers and male administrative staff, and six months for stenographers. However, this period should be subject to extension and it will probably work out that normally men will remain for a year and girls for nine months. But no one should, I believe, be required to stay beyond the minimum period if their health is suffering or if they are not able to adjust to the unusual and trying conditions....

Sherwood Lett

Section 34

Visite en Union soviétique

En 1955, Pearson effectue une visite en Union soviétique et a un entretien mémorable avec Nikita Khroutchev, qu'il décrit comme un homme « direct et imprévisible comme seul peut l'être un paysan ukrainien devenu l'une des figures politiques les plus puissantes du monde ». Les autres événements de cette visite, et surtout un dîner donné dans la villa criméenne de Khroutchev, sont décrits avec vivacité dans le deuxième volume de *Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson*.

A Visit to the Soviet Union

In 1955 Pearson visited the Soviet Union and had a memorable conversation with Nikita Khrushchev, whom he described as being "as blunt and volatile as only a Ukrainian peasant, turned one of the most powerful political figures in the world, can be." The other events of the visit, and especially a dinner at Khrushchev's Crimean villa, are vividly described in the second volume of *Mike: The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. Lester B. Pearson*.

Bonn, October 15, 1955

Rapport de
Lester Pearson
SOURCE : VOLUME 21, DOCUMENT 537

Report by
Lester Pearson
SOURCE : VOLUME 21, DOCUMENT 537

Visit to U.S.S.R.: Pearson–Khrushchev Talk October 11

Following from the Minister, Begins: The two hours talk which I had with Khrushchev and Bulganin on the last night of my visit was undoubtedly the most interesting both on account of the two Soviet personalities involved and the frankness with which Khrushchev in particular put forward the Soviet attitude to such important matters as NATO and the security of Europe. I am having this summary report despatched by Ignatieff at first opportunity on his way back to Ottawa.

2. Khrushchev, who is as blunt and volatile as only a Ukrainian peasant, turned one of the most powerful political figures in the world, can be, came straight to the point before we even sat down. With a CBC microphone pushed in front of him (this was permitted for the first few minutes of our visit along with photographers and a few journalists) he asked me why Canada does not leave NATO, which he described as an aggressive alliance and a direct threat to Russia and to peace. I replied that I had talked myself hoarse (I had indeed almost lost my voice at the time) trying to convince people in Moscow that NATO was purely defensive and had no aggressive intent whatever. I added for good measure that I had also been trying to convince them that the Americans were fine people, good neighbors with no thought of attacking anybody. Khrushchev also said that he hoped I was convinced by my visit that there was no economic or food crisis in the Soviet Union. It was typical of wishful thinking in the West who were looking in vain for Soviet weaknesses. I said that I doubted any such reports of crisis and that my own experience would suggest there was lots of food!
3. After this characteristic outburst and after we had taken our places around a table I tried to direct the discussion into more orderly channels by referring to my talks in Moscow and the communiqué. Khrushchev said that he had been kept informed and regarded the communiqué as acceptable though disappointingly vague and non committal. From their point of view perhaps they cannot expect more at this stage in Canada-Soviet relations, he added somewhat revealingly.
4. This gave me an opening to say that Canada is increasingly conscious of the fact of being between two powerful neighbors; with the United States we are on very friendly terms of good neighborhood and we hope to be on better terms with the Soviet Union also. Khrushchev replied that Russia never had conflict with Canada and that he could not foresee any conflict arising. He did not neglect to point out, however, we were on the air route to United States cities if war was ever forced on them. In that tragic contingency he reminded me they also had buttons which could be pushed with devastating effect.
5. In reply to my remark that Canada cannot feel comfortable unless Soviet–United States relations are also satisfactory, Khrushchev agreed adding that he saw no special grounds for concern at present; things would work out all right he thought. People like McCarthy who flourished on the line that the Soviet Union wanted war had been discredited. I emphasized that no right thinking people in the United States and especially the President even

considered any aggressive attack on anybody; that much of the news from the United States reaching Europe and the USSR was misleading as to United States intention and United States feelings. The sensational was shouted too much which distorted the picture so far as the United States was concerned. One of the advantages of visits was the opportunity to dispel misapprehensions and remove misunderstandings and distortions....

17. ... Khrushchev said that Russians knew better than any other people what war means (he mentioned that he had lost a son) – only the Germans had comparable experience. If NATO starts a war he said, the alliance would fall apart since most of its members would not be willing to fight. He returned to this theme of NATO falling apart a number of times either in the context of defence costs or because of unwillingness to fight. At one point he said that the war if it occurred would inevitably involve Germany and the allies might as well face up to the fact that the Germans will not fight having had enough of war.
18. I replied that no one wanted war in the nuclear age and the West would never be the first to start a war to which Khrushchev replied “we shall never fire the first shot but we shall be in at the finish”. To my answer that under present circumstances any world war would be infinitely worse than the last Khrushchev agreed but added “this time Canada would not be geographically secure”.
19. Since Khrushchev spoke somewhat disparagingly of the military experiences of the West both in the last war and in Korea, I had to take him up on both counts reminding him in particular that Canadians although not themselves invaded had gone in large numbers, thousands of miles, to fight in the common cause; and that as for Korea, our forces had joined others in support of a United Nations decision that aggression had been committed by North Korea and had stopped that aggression....
21. In conclusion Khrushchev now in a more mellow mood said that what the world needs is “time and patience”. “The Soviet Union,” he said, “could afford to be patient” – “our system is solid, our economy developing”. Western leaders however have to accord he said “civil rights to Communism” and not react to it “like a bull to a red rag”. “If you don’t like it,” he said, “you don’t have to join it”. In reply I said that it was not the boast that their loyalty is for their “socialist fatherland” rather than for their own but that was our own problem. Khrushchev agreed. When I pressed the matter of outside assistance to local Communist parties Khrushchev laughed it off with “what a dollar a day? We haven’t the dollars for that”. What they also wanted Khrushchev said was foreign trade with the West and business contacts; there could be peaceful competition between different systems. The talk ended with my thanking the Soviet leaders for this opportunity of talking frankly with them and telling them that it was our desire to have friendly working relations with them to which my visit, I hoped had contributed. Both Bulganin and Khrushchev hoped that this would not be the last such visit from Canada.

Pearson

Section 35

La crise de Suez

Quand la France et la Grande-Bretagne envahirent l'Égypte en octobre 1956, les autorités canadiennes réagirent avec consternation. Le premier ministre britannique, M. Anthony Eden, et son secrétaire aux Affaires étrangères, M. John Selwyn Lloyd, furent indignés par la position du Canada, ce qui détériora considérablement les relations entre Ottawa et Londres. À Ottawa, on arrive mal à comprendre clairement le raisonnement derrière les gestes britanniques. Mettant à profit ses contacts personnels, Arnold Smith, du haut-commissariat du Canada, fournit alors une description intéressante et précise de la situation. Quelques jours plus tard, Pearson propose avec succès l'adoption d'une résolution des Nations Unies demandant la formation d'une force internationale de maintien de la paix.

The Suez Crisis

When Britain and France invaded Egypt in October 1956, Canadian officials responded with dismay. Their stance was strongly resented by British Prime Minister Anthony Eden and Foreign Secretary John Selwyn Lloyd. As a result, communications between Ottawa and London became exceptionally poor. It was difficult for those in Ottawa to form any clear idea of the reasoning behind British actions. At this juncture, Arnold Smith of the Canadian High Commission was able to provide an interesting and accurate account through personal channels. A few days later, Pearson successfully proposed a United Nations resolution calling for the formation of an international peacekeeping force.

Dag Hammarskjöld et Lester
Pearson aux Nations Unies lors
de la crise du canal de Suez.

Dag Hammarskjöld and Lester
Pearson at the United Nations
during the Suez crisis.

SOURCE: PHOTO NO 51397 DES NATIONS
UNIES/ UNITED NATIONS PHOTO 51397



London, November 1, 1956

Norman Robertson
(haut-commissaire
Londres) à Lester
Pearson

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHEQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, CAHIERS DE LESTER
PEARSON, VOLUME 40

Norman Robertson (High
Commissioner, London)
to Lester Pearson

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
LESTER PEARSON PAPERS, VOLUME 40

Dear Mike,

I attach a memorandum of a conversation between one of my officers and a senior official in the Foreign Office who has been closely involved with the Suez issue. As you will see, this official seriously doubts the wisdom of the Cabinet's policy. However, he explains it in terms of frustration and emotionalism on the part primarily of Sir Anthony Eden, supported by Harold Macmillan and to a lesser extent by Selwyn Lloyd. He suggested the policy is to a significant extent to be interpreted as a rebound, and suggested leading British Ministers felt driven into the hands of the French because they were let down by the Americans.

I am sending you the report of this conversation in this form under cover of a personal letter since, for obvious reasons, it is important to protect the official's position in view of his frankly critical attitude towards his Minister's policy, and to give the report no circulation at all.

Yours sincerely,
N.A. Robertson

[London,] November 1, 1956

pièce jointe/enclosure

In a conversation last night a close friend of mine, a senior official in the Foreign Office who is closely involved in the Suez issue, let drop a number of frank, if possibly indiscreet, observations which form a significant, though depressing, background explanation of the British decision to join with France in military action against Egypt. His remarks were very much personal and off the record.

He said he had no reason to doubt that the French had been in cahoots with the Israelis in planning the Israeli invasion of Egypt, and he believed that the French initially may also have provided the Israelis with some Mystere planes.

He admitted that he himself (and I gather many of his colleagues) consider that the U.K. decision to take military action in Egypt profoundly unwise. I gathered that he had no particular reason to believe that the U.K.-French action would undermine support for Nasser in Egypt, or would do other than force Nuri Said and other hitherto friendly Arab leaders into an anti-Western position. Apparently, therefore, the U.K. decision was not based on any Whitehall expert assessment about "how to influence Arabs," as some apologists have suggested. On the contrary, he said that the decision was imposed from the top by Eden and Macmillan. I gather that Selwyn Lloyd was not entirely happy about the Prime Minister's decision. My informant, who has been sitting in as an expert at some of the meetings at 10, Downing Street, said that Eden had decided to go along in the Suez venture with Mollet and Pineau, and that these Frenchmen's view was frankly that pan-Arabism must be destroyed.

He emphasized to me that he was not trying to justify the Cabinet's decision, but to explain it. He then stressed the depth of the bitterness felt by Eden, as well as some of his followers, at what they considered a series of let-downs by the Americans. He showed me a memorandum which had just been prepared, on instructions, listing a series of broken promises by Dulles,

chiefly about the Suez Canal Users' Association and the effectiveness of economic sanctions. He emphasized that Eden's decision not to consult the Americans was quite deliberate, and taken as a result of a long period of frustration from having accepted American advice during the past years, against Eden's own inclinations, to go along with Nasser, and during the past few months to go along with the 18-Power Canal Plan.

My informant, who had been in New York with Selwyn Lloyd during the recent negotiations with Fawzi there, said that Lloyd tried desperately during that period to get some agreement, almost any *firm* agreement, with the Americans on a joint Middle East policy. Lloyd apparently explained to his officials that he kept hoping against hope that he could reach some agreement with the Americans sufficiently firm for him to avoid having to go along with Pineau. Lloyd's efforts to achieve this failed, and according to my informant the talks with Fawzi were not considered by the U.K. Cabinet to be as promising as we ourselves had thought. Apparently the U.K. had urged on the Americans that "even a little" pressure on the Egyptians at that time would bring about an agreement, but the United States had refused pressure and persisted in taking a relatively optimistic view of the prospects.

My informant also said that the bitterness about the Canadian attitude on Suez was as great as that against the Americans, that, in particular, our decision to sell Egypt wheat had been regarded as a stab in the back in a moment of Britain's crisis and need. In all this, he said, Canada had been even softer than the Americans. Incidentally, he quoted some official in the International Monetary Fund (he mentioned the name but I do not recall it) who, when asked why the Egyptians had applied to draw Canadian rather than American dollars, had said that the Egyptians explained privately that they considered that Ottawa would be less amenable to British influence than Washington. Apparently this had wounded Eden and his associates, and produced a rather irrational reaction designed to widen further rather than to narrow the gap between us. (Naturally I made the obvious defence of the Canadian position regarding wheat, but he merely brushed it off by reiterating that he was not trying to justify, but merely to explain, the Cabinet's policy.)

He emphasized that Eden is in a highly emotional state – he even called it "neurotic." He mentioned, incidentally, that Tuesday at noon he had been summoned across the street to 10 Downing Street. Eden was in bed, discussing business with a few people present but obviously in a highly worried and uncertain frame of mind. This was a few hours before the ultimatum was sent. (Incidentally, two or three other friends of mine who are officials at "Head of Department" level, have, during recent weeks, mentioned to me Eden's wrought-up and "difficult" mood these days.)

One disturbing point made was that Eden and several of his colleagues and senior officials considered that the present policy of going along with the French is very much a second best which, however, was forced on them by North America. "For years the Americans and you have been urging us to follow a more European type of policy," my informant told me: "now you have got it. This is the sort of policy that European statesmen want. The British have higher moral standards than the French or the Germans, but if we have to concert our policy with the Continentals rather than the other Anglo-Saxon countries, this is the result." He suggested that

Lester Pearson recevant le prix Nobel pour son rôle dans la résolution de la crise du canal de Suez.

Lester Pearson receives the Nobel Prize for his role in resolving the Suez crisis.

SOURCE: BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA/ LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
PA-121704



the present U.K. policy is definitely one of “action on the rebound”: Britain, “foiled in her desire to marry the woman she loved” – that is a concerted policy with the United States – “found the only thing left was to visit the whorehouse” (the French).

When I commented that the policy seemed more likely to disunite than to unite Western Europe, he again merely reverted to the line that he was trying to explain what the attitude really was. He admitted that it did not add up rationally. But he hoped we would appreciate the long frustration in the background, and how vital the Suez and Middle East oil was to Britain.

In conclusion, he read me a telegram that had just come in from the British Ambassador in Cairo. This telegram, reporting a meeting at 2.30 p.m. that day (Wednesday, October 31st) with the Secretary-General of the Egyptian Foreign Ministry, making amicable arrangements for temporary withdrawal of British technicians from a base depot, and temporary management of this depot by the Egyptians, who nevertheless recognized that it remained a British base, seemed to exude a fantastic air of unreality. My informant commented, however, that the telegram had obviously been despatched just before the bombs began to fall.

[Arnold Smith]

[New York,] November 4, 1956

Middle East Crisis: Emergency Force

Again because of the pressure here, we have been unable to send complete reports on the course of the debate. However, we hope to keep you abreast of the developments behind the scenes which help to explain events in the public forum. This telegram is concerned with the special session meeting November 3–4, which began at 8.00 o'clock in the evening [and] ended at 3.00 o'clock in the morning. The meeting was called at the request of Egypt because parties concerned had not complied with the Assembly's resolution of November 2 (Document A/3256).

2. Just before the meeting the Minister met with Lodge to discuss the text of the proposed Canadian resolution on the emergency UN force. The Minister explained why Canada considered it desirable to press the resolution in the special session. It was our hope that the resolution would provide a basis for an emergency force which could supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal called for in the resolution of November 2. This however, would be emergency action and we had in mind the establishment of a UN force of longer service which would maintain peace and order during the period of negotiating settlement of the two main issues, Suez and Palestine. For this reason, we welcomed the two USA draft resolutions providing machinery for negotiation. We hoped to link our own proposal with those of the USA.
3. Another aim was to persuade the UK and France not to land troops in Egypt. There were some indications that the UK Government was in a hesitant mood, although we could not be sure of this. We had received no repeat no assurance that the landings would not be made. In addition, we were anxious to demonstrate to Israel that its invasion of Egyptian territory could not [be] condoned.
4. We also hoped, the Minister continued, to head off any condemnatory resolution proposed by the Afro-Asians. We understood that the Indians had been circulating a draft. We had some reason to believe that this draft would not be too offensive.
5. Lodge expressed broad agreement with Canadian views on the subject. He enquired whether the Minister had a text providing for the establishment of an emergency force. The Minister showed him the draft which he had brought from Ottawa. Lodge suggested a simpler text which he had in front of him and which, we gathered later, had come from Washington. It read: "The General Assembly bearing in mind the urgent necessity of implementing resolution No. A/3256 of November 2, requests the Secretary General to submit to it within 48 hours a plan for the setting up with the consent of the nations concerned of an emergency international UN police force to carry out the purposes of resolution No. A/3256." Lodge said that he had every reason to believe that this text would be acceptable to the Egyptians and consequently to the Afro-Asian group.

6. The Minister pointed out that with some exceptions our text had appealed to UK Ministers. They had, however, suggested amendments which might be difficult to incorporate in the Canada text (we had received by then Léger's relay of the message from Robertson). The Minister explained that we were anxious to have a text which the UK and France would not oppose. Lodge said they could not oppose the text he had suggested. After further discussion, in which several changes were made in the draft, the Minister agreed to consider the possibility of submitting the draft resolution in Canada's name.
7. Later the Minister discussed the text with the Secretary General. He expressed himself in favour of it, though not optimistically. We canvassed the views of a number of delegations, among them Norway, Pakistan, India, Ceylon, Australia, NZ, South Africa, France and the Netherlands. The Norwegians discussed the draft with the other Scandinavian countries. Since there was a general expectancy in the Assembly that Canada would introduce a draft resolution, in a very short time our text was widely distributed.
8. A difficulty arose over the interpretation of the words "with the consent of the nations concerned". The Afro-Asians, in particular the delegations of Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia, India and Syria enquired informally whether this meant the consent of the nations contributing to the emergency force or the consent of the nations mentioned in the Assembly resolution of November 2. The Canadian Delegation had to consult several times with the USA Delegation to seek clarification. Since the language had come from Washington, the USA Delegation was reluctant to delete it and indeed there were psychological reasons for not doing so. Eventually the Minister and Lodge agreed that the interpretation should be the consent of contributing nations. After considerable persuasion the Afro-Asians, but particularly Egypt, agreed to accept an oral interpretation in a supplementary statement from the rostrum. They also insisted on the inclusion of the word "all" before "the terms" in the operative paragraph. They would have preferred a specific reference to the "withdrawal" of forces but this would have created difficulties, because the language proposed followed the words "secure and supervise" and the whole would have implied that withdrawal could be effected by force.
9. This process of negotiation behind the scenes occupied several hours but fortunately there was a long list of speakers. There was also the problem of whether Canada could support a nineteen power draft resolution. Para three of this resolution coincided to some extent with the proposal made in the Canadian draft. Accordingly, the Minister was able to say in his statement that the Canadian proposal was in a sense "supplementary" to the nineteen power proposal. The Minister was somewhat doubtful about supporting this draft resolution because in many respects it was unrealistic. In the end, however, he considered it desirable to give the nineteen power text his support in order to ensure strong Afro-Asian support for the Canadian draft resolution.
10. This correlation of the two proposals was carried still further when Lall agreed to give priority to the Canadian draft resolution, although the nineteen power proposal had been submitted first. This ensured that the Canadian proposal would have the support of the Afro-Asians because, had they not supported the Canadian resolution, the support for their own might have been weakened.

11. As you are aware, the two resolutions were adopted by large majorities. The vote on the Canadian draft resolution was 57 in favour, none against with nineteen abstentions (the Soviet Bloc, the old Commonwealth, Egypt, France, Israel, Laos, Portugal and Austria). The representatives of Egypt and Portugal explained to the Minister afterward that they had no instructions. The nineteen power proposal was adopted by 59 in favour, five against (Australia, France, Israel, NZ and UK) with twelve abstention (Benelux, Scandinavians, Dominican Republic, Laos, Portugal and South Africa). Both votes were roll call.
12. The Minister had some discussion about our text with Dixon. The latter complained that the text was very different from what he understood had been discussed in London. He gave the impression, however, that he would not vote against it (although as part of its price of abstention, the UK exacted an abstention from the Scandinavians on the nineteen power proposal).
13. At the meeting in the Secretary General's office today he read a message from Selwyn Lloyd concerning the resolution on the emergency force. In effect, it said that no reply could be given until UK Ministers had considered the resolution, a step they were taking as a matter of emergency. The Secretary General, who has been very pessimistic this past week, took some hope from the fact that the UK had not rejected the resolution out of hand.

Section 36

Les francophones au Ministère

À partir des années 1920, les francophones sont bien représentés au Ministère. Il ne fait aucun doute cependant que l'anglais y est la principale langue de travail. Marcel Cadieux, qui s'était joint aux Affaires extérieures en 1941 et avait gravi les échelons jusqu'à devenir sous-secrétaire, offre ce conseil aux jeunes Québécois attirés par la carrière diplomatique.

Francophones in the Department

Francophones were well represented in the Department from the 1920s on. However, there could be no doubt that English was the dominant language in the workplace. Marcel Cadieux, who joined External Affairs in 1941 and eventually became Under-Secretary, offered this advice to young Québécois aspiring to a diplomatic career.

Conseils aux étudiants qui se destinent à la carrière

SOURCE: LE MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES
EXTÉRIEURES (1949)

Le seul mot « diplomate » évoque des images flatteuses. Certains songent à l'habit d'apparat, avec le bicorné, le gilet brodé, l'épée de cérémonie ou encore à la redingote, au huit reflets. D'autres, oubliant les splendeurs vestimentaires, imaginent des réceptions d'État dans des décors brillants où de vieux messieurs couverts de décorations évoluent au milieu de dames en grandes toilettes, agitant l'éventail et discutant les questions politiques de l'heure.

SOURCE: LE MINISTÈRE DES AFFAIRES
EXTÉRIEURES (1949)

Malheureusement, la Commission du Service Civil et le ministère des Affaires Extérieures, en choisissant les candidats, doivent entretenir des préoccupations moins romantiques et prendre leurs décisions d'après des critères qui s'efforcent d'être scientifiques....

En premier lieu, pour se présenter à l'examen, il faut avoir le physique de l'emploi. C'est-à-dire qu'il ne faut pas avoir d'infirmités physiques ou une apparence qui puisse produire une impression trop désagréable. Le diplomate, par profession, doit rencontrer les gens; il est appelé à venir en rapport avec les fonctionnaires de pays étrangers. Il ne faut pas que son apparence soit de nature à lui aliéner les sympathies dont il a besoin pour bien faire son travail....

Depuis quelques années, les femmes sont admises au concours sur le même pied que les hommes, avec cette exception toutefois que la Commission du Service Civil ne leur permet pas de rester au service du Gouvernement lorsqu'elles se marient. La chose s'explique facilement. La nature de leurs fonctions les oblige à faire des séjours prolongés à l'étranger; leur époux devrait quitter ses affaires et accepter un rôle assez peu glorieux en les suivant. La séparation trop prolongée ne serait pas non plus une solution. De sorte que, même si théoriquement les femmes sont admises et traitées au Ministère sur un pied d'égalité, de rares exceptions pourront vraiment y faire leur carrière.

Il n'importe peu que les candidats soient mariés. D'un certain point de vue il est préférable que les jeunes secrétaires soient déjà mariés car, alors, ils ne sont pas exposés à épouser des étrangères. Il vaut mieux que l'épouse de nos diplomates soit canadienne. Le couple représente plus fidèlement le pays et d'ailleurs, le diplomate, étant forcé de vivre à l'étranger pendant de longues périodes, a besoin de retrouver dans son foyer un peu de l'atmosphère nationale. Seulement, à l'arrivée à Ottawa, le traitement est maigre et les débutants mariés ont du mal à boucler leur budget....

Le nouveau secrétaire risque de faire très mauvaise impression et de se décourager à moins qu'il ne possède une connaissance plus que moyenne de l'anglais. Il ne s'agit pas simplement de savoir lire ou de comprendre facilement. Les revues, les films anglais ou américains sont trop répandus dans la province de Québec pour que le jeune troisième secrétaire ne comprenne ou ne lise l'anglais aisément. Mais – ceci est plus important – le secrétaire doit pouvoir parler l'anglais avec facilité et correction. Il doit presque penser en anglais. À Ottawa, il s'exprime le plus souvent en anglais. Pour être en mesure de faire son travail avec efficacité, il importe qu'il possède bien cette langue pour traduire fidèlement les nuances de sa pensée....

Le secrétaire aux Affaires Extérieures, comme son titre l'indique, sait non seulement écrire, mais il aime écrire. Il éprouve une certaine satisfaction à exprimer son opinion sur des questions d'intérêt général ou à raconter ses impressions sur les personnalités qu'il rencontre. Aux conférences, le secrétaire doit bien s'exprimer et exposer, si possible avec éloquence, le point de vue de son gouvernement. En poste, il prépare des rapports sur les événements dont il est témoin. À Ottawa, s'il a

appris à étudier un problème de façon objective et méthodique et s'il sait bien présenter ses arguments, il facilitera la solution des problèmes et gagnera ainsi parfois des causes qui lui sont chères. En somme, le secrétaire n'est utile en poste, aux conférences internationales ou à Ottawa que dans la mesure où il peut s'exprimer correctement par écrit. Ceux qui n'aiment pas la composition seraient bien avisés de chercher à employer leurs talents dans d'autres professions.

Certains candidats aux Affaires Extérieures voient surtout dans la carrière diplomatique une occasion de voyager. Cela n'est pas mauvais. Il faut noter cependant que le secrétaire ne voyage pas en touriste et qu'il ne lui est pas loisible de parcourir le pays où il est envoyé selon son seul agrément. Son travail et ses obligations le retiennent à son bureau la plupart du temps. Il se présente néanmoins des occasions de voyager et de rencontrer des personnalités importantes. À cause de cela justement le secrétaire peut jouer un rôle utile s'il s'intéresse aux conditions et aux peuples étrangers. Il importe donc qu'il soit observateur, libre de préjugés de race ou autres et qu'il aborde gens et institutions avec un esprit ouvert. Cela n'est pas donné à tous. Il est des jeunes qui préfèrent se consacrer à quelques amis éprouvés, vivre dans un coin du pays humanisé par les ancêtres. Le jeune diplomate est appelé à devenir un spécialiste des relations humaines et il doit savoir accueillir les personnes qu'il rencontre, compatriotes ou autres, avec un intérêt sincère et constamment renouvelé. Le régime, les mœurs des contrées qu'il observe sont pour lui des sujets d'étude passionnants. Pour qu'il les comprenne, rien ne doit s'interposer entre son esprit et la réalité. L'objectivité la plus absolue est de rigueur.

Cet intérêt pour les gens et les institutions implique chez le secrétaire une attitude spéciale qui ressemble à celle du soldat. Le soldat obéit. Il va où on lui dit d'aller, revient quand on le lui demande et ne connaît d'autre patrie que son poste. Il en est de même pour le diplomate, qui est un spécialiste des négociations, de l'étude des conditions étrangères et de la protection des intérêts canadiens à l'étranger. Il abandonne sa famille, ses amis, sa patrie pour aller où le devoir l'appelle. Les Canadiens français sont plutôt casaniers. Ils sont attachés à la vie familiale. Souvent les exigences du service leur imposent des sacrifices très lourds. Ceux, par conséquent, qui n'aiment pas changer leurs habitudes ou leurs amis et qui n'aiment pas être bousculés doivent songer à faire leur avenir dans un autre métier. Vous n'avez pas aussitôt découvert un groupe de personnes sympathiques, trouvé un logement convenable et assuré votre approvisionnement en livres, en victuailles ou en renseignements, que vous pliez bagage et recommencez ailleurs. À ce point de vue, la vie du diplomate, qui paraît bien facile, comporte une austérité, un renoncement, des sacrifices dont le grand public ne s'avise pas toujours....

Si, d'aventure, certains s'imaginent que la carrière est avantageuse financièrement, qu'ils soient vite désabusés. Le Ministère ne désire pas et n'essaie pas de retenir les secrétaires en leur offrant des avantages matériels considérables. Ceux qui identifient leur travail à leur plaisir se soucient assez peu de la rémunération. Ils sont dans la situation de l'artiste qui peint pour son plaisir, qui peindrait même s'il n'était pas payé mais qui, naturellement, parce qu'il faut bien vivre, vend à regret quelques-unes de ses toiles. Le secrétaire ne s'attache pas au Ministère à moins qu'il n'ait la conviction que, même s'il n'avait pas besoin de travailler pour vivre, il n'aurait d'autre ambition que de se consacrer à son métier....

Elizabeth MacCallum à
Beyrouth, 1954.

Elizabeth MacCallum in Beirut,
1954.

RICHARD HARRINGTON
BIBLIOTHEQUE ET ARCHIVES CANADA
110-111, ARCHIVES CANADA PA-112/66



Section 37

Le rôle élargi des femmes

En 1947, les femmes reçoivent l'autorisation de participer aux examens d'agent du service extérieur. Sept ans plus tard, Elizabeth MacCallum, une spécialiste du Moyen-Orient, devient la première femme à diriger une mission diplomatique, en qualité de chargée d'affaires à Beyrouth. Pour ce qui est de son titre, elle souhaite d'abord qu'on l'appelle officiellement « Madame la chargée d'affaires », mais comme elle l'explique dans les documents suivants, cela suscite un tollé dans les rangs diplomatiques au Liban. Le directeur du protocole du ministère libanais des Affaires étrangères opte finalement pour « Madame le chargé d'affaires ». Trois ans plus tard, Marcel Cadieux rédige un mémoire sur la politique générale concernant les titres diplomatiques des femmes accréditées auprès de pays francophones.

The Expanding Role of Women

In 1947, women became eligible to take the foreign service officer exams. Seven years later, Elizabeth MacCallum, a specialist in Middle Eastern affairs, became Canada's first female head of post when she was appointed chargé d'affaires in Beirut. MacCallum's initial preference was to be formally addressed as "Madame la Chargée d'Affaires," but, as she explained in the following documents, this title met with a storm of disapproval from the diplomatic community in Lebanon. The Director of Protocol in the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs finally decided on "Madame le Chargé d'Affaires." Three years later Marcel Cadieux wrote a memorandum on general policy regarding diplomatic titles for women accredited to French-speaking countries.

Beirut, November 9, 1954

Opening of Beirut Post: Protocol

With the constant help of the United Kingdom Ambassador and Lady Chapman-Andrews and Mr. Ian Scott, First Secretary of the British Embassy, I have been able so far to surmount all difficulties arising out of the fact that I am the first woman to have become a member of the local diplomatic corps. I have been moving slowly and feeling my way, trying to avoid giving offence, but never quite sure of how successful I shall be. One question has arisen already on which a decision will obviously have to be taken in Ottawa.

2. The Doyen of the Diplomatic Corps and the British Ambassador do not agree with the Director of Protocol that my title should be in the feminine form. Both Mgr. Beltrami and Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews maintain that the phrase "Chargé d'Affaires" denotes a function, not a person, and that it may not be altered at will to the feminine form any more than "alto" or "soprano" may be so altered, or than the phrase "Sa Majesté" may be changed to [a] masculine form....
5. Although in Ottawa I said I myself should very much prefer to use the feminine form of the title, my views have changed, now that I have had a chance to feel out the local situation even in a preliminary way. Something of an endurance test probably lies in store for me. If I do anything at the outset which tends to diminish in any way the representational nature of my work I shall probably find myself ceasing to be useful to the Canadian Government. If I am to be known as a Chargé my position will certainly be clearer to others than if a new form of the title is introduced. There is uncertainty enough about the matter as it is.
6. The wives of two diplomats – two of the most charming women I have met here – suggested to me on separate occasions that, contrary to the local practice, I should make a point of calling on their husbands and themselves simultaneously on the occasion of my first official visits. Lady Chapman-Andrews has advised strongly against this, on the ground that if I accept the hospitality of wives in that manner neither Ambassadors nor Ministers will think of me as primarily a representative of my Government but rather as a person who likes to drop in for a social chat with their wives, in circumstances where it is unusual to discuss questions of national policy with complete seriousness. The ground lost at the outset might be difficult to recover...

Elizabeth P. MacCallum

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 6661,
DOSSIER 11852-C-40

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 6661, FILE 11852-C-40

Margaret Meagher, première ambassadrice du Canada, passant en revue les troupes en Israël, 1958.

Canada's first woman ambassador, Margaret Meagher, inspecting troops in Israel, 1958.

SOURCE: BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA/ LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
PA-187692



Letter No. 36

Beirut, November 16, 1954

Protocol, Beirut Post

SOURCE: BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 6661,
DOSSIER 11852-C-40

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 6661, FILE 11852-C-40

In my letter under reference I reported separate conversations with the dean of the diplomatic corps and the United Kingdom Ambassador and Lady Chapman-Andrews which led me to conclude that it would be both incorrect and perhaps injurious to Canada's interests to employ the feminine form of my title as *Chargé d'Affaires* of the Canadian Legation in Beirut. For the diplomatic corps itself, after a period of rather harried speculation on the subject of correct styles of address, the time has now come for commitment to one form or another. In some cases Their Excellencies have declared themselves hesitantly, but so far only the Minister of the Soviet Union has appealed to me directly for aid. It was the only subject he broached himself during my brief call yesterday morning and the only one in which he showed the slightest interest. His first letter has yet to reach me.

2. The dean of the diplomatic corps, Mgr. Guiseppe Beltrami, the Apostolic Nuncio, led off with a letter addressed to Madame E.P. MacCallum, *Chargé d'Affaires* a.i., in which he used the salutation "Madame le *Chargé d'Affaires*." The Ambassador of France, however, could not bring himself to accept this formula. He considered the Colombian Minister's "Madame la *Chargée d'Affaires*" to be incorrect, but "Madame le *Chargé d'Affaires*" grates upon his sensibilities as a connoisseur of fine writing. Nor do I think he would find any assuagement in the Brazilian Minister's "Mademoiselle *Chargé d'Affaires*," which omits the definite article entirely. The French Ambassador has decided to insert my name, where necessary, between "Madame" and "le", but will avoid even this whenever he can. Thus his salutation is simply "Madame" and the address he uses is Madame Elisabeth MacCallum, Le *Chargé d'Affaires* etc.

3. The representatives of Czechoslovakia, Italy and Spain have sided with the Apostolic Nuncio. The representatives of Belgium, Egypt, Greece, Jordan, Liberia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Venezuela and Yugoslavia go along with the French Ambassador, though the Spanish Ambassador (on the side of the Doyen) and the Swiss Minister and Netherlands Chargé (on the side of the French Ambassador) think I should be "Mademoiselle", not "Madame". To the Minister of the Federal German Republic, meanwhile, I am just "Dear Mrs. Chargée d'Affaires", so in the case of Bonn's representative we start off in an atmosphere of Gemütlichkeit to which only a pedant could object.
4. With something of a flourish, as if he were doffing to me the plumed hat of one of his more lively progenitors, the Minister of Uruguay has contributed a witticism aimed, I fear, at both of the main schools of thought into which the diplomatic corps is divided. "Monsieur", he writes solemnly (though the address at the foot of the page clearly says "Mlle. Elizabeth P. MacCallum") – "Monsieur le Chargé d'Affaires et chère Collègue." The salutation is not likely, alas, to survive my first official call on the Minister of Uruguay, but I pass it on for whatever ephemeral interest it may possess.

Elizabeth P. MacCallum

- P.S. The Minister of Iran has just written, with great courtesy, "Dear Colleague," addressing his letter to "Miss Elizabeth P. MacCallum, Canadian Chargé d'Affaires." The Chargé d'Affaires of Argentina, taking refuge in Spanish, writes "Senora Encargada de Negocios," thus taking his stand with the feminist minority.

[Ottawa,] le 18 mai 1957

Les titres des diplomates femmes

Il ressort de l'excellent mémoire préparé en 1954 par M. Lavoie et des auteurs que j'ai consultés (grammaires, dictionnaires) qu'il n'existe pas encore de règle définie en cette matière. La plupart des sources sont muettes et les autres ne concordent pas. En conséquence, à mon avis, nous devrions :

- (1) accepter l'usage local à l'étranger;
- (2) faire le choix nous-mêmes d'une règle que nous devons suivre systématiquement tout en l'adaptant à l'évolution de la pratique.

Quant à la solution que nous devons adopter, je me rallie volontiers à celle que suggère M. Lavoie (et que résume M. McGreer au paragraphe 3 de son mémoire) : elle est conforme d'ailleurs à la pratique suivie par l'O.N.U. Lorsque l'usage a élaboré une version féminine du titre, il l'employer. Dans les autres cas, comme la profession est encore généralement exercée par des hommes, l'article et la forme du masculin devraient être utilisés surtout si la version féminine n'est pas particulièrement euphonique.

Il est probable cependant que l'évolution actuellement en cours va se poursuivre et que certains titres maintenant exclusivement masculins recevront une version féminine; il faudrait adapter graduellement notre pratique à l'usage qui sera accepté.

Nous pouvons donc je suggère, adopter pour les diplomates femmes de notre service les titres d'Ambassadrice, Conseillère, Chargée d'Affaires ou de Mission, d'Attachée et de Secrétaire-générale, mais retenir la désignation masculine si elles sont le Ministre, Consul-général, Consul ou Vice-Consul du Canada.

M.C.

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 6661,
DOSSIER 11852-C-40

Assistant Under

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 6661, FILE 11852-C-40

Section 38

Le recrutement dans les années 1950

Trente ans après l'ouverture de la légation à Washington, le Canada compte plus de 60 missions diplomatiques et autres bureaux à l'étranger, et le ministère des Affaires extérieures emploie environ 300 agents. Chaque année, de 18 à 26 nouveaux venus viennent se greffer à cet effectif. La méthode de concours est décrite dans cet article publié dans le journal *Affaires Extérieures*.

Recruitment during the 1950s

Thirty years after the Washington legation was opened, Canada had over 60 diplomatic missions and other offices abroad, and the Department of External Affairs employed approximately 300 foreign service officers. Each year between 18 and 26 new recruits were hired. The competition process was described in this article published in the journal *External Affairs*.

September 1958

Competitive Examination

The competitive examination, which is the only avenue to appointment as Foreign Service Officer Grade 1, is conducted annually by the Civil Service Commission. In order to compete for appointment a man or woman must be under 31 years of age, a university graduate or an undergraduate in his final year of study, and be a British subject with ten years' Canadian residence. Those who take the examination while not resident in the country must have retained their contact with Canada....

SOURCE : EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
SEPTEMBRE 1958

Oral Competition'

SOURCE : EXTERNAL AFFAIRS,
SEPTEMBER 1958

The competition is divided into three phases: the written examination, the oral examination, and the assignment of a rating based on education and experience. Of the two written papers, one is prepared by officers of the Department of External Affairs in co-operation with representatives of the Civil Service Commission; the other, a multiple-choice objective examination, is drawn up by the Commission to test all university graduates who are seeking employment in any part of the public service. Candidates may write in English or French, and each is given a number in order to preserve anonymity until the marking of the paper is completed.

The written examination, in addition to testing the candidate's general knowledge of Canadian and international affairs, is intended to test mental and intellectual qualities, including reading comprehension. For this reason the Department regards the essay paper as an important part of each written examination. Candidates are offered a broad choice of topics and asked to write essays on two of these. (A copy of the 1957 External Affairs essay paper is appended to this article.) On occasion a précis is included. This paper provides an opportunity for candidates to demonstrate clarity of mind, logic, coherence and, of course, ability to write concisely....

A post-graduate degree is not required, though the majority of successful candidates in the past have taken at least one year of graduate studies. Those with post-graduate training and experience and a knowledge of foreign languages are given additional credits in the competition.

In the second phase of the competition those who are successful in the written examination are called before an oral board. The centres at which the oral boards sit may change from year to year, but normally the boards are convened in the main cities of Canada, and, if the number of candidates should warrant, in some of the larger cities in the United States, the United Kingdom and Western Europe. Occasionally it is more convenient, where there are only one or two candidates, to request them to appear for interview at the nearest city in which the board is sitting. The boards are normally composed of five members, including the Civil Service Commission representative who acts as chairman, two representative's from the Department (one English-speaking and the other French-speaking), and two outside members representing the universities and business respectively. In the interests of continuity and to ensure that similar selection standards are applied, an effort is made to have one or more persons common to all boards.

The function of the board is to assess the personal suitability of the candidate on the basis of his intellectual capacity, integrity, initiative, personality and appearance. To aid the board members in forming a judgment, they have before them the comments of the persons whom candidates

have given as references. On the basis of the board's assessment, a mark is assigned for the second phase of the competition.

In the third phase a rating, based on any military, business and professional experience, academic training and knowledge of foreign languages, is assigned to each candidate who has been successful in the written and oral examinations....

Foreign Service Officer I

Department of External Affairs

1957. Time: 2½ hours

Answer any TWO questions

1. "It is not the terms of the Charter that block the development of the United Nations into a peace-enforcing authority, but the facts of international life in our age." Discuss.
2. A Canadian statesman recently declared that a Canadian foreign policy is not necessarily "the same as an independent policy." Discuss this statement in relation to Canada's membership in the Commonwealth, the United Nations and NATO.
3. "The problem of disarmament is the problem of security." Is this dictum of the 1930's still valid ?
4. What would be some of the results of the application to the contemporary world of the principles of Adam Smith ?
5. The guiding principle of Soviet foreign policy has sometimes been described as "all mischief short of war." How characteristic in your opinion is this of the policy of the U.S.S.R. today ?
6. What features of Canadian life should a government-sponsored information and cultural programme try to project abroad ?
7. Discuss "colonialism" as a factor influencing the policies of countries of East and South-east Asia.
8. Do you believe that the policies pursued by Western democracies since the Second World War bear out the statement made by Walter Lippmann that "faced with these (interdependent) choices between the hard and the soft, the normal propensity of democratic governments is to please the largest number of voters. The pressure of the electorate is normally for the soft side of the equations" ?
9. What would be the views on the idea of the integration of Western Europe of any *three* of the following: Machiavelli, the Duc de Sully, Napoleon, Karl Marx, Bismarck, Woodrow Wilson?
10. Is Canada a "welfare state"? Should it be?
11. Suggest means by which international law could effectively make for a more orderly world.
12. Discuss some of the implications of industrialization of *either* the Province of Quebec or the four western provinces.

Section 39

La mort tragique de Herbert Norman

L'ambassadeur du Canada en Égypte, Herbert Norman, se suicide après avoir pris connaissance des allégations du sous-comité de la sécurité intérieure du Sénat américain voulant qu'il soit un communiste. Cet incident déclenche une forte vague d'anti-américanisme au Canada. Peu après la mort de Norman, il semble que Pearson soit sur le point de faire aussi l'objet d'accusations semblables. Peu impressionné, ce dernier presse alors le premier ministre Louis Saint-Laurent de défendre publiquement à la fois Norman lui-même et l'enquête faite précédemment par le gouvernement canadien sur les allégations portées contre lui.

The Tragic Death of Herbert Norman

Canada's ambassador in Egypt, Herbert Norman, committed suicide following allegations by the U.S. Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee that he was a Communist. The incident set off a wave of strong anti-American feeling in Canada. Shortly after Norman's death, it appeared as though similar accusations would soon be made about Pearson. Undeterred, Pearson urged Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent to publicly defend both Norman and the Canadian government's earlier investigation of the allegations against him.

[Washington,] April 9, 1957

Canada–U.S. Security Relations; U.S. Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA. RG 25, VOLUME 3175, DOSSIER
RELATIONS CANADO-AMÉRICAINES EN
MATIÈRE DE SÉCURITÉ, 1951-1958

SOURCE : LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA.
RG 25, VOLUME 3175, FILE CANADA-US
SECURITY RELATIONS, 1951-58

Last evening at his request, the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Burke Elbrick) called on me at 7:15 to bring to my attention two developments which he regarded as very serious in the proceedings of the Senate Sub-Committee. Hill, the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs, who had been conferring with the Sub-Committee (Morris, the Chief Counsel, I presume) earlier yesterday with regard to the Norman case, reported that the Sub-Committee were intending to go into the charge made by Elizabeth Bentley some years ago that "a high Canadian official" (identified in the press at the time as Mr. Pearson) had leaked American wartime secrets to a known Soviet agent. (This story had been repeated in the Hearst Press recently. *New York Journal American*, April 1, 1957: "Canadian Spy Secret" by David Sentner.) One feature of this story which concerned the State Department was the reference to the U.S. Foreign Service Officer going to Ottawa to see the Prime Minister and the Minister to inform them of these charges.

2. Elbrick noted from a ticker report during the late afternoon that the Minister was to make a statement on security relations with the United States in the House of Commons the following day (i.e. April 9). It seemed of great importance to the State Department that these difficult problems should be dealt with objectively and not complicated by the natural emotional reaction resulting from the recent behaviour of the Senate Sub-Committee and the Norman tragedy. He suggested that I let Mr. Pearson know at once what the State Department had learned concerning the Sub-Committee's intentions.
3. I told Elbrick that, while we agreed that these matters should be dealt with unemotionally and realistically, he could not expect other than a very violent reaction if the Senate Sub-Committee further confounded their irresponsible behaviour of the past few weeks on Canadian affairs by dragging out this old story about the Minister. I had myself heard earlier that afternoon (from Robert McEwan, a Canadian Journalist) that Morris was contemplating an investigation which would involve R.B. Bryce, Secretary of the Canadian Cabinet. Just how ridiculous could you get? I felt sure the Canadian authorities would scorn to do anything to prevent such absurd goings on.
4. Subsequently I communicated the sense of my conversation with Elbrick to the Under-Secretary in Ottawa, Mr. Pearson being unavailable. Léger promised to let the Minister know what had transpired as soon as possible.
5. This morning Mr. Pearson telephoned me at 9:15. He began by saying that the State Department should be given no reason to think that the Canadian authorities had any desire to suppress or have withheld stories involving himself. Canadian opinion, in the event of the Senate Sub-committee proceeding, would support him and the Government unanimously in condemning the Sub-Committee's action and would become even more violently anti-American than it was already. Personally he had never experienced an atmosphere so critical of the United States on all sides of the House of Commons and throughout the country. The Norman tragedy and the conduct of the Senate Sub-Committee in that connection had sparked the fire and the further

actions apparently contemplated by the Sub-Committee could only result in a violent popular explosion. This would not harm the Government but would indeed benefit them politically.

6. The Minister referred to the statement which he was proposing to make today in the House of Commons (and which the Opposition were pressing for) upon security cooperation with the United States. Action was being demanded on all sides and Parliament was on the point of pre-election dissolution. He felt that it was essential to assure the House that Canadian cooperation in security matters would be withheld without categorical assurances from the U.S. Government.
7. I urged Mr. Pearson to defer his proposed statement in the House (and his instructions to present a Note to the State Department) until I had a further opportunity of emphasizing with U.S. authorities the extreme gravity of the situation in terms of Canadian-American relations. It seemed to me, I said, that there were three solid reasons for delaying action at least for twenty-four hours:
 - (a) if we confined our statement to information deriving from Canadian sources this might prejudice our position respecting information from other sources affecting Canadians (the latter being the Norman case);
 - (b) there was real risk that the action proposed would imperil the system of security cooperation between the security agencies of the two Governments which was of great value to us as well as to the United States; and
 - (c) the State Department were presently engaged at the top level in trying to limit and control the actions of Congress in discussions presently being carried on with the Internal Security Sub-Committee; the tide of Congressional and public opinion against the excesses of Eastland, Jenner, *et al* was rising and violent action on our part might prejudice a successful issue.
8. The Minister agreed that he would hold his statement for twenty-four hours but he could delay it no longer than that. Although he was skeptical that the State Department could (or the Secretary of State would) take any effective action, he agreed that I should see the State Department at once and inform them of the state of opinion in Parliament and in the country. Even such a short delay would be difficult because the Opposition would question him on the opening of the House this morning. (He was trying to persuade Mr. Alistair Stewart of the CCF not to ask a question on the Orders of the Day whether the Government intended to withdraw their Ambassador to Washington.) It would be in order for me to tell U.S. authorities the kind of statement which the Government felt bound to make with regard to security cooperation with the United States.
9. I have now arranged to see the Acting Secretary of State (Herter) and Elbrick at 11:30 this morning and have undertaken to report by telephone to Mr. Pearson if possible before 1:00 o'clock.
10. Mr. Pearson also told me that he was thinking of referring publicly himself to the charges made by Bentley in 1952 (?). Later in the morning he told me that he had given instructions to request permission from the F.B.I. to use the Bentley evidence. At his request I passed on this information to Elbrick for the Acting Secretary. (The object, of course, would be to pour ridicule upon the whole Sub-Committee proceedings with regard to Canadian officials.)

A.D.P.H.

Section 40

Le NORAD et les armes nucléaires

En 1957, l'Accord sur la défense aérienne de l'Amérique du Nord (NORAD) voit le jour. Selon les fonctionnaires des Affaires extérieures, le gouvernement Diefenbaker, nouveau et inexpérimenté, s'est lancé dans cet accord sans vraiment tenir compte de ses « aspects politiques, aussi bien nationaux qu'internationaux ». Il ne faut guère de temps pour que se pose l'épineuse question de savoir si le Canada doit ou non acquérir des armes nucléaires, et si oui, qui en aura le contrôle.

NORAD and Nuclear Weapons

In 1957 came the North American Air Defence Agreement (NORAD). In the opinion of External Affairs officials, the new and inexperienced Diefenbaker government had rushed into this agreement without fully considering "the political aspects both domestic and international." It was not long before the question of whether Canada should acquire nuclear weapons, and, if so, who would have ultimate control over their use, became a contentious issue.

De gauche à droite : John Diefenbaker, Dwight Eisenhower, président des États-Unis, et John Foster Dulles, secrétaire d'État des États-Unis, à l'extérieur de la résidence du Premier ministre.

Left to right: John Diefenbaker, U.S. president Dwight Eisenhower, and U.S. secretary of state John Foster Dulles outside the Prime Minister's residence.

SOURCE: BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA/ LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
PA-113742



[Ottawa,] October 7, 1957

In a joint press release on August 1 by the Minister of National Defence and the United States Secretary of Defence it was announced that the two governments had agreed to the setting up of a system of integrated operational control of the Canadian and United States air defence forces. The integrated headquarters at Colorado Springs (NORAD) which became operational on September 12 is commanded by a United States officer with a Canadian deputy....

SOURCE : VOLUME 25, DOCUMENT 19

3. This Department has never questioned the military judgment that this integration was a defence necessity. We have, however, been conscious of the importance of this integration to our political relations with the United States and other NATO Governments. We have believed as well that it has important domestic political implications. We have therefore always considered it desirable that the setting up of the integrated command should be recorded in an intergovernmental agreement. The Chairman, Chiefs of Staff is unconvinced of the need for an intergovernmental agreement on the subject. He has argued that the Minister of National Defence has the authority to set up military commands and that the command is within the NATO concept and should not therefore be difficult to explain to Parliament or to the public....
8. We believe that the political aspects both domestic and international of the establishment of NORAD raise questions which can only be decided by Ministers. We would recommend therefore that you discuss the points we have raised with the Minister of National Defence with a view to reaching a decision in principle as to whether or not an attempt should be made to work out an intergovernmental agreement with the United States authorities. If it is decided that an attempt should be made to work out such an agreement there is much to be said for taking the initial steps towards that end as quickly as possible. If questions are asked early in the session of Parliament concerning the establishment of NORAD the government would then be in a position to say that a detailed agreement on the subject was in the process of being worked out with the United States Government. It would of course be necessary to seek the preliminary agreement of the United States authorities that an intergovernmental agreement should be negotiated before anything could be said publicly in this vein.

J.L.

[Ottawa,] December 4, 1957

Projet de note de
John Diefenbaker à
Sidney Smith

SOURCE : VOLUME 25, DOCUMENT 25

Draft memorandum from
John Diefenbaker to
Sidney Smith

SOURCE: VOLUME 25, DOCUMENT 25

NORAD Arrangements

I am somewhat concerned over the impression that is being given to the public, for example in this morning's papers, concerning the lack of consultation with External Affairs over arrangements made with the United States for the establishment of the North American air defence operational control. I thought I should let you know my understanding of what happened so that should the matter come up again in Parliament or in public, we can all safeguard against creating the impression that there has been some serious dispute within the government or between the departments of External Affairs and National Defence on this matter.

Most of the preparations for this integration of operational control went forward under the previous government. It is my understanding, which I have already told the House of Commons on November 22nd, that these preparations had got to the point where the substance of the proposals were before the previous government for decision, but no decision was taken for reasons that it is best that they explain rather than ourselves. My understanding is that they simply did not wish to take action which might lead to controversy before an election, nor to authorize this matter after the election, when they were leaving office.

During these preparations over a period of several months, I understand that the department of External Affairs knew very well what was going on and that in fact senior officers of that department had discussed the matter on a number of occasions at meetings of the Chiefs of Staff and indeed had made suggestions that had been accepted by the Chiefs in connection with the recommendations that should be made to Ministers. I have no doubt myself that Mr. Pearson was quite familiar with what was going on, but of course we are not in a position to prove this in public. I would assume, and I am sure you can verify, that the department must have done some work on this in advising Mr. Pearson on the matter in preparation for consideration of it when it came before Ministers in a group.

After we took office, the Chiefs of Staff placed this matter before Mr. Pearkes as was their duty. He went into it in detail and came to the conclusion that the proposal of substance should be implemented without further delay. The delay occasioned by the preceding government had already been so long that it was embarrassing to delay further on matters of procedure or form when the question of substance was of such importance and agreement in substance had been achieved.

Mr. Pearkes brought the matter to me in my capacity as Secretary of State for External Affairs as well as Prime Minister. I understand that before he did so, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff had advised the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs that Mr. Pearkes considered the matter should not be taken up by the Cabinet Defence Committee as originally had been expected but directly between Ministers and possibly by the Cabinet.

When Mr. Pearkes and I discussed the matter, we came to the conclusion that it did not require action by the Cabinet and it should be put into effect and announced without any further delay. In agreeing to this, I was acting as Secretary of State for External Affairs as well as Prime Minister. I was responsible for the degree of consultation that took place with officers of the department of External Affairs. It is my understanding that immediately after Mr. Pearkes and I took the decision we did, he went directly to Mr. Léger's office and informed Mr. Léger of what was decided, so that

the department of External Affairs would know immediately what was involved. He also informed the Secretary to the Cabinet at about the same time and to the same effect....

The immediate problem is to see to it that the terms of reference of NORAD are properly defined, that the lines of authority are properly drawn and that the understanding with the Americans is properly negotiated and recorded. I think now that your department as well as National Defence should address themselves to this question and see to it that this important matter is handled in the best way possible. I do not know of any reservations that you and your department have on the questions of substance involved and I would think it is possible now to work out the procedures and necessary formal agreements in a satisfactory manner.

Section 41

La tournée mondiale de John Diefenbaker

En 1958, le premier ministre John Diefenbaker effectue une longue tournée des pays du Commonwealth. Il rencontre alors, entre autres dirigeants, le président Ayub Khan, du Pakistan, et le Premier ministre Jawaharlal Nehru, de l'Inde. Il s'agissait là, pour l'époque, du plus long voyage à l'étranger jamais fait par un dirigeant canadien. Une fois la tournée finie, H. Basil Robinson, des Affaires extérieures, en évalue les aspects organisationnels et administratifs. Il fait aussi d'intéressantes observations sur la préparation des discours de Diefenbaker.

John Diefenbaker's World Tour

In 1958 Prime Minister John Diefenbaker carried out an extensive tour of Commonwealth countries. He met with, among other leaders, President Ayub Khan of Pakistan and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India. It was one of the most extensive foreign tours undertaken by a Canadian leader up to that time. After the tour was over, H. Basil Robinson of External Affairs evaluated its organizational and administrative aspects. Robinson also made some interesting remarks on the preparation of Diefenbaker's speeches.

[Ottawa,] January 29, 1959

Prime Minister's Tour – Some thoughts on administrative arrangements, briefing, etc.

Preparations

Considering the short time which the Department had to make preparations for the tour, the administrative arrangements went remarkably smoothly. Much of the credit for this must go to the Commonwealth Division, which carried out a difficult coordinating role under extremely heavy pressure. The performance of missions in the early planning was uneven but improved as the preparations progressed. The advance party did its work very well....

3. I ... believe that since extended tours by Ministers seem likely to become more rather than less frequent, it will be necessary for the Department as a whole to give a higher priority to the work, not only of administrative preparation, but also to briefing and speech drafting.

Scope of Tour

4. On the basis of the recent tour, I would be inclined to suggest that future ministerial journeys might better be confined to one major area. The decision to include the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Italy was admittedly taken by the Prime Minister himself. He might have been better advised however to have deferred these visits, and to have begun the tour, say, at Karachi. This would have enabled him to see more of the Asian countries and to be exposed more than he was to the real problems they are facing. As it was, the psychological impact of Asia was not really felt since, in the short time available, it was not possible to free the Prime Minister and his party from the luxury of presidential palaces and all the pomp associated with brief official visits. Apart from a visit to Warsaw, the Prime Minister saw virtually nothing of the operation of the Colombo Plan and he had only the briefest glimpse of such Asian realities as refugee camps, villages, and slums. It is the natural desire of Asian governments, when time is short, to put on as brave a front as possible, and only a longer visit would encourage them to give a visitor a glimpse of the seamy side. I am very much afraid that the educative value of the Asian part of the tour was largely lost because of the short duration and formal nature of each visit.
5. To have omitted Europe would also have avoided the slights which I believe both the French and Italian authorities felt at the ricochet visits paid to Paris and Rome.
6. Finally, there was the problem of the refuelling stop at Djakarta. In the end, this worked out pretty well but only at the cost of much anguish to our Mission, which found the Indonesians highly sensitive at the Prime Minister's inability to pay a longer visit. There was no logic in this since the Indonesian Embassy here had themselves suggested a refuelling stop, but if we had it to do again, it might not be worth risking a misunderstanding....
10. The police aspect was somewhat overdone in certain places, notably in Pakistan. The reception which Mr. and Mrs. Moran held in the gardens of their residence was marred by the presence in the surrounding bushes of what must have been between fifty and one hundred uniformed policemen who kept moving soundlessly about in the half light. The whole effect was unfortunate and I doubt very much, even though martial law was in

SOURCE : VOLUME 24, DOCUMENT 402

SOURCE : VOLUME 24, DOCUMENT 402

John Diefenbaker lors de sa tournée mondiale, 1958.

John Diefenbaker during his world tour, 1958.

SOURCE: JIM THOMPSON, BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES CANADA/ LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA, PA-187715



force, that it was justified by existing conditions. Although Pakistan was conspicuous in this respect, I think the security escort was overdone in some other places. We cannot of course control the security precautions of host countries, which is strictly their own affair, but a word from us might avoid an exaggerated outlay of protective power....

16. ... We had not been twenty-four hours away from Ottawa before it became clear that we could not possibly operate without at least two full-time stenographers. We had good help from stenographers assigned on a temporary basis from missions abroad and perhaps this formula could be adopted in future so long as the individuals in question were assigned to the party for a substantial period. Continuity is, however, all-important since a touring party develops its own methods of production and since the conditions under which stenographers must work frequently involve some discomfort and adjustment....
18. Finally, I would emphasize the importance of selecting people who are likely to wear well under the stress of travel, changes of climate, a heavy social programme, and pressure of work. Despite advice from others who had experienced these tours in previous years, I had not fully realized the physical and psychological strains involved. This factor is all-important.

Briefing

19. The briefing supplied to the Prime Minister took the form of a series of country chapters, supplemented by short papers on special subjects. This book was supplied to the Prime Minister some two weeks before the tour began and it was, I think, as good a method of

briefing him as could have been devised. I do not think that the Prime Minister found time to read his book before the tour began. Even during the tour he tended to rely on having particular sections fed to him from the duplicate copy with which I was supplied. I was also provided with a considerable quantity of supplementary material organized by country and by subject, with a set of J.I.B. papers and a collection of maps....

21. I had not realized how little time there would be for the Prime Minister to be briefed in the course of the tour. The best opportunity usually arose in flight, prior to arrival in a new country. Sometimes there was as much as half an hour and sometimes not more than fifteen minutes owing to the Prime Minister's habit of sleeping through as many flights as possible. This meant that one was obliged to select and place in order of priority the most important papers, including any recent telegrams received. It also meant that the Prime Minister was not always fully briefed before arrival in each country despite the remarkable capacity he has for quick reading and absorbing of written material. Once the party had arrived in a new capital, the pace of official functions was such that there was seldom time for further briefing although the practice grew up of a short meeting of some 15 or 20 minutes where possible immediately prior to conversations and press conferences. In addition, I supplied the Prime Minister before each conversation and press conference with a short outline of the topics which would probably arise and brief suggestions as to the line he might take....

Speeches

27. Unfortunately it was the speeches which gave rise to the greatest difficulty, mainly because it was seldom if ever possible to look at drafts sufficiently in advance to present them in a form which would be acceptable to the Prime Minister. This is not to say that the drafts prepared in the Department were in themselves inadequate; rather, it was that there was never time to incorporate in those drafts new points which deserved inclusion either by reason of new developments or because of some indication one might have had of the Prime Minister's views. Frequently we were obliged to hand the Prime Minister the speech draft prepared in Ottawa with little or no attempt to bring it up to date or to fashion it to his special needs or inclinations.
28. The result of this was that the Prime Minister several times expressed impatience with speech drafts submitted to him and could not understand why it was that they failed to fit the occasion. At various times he asked other members of the party (notably Mr. Guest) to improve the Department's drafts, but more often he took them himself, gleaned an idea or two and then discarded them in favour of material he had accumulated himself.
29. I am afraid that because we were unable to make a better show on the speeches, the Department's reputation suffered considerably. It is of course true that we have not managed in the Department to attune ourselves to the Prime Minister's wave length for speeches, but it should not be beyond our capacity to find a way of satisfying his requirements.
30. As a general rule, we must, I think, accept the fact that the Prime Minister's habit with speeches is to produce his own out of raw material supplied from as many sources as will produce. He does not like to feel tied to someone else's plan or wording. Nor is it his normal

habit to give anything more than the most general indication of what each speech is to contain. Efforts to draw him out have been unsuccessful, I think, because the subject matter and structure of his speeches do not crystallize in his mind until a very late stage in the preparation.

31. The requirements for speeches on tour will of course always vary with the Minister concerned and one hesitates, therefore, to be categorical in suggesting a general formula. The first thing which seems to me clear, however, is that with Mr. Diefenbaker, public statements deserve a very high priority, certainly as high as the briefs to which we have normally devoted our main attention. On this tour Mr. Diefenbaker went from major speech to major speech rather than from one official conversation to another and I sometimes had the feeling that he could not understand why so much trouble had been gone to in telling him what to say to other Prime Ministers when what he really needed was some meat to put into his speeches. This seems to suggest therefore (and it applies as well to our operations in Ottawa) that the Department might consider devoting much greater attention to the preparation of speeches for the Prime Minister even though this may require some considerable re-allocation of Departmental priorities....
33. Another point which should be borne in mind in preparing material for Mr. Diefenbaker is that he does not normally accept and use other people's high-flown or even artistic language. He prefers a text to a series of headings (although a combination of the two is often useful to him) and the language of the text is often more acceptable if it is straightforward. In other words, he is more interested in substance and ideas than in the wrapping. He has his own very personal style of composition and delivery and to succeed in equipping him we should, I think, not hope to change these.
34. While Mr. Diefenbaker is not given to the detailed use of statistics in speeches, he often likes to see some broad figures on trade, population, economic growth, etc., included in speech drafts. He also likes references to distinguished figures of the past where these are appropriate. Apt quotations are appreciated. One thing he cannot abide is reference to Canada's cold climate, a point which irritated him more than once in the departmental drafts for the tour.

H.B.R.

Section 42

La révolution cubaine

À la charnière des années 1950 et 1960, les autorités canadiennes veulent resserrer les liens du pays avec le monde en développement, surtout l'Amérique latine et l'Afrique. Le jour de l'An 1959, arrive la révolution cubaine, qu'Hector Allard décrit avec vivacité dans une lettre envoyée depuis La Havane. Cet événement va avoir des conséquences inattendues pour le Canada : la décision d'Ottawa de rester en bons termes avec le nouveau régime lui vaut en effet bientôt la critique des États-Unis.

The Cuban Revolution

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Canadian officials wished to strengthen their country's ties with the developing world, particularly Latin America and Africa. On New Year's Day 1959 came the Cuban revolution, vividly described in a letter from Hector Allard in Havana. This event was to have unexpected consequences for Canada: Ottawa's decision to maintain friendly relations with the new regime soon led to criticism from the United States.

Le dirigeant cubain Fidel Castro lors d'une entrevue radiophonique menée par la Société Radio-Canada, 1961.

Cuban leader Fidel Castro being interviewed by the CBC, 1961.

SOURCE: HENRY FOX, BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES CANADA/ LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA, PA-213800



Havana, January 8, 1959

Batista's Fall

New Year's Day, 1959, was probably the most memorable New Year's Day for Cuba in this country's history. It marked the fall of a legend, the legend of Batista's invulnerability, and the rise of a new legend, that of the young Cuban guerilla leader who, in two years, starting with a force of a few dozen members, has risen to control a nation of six million people. Although it had become apparent during recent months that Batista's hold on Cuba was slipping, his sudden departure in the early morning hours of January 1 surprised most residents of Cuba. Many of the exact details of Batista's last hours, the reasons for his sudden decision and the events of January 1 and 2 will probably never be clarified, but the following summary may serve to supplement the spotty reports published by the international press.

2. Fidel Castro has issued his version of the events which forced Batista's flight from Cuba, although this version probably contains some inaccuracies designed to assist Castro in crushing any Batista sympathizers who may hope to retain some influence in the new Government. According to Castro's version, one of the senior army Generals in Havana, General Eulogio A. Cantillo Porras, headed a plot among army officers to swing the army support to Castro. Castro has released the texts of an exchange of letters between General Cantillo and himself, leading up to a meeting in Santiago de Cuba with Cantillo three days before Batista's flight. At this meeting, it was apparently decided that on January 1 Cantillo would announce the army's support for Castro and arrange for the seizure of Batista and all his senior government officials. Castro claims that following his return to Havana, Cantillo notified Castro that the plan would have to be postponed until January 6 and then proceeded to organize his own military junta to seize power in Havana. According to this version, Cantillo warned Batista that the army would seize power on January 1, thus allowing Batista and most of his senior officials to escape from Cuba before the attempted coup. As soon as Batista and his followers had left Havana, Cantillo attempted to set up the Chief Magistrate of the Supreme Court, Dr. Carlos M. Piedra, as the provisional President according to the terms of the 1940 Constitution. This treasonous plot collapsed, according to Castro, because the remainder of Cantillo's junta fled with Batista so that Piedra refused to carry on in the scheme and resigned.
3. Meanwhile, Castro approached the leader of the military garrison in Santiago de Cuba, Colonel José Rego Rubido, with the original scheme as agreed to by Cantillo. Rubido at first refused to lay down arms. Castro then ordered a rebel march on Santiago. However, when news of Piedra's refusal to assume power in Havana was handed to Col. Rubido, he met Castro at the outskirts of Santiago and turned over the complete Santiago garrison peacefully to the Castro forces. As a reward for this gesture, Castro has named Col. Rubido as Chief of the new Cuban Army and has arrested Cantillo, charging him with high treason. It is also worthy of note at this point, that the new Chief of the Cuban Navy, Gaspar Bruch, was the Commanding Officer of a small frigate stationed in Santiago harbour who arranged for the surrender of the naval forces to Castro on January 1. Defection apparently has paid off for both of these former Batista officers.

4. In Havana, news of Batista's flight began to filter out in the early morning hours of January 1. The Havana radio stations confirmed that Batista, most of his Cabinet and 50 or 60 top Government officials had fled the country sometime between 2 and 4 a.m. on January 1. Two notable exceptions were the former head of the Cuban Confederation of Labour, Eusebio Mujal, who is reported to have received asylum in the Argentine Embassy, and the President of the National Bank, Martinez Saenz, who has been arrested. Several other lesser government officials have also succeeded in gaining asylum in one or another of the Latin American Embassies, although the rebel groups have succeeded in seizing many real or suspected Batista supporters or sympathizers. Castro has warned that many heads will fall in revolutionary justice. Recent newspaper reports indicate that more than 1100 police, army and air force personnel plus many civilians are under detention. The rebels have promised military justice for the chief offenders but have indicated that minor officers who acted honourably under orders might be recalled to duty. Apparently at least ten armed forces officers have already been put to death after summary court martials. This does not seem to be too good an omen for fair trials for the others.
5. The public announcement of Batista's departure was the signal in Havana for wild rejoicing, which took the form of racing automobiles, blaring horns, cheering crowds displaying the red and black Castro colours and the occasional shot. By noon on January 1 the shots were becoming more than occasional. Mobs of unruly youthful Habaneros entered police and army stations which had been surrendered peacefully, seized all available weapons and began to roam the streets. It was unfortunate that Batista chose the eve of a holiday for his flight, since all workers were, therefore, available to take part in whatever rioting might occur. As soon as it became obvious that the provisional government of Carlos Piedra would not be functioning, the disorganization became complete. In spite of occasional pleas for restraint broadcast by the radio, the wandering mobs became more unruly. They sought out suspected Batista sympathizers, killed several (later reports state that 70 people died in Havana street fighting) and put others to flight, savagely looted the homes of former Cabinet Ministers or government officials (including Batista's daughter's residence), looted the army-supported free import stores and seized most of the Havana radio and TV stations. Havana residents were in more danger from these youthful hoodlums than they ever were from the actual 26th of July troops. Road blocks were thrown up on the major Havana streets and any citizens foolish enough to travel were stopped at almost every intersection and forced to identify themselves.
6. This disorganization continued through the afternoon and night of January 1, on January 2 and during the early hours of January 3. By that time, however, legitimate members of the 26th of July movement, complete with up to two years' growth of hair and beards and colourful guerilla costumes, had arrived in Havana. These troops have by now earned considerable respect for their orderly and subdued deportment. They immediately issued orders designed to call in the arms held by wandering mobs, placed a strong curfew on Havana residents for the night of January 3 and gradually brought the city under more or less effective control. Meanwhile, the general strike which Castro had called as soon as he learned of Cantillo's perfidy continued in effect until midnight of January 4. As a result, local

city transportation collapsed entirely, shortages of food, milk and drinking water became serious for many unprepared Havana residents; garbage collection facilities ceased to function, and traffic conditions degenerated from Havana's usual bad to worse.

7. During the height of the crisis in Havana, the American and Canadian Embassies made arrangements to evacuate in the neighbourhood of 1700 American and Canadian tourists and students stranded in Havana by the general strike....
8. Castro remained in Santiago de Cuba long enough to swear in his candidate for President, Dr. Manuel Urrutia, 57-year old former Judge of the Santiago District Court ... [O]n January 7 the recently elected Congress was dissolved by presidential decree and all Political Parties abolished; however, a promise was issued that elections would be held within 18 to 24 months (a rather long period for a provisional President to retain power). In the meantime, the new President and his Cabinet will rule Cuba by decree, a procedure which Cubans have become accustomed to during the last two years of the Batista régime.
9. As soon as he had installed his candidate as provisional President, Castro began a triumphal journey by land from Santiago to Havana. This slow journey, obviously designed to cement Castro support throughout the island and to allow the 26th of July troops already in Havana time to solidify their positions has been further slowed by the poor condition of the roads, resulting from Castro's earlier activities, and by two to three-hour Castro speeches in each major centre en route. The Cubans, always quick to hail a conquering hero, are apparently turning out in force to cheer Castro on his journey, and at the time of this writing plans are underway to provide a rousing welcome in Havana for the Castro procession, which has grown with each stop. Some concern has been expressed that Castro is delaying his entry to Havana too long and that the revolutionary unity preceding the victory may not persist long after the victory. An indication of this tendency to split into factions appeared on January 7 when the so-called 13th of March Revolutionary Directorate, the survivors of the University Students' armed attack on the Presidential Palace on March 13, 1957, who had created a second front in Las Villas Province, issued a statement demanding participation in the provisional government for all revolutionary organizations, and a part in drawing up the government's programme and setting the date and form of the general elections. Urrutia made a major speech before the University faction in an obvious attempt to prevent an open split from developing. One of the main dangers, however, for Cuba in the forthcoming weeks will be the great possibility of quarrels among the various factions which form the new group of victors. This will be complicated by the presence in Cuba of ex-President Carlos Prío Socarrá, whose political party has been dissolved, but who will without doubt wish to exert some influence in the future reorganization of the Republic. He was, after all, for some time the only source of funds for Castro's rebels.
9. Since this report was drafted we have learned that the Revolutionary Directorate (university students) have taken over the third floor of the Amber Motor Building in which we are located and that the front door of this office building is now under 24-hour armed guard and some visitors to the Embassy are being stopped and questioned.

Hector Allard

Section 43

L'avenir du Commonwealth

En 1960, l'indépendance, réelle ou imminente, de nombreuses anciennes colonies britanniques en Afrique, ainsi que la controverse grandissante provoquée par la politique d'apartheid en Afrique du Sud, viennent ajouter aux craintes concernant l'avenir du Commonwealth. R.B. Bryce, du Conseil privé, prépare alors ce mémoire à l'intention de Diefenbaker avant la réunion des premiers ministres du Commonwealth à Londres en 1960.

The Future of the Commonwealth

By 1960, the independence or imminent independence of many former British colonies in Africa, along with the growing controversy over South Africa's apartheid policy, gave rise to more fears about the future of the Commonwealth. R.B. Bryce of the Privy Council Office prepared this memorandum for Diefenbaker before the 1960 meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London.

[Ottawa,] April 18, 1960

Central Issues re the Commonwealth

You have asked me for some ideas about the Commonwealth in relation to the London meeting in May. I see three major issues and would comment on them as follows:

Composition and Nature

The first issue is the future nature of the Commonwealth itself. It has now passed through two stages and is about to enter a third, which poses some threat to its continuing usefulness. First it was a small group of half a dozen reasonably similar, white, parliamentary constitutional monarchies, inevitably dominated by the United Kingdom, which was much larger and richer than the others. It was almost a family affair. Since 1947 it has come through a second stage, with India, Pakistan, etc. giving it a new significance but making it a broader, looser association – let us say a club of the Imperial “old boys” who have graduated from U.K. tutelage. Still the number was manageable and while the members varied in size, it was possible to regard them as tolerably equal.

Now we have a dozen or two new members coming up the path to the doorstep, most of them quite small and poor. Nigeria will be first, and need not change the character of the club, but then will come a lot of little applicants – from Cyprus to British Honduras. I think we must and should admit them all, and on equal status with the rest of us, although it will then be perfectly obvious that “some are more equal than others.” All these are likely to become members of the United Nations and sensitive about their status. We cannot make them second-class members.

This flood of small new members will make two main differences. First, the periodic meetings of Prime Ministers will get closer and closer to a sort of U.N. meeting, in which it will be hard to preserve the intimate, informal character that has been an important feature in the past. I think we should try to preserve the forms and the atmosphere as much as possible, but I think we must recognize that we cannot always proceed by unanimity. The meetings cannot be conducted quite so much like Cabinet meetings. There will have to be some willingness to proceed by preponderance, if not by majority. Perhaps some of us may retain, in effect, a veto if we feel strongly about a matter, but everyone cannot have this privilege, and instead must be permitted publicly to disagree. Managing this new flock will be quite a job for the chairman, who will need the help of some of his experienced colleagues like yourself.

The second difference made by the new members will be in the day to day workings of Commonwealth consultation. This will be more a problem for the United Kingdom than for us. I do not see that it need bother us very much. We will just have to choose which Commonwealth members we consult with on a basis different from other nations, and treat the others in a friendly way, but not so often. Clearly, however, it will mean there cannot be a Commonwealth seat on U.N. councils that would rotate quickly enough to be of interest to us, unless it were accepted that some would qualify more often than others.

Poverty, Development and Aid

It must be recognized that in the Commonwealth we now belong to a club in which the richer members are expected, as a social duty, to assist the poorer. The second stage of the Commonwealth led to the Colombo Plan within two or three years of the entry of India, Pakistan and Ceylon. Since then the pace of nationalism and of hunger for economic development has quickened. Emergent members are now expecting aid to come with independence. Unless the new members, especially in Africa, receive some sort of help from the older (white) members, they are going to be very disappointed, and say they are not being treated fairly or on the same basis as the Asian members.

Looking ahead, it seems to me that this problem is going to get much more acute as this decade progresses. The population pressure in Asia and many parts of Africa (and Latin America) will be inexorable and frightening. The contrast in living standards will become wider and more glaring. The poorer countries will get more and more conscious of it, and feel that something should, indeed must, be done about it at almost any cost. They will try to trade with us, the richer nations, and we will find that requires painful readjustments in our economies which we will resist. They will ask more urgently than for aid, which we will give in amounts that will not satisfy them and which cannot do so while the population surge is on....

Racial Equality and South Africa

Whatever one says or does, the issue arising from the South African violence will inevitably dominate the public attitude toward this Commonwealth conference. The timing makes it inevitable. The action of the U.K. House has clinched it. I do not see how you or the others can dodge it. The press and Parliament will ask you what you propose to do about it, and, afterwards, what the Commonwealth has done about it.

The issue has already been raised by the Prime Minister of Malaya, whose representatives in London put it up to all Commonwealth governments. You owe him some sort of reply before leaving. He is committed to raise the matter at London.

I recognize that neither your colleagues here, nor those in London, would support a proposal to invite South Africa to withdraw, even though that might be the best for the Commonwealth as an effective force in itself.

I think that one must find some means of dealing with the issue at the conference table, and not just at luncheon. I think, too, the communiqué must mention it in some manner. Otherwise there is apt to be a wave of reproach and disillusionment about the morality or the courage of the Commonwealth that will weaken it when it most needs strength to meet the two problems noted above and remain an effective bond between its white and coloured member countries.

I think one could deal with the matter by taking note of the manner in which the policies and actions of South Africa have given rise to questions across the world as to the attitude of the Commonwealth on the principle of racial equality – a principle of first rate importance in this mixed modern world. In these circumstances the other members of the Commonwealth can properly feel it necessary to state jointly, without asking South Africa to concur, that they believe

in the principle of racial equality and in respect for the inherent dignity of all men, regardless of race, creed or color, and that they follow, and intend to continue following, policies which respect these principles and apply them in the treatment of all the people in each of their own countries.

A discussion and a statement along such lines would be in order, for it would concern the public reputation of the Commonwealth as a whole, and would not involve direct comment upon the domestic affairs of South Africa. We would not challenge her right to behave as she wishes at home, but we would recognize that when her behaviour attracts such universal disapproval, we must make clear that those of us associated with her do not share her views or be made by silence to appear to endorse them.

I would suggest that we consider urgently the possibility of some action along this general line but worked out in advance as carefully as time permits. Possibly it might be reflected, in a general way, in the line taken in the debate that presumably will take place in Parliament on the 26th or 27th just before you leave.

R.B.B.

Section 44

L'Afrique du Sud et le Commonwealth

De nombreuses controverses ont marqué la politique étrangère de Diefenbaker, mais le rôle que ce dernier joue lors des réunions des premiers ministres du Commonwealth de 1960 et 1961 doit être mise au rang des victoires. Diefenbaker affirme avec insistance, contre l'avis de son homologue britannique Harold Macmillan, qu'une nation pratiquant la discrimination raciale n'a plus sa place au Commonwealth. Grâce à son entêtement, le communiqué émis à l'issue de la réunion de 1960 fait ressortir que le Commonwealth est une « association multiraciale ». Beaucoup s'opposent à l'expulsion de l'Afrique du Sud, mais vers la fin de la réunion de 1961, les Sud-Africains annoncent leur intention de se retirer volontairement de l'association. Les documents suivants exposent la teneur d'une conversation entre Diefenbaker et R.K. Nehru pendant la réunion de 1961.

South Africa and the Commonwealth

Among the many controversies that marked Diefenbaker's foreign policy, his role at the 1960 and 1961 Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meetings must be remembered as an undoubted triumph. Against the advice of British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, Diefenbaker insisted that a nation which practiced racial discrimination could not continue to be a member of the Commonwealth. Thanks to Diefenbaker's persistence, the communiqué issued after the 1960 meeting emphasized that the Commonwealth was a "multiracial association." There was strong reluctance to expel South Africa, but near the end of the 1961 meeting the South Africans announced their intention to withdraw voluntarily. The following document records a conversation between Diefenbaker and R.K. Nehru during the 1961 meeting.

[London,] March 12, 1961

Indian Attitude on South African Questions

SOURCE - VOLUME 28, DOCUMENT 475

Mr. R.K. Nehru, Secretary-General for External Affairs and the senior Indian official on their delegation, finally reached me by telephone about 5.30 on Saturday afternoon and said that his Prime Minister had asked him to see me on a matter relating to the Conference. I arranged for him to come here almost immediately to speak about it.

SOURCE - VOLUME 28, DOCUMENT 475

When I met Mr. Nehru, he informed me that he wanted to tell us of their attitude on the South African question. He said that his Prime Minister had been careful not to make any public statements on this during the preceding week and they had been giving a good deal of thought to the subject both before leaving India and here in London. Now they were ready to inform the other delegations confidentially of their views in anticipation of the discussion next week.

At this point I saw the importance of Mr. R.K. Nehru's message and suggested that he might like to come in and give it directly to Mr. Diefenbaker, so that the latter could ask any questions about it that occurred to him. This was quickly arranged and Mr. Nehru resumed his account with Mr. Diefenbaker, repeating two or three of the earlier points.

There were four principal considerations in their attitude on this question. They were as follows:

- (1) They must not make or appear to make any compromise on the subject of racialism. What they did in regard to South Africa must be consistent with what they have said and done on racialism in the past.
- (2) If they took any positive action which could be interpreted as approval of South Africa, they would be letting down and weakening the progressive forces in Africa, which they had been supporting heretofore, and which were relying on their understanding and support in their struggle for the establishment of successful independent nations in Africa.
- (3) If they took any positive action that appeared to constitute approval or support of South Africa, this would expose them and other western and neutral members of the Commonwealth to serious criticism and undermining by the Communists, including particularly Communist China which was already attacking India.
- (4) The granting of consent by other members to South Africa continuing in the Commonwealth would weaken the value and usefulness of the Commonwealth in future, whereas on the other hand the Commonwealth could be strengthened and made more useful if South Africa should drop out.

At this point Mr. Nehru referred to the editorial in the latest issue of the *Economist* on Commonwealth affairs and said that this contained thoughts along the same lines that they had in mind.

Mr. Diefenbaker noted that he had not always been able to agree with the ideas of the *Economist* but that he would look at the article. (It is presumably the article entitled "Bridge Club.")

After outlining these arguments, Mr. R.K. Nehru then said that if a positive act of consent or its equivalent were needed in order to retain South Africa in the Commonwealth, India would have

to take a decision in accordance with the above principles. I felt Mr. Nehru made it quite clear in the context that this would mean India refusing to consent if the issue became a direct one.

Later, as he was leaving, I asked Mr. Nehru whether it was not his belief that positive consent by all members was required and he said that they felt last year's communiqué indicated this quite clearly. (This appears to be contrary to the understanding and the plan which the United Kingdom appear to have in mind.)

Mr. Diefenbaker asked Mr. Nehru several questions in the course of the latter's exposition. He then went on to outline the present stage of his own personal thinking on the subject as indicating a possible course of action.

He thought it would be quite feasible to say that it was not necessary to take action yet on the South African request to continue as a member of the Commonwealth, despite the precedents that had been established. Their legislation is not yet through their Parliament and it does not go into effect until the end of May. He therefore thought the question of consent to continuing should be left until later and a decision to that effect should be made by the Conference. He thought the Conference should also make a statement in the communiqué condemning apartheid.

The result of these two actions, Mr. Diefenbaker suggested, would be that South Africa would withdraw from the meeting and probably from the Commonwealth as well, without direct action having to be taken to exclude her. If she did not withdraw, he thought the Verwoerd government would be apt to be under severe attack at home in the next twelve months and might indeed be defeated over the issue. He said that he had not informed Mr. Macmillan of these particular views when he had seen him during the preceding twenty-four hours at Chequers, but that he was so interested in the views that Mr. R.K. Nehru had set forth that he thought he should tell him the state of his own thinking on the matter at this stage.

R.B.B.

Section 45

Élargissement du commerce avec la Chine

Avant l'établissement de relations diplomatiques entre le Canada et la République populaire de Chine, une des rares sources d'information du Ministère sur les affaires chinoises est le délégué commercial du Canada à Hong Kong, C.J. Small. Ce dernier multiplie les voyages en Chine dans l'espoir d'intensifier le commerce avec ce pays, et en 1961, ses efforts mènent à une importante vente de blé canadien. En juin 1960, il envoie aux Affaires extérieures ce compte rendu à la fois divertissant et instructif sur une de ses récentes visites.

Expanding Canada's Trade with China

Before the establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and the People's Republic of China, one of the Department's few sources of information on Chinese affairs was the Trade Commissioner in Hong Kong, C.J. Small. Small made several trips to China in hopes of increasing Canadian trade with that country; in 1961 his efforts would result in a large sale of Canadian wheat. In June 1960, he sent External Affairs this entertaining and informative account of a recent visit.

Hong Kong, June 30, 1960

C.J. Small
(délégué commercial,
Hong Kong) à Norman
Robertson (sous-
secrétaire d'État aux
Affaires extérieures)

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 5280,
DOSSIER 9030-40

C.J. Small
(Trade Commissioner,
Hong Kong) to Norman
Robertson (Under-
Secretary of State for
External Affairs)

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 5280, FILE 9030-40

China Visit by C.M. Forsyth-Smith & C.J. Small, May 13th–June 8th, 1960

Dear Sir:

Inauspiciously on Friday, 13th of May, Max Forsyth-Smith and I walked across the renowned but insignificant bridge linking Lo Wu and Shumchun on the Hong Kong–China border. Four weeks later on June 8th, we made the return journey after two hours of nagging delay while Chinese officialdom decided whether or not to release our photographs. Another hour's delay would have prevented our return to Hong Kong for Typhoon Mary was on the verge of striking the Colony; as it was, we caught one of the last ferrys across to the island before operations ceased and Hong Kong battened down to sit out the storm. Between May 13th and June 8th we spent four days in Canton, ten days in Peking, three days in Tientsin and five days in Shanghai, the remaining time being consumed in train travel and a single flight from Shanghai to Canton. The purpose of our journey was trade promotion and this occupied an overwhelming portion of our time in the form of discussions with the numerous State Trading Corporations. In addition, however, we attended the Canton Export Commodities Fair, visited rural and urban people's communes, ducked an anti Japan–U.S. Security Treaty rally in Canton but unofficially observed – until thrown out – the record breaking mass rally of 3.2 million people in Peking protesting against the alleged U.S. sabotage of the Summit Conference, and tasted the best and worst of Chinese culinary art.

Border customs formalities were at a minimum, although there was a brief moment of consternation and embarrassment when one of our handbags (whose ownership we had switched temporarily for balancing-up purposes and whose contents the new “owner” was under the impression contained trade promotional material and had declared as such) was opened, to reveal a substantial proportion of well known Canadian liquid export products. However, the customs official, either in a moment of understanding or of pity, did not bat an eye and passed all without comment beyond noting our photographic equipment....

Canton to Peking by Rail

For the journey to Peking we purposely chose the slow train which requires 48 hours instead of the ‘Peace Train’ which covers the distance in 43 hours and offers foreigners or overseas Chinese fairly luxurious accommodation. We did this despite some pressure on the part of the Chinese because the slow train departs at 8:05 a.m. and travels through attractive river valleys and hills and mountains throughout the first day, whereas the Peace Train departs in the late afternoon and the best part of the country is traversed during the night. We followed various rain-swollen Pearl River tributaries for most of the first day, initially through tall groves of lush green bamboos which later gave way as we climbed to higher elevations to fir trees and tangled undergrowth. Finally, we moved up into the hills, broken by valleys set out with rice paddies and other grain fields. Wheat and barley harvesting were under way while rice transplanting was almost completed....

For travelling comfort we had donned sport shirts and shorts and at each stop hopped off for a speedy hike up and down the platform – to the immense curiosity and amusement (was it the

hairy, bony legs?) of our fellow travellers all of whom were Chinese including a group of overseas student returnees ...

Our ten days in Peking were frustrating, galling, interesting and stimulating. The frustration and gall resulted from the familiar delaying tactics employed by the Chinese when dealing with foreigners. We had planned a six day sojourn in Peking but for the first two we were left cooling our heels without any appointments. The time was not lost entirely, however, as it provided an opportunity to call on Western embassy and press representatives and to look about Peking. The third day our interviews with the State Trading Corporations began and from then on came along steadily, if somewhat slowly. As usual, our first appointments were with the corporations of least interest to us and only after we had issued an ultimatum about our departure were the ones of greatest interest forthcoming. In the end we departed having seen all but two of the corporations with which we had requested interviews....

In Peking – but only once or twice in the other cities visited – we were subjected to constant pressure concerning Canadian dumping duties and to a lesser extent, the strategic embargo and the matter of recognition.... After fairly lengthy exchanges ... we generally got one of two reactions: (1) if our Chinese protagonist was obviously a man of some intelligence and authority he frequently stated his case, we stated ours and we then agreed to disagree or (2) if our opponent was a birdbrain as happened occasionally, he rapidly became confused and when backed into a corner made frequent and desperate references to his notebook hoping to find the correct answers and appropriate line with which to extricate himself. The worst of the latter type persisted so long that we finally asked him if he was interested in discussing trade as, otherwise, there appeared to be no point in wasting each other's time further....

Peking is still the imperial city. It revels in its antiquities and its new-found importance, its new buildings, new industries, new trolley buses, new railway station, and in its pride in again being the capital of China – a new, energetic and powerful China. The foreigners of other days – exploiters, missionaries, educationists and all – have gone and in their place the foreigners of today are generally suppliants of one sort or another. The Western businessman must beg and wait for his visa to enter China and, when there, be happy for a few crumbs from the Chinese trading table. “Fraternal brothers” from the Communist countries are frequently little better off than their Western counterparts....

Nevertheless, the ordinary people remain friendly and are happy to chat with a foreigner in a bus if he speaks their language. Bus conductors and conductresses are unfailingly cheerful, polite and inveterate chatterers. They assist old folk, pregnant women, women with children and foreigners to their seats and if there is no vacancy this is speedily righted by turfing someone from his place. Generally speaking, however, this is unnecessary as the seat is normally offered at once without being asked. The life of a bus conductress is a busy one as she is constantly on the move: leaping from the front door to assist people aboard and sprinting to the back to collect old tickets; leaning from the window at a precarious angle to watch the trolleys safely past each switch point and reporting it to the world at large; shouting instructions to passengers and driver and, on occasions, spreading propaganda on public health or the conquest of Everest as occurred while we were in Peking. The children of Peking, and indeed of all China, are

an attractive lot: bright, cheerful, inventive, undemanding, getting on with little or nothing for amusement but devising their own games with coins, a bit of paper, a few bricks and so forth. Spitting, alas, has not disappeared from China although the results are less in evidence than before. Neat spittoons with a cover and long handle are available in strategic positions and, with the technical innovations campaign in full swing, we even saw a few of the latest version – a foot-operated cover-raising model....

On May 19th the Chinese held their record demonstration of 3.2 million people marking the break up of the Summit Conference. The previous day there was no indication that anything of the sort was afoot until a late hour. En route back to the Hsinchiao Hotel we walked along one of the approaches to Tien An Men Square about 5:30 p.m. and saw no signs of preparations. However, that evening at the hotel we encountered Bert Whyte, the Canadian Communist correspondent, who, in reply to our question and as an illustration that he received from the Chinese no special consideration as a Communist reporter, mentioned the fact that he had by chance at a visiting reception for Algerians stumbled on the news that a massive demonstration would take place the next day. Later that evening Ron Farquhar, Reuters correspondent in Peking, returning to the hotel about midnight, noticed that giant red lanterns were being hung on Tien An Men – a sure sign of a demonstration to come. The following morning en route to our first appointment at 8:30 a.m., we retraced our steps of the previous evening and discovered that arrangements were well advanced for the day's "spontaneous" demonstration: portable latrines – primitive efforts of canvas wrapped around poles concealing a series of pits freshly dug in the ground – had been set up overnight all along the approach roads to the Square. About 11:00 a.m. marchers commenced passing the Export Corporation Building where we were and when we left at noon we followed them into Tien An Men Square to find it already one quarter full and long lines of marchers approaching from all directions. In addition to the portable latrines, there were on all the approaches, first aid brigades, traffic directors, food and drink dispensers, the most popular item being a type of popsicle which was apparently being issued free to all participants. All groups carried red flags, banners with anti-U.S. slogans and, frequently, cartoons depicting a great Soviet hand crushing a U.S. plane or Eisenhower in numerous undignified poses. Banners bore such slogans as "Down with U.S. imperialism," "Oppose U.S. Imperialism's Wrecking of the Four Power Conference," "Support the Soviet Union's Stand," "Support World Peace," etc., etc....

A substantial portion of the crowd comprised young pioneers, both male and female. However, there were demonstrators of all ages and they were still pouring into the Square from every direction in orderly fashion when we departed at 2:00 p.m. for a hasty lunch and, as we thought, a three o'clock appointment. We had just commenced our lunch when Mr. Huang of the CCPIT [China Council for Promotion of International Trade] appeared to invite us to view the demonstration from the special visitor's stands at Tien An Men. A car was waiting to convey us and a more senior member of his organization, he said, would meet us at the Square to accompany us to our reserved seats. Mr. Huang made no comment but appeared somewhat amused or embarrassed (apparent amusement often covers embarrassment in China) as we declined the invitation in no uncertain terms and affirmed as clearly as possible that we disapproved of the purpose and practice of the whole demonstration. When he departed,

however, we rapidly made our way to the rear of Tien An Men Square which was not far from the hotel. We unsuccessfully sought permission from a soldier guarding the entrance to a building at the back of the Square to enter and take photographs from the second floor balcony but just then a friendly cadre appeared and asked what country we were from and, upon being told, said he would seek the necessary permission. However, he returned with a negative reply and we were forced to employ a nearby scaffold for the same purpose to which no one objected. By this time it was 3:00 p.m. and the Square was comfortably filled with an estimated 600,000 odd people and the official speeches had begun. After all the northern Mandarin I had been subjected to, it warmed my Szechwanese heart to hear Teng Hsiao-ping declaiming in the broadcast of Szechwanese dialect, although I was less enamoured of the contents of his speech. The Soviet Ambassador's speech, parts of which we heard, while following the Communist line, was far less condemnatory than the Chinese speeches and appeared to leave the door open to co-existence with the West.

We had just picked our way carefully through the crowd to the centre of the Square with no particular objective in view other than observation of the proceedings, when a determined looking cadre challenged us and asked our business there. Looking as innocent as possible we gave the obvious answer that we were merely watching the show but this did not satisfy him. He replied that this was a demonstration of the Chinese people and that we had no right to be there. When we announced we had been invited he promptly asked for our invitation card which, of course, we could not produce as we had been invited orally. Explaining that we were under the wing of the CCPIT he then asked our nationality and the news that we were Canadians cut no ice at all with him and, indeed, appeared to make up his mind to act. He then asked where we were staying and, on learning that we were at the Hsinchiaio, unceremoniously ordered us to return to the hotel and stay there. At the same time, he gathered half a dozen of his cohorts about him and ordered us to proceed. After some further discussion it became apparent that he meant business and, as we had by this time become the main attraction in the centre of the Square, we decided to beat as dignified a retreat as possible under the circumstances – a difficult objective since we were clearly under escort until we were out of the Square and down the street. Our escort finally tired of the game and dropped off, whereupon we cut back to Chang An Jieh at a point close to the Square and opposite the Peking Hotel where we decided to make a personal estimate of the size of the assembly. From our observations, besides the 600,000 odd people in the Square itself, we concluded that the figure of 3.2 million was not an exaggerated one, Chang An Jieh – a street at least 50 yards wide – was choked with demonstrators for a mile and a half on each side of the Square and the smaller approach streets were filled as well.

Tien An Men Square was a magnificent sight with its blue sea of demonstrators broken only by the many red and gold banners and brilliant red flags streaming in the breeze and gleaming in the brilliant sunshine under a typical Peking blue sky and billowing white clouds. It was a sight that would have gladdened the heart of Hitler or Mussolini and it contained most of the elements employed by the Nazis in their day: The vast mob filling the Square, marching feet, banners, songs, shouted slogans and raised clenched fists. However, something was missing for the oratory was either less inspired than Hitler's or the Chinese character did not respond to it. Whatever it was, the cheering and shouting were automatic and perfunctory and evidence of

boredom over the whole business was easy to find amongst the frequently dozing or card playing demonstrators. At the conclusion, the relief of the demonstrators was obvious as they speedily folded their banners, broke ranks and dashed away to their homes. Some of the groups, however, including most of the young pioneers marched off in orderly fashion and the last disappeared from the Square exactly an hour after the demonstration had officially ended at 4:30....

Yours truly,
C.J. Small

Section 46

Les premières foires commerciales du Canada en Afrique

Le ministère des Affaires extérieures et le ministère du Commerce organisent conjointement les premières foires commerciales du Canada, respectivement à Accra, au Ghana, et à Lagos, au Nigeria. D'importantes personnalités, dont le président Kwame Nkrumah, du Ghana, et le premier ministre Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, du Nigeria, assistent aux cérémonies d'ouverture.

The First Canadian Trade Fairs in Africa

The Department of External Affairs and the Department of Trade and Commerce together organized the first Canadian trade fairs in Accra, Ghana and Lagos, Nigeria. In both Accra and Lagos, the opening ceremonies were attended by important officials, including President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria.

Lagos, March 17, 1962

Canadian Trade Fair Lagos – January 17–28, 1962

Rapport de Thomas
Carter (haut-commissaire
au Nigeria)

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 5541,
DOSSIER 12490-CK-40

Report by Thomas Carter
(High Commissioner
in Nigeria)

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 5541, FILE 12490-CK-40

The purpose of this letter is to provide some general information about our experience with the Trade Fair, which may be of help to the Department or to the Department of Trade and Commerce and the Exhibition Commission in organizing similar fairs in the future. This letter, of course, deals only with some general aspects of the Fair and with those within the responsibility of the Department of External Affairs. A comprehensive report on the commercial aspect is being prepared by the Commercial Counsellor.

2. The opening ceremony took place in the open air at the end of the main avenue in the fair grounds and in front of one of the pavilions. The guests had a good view down the avenue, which was lined with Canadian and Nigerian flags, and they could see four of the fair buildings on each side. In the immediate foreground was the naval guard of honour furnished by HMCS *Fort Erie* and HMCS *New Waterford*. The guests were invited for 5:50 p.m., and it was suggested that the Prime Minister arrive ten minutes later. The ceremony was timed for just before sunset to avoid the heat of the afternoon but allow enough light for the participants to read their speeches.
3. On the arrival of the Prime Minister the guard of honour gave the General Salute and he inspected the guard of honour. The General Salute was played by the Nigerian Police Band. The guard was well turned out and contributed a good deal to the effectiveness of the ceremony.
4. The Prime Minister was joined on the platform by six ministers and by Messrs. Richardson, Dudley Douglas and myself. We were very satisfied with the turn out of Ministers, who were all from the North as the ministers from the East in the coalition government were busy attending a NCNC party convention outside Lagos. However, we managed to arrange for a number of the NCNC Ministers, including Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh, Minister of Finance, Mr. T.O.S. Benson, Minister of Information, Mr. Njoku, Minister of Transport, and Mr. Akinfosile, Minister of Communications, to pay visits to the Fair after their return from the convention. The attendance of invited guests at the opening ceremony was very satisfactory and nearly all the chairs were occupied....
- 6 Following the speeches, the Prime Minister was invited to cut a purely symbolic ribbon which stretched between two short posts in the middle of the main avenue. He then made a tour of the Fair, accompanied by a number of ministers and other persons of consequence, and took 50 minutes in doing so. The Prime Minister visited nearly every single exhibit, missing only one or two, and talked to the person in charge of every booth. Following the tour of the Fair, drinks were served in the area which had been used for the opening ceremony....
- 7 The particular External Affairs responsibility was the information exhibit ... Mr. D. Rose ... was placed in charge of [it] within a week of arriving in Lagos to join the staff.... The information exhibit was a very creditable one and compared well with what had been done in Lagos by other countries. There was a great deal of room in the building for the displays and, as a result, the visitors had a good chance to look at the photographs. I think that the

information exhibit gave a good general impression of Canada and complemented the effect of the industrial displays and the films in the minds of visitors to the Fair.

8. ... Mr. Rose had considerable difficulties with the distribution of shopping bags and pamphlets. Any giveaways of any character are much sought after in Lagos, and the shopping bags were extremely popular. They were also in my opinion a most effective way of publicizing the Fair because, particularly in the first two or three days of the Fair, a good many people were to be seen walking around the streets of Lagos carrying shopping bags with "Canada" clearly visible on them. I know that two or three of my diplomatic colleagues have advocated that shopping bags should be given out at their national exhibits at the forthcoming Lagos International Trade Fair next October...

T. LeM. Carter

Section 47

La question du désarmement

Après la mort prématurée de Sidney Smith, Howard Green est nommé secrétaire aux Affaires extérieures par le Premier ministre John Diefenbaker. Green devient vite un partisan du désarmement nucléaire. En cela, il a le solide soutien de Robertson (qui occupe de nouveau le poste de sous-secrétaire) et du général E.L.M. Burns, l'ex-commandant de la Force d'urgence des Nations Unies. Arnold Heeney, alors ambassadeur du Canada à Washington, décrit en 1960 les problèmes et les solutions possibles dans un mémoire pondéré.


The Question of Disarmament

Following the untimely death of Sidney Smith, Howard Green was appointed Secretary of State for External Affairs by Prime Minister John Diefenbaker. Green quickly became an advocate of nuclear disarmament. In this, he had the strong support of Robertson (now once again serving as Under-Secretary) and General E.L.M. Burns, the former commander of the United Nations Emergency Force. Arnold Heeney, then the Canadian ambassador in Washington, outlined the problems and possibilities in a thoughtful 1960 memorandum.

Howard Green, secrétaire
d'Etat aux Affaires extérieures,
s'adressant à l'Assemblée
générale des Nations Unies.
1959

Secretary of state for external
affairs Howard Green
addressing the United Nations
General Assembly, 1959.

UNICEF PHOTO NO 52975 DES NATIONS
UNITED NATIONS PHOTO 629



[Ottawa,] November 12, 1959

Norman Robertson
à Howard Green
(secrétaire d'État aux
Affaires extérieures)

SOURCE : VOLUME 26, DOCUMENT 13

Norman Robertson
to Howard Green
(Secretary of State for
External Affairs)

SOURCE : VOLUME 26, DOCUMENT 13

Disarmament

... Canada's special position in disarmament discussions is based upon our participation in atomic energy development during the war. You will recall that in November, 1945 Prime Minister King joined with Prime Minister Attlee and President Truman in a declaration calling for the international control of atomic energy to the extent necessary to ensure its use for peaceful purposes only and for the elimination of atomic weapons from national armaments. Substantially the same declaration was made by the Four Power attending the Moscow Conference in December, 1945. With minor changes the same text was incorporated in the first resolution adopted by the General Assembly in January, 1946 when it established the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission with Canada as a permanent member.

Since that time Canada has come to be regarded as a normal participant in disarmament negotiations ... Particularly during the early stages, we tended to consider that we had a certain "representative" quality and that we should be the medium through which the views of the lesser powers might be heard. I think that we do have a sort of responsibility of this kind, but experience on the whole suggests that the most fruitful way of meeting it usually has been and probably will be less by way of occasional public exhortation than by continuous and quiet efforts in private at all levels. Because of our status we have been approached often by interested governments as a channel for advancing their views, and in several cases we have developed useful working relationships (I have in mind particularly Norway, Australia, Japan and Yugoslavia). Such interested governments have recognized, as we have done, the limitations within which increasingly we have had to work as the lines between East and West became more and more formally drawn.

The fact of the matter is that no matter how we may try to disguise it there are only two sides to the disarmament discussion. I think it is fair to say that the influence of even such a country as India is negligible except when it makes common cause with one or other of the principals. The result has been that to a surprising extent Canada's own negotiations have been for the most part with our allies, and particularly with the United States rather than with the Russians. Our purpose has been to influence the broad plan of the Western nations and its presentation because we ourselves have very little to offer in negotiations with the Soviet Union.

This is no more than recognition of a point which is usually overlooked by those editors and members of the public who urge Canada to take the lead in disarmament, namely, that most of the disarming has to be done by the nations which have most of the armaments and armed forces. Experience has shown that those of our allies who have the most disarming to do (and on whom, incidentally, we place reliance for our defence and the defence of the Western world) are not invariably grateful for proposals drawn up by those who do not have to carry them out. However, I think it is only fair to say that we have always been given a careful and attentive hearing in Washington and London and often our suggestions have been accepted. I might add that some at least of the same suggestions if made publicly might have been difficult for the United States, the United Kingdom, or France to adopt...

N.A.R.

[Ottawa,] November 8, 1960

Note du
général E.L.M. Burns
(conseiller en matière de
désarmement)

SOURCE : VOLUME 27, DOCUMENT 105

Memorandum by
General E.L.M. Burns
(Adviser on disarmament)

SOURCE : VOLUME 27, DOCUMENT 105

Argument against Spreading of Nuclear Weapons

It is proposed that “tactical” nuclear weapons should be provided to give supporting fire to all units of land forces. Also, tactical aircraft will use nuclear weapons instead of high-explosive bombs or rockets. If military forces so equipped become engaged in any hostilities at all, it would be nuclear warfare.

We have long had “strategic” nuclear weapons of many megatons power. A “strategic” weapon or “weapons system” is intended for the attack of the enemy’s centres of industry and population; his war potential. With the provision of the tactical, “low-yield” nuclear weapons, there would be a range of nuclear weapons increasing in power from those attributed to the smallest land force units, to the largest strategic weapons.

The main objection to equipping military forces with the less powerful nuclear weapons for tactical use (that is, against the enemy’s armed forces) is that there seems to be no valid reason to doubt that if the use of the so-called tactical nuclear weapons is begun, more and more powerful weapons will be brought into use, until the nuclear war becomes unlimited. This is the so-called escalator effect. The almost irresistible conclusion is that once nuclear arms are used at all, their all-out use must be anticipated, and so the enemy must be defeated by the earliest possible and most powerful attack on his homeland.

Perhaps all this is realized by those advocating the wide distribution of tactical nuclear weapons. The reasoning might be that possible opponents would be warned in the following terms: All elements of our armed forces will use nuclear arms if hostilities begin at all. Therefore, unless you are prepared to face the possibility of an all-out nuclear war, do not attack us, or make any aggressive moves to which our forces will be obliged to react. With the widely-distributed tactical nuclear arms becoming the detonators of full-scale nuclear war, it perhaps is hoped that the rulers of the USSR, not being insane and not wanting full-scale nuclear war, will not use military force to attain any of their ends, if this involves contact with the U.S. or allied forces equipped with tactical nuclear arms.

But is it realistic to hope that this built-in brinkmanship will have such a result, over any considerable period? Is not the threat out of proportion to the kind of aggression it is designed to check? Do the American people and the peoples of their allies really intend to make good on such a threat? Do they wish to secure themselves against any kind of military aggression by responding to it by waging an all-out nuclear war? Put in these terms, the answer is almost certainly no. Commonsense would be that small-scale military aggression employing conventional military forces should be repulsed by the same kind of forces, not by the threat of resorting to all-out nuclear war.

For a threat to deter, the party threatened must be convinced that if he does certain things that he has been warned not to, the threat will be certainly made good. There is a great temptation to test the resolution of the threatener, to see how far it is possible to go towards the prohibited act, without incurring the penalty. Sooner or later, if the threatened punishment is not applied, the deterrent will fail. And the possibility of war through miscalculation becomes considerable.

Then we must consider that if the USA and her allies and clients are equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, it will not be long before the allies and clients of the USSR will be similarly equipped. Recent history teaches us that the USSR is quite as capable of making friends and influencing people by providing them with weapons as the USA is. So, once the spreading of nuclear arms is begun by the USA, we are embarked on a process under which all military forces will have nuclear weapons, sooner or later. The arms race, instead of being moderated, will be intensified. This, accompanied by increasing tensions, will some day or other, in some part of the world, erupt into war in which nuclear weapons will be used, to the extent that the belligerents possess them. Such a war need not necessarily be between the USSR and the USA, or even between a pair of their clients. If this happens in one case, it can happen in others, supposing nothing is done to put an effective stop to war as a means of settling international disputes. So we would gradually acquiesce in the idea of war employing nuclear weapons – which their users would hope would be immediately decisive. Is this the sort of development which will lead to the security of any nation, which will lead to the kind of world we want?

It is clear that certain kinds of aggression which could be carried out by conventionally armed forces would not be considered by the people of the nations possessing nuclear arms to be worth repressing, or repulsing, at the cost of engaging in a nuclear war – or running the risk of employing tactical nuclear weapons, and having the escalator get into operation. In fact, one may hazard the guess that the vast majority of people in any state would not wish to sanction the use of nuclear weapons in any conflict except one in which it appeared the enemy would also use such weapons; in fact, where national survival was at stake.

So, as we would also be reluctant to see our essential political and strategic positions of strength eroded by a series of minor aggressions, which we would not be prepared to resist at the risk of nuclear war, we find that the only alternative is to have conventional forces of our own.

But such a type of defence could be only a temporary solution, at best. If the world is to have a reasonable chance of avoiding nuclear war, the nuclear arms race must be stopped and then put into reverse – that is, we must commence to disarm. And this can only be done if, first of all, there is agreement between the USSR and the USA that this will be done; that there is no quarrel between them of such gravity that they must resort to nuclear war to resolve it; and that it is their prime duty to preserve peace in the world through the United Nations. Either the USSR and the USA must get together to stop war, or they will one day fight each other with nuclear arms. There is little probability of a lasting stalemate.

As a first step, renunciation of the spreading of nuclear weapons seems reasonable and necessary.

E.L.M. Burns

[Washington,] September 30, 1960

le Arnold Heeney

SOURCE: VOLUME 27, DOCUMENT 236

ndum by

ild Heeney

SOURCE: VOLUME 27, DOCUMENT 236

Thoughts on Canadian Defence Policy

1. It seems to me that there are three directions in which Canadian defence policy might logically develop. These can be defined roughly as follows:

First, *a neutralist policy*. This would involve renouncing our traditional joint defence arrangements with the United States, leaving NATO and sharply reducing our defence expenditures. Under such a policy, Canadian defence forces could be restricted to "coast guard" operations and patrols, probably sea, land and air, which would have no military significance.

Second, *a limited policy*, based upon the denial to Canadian forces of nuclear weapons of any kind or training for nuclear weapons with concentration on conventional defences. Such a policy could be accompanied by full and public acceptance (or reaffirmation) of the Canadian reliance on the USA nuclear deterrent and, as a corollary to this, willingness to do everything necessary or desirable to improve not only the defence of the deterrent but also its effectiveness. So, for example, while Canadian forces at the disposition of a joint Canada-United States command, NATO and the U.N. would be strictly conventional, Canada would contribute directly to the efficiency of the nuclear deterrent by the provision of bases, storage, refuelling points and so forth for SAC as well as for NORAD.

Third, *continuation of the present policy*, as developed since 1940, Ogdensburg. Ostensibly this involves full cooperation with the United States in North American defence, in the protection of the deterrent, facilitation of U.S. strategic nuclear power *and* the preparation and training of Canadian forces for nuclear armament. In fact, this has tended more and more to mean "integration" of Canadian elements with those of the United States, at any rate in North America. The process has been slow and spasmodic and, though based upon fairly consistent "doctrine," has led to criticism within and outside government circles in Canada.

2. The first policy, with variations and additions, is not far from the C.C.F. or the new party platform as I understand it. The second may have some features in common with the new Liberal position although this is far from clear. The third policy is that which has been followed by Canadian governments, Liberal and Conservative, since before Pearl Harbour. Practice has tended increasingly to diverge from official profession, not only where Canadian "sovereignty" appears to be involved but especially where there is some nuclear element in the mix.
3. An important advantage which might be claimed for a policy along the second line would be that it would tend to withdraw the poison from recent Canada-U.S. defence relationships. It would enable the Canadian Government to be frank and cooperative in its dealings with the United States. It would enormously facilitate the use of Canadian geography for North American defence and it would enable Canadian (conventional) forces to be fitted in precisely with those of the United States while, at the same time, retaining, I think, a larger measure of national identity. In this conception, Canadian forces would be tailored to tasks for the North American Alliance, for NATO and for the U.N. to which they were suited.

Another considerable advantage would be the contribution of such a policy by Canada to restricting to the U.S. and the Soviet Union the use of the nuclear weapon. Such a policy would and should not involve any reduction in Canadian defence expenditure.

4. The third "traditional" policy has become greatly confused in the public mind and, I believe, in the minds of those who have to operate within it on both sides of the border as nuclear and other technology has developed. The special public distaste for Canadian involvement in anything to do with the nuclear weapon has been partly responsible for this and the rigidities of U.S. law have added to the difficulty. Consequently it has not been possible for Canadian governments to accept the full implications of agreed principles and the tendency has been to delay and even refuse proposals involving Canadian action even though such actions are clearly implicit in professed policies and recommended by the military advisers of both nations. If the traditional policy is to be continued, there would be advantage in having it restated fully and frankly and it seems to me the Government could minimize rather than add to their difficulties at home by a reaffirmation of closest military partnership and a frank admission of what that involved in terms of integration and joint command.
5. There are obvious difficulties in any one of these three courses, both practical and political, domestic, bilateral and multilateral. Nevertheless, I am inclined to the opinion that, unless an attempt is made soon to develop a coherent line, the situation at home and in our relations with the United States is likely to become worse rather than better. The first step would be a serious and certainly "agonizing" reappraisal in Ottawa on a political and military level. It would also be necessary to have very private conversations with U.S. authorities before anything final were decided. Such an undertaking, even if it did not result in dotting the I's and crossing the T's, is, I am sure, long overdue. Finally, although I have sketched in very roughly three distinguishable courses, it is obvious that there is also a good deal of unexplored territory between each and that combinations and shifts of emphasis would be possible.

A.D.P.H.

Lester Pearson et John F. Kennedy, président des États-Unis, à Hyannis Port, 1963.

Lester Pearson and U.S. president John F. Kennedy at Hyannis Port, 1963.

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Section 48

Réunion à Hyannis Port

Malheureusement, la réévaluation et le développement d'une « ligne cohérente » recommandés par Heeney ne se feront pas durant le mandat de Diefenbaker. Les différends entre le Canada et les États-Unis sur la question des armes nucléaires se sont envenimés pendant et après la crise des missiles à Cuba en octobre 1962. Pearson, alors chef du Parti libéral, devient premier ministre en 1963. Il rencontre le président John F. Kennedy à Hyannis Port peu après les élections, et convient que le Canada devrait accepter la présence d'armes nucléaires sur son territoire.

Meeting at Hyannis Port

Unfortunately, the reappraisal and development of a “coherent line” recommended by Heeney did not take place during Diefenbaker's time in office. The conflicts between Canada and the United States over nuclear weapons came to a head during and after the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962. Pearson, by then the leader of the Liberal party, became Prime Minister in 1963. He met with President John F. Kennedy at Hyannis Port soon after the election, and agreed that Canada would accept nuclear weapons.

May 10–11, 1963

Meeting between Prime Minister L.B. Pearson and President J.F. Kennedy at Hyannis Port

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 3175, DOSSIER
RELATIONS CANADO-AMÉRICAINES EN
MATIÈRE DE SÉCURITÉ

SOURCE : LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA
RG 25, VOLUME 3175, FILE
CANADA US RELATIONS

1. The following is a summary record of the discussion with particular reference to items on which decisions were taken or some follow-up actions was agreed.
2. *Nuclear Weapons Policy:* The Prime Minister said that on his return to Ottawa he would be in a position to send to the United States Government a note which would include a draft bilateral agreement based on the text previously under discussion between the two Governments and designed to provide for the acquisition by Canada of nuclear warheads for use of Canadian forces. The Prime Minister specified the Bomarc, Voodoo, CF-104 and Honest John as intended to be covered by this agreement. He made it clear that owing to the need for full parliamentary discussion it would be some three or four weeks before the bilateral agreement could be concluded. The Prime Minister also said that once the bilateral agreement had been concluded it would be possible to go ahead with discussion of other aspects of the continental defence problem in which Canada had undertaken no commitment. He mentioned in this context storage of warheads for United States interceptor squadrons at Goode Bay and Harmon as the second stage. The storage of bombs for SAC use at Goose Bay would cause “much greater difficulty” for the Canadian Government. (The President interjected on this point that the SAC requirement had a “much lower priority.”) The Prime Minister made a later reference to the difficulties posed for the Canadian Government by United States interest in the dispersal of interceptor squadrons to Canada.
3. The President gave at the first working session and on a separate informal occasion an assurance that there would be joint consultation with Canada if the United States should at a later stage decide on a more modern weapons system to replace the Bomarc. It could be taken from his remarks that the same undertaking would apply in the case of other weapons systems in use by Canada. No indication was given by the President of whether and if so how soon the Administration might be planning to phase out the Bomarc.
4. *Defence Production Sharing:* It was agreed that there should be consultations at the ministerial level which might begin when Secretary McNamara went to Ottawa for the NATO meeting. A subsequent visit by the Minister of Defence Production to Washington was also envisaged but no time for such a visit was mentioned. The President said that so far as Canada was concerned the Administration did not intend to make any changes in existing defence production policies with regard either to the waiving of the buy-America provisions for the F-104G programme. Some changes might subsequently be necessary however and in particular the Administration was reviewing the need for continuing with the Caribou programme for 1964–68 which “may not be renewed”. The President also said that no decisions on the “Caribou and these other matters” would be taken until the whole question had been brought once again to his attention and to that of the Prime Minister.
5. *Inter-Allied Force and Multilateral Force:* The Prime Minister said that on the assumption that agreement would be reached on the question of acquiring nuclear weapons for the use

of Canadian forces the Canadian Government would be happy to participate in the IANF. He hoped that the discussion of IANF in NATO would not be pushed to an open break with France. It was stated by Tyler, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs in the State Department, that recent discussions with the French indicated that a formula would be found which the French could live with.

6. On the MLF the President said that he now felt very strongly in its favour although earlier he had been rather lukewarm. The Prime Minister said that the MLF was of less concern to Canada than to the European members and bearing in mind the extent of other Canadian defence undertakings especially in North America it would probably not be possible for Canada to participate. The President did not demur but asked for Canadian sympathy and understanding of the effort. The Prime Minister said that the Canadian Government would "make all the right noises" and "try to help you." The President said he would be sending a brief on the MLF to the Prime Minister.
7. *Machinery for Communication and Consultation*: The Prime Minister stressed the importance of inter-governmental exchanges at all levels and said that he hoped the joint cabinet level committees on economic matters and on defence could meet in the fall of 1963. He also thought that individual ministers (he mentioned particularly Mr. Martin and Mr. Hellyer) should visit their opposite numbers in Washington; such visits would of course be in addition to the meeting between Mr. McNamara and Mr. Drury mentioned above. The Prime Minister also referred to the importance of consultations through the PJBD and through the joint Parliamentary committees.
8. The President gave every impression of being personally favourable to the development of inter-governmental exchanges at all levels....

Section 49

Le Canada et la crise au Vietnam

En 1965, après l'échec de la mission de paix menée par Blair Seaborn au Vietnam, le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures Paul Martin qualifie la situation de « triste » et fait le commentaire suivant : « La frustration et la déception que nous éprouvons sont d'autant plus grandes que le Canada a mis beaucoup d'effort dans cette tentative ». Néanmoins, Martin estima que le Canada devait rester membre de la Commission du Vietnam.

Canada and the Crisis in Vietnam

In 1965, after the failure of Blair Seaborn's peace mission in Vietnam, Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin described the situation as "a sorry one," and he commented: "The frustration and disappointment we have experienced is the greater because of the Canadian effort which has gone into this attempt." Nevertheless, Martin believed that Canada should continue to serve as a member of the Vietnam Commission.

Le diplomate Blair Seaborn au
Vietnam, 1965.

Diplomat Blair Seaborn in
Vietnam, 1965.

SOURCE: COLLECTION DE LA FAMILLE
SEABORN/ SEABORN COLLECTION



Ottawa, August 25, 1965

I Martin (secrétaire

Future Canadian Participation in Vietnam Commission

Taking into account the political objectives and time-table recommended by the special liaison team last autumn, your most recent consideration of these problems and our own experience here, we have recently completed a comprehensive review of the work of the Vietnam Commission over the past year, and an assessment of the prospects for success in meeting the objectives outlined in my telegram No. Y-682 of September 28, 1964.

2. The results have not been very gratifying, and I think it must be admitted that despite our efforts, the Commission's record in discharging its obligation to deal adequately and in a balanced manner with evidence of all violations of the agreement and more particularly, evidence of violations by the North, is a sorry one. The frustration and disappointment we have experienced is the greater because of the Canadian effort which has gone into this attempt. The work which you and all members of the delegation have done in the most difficult circumstances has been remarkable in both quantity and quality and deserves the highest commendation; if we have been unable to convince our partners in the Commission of the need for balance in the Commission's work, it is clearly not for want of trying or indeed for want of adequate evidence of the basic cause of the present turmoil in Vietnam. Your efforts have, with considerable success, ensured that these factors have been made abundantly clear in the record of Commission deliberations if not in its decisions, and this will have an important, if secondary, usefulness.
3. We had anticipated earlier that, if we could not make the Commission function adequately, we would at least have a convincing record of deliberate efforts to do so on which it would be possible to base a far-reaching decision about future Canadian participation and justify whatever course of action seemed most desirable in the light of this well-documented effort and prevailing circumstances. Although the record which you have established might of itself indicate the desirability of some readjustment of our commitment, it is the broader perspective of prevailing circumstances in Vietnam, of international policy factors now that Vietnam has become perhaps the most pressing single world problem, and public opinion here which have acquired a more compelling significance over the past year.
4. The alternative courses of action which might be open to us could be listed as follows
 - (a) formal withdrawal, thereby breaking up the Commission
 - (b) suspension of participation and withdrawal of all Canadian personnel from Vietnam but without renouncing our claim to Commission membership, on the understanding that he would be prepared to resume participation when adequate assurances had been received that the Commission would function more objectively
 - (c) refusal to participate further in the work of the Commission but with the Canadian delegation remaining on in Vietnam

Paul Martin, secrétaire d'état
aux Affaires extérieures, en
compagnie de nouvelles recrues
du Ministère, 1967.

Secretary of state for external
affairs Paul Martin with new
recruits to the department, 1967.

SOURCE: AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES ET
COMMERCE INTERNATIONALE CANADA/
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL
TRADE CANADA



(d) to work towards a quiescent “do-nothing” Commission.

5. All of these alternatives would have advantages judged solely from the point of view of our dissatisfaction with the Commission's failure to render adequate account of the North's basic responsibility for Vietnam's instability. At the same time they all have serious disadvantages some of them local (for example course (c) above) but more particularly in terms of wider Canadian objectives and interests in relation to the Vietnam crisis. Without attempting a detailed analysis of the various pros and cons (of which you will be fully aware) of each alternative course of action above, I think you should know that I have concluded that any radical readjustment at this time of our presence, our objectives and our efforts in the Vietnam Commission would only create new and perhaps more awkward problems than those which I recognize are implicit in continuing to participate as at present. The main factors which are relevant to this decision are as follows:

(a) Unilateral Canadian withdrawal, or other major revision of commitment carried out on Canadian initiative could be held to add a further complicating factor to a tense situation; it might also be misunderstood by public opinion in Canada and by international opinion, as well as opening the way for deliberate misrepresentation by countries such as China and North Vietnam.

(b) Active Canadian membership in the Commission does give us a *locus standi* in international discussions of the Vietnam problem and a potential claim to participate in any forthcoming conference where I believe we would have a positive and perhaps unique contribution to make.

(c) Similarly, continuing our active membership enables us to resist pressure for direct Canadian involvement in the situation in military terms. I would judge that any revision of

our policy in this regard (short of a radical change in the nature of the situation) would be unacceptable to Canadian opinion.

(d) However remote the prospects may appear at the moment, there is always the possibility that the Commission may be able to play some part in helping to resolve the crisis.

(e) Finally, our presence in Vietnam gives us a source of information and independent assessment which must be retained, especially because no other conceivable presence would provide simultaneous access to both North and South.

6. For these reasons, I have concluded that the only possible course of action open to us is to continue our activities in the Commission in accordance with the two major objectives set forth in my instructions last September, and as these have been developed by subsequent practice. I realize that this is likely to be an unsatisfying and probably unrewarding task, and that it involves hazards as long as the Indians perform the way they have. But I can see no alternative for us except to continue to press the South Vietnamese for cooperation and the Indians for support, and in this latter connection, there have been some hopeful signs recently that Delhi may be taking a closer look at its policies in Indochina. Regardless of whether the Indians may be thinking in terms of "specific instances" or a more general policy reappraisal, the full and indeed expanded cooperation of the South Vietnamese is obviously vital if we are to achieve at least minimal Canadian objectives (i.e. a convincing record of effort and an accumulation of independent Canadian evidence) even if the Commission as such is not prepared to reach the decisions we believe are justified. I realize that you are doing your best to convince Colonel an of this requirement and if you believe that it would be useful to appeal to the Foreign Minister, I would be prepared to consider your recommendation to that effect. Beyond that, I can only assure you that your efforts will be viewed with sympathy and understanding here and that we will do everything possible to facilitate what may be an increasingly difficult and unrewarding assignment.

Martin

Section 50

La diplomatie discrète et les relations canado-américaines

Les désaccords sur la politique américaine au Vietnam continuent de compliquer les relations du gouvernement Pearson avec les États-Unis. En 1965, Heeney et Livingston Merchant (un ancien ambassadeur des États-Unis au Canada) commencent à travailler sur un rapport qui proposera des moyens d'améliorer les relations. Les deux hommes consultent abondamment leurs collègues. Une lettre de Charles Ritchie (qui a remplacé Heeney en tant qu'ambassadeur du Canada à Washington) offre une évaluation particulièrement claire de la situation.

Quiet Diplomacy and the Canada-U.S. Relationship

Disagreements over American policy in Vietnam meant that relations with the United States continued to be difficult for the Pearson government. In 1965 Heeney and Livingston Merchant (a former American ambassador to Canada) began work on a report that would suggest ways of improving matters. Both men consulted extensively with their colleagues. A letter from Charles Ritchie (who had replaced Heeney as Canadian ambassador in Washington) contains an especially clear assessment of the situation.

Washington, March 12, 1965

Dear Marcel,

I greatly appreciate your sending along a copy of your draft paper on Canada-United States relations....

It is ... true that there are occasions, as mentioned in paragraph 11 of the memorandum, when we tend to "swamp" the United States Administration with our problems, both large and small. This can obviously have serious effects as it debases the coinage of Canadian approaches. This problem is, it seems to me, both of an intradepartmental nature within External Affairs and an interdepartmental nature within the government matrix in Ottawa. To avoid this we need to establish a better method of overall coordination of the manifold problems that arise in the Canada-United States field or affect the temper of Canada-United States relations....

This coordination is particularly important when for sound reasons we may have to adopt a stand inimical to the United States; in so doing we should be certain not only that it is in the Canadian national interest to act but that the decision to do so has been taken in the light of the general circumstances of Canada-United States relations at the time. This may entail a concomitant decision to hold our fire on some other less important issue of the day. We cannot advance on all fronts simultaneously. Essentially this is a matter of establishing some overall coordination to ensure that we are not, while seemingly promoting our interests on a number of issues, damaging the basic position of Canada in Washington and so in effect running the risk of winning an individual battle but losing the war....

The point is made in the paper that we should try to return to a more private type of diplomacy in our dealings with the United States. In this connection I am reminded of a comment that McGeorge Bundy made to me some time ago. It was, he said, half the battle in dealing with the United States not to prod the Administration publicly in difficult situations. Related to this is the sound point made in the memo that in our private diplomacy we should attempt to create a basis of trust and confidence with United States officials to make them feel that Canada is a good neighbour in whom the United States can have full confidence. I am also impressed by the suggestion in the memorandum (paragraph 20) that while we should not hesitate in advance of a crisis or critical decision to offer advice or to express a difference of view, we should, once the crisis is upon us, give what support we can both immediately and whole-heartedly (if we can do so in conformity with the interests of Canada). At the very least it seems to me we should always display an attitude of understanding and try where possible to give support in circumstances of this nature. One senses here at times a bit of the feeling on the part of United States officials that they see Canadians as quick to carp but slow to rally to their support. This is a not insignificant factor in creating the right kind of atmospherics in our relations with the Americans....

Yours sincerely,

C.S.A. Ritchie

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 8673,
DOSSIER 20-1-2-E-U

SOURCE : LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 8673, FILE 20-1-2-USA

Section 51

Célébration et controverse

L'année marquant le centenaire du Canada est célébrée tant au pays même qu'ailleurs dans le monde. Toutes les missions canadiennes à l'étranger font la publicité de l'Exposition universelle de Montréal en 1967. À Paris, la date d'ouverture d'Expo 67 fait l'objet d'une imposante cérémonie; à Los Angeles, la ministre Judy La Marsh est l'hôte d'une réception en plein air à laquelle assistent des célébrités canadiennes comme l'acteur Lorne Greene. Le ministère des Affaires extérieures gère aussi les nombreuses visites officielles de dignitaires étrangers à Montréal. De Paris, Jules Léger fait rapport des suites du discours où le président de Gaulle a prononcé son fameux « Vive le Québec libre! ».

Celebration and Controversy

Canada's centennial year was a time of celebration both at home and abroad. All the foreign posts worked to publicize the 1967 World's Fair in Montreal. In Paris, the opening date of Expo 67 was marked by an impressive ceremony; in Los Angeles, cabinet minister Judy La Marsh hosted a garden party that featured such Canadian stars as Lorne Greene. The Department of External Affairs was also responsible for the many official visits by foreign dignitaries to Montreal. From Paris, Jules Léger reported on the aftermath of French President Charles de Gaulle's famous "Vive le Québec libre" speech.

Paris, le 27 avril, 1967

Expo à Paris

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 10470,
DOSSIER 55-7-3-MTL-1

L'ouverture de l'Expo universelle et internationale a été inaugurée à Paris sur les berges de la Seine avec tout l'éclat des grands jours.

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 10470, FILE 55-7-3-MTL-1

2. Jean Vinant, directeur des relations publiques d'Expo 67 à Paris organisa pour l'occasion une série de manifestations qui ont débuté hier soir au pied de la Tour Eiffel où les personnalités canadiennes s'embarquèrent à bord de la vedette *Saint Laurent* (baptisée en 1962 avec de l'eau du fleuve rapportée du Canada) pour se rendre au Square Vert Galant situé à la pointe de l'île de la Cité. Les personnalités canadiennes à leur descente ont été accueillis par Monsieur Paul Fabre, président du conseil municipal de Paris entouré des membres du conseil et de nombreuses personnalités françaises.
3. La cérémonie débuta par l'envoi de 3 fusées et le déploiement du drapeau Expo 67. Puis le maire suppléant de Montréal, M. Léon Lortie, prononça une allocution évoquant les liens d'amitié entre Paris et Montréal sans toutefois faire la moindre allusion au Canada, à la province de Québec ou au centenaire. Il présenta ensuite à la ville de Paris au nom de la ville de Montréal une stèle provenant de l'île Ste Hélène pour commémorer l'Expo 67. M. Paul Faber remercia M. Lortie et la ville de Montréal en termes chaleureux. La cérémonie du Vert Galant se termina par un feu d'artifice aux couleurs rouges et blanches du Canada et une rivière lumineuse tombant du Pont Neuf. Le Square Vert Galant éclairé aux « Brulots, » une cinquantaine de membres de la gendarmerie française en uniforme Louis XV portant l'étendard des régiments de l'époque, monuments de Paris éclairés, le tout donnant à cette cérémonie un cachet spécial.
4. Les personnalités canadiennes et françaises remontèrent à bord de la vedette *Saint Laurent* pour une promenade autour des deux îles de la cité pour ensuite retourner au débarcadère de la Tour Eiffel où une réception leur était offerte.
5. La presse de ce matin a pris bonne note de cette cérémonie ainsi que l'ouverture de l'Expo à Montréal. Hier soir la télévision et la radio française ont fait reportage des deux événements. Les cérémonies de l'ouverture de l'Expo ont été transmises en direct par satellite « Early Bird. »
6. Hier soir aussi, dans les huit villes principales de la France hors de Paris, un représentant de l'ambassade (ou du consulat général) et un étudiant canadien ont présenté aux maires respectifs un message du Maire Drapeau et de M. Dupuy, ce qui a donné comme résultat une assez bonne récolte publicitaire dans la presse, radio et TV régionales.

Los Angeles, June 9, 1967

Rapport du Consulat
général du Canada,
Los Angeles

SOURCE: BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 10498,
DOSSIER 55-7-3-MTL-1

Report from Canadian
Consulate General,
Los Angeles

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 10498, FILE 55-7-3-MTL-1

Centennial and Expo '67 – Local Activities

We should like to report briefly upon two recent events related to the Centennial and Expo '67 which received considerable publicity in the local press and on television and radio.

Centennial Garden Party:

On Sunday, June 4, 1967, the Honourable Judy La Marsh hosted a Centennial Garden Party at Statham House in Bel Air (an exclusive local residential area). Arrangements for the party were made by Gottlieb & Associates, the public relations firm for Centennial in the United States, with a group of local society women called Les Dames de Champagne of Los Angeles. Some time ago, Mr. Louis Statham, a wealthy local widower, turned Statham House over to these ladies to be used as a guest house for distinguished visitors to Los Angeles. The spacious grounds and stately mansion lent themselves admirably to the occasion. The Consulate General was closely involved in the arrangements for the party.

Guests at the Garden Party included many Canadians prominent in the Hollywood movie and television industry, as well as distinguished people from Governmental, society, consular and other local circles. Approximately 500–550 persons attended the event. The guests were received by Mrs. Robert Sully, President of Les Dames de Champagne of Los Angeles, Miss La Marsh, Mr. and Mrs. Yvon Beaulne and our Consul General, Mr. McEntyre, who returned from a vacation in Ottawa on the Department of Transport aircraft which brought Miss La Marsh and her party to Los Angeles.

During the afternoon, Mr. McEntyre introduced the guests of honour and there were brief speeches made by Mrs. Sully and Mr. Beaulne, who conveyed greetings to the guests from the Canadian Ambassador. Miss La Marsh gave an interesting and informative address on the Centennial and the contribution which the Canadians have made to the Hollywood movie industry. After an enthusiastic round of applause, the Minister presented a trophy to Mr. Lorne Greene on behalf of the Government of Canada as a tribute to the local Canadian creative community. Mr. Greene accepted the trophy on behalf of all his fellow-Canadians in Hollywood.

The grounds were beautifully decorated with Canadian flags, bunting and posters. Miniature flags were on each table. Entertainment was provided by a Highland Pipe Band from Vancouver, British Columbia, and a group of local madrigal singers. Lady guests were presented with Centennial pins and a small box of maple sugar. The gentlemen received silver Centennial medallions and lapel pins. The weather was perfect for the occasion.

From comments of those who attended this event and from articles which have since appeared in the local press (copies of some of which are attached), the party was a tremendous success. Certainly no Canadian event in Los Angeles in recent years has attracted so much attention and favourable comment...

Paris, le 17 octobre 1967

Cher Marcel,

La conversation que j'ai eue avec Louis Joxe au sujet du voyage du Général au Québec a été plus poussée que la plupart des autres. Dès le début Joxe a indiqué que, quant à lui, le Général n'aurait pas dû employer certaines expressions « malheureuses » à Montréal. Connaissant bien de Gaulle, il a cependant ajouté immédiatement qu'on ne pouvait pas appliquer à cet homme les normes habituelles. Ainsi le désordre qui avait suivi son voyage au Québec ne devait pas être étudié hors de contexte mais devait plutôt être comparé à ce qui se passait dans d'autres capitales comme Phnom Penh ou Varsovie lorsqu'il s'y rendait. Les membres de son Cabinet étaient toujours un peu effrayés lorsque le Général partait en voyage car d'habitude ses déclarations créaient pour la diplomatie française des difficultés considérables. Cela n'aura pas été vrai qu'au Québec et nous ne devrions pas considérer que nous avons été traités de façon exceptionnelle.

Souvent au cours de tels voyages le Général se créait de nouvelles responsabilités que le Gouvernement français devait par la suite honorer, ce qui n'était pas facile. Répondant au réflexe du remords de Gaulle décida après son voyage au Québec de donner une importance imprévue aux relations franco-québécoises, la France ayant été injuste au cours des siècles vis-à-vis de ces millions de descendants de Français. Il prit sur lui de redresser cette injustice. Une fois ce déclic mis en mouvement, plus rien ne peut arrêter le Général dans son action. C'est ce sens de la responsabilité qui, toujours selon Joxe, a redonné à la France une place qu'elle avait perdue dans le monde et qu'elle ne réussira peut-être pas à maintenir après le départ du Général. Joxe n'est donc pas prêt à condamner le Général mais plutôt à l'admirer dans cet aspect « conscience, » tout en reconnaissant que cette conscience crée à la France des responsabilités qu'elle ne peut pas toujours remplir et qu'elle ne réussira peut-être pas à maintenir une fois le Général disparu de la scène politique.

De notre côté, Joxe m'a répété qu'il considérait que le Gouvernement canadien avait fort bien joué ses cartes et que la « discrétion » dont il avait fait preuve était tout à son honneur. Lors des réunions du Conseil le Général n'avait d'ailleurs pas attaqué Ottawa.

À la suite de cet exposé je dis à Joxe qu'il fallait maintenant étudier la nouvelle situation de près et qu'il me semblait, parlant à titre personnel, que le Gouvernement français devait maintenant compléter le rôle qu'il s'était assigné d'une part en s'intéressant aux francophones dans les autres provinces et d'autre part en participant à l'effort du Gouvernement fédéral pour faire du Canada un pays de plus en plus bilingue et biculturel. Il ne s'agissait pas d'avoir « moins de France, mais d'en avoir plus » afin de créer à la longue un nouvel élan qui ne pouvait qu'être avantageux pour la France. Pour le moment, cependant, il y avait un déséquilibre assez marqué et nous devions le redresser ensemble. Joxe convint immédiatement du bien-fondé de cette considération et me dit que pour sa part il verrait d'un bon œil tout développement dans le sens indiqué.

Le Pavillon du Canada à
l'Expo 67.

The Canadian pavilion at
Expo 67.

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA / LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
PA 168604



En poursuivant cette suggestion, Joxe ajouta qu'il lui semblait qu'il y avait entre autres trois champs d'activité où la France devrait montrer plus d'initiative : l'émigration, la fonction publique et les investissements.

En terminant, Joxe me dit qu'il se rendait compte que la question de visites de ministres français au Canada était en ce moment mal posée et que pour sa part, afin de ne pas ajouter à une situation déjà confuse, il avait refusé une invitation de Pierre Dupuy de se rendre à titre d'ami à l'Exposition de Montréal.

En toute amitié

Jules



Troisième Partie
1968–2008

Part Three
1968–2008

La Commission royale d'enquête
sur l'assassinat de James Earl Ray
a été créée en 1975 pour
enquêter sur l'assassinat de
Martin Luther King Jr. en 1968.


James Earl Ray, assassin
de Martin Luther King Jr.,
a été condamné à la prison
à vie en 1969.

SOURCE: CANADIAN PRESS /
FRED CHARTRAND

Mitchell Sharp, secrétaire d'Etat
aux Affaires extérieures, en
1970.

Mitchell Sharp, secretary of
state for external affairs, in 1970.

THE CANADIAN PRESS / CHUCK



Section 52

1968 : Une année de bouleversements

Le « Printemps de Prague » décrit dans la première lettre de cette section est une période de libéralisation et de réforme en Tchécoslovaquie, sous la direction d'Alexander Dubcek, qui a duré huit mois. Une invasion par les Soviétiques y a mis un terme, en août 1968. À Washington entre-temps, l'assassinat de Martin Luther King déclenche des émeutes, et les manifestations contre la guerre du Vietnam prennent de l'ampleur. De Saïgon, Paul Laberge, membre de la délégation canadienne à la Commission internationale de supervision et de contrôle, transmet une analyse perspicace des effets économiques et environnementaux de la présence américaine au Sud-Vietnam.

1968: A Year of Turmoil

The "Prague spring" described in the first letter in this section was an eight-month period of liberalization and reform in Czechoslovakia under the leadership of Alexander Dubcek. It was ended by a Soviet invasion in August 1968. In Washington, meanwhile, the assassination of Martin Luther King sparked rioting, while protests over the Vietnam War strengthened. From Saigon, Paul Laberge of the Canadian I.C.S.C. delegation sent a perceptive analysis of the economic and environmental effects of the American presence on South Vietnam.

Prague, March 22, 1968

Political Developments in Czechoslovakia

What has been happening here in recent weeks has been called "Czechoslovakia's Quiet Revolution." And it has been quiet in the sense that there has been an amazing absence of violence. It has been quiet compared to sickening shouts of "Gestapo!" and "Jew!" in Warsaw or the raucous uproar of rioting mobs in London. But it certainly is not quiet here in the sense that the endless barrage of words for which Czechoslovaks have been famed since "The Good Soldier Schweik" has become clamour of opinion and agitation unheard ever before in a communist country. Revolutionary things are being said such as "freedom" and "democracy" and "justice" and (always in the same breath) "socialism." Yet it is still questionable whether this is a revolution because revolutions involve action as well as words. Action has been promised following the March 28 plenum of the Communist Party Central Committee. Meanwhile the nation is waiting and wondering: is this a revolution for real or is it just a "happening?" ...

3. To the average Czechoslovak the most exciting element of the process of liberalization must be the new spirit and outlook that has appeared in the press and in radio and television broadcasts. "Freedom of information" has inspired many extravagant statements and apologists for the new order justify these to the more orthodox communists by explaining that the extremes of opinion will cancel out leaving the great body of opinion where it should be. Meanwhile Ministers of the Government are being called to account in public for past statements and actions; their responses are then subjected to the most rigorous scrutiny. As a result of such rudimentary inquiries the Minister of the Interior and the Prosecutor General have resigned. The Prime Minister and the Ministers of Defense, Agriculture, Foreign Affairs, Justice and Health have been invited to do so. The departure of many leading Party officials has been suggested amid an orgy of self-criticism that has gone so far as to imply at times that all those who failed to oppose oppression during the last 20 years must go.
4. Even the authoritative voice of the Party Central Committee, *Rudé Pravo*, has had to apologize for sins of omission and commission while through its editorial views and articles it has now become the most interesting newspaper in the country. Even the censors have complained; the Party cell in the Central Publication Authority publicly condemned the chairman of the Authority and his deputy for an insufficient reaction to public criticism, and it has proposed that preventive political censorship be abolished. Contrary to some Western newspapers, censorship has not disappeared. While there does seem to be freedom to publish and expound views more or less consistent with the new policies, and while these are sufficiently exciting in themselves, there has been very little criticism of foreign policy. Perhaps most significantly, the cautious and conservative point of view is now nowhere to be found and most of the criticism is within the confines of communism. No one is openly advocating the abandonment of this fundamental faith....
11. Rehabilitation of those who were unjustly convicted in the past is just one of the many problems now confronting the régime. The Prosecutor General has been dismissed and there have been demands that his predecessors should also be called to account but the

question of how far rehabilitation can go without involving every communist who has held any office of responsibility is very pertinent. How far into the dark cupboards can the authorities delve without resurrecting the atmosphere of purge that they must surely avoid if they wish to develop confidence in the Party and Government? On the other hand, to win that confidence there must be some punishment of those who flagrantly violated the principles of justice and it has been estimated that 30,000 persons were illegally condemned. This figure must of course be multiplied many times to encompass all who have been persecuted in other ways. The Party will not win the trust of the people through pious words or promises that at last dictatorship through force and fear is at an end. Although all Czechoslovaks are being assured that they need no longer be afraid of the authorities, fear has not ceased to exist. It is too ingrained to disappear overnight. Indeed, if there were no fear involved in non-conformity, there would not be such a rush to leap onto the progressive bandwagon (and for many it is a very long jump); some of those concerned must still hold the opinions that they professed last month and last year and for the two previous decades.

12. Liberalization, freedom of speech, rehabilitation, increased participation in government are not likely to mean much or to last long unless the economic problems that confront the country are dealt with quickly and effectively. The progressives are well aware of this but the implementation of the economic reforms begun last year will still be difficult. The nation's leading economist, Prof. Ota Sik, in a speech on March 20 proposed the establishment of a strong central economic executive organ to insist upon competitive conditions, eliminate inefficient enterprises and lower production costs. Sik said that convertibility of Czechoslovak currency must be achieved eventually and he proposed the creation of an Eastern European gold fund with a "gold rouble" to be exchangeable internationally. The economist was indicating the critical problem that precipitated the present crisis: Czechoslovakia's substantial surplus in trade with its socialist allies cannot be converted to offset its deficit in trade with Western countries and its need for increasing technological imports from the West. Sik said Czechoslovakia is negotiating for a loan to help overcome these difficulties but he declined to name the institution or nation involved. Could it be West Germany and is the price diplomatic recognition?
13. Tune in tomorrow and maybe some of these questions will be answered. Maybe. But even when they are, many Czechoslovaks and particularly the unskilled workers who are the Communist Party's strongest supporters are not going to like the answers. Thus Dubcek cannot contemplate an easy political victory and sooner or later the conservative communists seem certain to return to challenge his leadership.

Washington, March 6, 1968

Political Report Number One

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 14960,
DOSSIER 45-USA-13-3-1

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 14960, FILE 45-USA-13-3-1

To sense the mood of an America fighting two wars, one at home, the other 10,000 miles away, it is necessary only to glance at the face of her newspapers and magazines, e.g. *Harpers* giving virtually the whole current issue to Norman Mailer's account of last fall's peace march on the Pentagon; *Atlantic* doing the same for an omnibus presentation entitled super nation at peace and war; and a recent issue of *I.F. Stone's Weekly*, a newsletter of radical and pungent comment, carrying the headline, "Saigon afire now – will it be Washington in April?" The *Washington Post* of February 28 looking editorially at the steps being taken in various parts of the country by police and private citizen alike, to prepare for another summer's chapter of the urban crisis, found the prospect "terrifying." "The idea of citizens arming themselves, of women taking target practice in deadly earnest, of police forces buying tanks and plans and machine guns is so alien to this country as to be almost unbelievable. Yet, it is happening in city after city, armed might is being lined up on the theory that it will prevent another disaster like Detroit. Undoubtedly it will, for the next outburst will be squelched immediately or it will turn into a holocaust of the kind unseen in America since the Civil War."

2. ... While the report of the President's Advisory Commission served constructively to direct attention to the number one domestic problem, the great foreign issue was neither out of mind nor of sight. Vietnam continued to pervade all.
3. It is this war – "this great national unhappiness," as it has been called – that has brought the guns and butter conflict into focus in spite of the President's best intentions and his accelerated legislative efforts. How can we, the argument goes, rich and powerful as we are, really find the time, talent and dollars to cope with our fundamental and inter-related national problems – poverty and the black revolution – while at the same time prosecuting a war for which we will need clearly to mobilize more men and spend more money? The President has not to date succeeded in getting his 10 percent tax increase through Congress, although the outlook appears to be brightening. One result of its passage, however, may be budget cuts elsewhere in the economy. This seems to be the view of Representative Mills, Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, who will have most to do with disposing of the President's proposed legislation. The Republicans have already taken the position that what the country needs are budget cuts not tax increases.
4. Vietnam dissent is not easily measured, although its profile tends to be that of the intellectual/the academic/the liberal politician/and the student. Away from the great population centres, especially those of the East and West coasts dissent is said to be less evident, and this is probably true. But even so, there can be little question that there is a feeling of uncertainty in the land, the uncertainty of those who doubt the cause, of those who doubt the price, of those who doubt both balanced against these groupings, of course, are the hard-liners, subscribers in the main to the "domino" theory and the "halt communism now" school; and

those who, while rejecting the “hawk” label for themselves, proclaim that no matter how painful the cost or discouraging the outlook, the USA, born and nurtured in idealism, must honour its obligations while seeking a negotiated settlement.

5. For most Americans, whatever their feelings, the war in Vietnam is not yet a keenly personal thing. Apart from the professionals it is still the war of “the laborers, the truck drivers and the occasional store clerk,” as one writer characterized the rank and file marine defenders of Khe Sanh. The obituary columns reflect this. But there are changes afoot – under the newly announced regulations student deferments end with the acquisition of an undergraduate degree and the youths are put into the pool where they are liable to be first called because of their age. As well, most classifications of graduate students are due to have their exemptions lifted. As a result, the more articulate and affluent sections of the community will begin to feel the bite of the war and this can only contribute to the deepening of dissent – and probably also to an early increase in the migration of such people to Canada with benefits for our universities, but also with an intensification of the draft dodger issue in USA attitudes towards Canada.
6. Louis Harris, the public opinion analyst, has said that for the first time in the modern era “the politics of the pocketbook” are taking a back seat to other dominant issues: the testing of America as a world power and, on the race issue at home, her testing as a nation of conscience....
10. From now until the elections in November, we shall attempt with the help of regional advice from the consulates, to provide some comments on the mood of the USA by sending you each month a short political assessment of which this is the first.

A.E. Ritchie

Washington, April 8, 1968

Political Report 2

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 14960,
DOSSIER 20-USA-1-4

port by A.E. Ritchie

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 8997, FILE 20-USA-1-4

This was cherry blossom weekend in Washington. But because it was also the weekend of the murder of Martin Luther King, there were no parades, no smiling princesses, no throngs of picture-snapping tourists. The great gleaming monuments this republic has erected to its past political heroes, Lincoln, Jefferson and George Washington, went largely unattended. The marines were at station on Capitol Hill, and a riot fence encircled the White House.

2. A few hundred yards from where the President lives and works battle clad federal troops (on active duty in Washington for the first time since 1932 and reaching at times over 10,000 men) patrolled, some with bayonets unsheathed. Scarcely ten minutes further away by car lay the shattered, smoking streets of what is euphemistically called "the inner city," the heart of the sprawling network of Negro areas which house some sixty-five percent of the population of the District of Columbia.
3. To walk those streets under the curfew that has been in effect from late afternoon until 6:30 a.m. these past three days (to be imposed again tonight despite the return of relative calm) was to walk, unbelieving, into a silently eerie other-world of pillage and destruction. Marauding bands of looters did succeed on Friday evening in penetrating the lower midtown shopping area and smashing several stores, hit and run fashion, setting one afire (two of these stores were only three blocks from the White House and the billowing smoke could be clearly seen from our Chancery roof) but it was in the ghettos that the looting and arson were concentrated. In these same sectors is inevitably concentrated the social distress that has accompanied the disturbances – the homeless, the foodless and, in many cases, now that their places of employment have been destroyed, the jobless.
4. The Washington toll to date: six deaths, six sniping incidents, close to a thousand injuries, more than 850 fires, some 4,900 arrests (no Canadians so far as we are aware). There is no official estimate of property damage but insurance sources have produced a preliminary figure of more than \$10 million which seems remarkably low and may be explained by the fact that a large number of the burned buildings, while centrally located, were old and deteriorating.
5. The assassination of Dr. King set off outbreaks of disorder and violence in a dozen other USA cities including Boston, Detroit, New York, Pittsburgh, Baltimore and most notably Chicago where ten people were killed. But Washington, with its real and symbolic significance, was the focus of national and international attention. The question through the winter had been, could Washington survive unscathed another long hot summer? Within hours of the King shooting, the answer came, heralded by screaming sirens and punctuated by flames, columns of smoke and rampant looting. And summer had not even arrived.
6. The President, having cancelled his trip to Hawaii, conferred at the White House with General Westmoreland. Amidst the crisis at home Vietnam had become temporarily the forgotten war,

crowded at the height of the turbulence off most newscasts and to secondary position in most newspapers. Even the domestic political debate was stilled.

7. On the Tuesday morning funeral services will be held in Atlanta for Martin Luther King. When and if President Johnson makes his postponed address to a joint session of Congress it is almost certain to be the gravest presentation to the nation and its legislators he has yet made.
8. Already in some quarters the hope is being expressed that the President – “his hold over the public opinion recaptured,” in the words of the *New York Times* – will make the most urgent demands of Congress to vote the money that will permit a massive material effort to combat the deepening alienation of black America – “the by-passed America,” spoken of by Senator Edward Brooke (R-Mass), the first Negro to be elected to the USA Senate. Civil rights guarantees alone, he says, are no longer enough.
9. But James Reston in the *New York Times* for Sunday, April 7, submitted it was not a problem of government alone “but of American attitudes and assumptions.” He warned of the violent strain in American society, adding, “If the black arsonists carry the torch from the ghettos to the white communities, it will take more than troops to quell the bloody reaction.”
10. Whatever validity this sombre note may have, and despite the anxiety of the past few days in this city and environs, one is struck by the tolerance and restraint, coupled with firmness, that has marked the conduct of the authorities, both civil and military, and the humanitarianism that has seemingly characterized the response of a good part of the white community and its leaders to the plight of those innocently affected by the disorders. In this connection the role of the Mayor-Commissioner, Walter Washington, himself a Negro appointed by President Johnson, has been outstanding, possibly crucial.
11. Meanwhile, in Dr. King Negro America has an authentic hero-martyr, probably its first to be almost universally accepted. And the nation waits.

A.E. Ritchie

Saigon, April 29, 1968

le Paul Laberge

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 8929,
DOSSIER 20-USA-1-3-VIET S

Report by Paul Laberge

SOURCE : LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 8929, FILE
20-USA-1-3-VIET S

Vietnam: Secondary Effects of United States Presence

Even without the advantage of a continuous observation over the last three years through the same eyes it is quite clear that the massive build-up of United States troops over that period has brought about a profound upheaval in South Vietnam's socio-economic structure. In accordance with the policy of escalation this build-up has been gradual; it has therefore created a process of continuous disruption in the fragile and under-developed infra-structure of the country. The socio-economic effects for the Vietnamese people of the huge construction activities for the establishment of permanent or semi-permanent bases and logistic facilities of all types represent a so-called secondary aspect of United States military involvement, the consequences of which for the future of Vietnam have hardly begun to be explored. Bearing in mind that the estimated gross national product of South Vietnam for 1965 was possibly about \$2 billion (typical of a less-developed country of Asia primarily dependent on agriculture) the impact of direct or indirect United States and allied spending now reaching an annual level of over \$30 billion has created conditions under which it is indeed surprising that South Vietnam has succeeded in retaining any kind of administrative or political cohesion. By way of comparison it would be necessary to visualize the effects of direct or indirect yearly foreign expenditures in or for Canada totalling \$900 billion. Bases such as Cam Ranh Bay, Qui Nhon, Da Nang and Bien Hoa probably rival in complexity and sheer size any other similar establishments in the world. The air base at Bien Hoa is reportedly the busiest in the world. Logistic problems raised by the building, maintenance and supply of these bases as well as the huge "baggage train" of a modern Western army of over 500,000 are without parallel in the past. This has required the virtual reconstruction and expansion in a very short time of the country's infra-structure i.e. roads, bridges, port facilities, communications etc.

2. The resulting social disfiguration [sic] of South Vietnam is less surprising than the fact that this country has succeeded in avoiding total collapse. Under this outside pressure South Vietnam has been resilient enough to adapt. But this has not been possible without a large measure of instability, disorganization and important and continuing bottle-necks in the economy. The vastly accelerated economic development of certain sectors of the economy under the impact of United States involvement has cast in stark relief the continued under-development or stagnation of other sectors, such as agriculture and industry, which would or should be the more natural growth sectors under more normal circumstance. In fact, as reported earlier, agricultural production in particular has continued to fail to approach its pre-war records.
3. The migration from the insecure countryside to the cities has brought in its wake a host of new problems. It is now estimated that close to 50 per cent of South Vietnam's population lives in urban areas. This represents an obviously serious structural distortion in an agriculturally based economy. Following repeated waves of migration and refugees to the city over the past few years the population of Saigon, for instance, is now estimated at somewhere between three and four million living in roughly the same area that ten years ago accommodated less than one million people. It has even been estimated that the density of population in Saigon may now be

the highest in the world. This has brought about another major pressure on the country's feeble infra-structure and institutional organization. Shortages of housing, schooling, health facilities as well as the flooding of the labour market in certain urban areas have posed serious problems which as long as the war goes on are unlikely to receive the attention required.

4. An inevitable consequence of United States build-up is that the South Vietnamese economy has become oriented toward service industries which are in turn heavily dependent on United States military presence and its huge supply requirements. This raises the important question of readjustment of economic activity and in the labour force following even a gradual United States withdrawal.
5. For the time being, however, it is somewhat ironic that motorization has appeared as the favourite United States-sponsored and temporary panacea or cure-all for a number of socio-economic problems. As an effective, if somewhat crude means of combating inflation, hundreds of thousands of motorscooters and motorcycles have been imported in recent years for the purpose of sopping up excessive purchasing power resulting from the rapid increase in employment and income. It has also been used as a somewhat disorderly solution to the problem caused by the breakdown of urban public transport systems and in railroad and other cross-country communication. As noted earlier, the Vietnamese army has also become heavily motorized largely on the pattern of its United States model. It is interesting to note the enthusiasm with which Vietnamese have taken to motorization albeit in a manner more reminiscent of a "continuing revolution" than of what is generally understood as being minimum essential driving and traffic requirements. This widespread motorization is in sharp contrast with the continued fundamental under-development of the country. In addition to solving certain problems (and creating others such as massive traffic jams and the deterioration of the streets) the net effect has again been to encourage the rapid growth of service-orientated activities.
6. While all the classic problems of under-development remain in South Vietnam – disease, poverty, ignorance, unemployment and underemployment – a broad if rather artificial injection of prosperity has at the same time temporarily benefited wide sections of the population. The under-pinning of this prosperity remains shaky since income necessary to sustain it is largely derived, directly or indirectly, from United States expenditures in, around or connected with Vietnam. It has been argued that the effects of this prosperity on large sections of the population may well represent the most significant United States legacy to Vietnam and the best guarantee against communism after the departure of United States troops. But for this to be borne out in practice, major attention will have to be devoted to the construction of a more durable basis for this prosperity in the event of United States withdrawal and/or reduction in expenditure. It is difficult to visualize the creation of this basis without a major effort on the part of the Vietnamese to prepare and organize for it. Since apparently the most the Vietnamese authorities are capable of at this time is to cope after their fashion with the immediate requirements of prosecuting the war, there is no evidence that anything but the most cursory long-term planning has taken place. In view of the major administrative and organizational weaknesses of the Vietnam Government, this situation does not portend well for the future.

Section 53

De nouvelles idées : Visites à Beijing et à La Havane

Pearson quitte la vie politique en 1968. Dans son énoncé de politique étrangère, le premier ministre nouvellement élu, Pierre Trudeau, répudie ouvertement bon nombre des éléments clés de la philosophie pearsonnienne. Pearson est profondément blessé par ces critiques venant d'un autre chef libéral. Comme il l'avait promis dans son énoncé de politique étrangère, Trudeau accorde la priorité à l'ouverture de rapports avec la République populaire de Chine. Les relations diplomatiques sont établies en 1970. En 1973, Trudeau effectue une visite en Chine. Outre les objectifs politiques de cette visite, exposés dans le mémoire suivant, les Canadiens espèrent aussi obtenir un couple de pandas en cadeau. Pour donner le ton, ils remettent au gouvernement chinois quatre castors, ce qui nécessite la nomination d'un « agent de liaison pour les castors ». Malheureusement, les Chinois n'offrent pas la contrepartie souhaitée.

Un autre des objectifs visés par Trudeau en 1968 est le resserrement des liens avec l'Amérique latine. À cette fin, le premier ministre et son épouse Margaret effectuent une visite à Cuba en 1976. Trudeau et le leader cubain Fidel Castro nouent alors des liens personnels étroits et amicaux. Cependant, cette visite choque beaucoup de gens aux États-Unis. De plus, l'intervention de Cuba en Angola force le premier ministre à prendre ses distances de Castro.

New Ideas: Visits to Beijing and Havana

Pearson retired from politics in 1968. The foreign policy statement by the new Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau, pointedly repudiated many of the key elements of Pearson's philosophy. Pearson was deeply hurt by these criticisms from a fellow Liberal leader. As he had promised in his foreign policy statement, Trudeau made the establishment of relations with the People's Republic of China a priority. Diplomatic relations were established in 1970. In 1973 Trudeau visited China. Besides the political objectives for the visit outlined in the following memo, the Canadians hoped to secure the gift of a pair of pandas. To start things off, they presented the Chinese government with four beavers, necessitating the appointment of a "beaver liaison officer." Unfortunately, the Chinese did not reciprocate in the desired manner.

Another of the objectives stated by Trudeau in 1968 was the creation of closer ties with Latin America. To this end, the Prime Minister and his wife, Margaret, visited Cuba in 1976. Trudeau and Cuban leader Fidel Castro established an unusually close and friendly relationship during the visit. However, not only did Trudeau's action offend many in the United States, but Cuba's intervention in Angola forced the Prime Minister to distance himself from Castro.

Pierre Trudeau visite les grottes de Loyang en compagnie de M. Chou En-lai, République populaire de Chine, 1973.

Pierre Trudeau and Chou En-lai in the caves of Loyang, People's Republic of China, 1973.

SOURCE: CANADIAN PRESS / PETER BREGG



[Ottawa,] August 3, 1973

Prime Minister's Visit to China

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 9245,
DOSSIER 20-CDA-9-TRUDEAU

SOURCE : LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 9245, FILE
20-CDA-9 TRUDEAU

Ralph Collins, Ivan Head and I met July 31 for a discussion which touched on a number of subjects, of which it might be useful to have some record. Concerning the objectives of the visit, it was suggested that the first should be to attempt to stabilize the state of our general relations with China at a reasonably high level. It was recognized that there had been some slipping from the particularly favoured position that Canada has occupied during the past two years or so. Naturally the more recent arrivals in Peking, particularly the Americans and Australians, were enjoying favoured status and there was no question of trying to counter this. The objective should be to establish a firm basis for a long-term relationship at as high a level as possible. This should include the removal in advance of the visit of the irritant of the visa problems and the tidying up of the unfinished matter of the Bethune House. The visit itself should be the occasion for launching some longer-term and significant cooperative undertakings. In selecting these areas and in planning the discussions generally, first priority should be given to the economic and commercial aspects which the Prime Minister has stated as being his primary reasons for going. It was important that he should be able to produce a measurable result of his trip.

2. It was agreed that we would coordinate with Industry, Trade and Commerce and other interested departments in discovering which areas offered the best prospect of exploitation in the commercial field. Some examples mentioned were: a Massey-Ferguson tractor factory, atomic power development, petrochemical plant and oil exploration technology and equipment.
3. There was also some discussion of the sort of longer-range project that might be developed in time to enable an agreed announcement during the visit. One suggestion to be explored was Chinese agreement to cooperate in the implementation of the proposals contained in the Report of the Canadian Medical Association's delegation on its visit to China. This report mentioned particularly clinical studies of acupuncture, the evaluation of Chinese herbal medicines and medical techniques for the restoration of severed limbs and the treatment of burns.
4. In the area of *weltpolitik* it was suggested that perhaps the Prime Minister could try to penetrate the anti-Soviet rhetoric of Chou En-Lai with the idea of coming to some sort of conclusion as to whether Chinese fears of USSR was the result of any objective assessment that a Soviet attack on China was a genuine possibility or whether it was a matter primarily of injured pride and ideological manoeuvring.
5. Under the heading of general bilateral relations an effort should be made to find out how the Chinese felt about Canadian representation and the existing arrangements for maintaining contact both in Peking and in Ottawa. (It might be recalled that the SSEA during his visit mentioned the possibility of formalizing some means of exchanging views on matters of common interests.)
6. There was some discussion of the Chinese fondness for "magnanimous gestures." (One possibility on the Canadian side might be to accede to the Chinese request for consular and trade representation in centres outside Ottawa.)

7. There was some discussion of the division of responsibilities as between PCO and ourselves. It seems likely that Mr. Collins will be the senior External representative with the Prime Minister's party and would therefore be involved in all aspects of planning and documentation. Operational responsibility and coordination will remain in this Bureau so far as External is concerned. To assist us in meeting this additional commitment, particularly in view of the fact that the China desk officer will be entirely new to his job, I propose to ask the Commissioner in Hong Kong to release Mr. Sean Brady to be this department's coordinator. In the meantime GPE will start preparing draft objectives and proposals for selected areas of concentration for submission to the PMO and other departments as necessary. Work should also begin on drafting a table of contents for the briefing book.

A.J. Andrew

Telegram FAI-2655

Ottawa, September 28, 1973

Télégramme pour
l'ambassade du
Canada à Beijing

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 9245,
DOSSIER 20-CDA-9-TRUDEAU

Telegram to Canadian
Embassy, Beijing

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 9245, FILE
20 CDA-9-TRUDEAU

Prime Minister's Visit – Animal Presentations

Four beavers arriving on Prime Minister's aircraft will need to be fed. INA reports following kinds of food suitable : (a) populus (poplar), (b) salix (willows), (c) rubus (raspberries), (d) nuphar (water lilies), (e) betula (birch); understand hyacinth available in China can probably replace water lilies if after tasting beavers like Chinese food. We will send 50 lbs bag of alfalfa to sustain them until local food supply obtained.

2. As beavers only defecate in water and hold back during journey they should be placed in pool of water on arrival to provide relief and prevent possible critical condition especially after such long flight.
3. Grateful you designate member embassy staff as beaver liaison officer.
4. For Tokyo: Beavers will remain on aircraft during stopover. Grateful you advise Japanese authorities.

[Ottawa,] February 4, 1976

U.S. Reaction to Canadian-Cuban Policy

A hasty perusal of American media comments on the Prime Minister's visit to Latin America suggests that there are three aspects of the visit that have aroused, if not angered, the American public.

The first is the timing of the visit. The second is Prime Minister Trudeau's shouts of "Viva Cuba, Viva Castro and Viva La Amistad Cubano-Canadiense" and finally Prime Minister Trudeau's remarks at his Jose Marti airport press conference in Havana which, taken out of their context, seem to suggest support for Cuba's intervention in Angola rather than condemnation of it.

In order to deal with these points, I attach to this memorandum a statement of the Canadian official position on Angola of January 20; the Prime Minister's report to the House of Commons on his return from the trip on February 3; a complete transcript of the Prime Minister's speech in Cienfuegos; a complete transcript of the Prime Minister's remarks at the Havana press conference as well as the transcripts of his press conference in Mexico where he also made comments on Angola. The transcript of the Prime Minister's press conference in Venezuela is not yet available. When it is, it will be sent to you. I also attach a selection of the American press comments on the visit to Cuba that we have received so far.

The following are possible questions that may come up as a reflection of American concerns, and the answers that you might give:

Question: Why did your Prime Minister have to visit Cuba just now at a time when Cuban forces have intervened in Angola?

Answer: The visit to Cuba was in fact arranged some months ago at the same time as the visit to Mexico and Venezuela. It was decided at that time to make the visit to the three countries for several reasons. The three countries are among the four countries in Latin America with which Canada has extensively developed trade relations, the fourth being Brazil. The three countries alone represent more than one half of Canadian trade with Latin America. They receive the overwhelming majority of Canadian tourists going to Latin America. The leaders of the three countries are among the most influential of Latin American leaders and the three countries themselves are among the most active of Latin American countries in international conferences and forums. What is more, they are working increasingly closely together. It is they who are principally responsible for the establishment of SELA, the Latin American economic system.

In addition, all three countries are becoming increasingly active in an area of considerable interest to Canada: the Commonwealth Caribbean. When the trip was first planned several months ago before the Angola crisis arose it was, therefore, fully normal for Cuba to be included. Indeed, it would have appeared strange from the point of view of Canadian interests for Cuba not to be included. Cuban imports from Canada, just to cite one example, have increased by three times in the last three years, while Cuban exports to Canada have gone up six times.

We considered that we could achieve the maximum effect on Cuban Angola policy, to the extent that we could influence it, both by our public statements on the subject and by our private

discussions with Castro. A postponement of the trip to Cuba, we considered, would lead to a definite cooling in our relations with Cuba without giving us any further influence on their Angolan policy.

Question: What is your policy on Angola and how did you make it clear to Castro?

Answer: Before the trip on January 20, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Mr. Allan MacEachen, issued a statement in which he declared "we are completely opposed to the continued supply of foreign soldiers, arms, material, money and mercenaries to the three warring factions in Angola." The Prime Minister, in his public speech in Cienfuegos, made an indirect reference to Angola when he condemned "adventurism in the nuclear age" which he declared can "lead to the destruction of the entire human race." In addition, he devoted the better part of three hours in his private conversations with Prime Minister Castro to what he described as a "frank and brutal discussion on Angola."

In the course of these discussions to quote the Prime Minister "one of the points of view that I took was, that apart from the destabilizing effect of any foreign intervention, particularly by nations from outside the African continent, I felt that Cuba, and I said so, was making a very serious mistake from the point of view of its own involvement in that Angolan situation. Regardless of the harm that they might be doing in Africa, I thought they were doing a fair amount of harm to themselves and I made that quite clear."

Question: In that case, why did your Prime Minister state that Prime Minister Castro made the decision to intervene in Angola on a great deal of thought and feeling for the strategic situation in Africa?

Answer: This remark was given out of context. It was part of an answer the Prime Minister gave to a question in which he asked whether he had been able to influence Prime Minister Castro's opinion on Angola. He went on to say that he too had some knowledge of Africa and that there had been a lengthy attempt on both sides to influence opinion of the other and that while he probably had not changed Prime Minister Castro's mind he thought that both sides were now more aware of the reasons taken by the other.

Question: Why did your Prime Minister, at a serious time of crisis like this, have to conclude his speech in Cuba with the words "Viva Cuba, Viva Premier Ministre Comandante Fidel Castro, Viva La Amistad Cubano Canadiense" and why did he have to make several other favourable remarks about Castro such as saying he was a man of world stature?

Answer: The vivas which the Prime Minister put at the end of his speech in Cienfuegos were in response to similar vivas given by Castro at the end of his speech. They were a normal conclusion of the public speeches of this sort in Cuba. To have done otherwise would have been impolite and would have gained nothing.

The Prime Minister's other references to Castro were his objective assessment of the man. The Prime Minister made it clear that although there were profound ideological differences between him and Prime Minister Castro and although he disagreed with many of Castro's policies, he nevertheless recognized both the abilities and the accomplishments of the man.

Derek R.T. Fraser

Havana, May 11, 1976

Rapport de
James Hyndman
(ambassadeur à Cuba)

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 8638,
DOSSIER 20-1-2-CUBA

Report by
James Hyndman
(Ambassador to Cuba)

SOURCE : LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25 VOLUME 8638, FILE 20-1-2-CUBA

Call by Prime Minister Castro

Prime Minister Castro paid me visit at residence last Sunday afternoon and stayed on for over hour and half. Visit had been preceded by cryptic phone call around 15:00 from one of his assistants to enquire if I would be home after five. Caller took note of my affirmative reply but would not say more. I had expected further call, or delivery of message or that members of Prime Minister's staff might come to take me to see him. Even for Castro, casual call on Ambassador in this way is highly unexpected and indeed rare occurrence.

2. Prime Minister Castro came in alone around 18:15. He was without interpreter. Usual escorts had positioned themselves outside house and sealed off area. He greeted me warmly and settled down in patio with a Canadian rye on the rocks (his selection) and we had relaxed, informal conversation for over hour. On way out Prime Minister stopped to chat with my wife, children and house guests, lingering on for further half hour.
3. Prime Minister began by explaining he had come personally to deliver presents for Prime Minister and Mrs. Trudeau as mementos of their January visit to Cuba. Prime Minister Trudeau's gift in large crate (brought in by attendants) was stuffed fish he had speared during scuba-diving session off coast of Matanzas. For Mrs. Trudeau he had large box which contained inter alia small cigars she had liked. Photographer appeared to take variety of pictures of event. I thanked Prime Minister, saying I knew that Canadian Prime Minister and Mrs. Trudeau would be most grateful for his thoughtful gesture. I added that he would probably have occasion to do some good fishing when he visited Canada. "Perhaps I can catch one of your large salmon," he replied. He did not otherwise comment on his eventual visit.
4. Prime Minister Castro then said he also wanted to convey his response to question I had raised on behalf Canadian Prime Minister in conversation with Deputy F.M. de Cossio previous week. I am reporting separately on this part of conversation ...
5. We then turned to other subjects. Prime Minister seemed to be in no hurry and to welcome exchange of views. Main questions touched upon were USA electoral situation and prospects, Rhodesia (separate telegram will cover discussion on these two subjects)... There was also fair amount of small talk dealing with such matters as Prime Minister's health and sporting activities, our life in Cuba, and Embassy's desire to move into new and larger Chancery. (He indicated his continuing interest in meeting our needs and I told him we were to see possible site in a few days.)
6. Prime Minister Castro seemed especially interested in hearing comments on USA electoral situation. He acknowledged he was worried about trend of public discussion of foreign policy issues and alarmed about possibility of Reagan presidency which would be worst outcome for world at large. He made no criticism of USA, spoke in very moderate terms and later expressed cautious optimism about chances of essentially peaceful settlement in Rhodesia.

7. He alluded to his current preoccupation with installation of new economic management system. One of main purposes and requirements was to achieve more effective control of expenditures and to avoid waste and inefficiencies of past. Other main element was decentralization of responsibilities where this made sense. I said we were also engaged in major battle in economic field, against inflation and unemployment. Conversation wound up with lighter talk of more personal nature.
8. I have provided some detail about circumstances and atmosphere of talk since visit remains a little mystifying and seems to require interpretation. Prime Minister obviously did not have to come to deliver presents, and could have called me in or had Roa or de Cossio talk to me to convey specific views or information. While visit no doubt also reflects Prime Minister's personal style and mode of operation, I am inclined to think it was intended to underline once again importance he attaches to special rapport with Prime Minister Trudeau, and his desire to pursue dialogue, and also perhaps to open channel for doing so easily by establishing relaxed personal relationship with Canadian Ambassador. Channel is obviously open and perhaps especially with an eye to Cuba's uneasy relations with USA he may feel he will have occasion to use it in future. Any further distribution and declassification left to you.

Hyndman

Section 54

Un nouveau foyer

Depuis la création du Ministère en 1909, il avait toujours été impossible de loger tout le monde sous un même toit. Lorsque le nouvel Édifice Lester B. Pearson ouvre ses portes, sur la promenade Sussex, il est tellement vaste que de nombreux locaux sont occupés par d'autres ministères. Commencé en 1970, les travaux furent achevés en 1972.

A New Home

In the years since 1909, it had never been possible to accommodate all External Affairs employees in a single building. When the new Lester B. Pearson Building on Sussex Drive was constructed, there was so much space that many of the offices were initially occupied by other departments. Work on the building began in 1970 and was completed in 1972.

La reine Elizabeth II à l'occasion
de l'inauguration de l'édifice
Lester B. Pearson.

Queen Elizabeth II at
the opening of the Lester
B. Pearson Building.

SOURCE: UPI



L'édifice Lester B. Pearson.

The Lester B. Pearson Building.

SOURCE: BLAKELEY WORDS+PICTURES



Press Release G-430

May 8, 1970

Ottawa - A \$25,711, 000 contract has been awarded to the Foundation Company of Canada Limited and Janin Building & Civil Works Ltd. of Toronto for the Department of External Affairs on Sussex Drive in Ottawa, Public Works Minister Arthur Laing announced today.

The successful bid for the External Affairs building was the lowest of five, with the highest tender submission being \$26,700,000.

At the present time the Department of External Affairs is located in more than 10 scattered premises in Ottawa. The need and purpose of this Headquarters is to provide for the Department of External Affairs one new building, having the qualities of function, durability, flexibility of office use and re-use of space with inherent ease of maintenance and being economical in cost.

The headquarters building will be located on an island site formed by Sussex Drive and Sussex Drive approach ramps to the Macdonald Cartier bridge. The main entrance to the building is from Sussex Drive. Notable buildings in the immediate vicinity include Earnscliffe House and the National Research Council building on the opposite side of Sussex Drive and immediately north, the Ottawa City Hall.

The location is impressive from a representational point of view as well as being convenient for representatives of foreign governments and the business community.

Space initially not used by External Affairs will be allocated to other Government departments for office use pending requirement by External Affairs.

The building is basically horizontal and comprises four elements, connected, interrelated and articulated in a sculptural form. The four elements have varying heights of ten, five, seven, and four storeys above grade. The total gross area is 1,080,000 sq. ft. In addition to this two levels of parking for 630 cars are provided.

The main theme in the architecture is intended to be the sculptural form of the building. The wall treatment itself is the secondary theme and is horizontal in form, comprising consistent and repeated elements of the horizontal spandrel in local granite aggregate precast, dark brown bronze in general colour. Deep set continuous horizontal windows in bronze solar glass set in slim bronze coloured anodic aluminum frames complete the exterior wall.

The building is comprised mainly of what may be termed general open office area but includes special areas specifically related to the requirements of the Department.

Areas of special usage and interest include on the main floor level the main entrance lobby; a conference-auditorium complex with facilities for small international conferences and use by all Government departments; an historical library; a staff cafeteria and the passport office. Located on the ninth floor are special reception and dining facilities.

Plans and specifications were prepared by Webb, Zerafa Menkes of Toronto. Supervision will be provided by E.C. Martel, Regional Director of the Capital Region.

Completion is expected in April 1973.

Section 55

L'étéiolement du pouvoir soviétique

Le déclin de l'Union soviétique s'est accompagné de nombreux événements dramatiques, par exemple la fureur déclenchée par la publication de *L'Archipel du Goulag*, d'Alexandre Soljenitsyne, les conflits entre le gouvernement polonais et le syndicat Solidarité, ainsi que la catastrophe à la centrale nucléaire de Tchernobyl. Robert Ford, qui a été longtemps ambassadeur du Canada à Moscou, était un fin observateur des développements politiques et culturels des Soviétiques. Les politiciens et diplomates étrangers, dont le secrétaire d'État américain, George Schultz, recherchaient et respectaient son avis.

The Waning of Soviet Power

The decline of the Soviet Union was marked by many dramatic events, among them the furore over the publication of Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn's *The Gulag Archipelago*, the conflicts between the Polish government and the Solidarity labour union, and the disaster at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. Canada's long-serving ambassador in Moscow, Robert Ford, was a keen observer of Soviet political and cultural developments. His views were sought and respected by foreign politicians and diplomats, including American Secretary of State George Schultz.

Flora MacDonald, première femme à occuper le poste de secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, lors d'une conférence de presse aux Nations Unies, 1979.

Flora MacDonald, Canada's first female secretary of state for external affairs, at a United Nations press conference in 1979.

SOURCE: YUTAKA NAGATA, NATIONS UNIES PHOTO/ UNITED NATIONS PHOTO



Telegram 424

Moscow, February 28, 1974

Solzhenitsyn's Expulsion: Aftermath

...

2. Immediately after expulsion campaign was mounted here to justify action Soviet authorities had taken. They have also used repressive measures against those who took Solzhenitsyn's side and even, according to some reports, have attempted to discipline fence sitters. It is clear that they were seriously worried at way in which situation developed and are determined to stop rot from spreading. Action taken against Solzhenitsyn has clearly cause dismay and uneasiness in intellectual circles.
3. Authorities appear to have had some difficulty in extracting anti-Solzhenitsyn letters from writers union. Only three writers of any stature, Konstatin Simonov, Valentyn Katayev and Boris Polivoi, have written condemning Solzhenitsyn and their letters were couched in ambiguous terms. Party did however achieve greater success in rounding up support in other disciplines. These have included two Nobel Prize winners, Nikolai Basov and Nikolai Semyonov, some members of academy of sciences, and various actors, composers, artists, plus the usual Kolkhozniks, and factory workers. There have been, however, no group letters from individuals purporting to represent academy of sciences or writers union as there were in the campaign against Sakharov last summer. This may be because knowledgeable

Document 1
L'Union soviétique (Moscou)

SOURCE : LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 13644,
DOSSIER 45-USSR-13

Document 2
L'Union soviétique (Moscou)

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 13644, FILE 45-USSR-13

members of the public and foreign observers found it more interesting to see who had not signed such letters than who had.

4. Besides mitigated success of letter writing campaign there have been other indications expulsion of Solzhenitsyn has provoked opposition among many of intelligentsia. Position taken by Yevgeny Yevtushenko is especially interesting. He has for several years now been silent or ambiguous in public on questions of human rights in USSR. Last autumn however he told me he had refused to sign letter condemning Sakharov even though he was warned he might not be allowed to become editor of new poetry journal which started publication at beginning of this year. On February 12, day of Solzhenitsyn's arrest, Yevtushenko was attending party when news broke. According to eye-witness from British Embassy, Yevtushenko, considerably shocked, declared story was so monstrous it could not be true. He then ran out and phoned friends to seek confirmation. Next day, he sent his confidential letter to Brezhnev, reportedly couched in moderate terms, in which he expressed concern over fate of Solzhenitsyn and warned about blow to Soviet prestige that could result from his arrest.
5. Reaction from Soviet authorities came quickly. On February 16 recital and concert at conservatory was cancelled and ticket owners found area sealed off by police. In rebuttal, Yevtushenko on morning of February 16 made statement to Western newsmen in which he made public substance his letter to Brezhnev, criticized reprisals taken against those who supported Solzhenitsyn and challenged official position that enough was already known about the Stalin period. Yevtushenko then left town to lie low for a while...
9. Fear aroused in leaders of this powerful nation by Solzhenitsyn episode ... will make them less ready than previously to compromise on positions they consider necessary for their basic security...
10. Equally we can expect that literary climate will grow even chillier in USSR and controls will become even tighter. This has of course been happening ever since American-Soviet thaw began, as I suggested in June 72. It does not mean a return to Stalinism or neo-Stalinism. It means simply that total intellectual conformity will continue to be demanded from all members of Soviet society. And departure of Solzhenitsyn, by removing major literary dissident, makes it that much easier for government.

Ford

Warsaw, December 16, 1981

Rapport de l'ambassade
du Canada, Varsovie

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 16026,
DOSSIER 20-POL-1-4

Report from Canadian
Embassy, Warsaw

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 16026, FILE 20-POL-1-4

Imposition Martial Law

...

2. ... Martial law was proclaimed in Poland during night of 12/13 December by Military Council of National Redemption, formed same night and led by General Wojciech Jaruzelski. Proclamation was preceded by troop movements throughout country and raid on Solidarity Warsaw (Mazowszf) headquarters. Reasons for clamp down at this time are many and varied but thoroughness of operation suggests decision to move made some time ago. Of obvious significance were results of Solidarity national council deliberations on which we are reporting separately.
3. *Jaruzelski speech*: Addressing the nation as a soldier and chief of Polish Government, Jaruzelski went on air at 6 a.m. 13 December to announce imposition of martial law. Claiming that country was being destroyed with state structures ceasing to operate and economy dying, Jaruzelski decried atmosphere of "unending conflicts, disagreements and hatred" which he said were sowing mental devastation and mutilating tradition of tolerance. Jaruzelski admitted that mistakes had been made in past and claimed his government had good intentions and sense of measure and patience. These efforts had deliberately been torpedoed by those same people who were turning national economy into political arena. Jaruzelski blamed Solidarity for refusing to support national concord and claimed that the random deliberations and Gdansk meeting had unveiled true intentions of Solidarity's leading circles, i.e. intensified aggressiveness and open striving to dismantle socialist state.
4. It was as result of this, government had proclaimed martial law for whole country and set up Military Council of National Redemption. This was not a military coup nor would it lead to military dictatorship, he claimed, adding that the nation had enough strength to develop efficient democratic system of Socialist Government which would permit army to return to its rightful place i.e. barracks....
11. *Measures*: Poles have been assailed by a flood of decrees, announcements and special measures of which most important are capsulized below: (1) All passenger traffic across Polish border has been halted except for (inter alia) Poles and foreigners returning to their place of residence be it Poland or abroad, and employees of diplomatic missions in possession of visas. (2) All meetings, marches, demonstrations, public assemblies, artistic entertainment and sports events are banned unless permission obtained. Religious ceremonies within churches are exempted. (3) The activities of trade, student and social unions are suspended. Strikes and protests of any kind are illegal. (4) Communications have been limited: Warsaw is totally without telephone service and all domestic and international long distance calls have been suspended. Polish radio and TV are broadcasting one programme only. Only daily newspaper appearing in Warsaw are *Trybuna Ludu* (party paper) and *Zolnierz Wolnosci* (army paper). (5) Mail will be censored and phone communications monitored. (6) Curfew is in force from 2200 to 0600. (7) Council of ministers is empowered

to compel individuals and corporate bodies owning farms to cultivate specific plants and deliver specific agriculture products to state. (8) Court martial offences include: offences against basic political and economic interests of state, offences against public security, state and official secrets, public order, offences against life and property committed with fire arms and explosives, offences against duty of defending peoples Poland and offences against violation of bans and restrictions imposed for duration of martial law.

12. *Comments:* Poles tired and disheartened from daily frustrations created by economic crisis were stunned Sunday morning with news of martial law. There was little evidence of anger just sadness and disbelief. Warsaw residents took their usual Sunday walks as if their presence in the streets among buildings rebuilt from rubble of World War II would lessen the blow. Several stopped to reread days old Solidarity messages pasted to walls. These symbols of freedom would soon disappear as would the banners and flags flying from strike-bound Warsaw universal gates. Churches were crowded as people turned to it for solace, hope and direction. The primate was praying for peace in Czestochowa they were told. Sermons concentrated on theme of God of peace and prayers were intoned for Poland.
13. That was Sunday. By Monday, the troops at intersections and on bridges almost seemed normal. As incredulity passed, fear and anxiety grew. Borders closed, bank accounts frozen, no gasoline for private cars, no private purchases of food from farmers, censorship. The whole way of life to which Poles had become accustomed was disrupted.
14. Martial law has affected every facet of Polish life. Church remains only body left virtually intact. We might expect as result that church will be in position to take up role of interlocutory of Polish authorities. So far primate has obliged authorities by stressing peace and avoidance of bloodshed. This might put him in position to extract some compromises from government although there is no evidence yet that this is case.
15. Since drafting above have received first hand report that on Monday evening primate was very pessimistic about situation although he had little hard information on what was happening. He estimated that 2000–3000 people had been arrested (more by now). He had spoken with Walesa by some kind of telephone link. Walesa had said “I can see nothing but soldiers and trees.” Only contact with senior authorities so far had been visit to Bishop Dubrowski by Politburo member and co-chairman of State-Church Commissioner Barcikowski an hour before martial law had been announced. So far four priests have been arrested.

[Washington,] September 10, 1982

Rapport de Robert Ford

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, DOCUMENTS DE ROBERT FORD,
VOLUME 3, DOSSIER 5

Report by Robert Ford

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
FORD PAPERS, VOLUME 3, FILE 5

Report on talk with The Honourable George P. Schultz, Secretary of State, Washington

The meeting took place at the State Department on Friday, September 10, one day later than scheduled due to the summoning of the Secretary of State to testify before Congress. It lasted about an hour and I had a further conversation with Stoessel and Eagleburger.

Present at the meeting in addition to Mr. Shultz were:

His Excellency Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr.
Deputy Secretary of State (Outgoing)

The Honorable Kenneth Dam,
Deputy Secretary of State (Incoming)

The Honorable Lawrence S. Eagleburger,
Under-Secretary for Political Affairs

Mr. Paul Wolfowitz,
Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State

Mr. Thomas W. Simons Jr.,
Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs (EUR/SOV).

Only Ambassador Gottlieb was present on our side. It was obviously impossible to take notes but I have reconstructed the conversation as best I could.

Mr. Shultz said he had gone through my paper and expected his colleagues had also done so but he would welcome any elaboration or comments which I cared to make. I therefore made a brief summary touching on the high spots following up with the following general comments on what it seemed to me the Western powers ought to do.

I said that in the first place there had to be a recognition that, at least in the short run, we are unable to alter the Soviet régime to something more palatable to us and that any changes which may take place will have to come from inside.

The next few years are going to be difficult, if not dangerous, because of the few alternatives the Soviets perceive, and in view of the continuing internal problems and the tendency of the military to increase their strength.

Any real efforts on either side to improve relations significantly are going to come up against the obstacles of Afghanistan and Poland – on the Soviet side because they refuse to believe that we have any legitimate interest in the fate of the Afghan and Polish people and because of their security preoccupations; on our side because of the unacceptability of their military intervention in Afghanistan, and the emotions aroused by Poland.

Then I suggested that there were a few things which I thought that we could do to improve the stance of the West and reduce the dangers in the East-West confrontation.

In the first place, there should be a recognition that the Soviets perceive themselves to be in a beleaguered situation, and that they think we see the situation as they do and are attempting to weaken, if not destroy, the régime.

In order to correct this, and bring them out of this partially paranoid attitude, we could give them at least the semblance of respect as a great power, recognizing how extremely touchy they are on this score. It is part of their constant obsession with the United States and their status in the world.

I thought it important to try to re-establish some measure of crisis control which need not be presented on either side as anything more than a move to prevent miscalculations and of mutual benefit to both sides. I added that I thought the allies had a legitimate interest in this and in my own view it would go far to meet the concerns of the allies and restore their respect for American leadership.

Serious arms talks were an absolute necessity and, no matter what the political developments, nothing should interrupt the negotiations.

I thought we ought to be prepared, when the leadership change takes place, to seize any opportunity which might be presented by the Kremlin of a shift in attitude, to reduce tension. But at the same time, we must be prepared for a long haul, particularly because of the problems of Afghanistan and Poland.

Mr. Shultz thanked me for my exposé and opened the discussion by asking whether I thought arms control should be considered in the context of Soviet internal affairs, or as an element of East-West relations primarily. He showed throughout very great interest in the discussion and asked a number of questions but arms control, economics and Poland appeared to be uppermost in his mind.

I said I saw arms control in both contexts. It was almost the only way in which the Soviets could hope to reduce the proportion of the GNP devoted to the military and therefore have means of improving the economy. At the same time, it seemed to me the key element in East-West relations and negotiations should be pushed forward rapidly and seriously.

Wolfowitz queried my assumption that it was possible to reduce the proportion of the GNP devoted to the military, or save money, through arms reduction. He thought this had not been the case in the past. He wondered if it might not appear to the Soviets that the best way of economizing in the military would be to seek an agreement with the Chinese which would permit them to reduce the huge standing army in their Asian and Pacific provinces.

I said he was probably right about the experience of the past but the next phase in arms development was going to require more capital and above all more scientists and technologists from a not very big pool. I thought the Soviets must be worried about the implications of the next arms race, about its costs and about their ability to match the U.S. without further depleting the civilian sector.

As regards China, no doubt the Soviets would like to improve relations and possibly they would be able to reduce the dangers on the Sino-Soviet frontier but I thought a rapprochement unlikely and without a complete reconciliation the Soviets would not take the risk of reducing substantially

their conventional forces which were a very necessary visible reassurance to the Russians in Siberia. And as far as costs were concerned, they paid their soldiers a pittance and their up-keep also cost very little.

Shultz wondered if it was wrong to press for arms reductions since the high cost of the military establishment seemed certain to weaken the economy as a whole. I said this was true – in the long run. But we had to deal with a period of five years or so before the Soviets succession was settled and during which the Soviets had military superiority, which a policy of forcing up military costs would not solve and which could be potentially dangerous.

Mr. Shultz said he agreed about Poland as an obstacle in East-West relations, and in reply to his request I spelled out my reasons for seeing no solution in sight. Briefly I said the economy was in a hopeless mess and could only be improved by economic reforms which were anathema to the Soviets and would take years to produce results anyway. The Soviets could not accept indefinitely a situation where power did not lie squarely in the hands of the Communist Party. At some point they had to re-establish a Polish CP which would have some authority in the country and be loyal to Moscow. Finally the security problem is most important to them. All three of these issues seem insolvable. I asked Stoessel if, as former Ambassador to Poland, he agreed. He did.

Eagleburger asked for my views on the kind of people likely to come to power after Brezhnev – not specific names. I said those at the top of the Party apparatus (the hierarchy, Central Committee, etc.) had all come up through the Party apparatus and had the same basic formation as Brezhnev. The extraordinary length of the latter's stay in power had inevitably affected all of them and they had come to accept his policies and way of doing things. In fact he had survived by making their interests identical with his. They were better educated and more sophisticated but just as devoted to the main aim of the Soviet leadership – the preservation of their power and privileges.

Stoessel said their people seemed to think that the industrial managers would have a greater interest in more practical approaches to problems in order to make the economy more productive. I said they might be more flexible but their main aim would be the same because they shared the fundamental instinct of the Party and their first loyalties were to their "class."

In reply to Mr. Shultz' question, I spelled out why I thought it unlikely that any real economic reform would be instituted which I need not repeat here. I said there was always the possibility of an extraordinary man appearing who would have the power base and imagination to push a reform programme through. At the moment, I saw no one of that ilk on the horizon. Stoessel and Eagleburger said this was much their view as well....

From this the discussion turned to reasons for the aggressiveness of Soviet foreign policy in the seventies. I said it was a combination of a number of factors. The first was simply that Brezhnev was at his prime and feeling his power internally and that of the USSR. The second was the coming to fruition of the arms development programmes started in the sixties. The third was the appearance of targets of opportunity in the Third World. I then digressed a bit to outline my theory on the ideological importance for the Soviets of support for National Liberation Movements and how they did not consider this a breach of the rules of peaceful co-existence since the latter explicitly excluded it, as it did ideological or political co-existence. I suggested that there had

been a misunderstanding of the meaning of détente on both sides which illustrated clearly the problems of managing relations between the two blocs.

Mr. Shultz seemed interested in this explanation and then asked me what I considered the U.S. had done which the Soviets believed were “humiliating.” I mentioned the rejection by Congress of SALT II after its signature by Carter and Brezhnev; the Jackson-Vanek amendment tying trade to Jewish emigration; the Carter letter to Sakharov; and, with due respect, some of the more outspoken speeches of President Reagan, which might better have been left to other members of the Government. While the Soviets frequently attacked the U.S., the President never did directly.

(Eagleburger later referred to this and said one of the problems was that Reagan genuinely believed in what he said about the USSR.)

Mr. Shultz expressed interest in my suggestion of a policy of attentism on our side. I said I was thinking in the following terms. We should not try to achieve military superiority in a way which would alarm the Russians. At the same time, we should not attempt an improvement of relations without a solid increase in our military strength. There was very little that could be done with the present leadership and the best policy was perhaps to await the change, taking some steps to reduce the immediate tension while being ready to seize any opportunity for the better which might present itself. However, as I had said earlier, there were dangers of miscalculation in the present situation which should be reduced, above all by crisis control.

I said I thought the Soviets might be approaching one of those periodical watersheds in their history when they pause for a consolidation of their gains. I thought the new leadership might realise that they had pushed their own people too far and too hard, and the confrontation with the United States was becoming dangerous and unprofitable. I was not suggesting that they would retreat in any way as far as their political or ideological aims were concerned but they might see merit in a tactical pause....

R.A.D. Ford
Special Adviser on East-West Relations

Ottawa, May 2, 1986

Télégramme pour
l'ambassade du
Canada à Tokyo

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 17106,
DOSSIER 65-11-7-CRNBL

Telegram to Canadian
Embassy, Tokyo

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 17106, FILE 65-11-7-CRNBL

Tokyo Economic Summit – Chernobyl and Implications for East/West Relations

Accident could impact on East/West relations, and hence on summit discussions in at least two ways. First, Soviet Government's secretive and dilatory reaction to accident could be cited as dramatic reminder of unsavoury character of Soviet political system and of corresponding need for continued Western vigilance in pursuing cooperative track with Moscow. As such it is a setback for Soviets and windfall for President Reagan in public relations terms. Secondly, accident itself and damage it has caused to neighbouring states, including Western states, could elevate environmental cooperation issues to much higher status on East/West agenda.

2. In approaching summit discussion of matter, following considerations occur to us.
3. There will be strong temptation on part of the Americans, and perhaps British and French, to argue that Soviet handling of Chernobyl incident shows how little has changed since Gorbachev's arrival on scene in Moscow, despite hopes some had entertained for a more open, humane and responsible attitude under new leadership. But incident is of such extraordinary character that no general conclusions should be drawn from it, at least not yet. Delay in notifying others of radiation hazard was certainly morally inexcusable, and Moscow has released far less information than is needed to make accurate calculation of danger and take corrective action. But testimony of Soviet embassy officer before congressional committee is exceptional. Also we know very little about bureaucratic process which produced situation, and it is not inconceivable senior leadership found it wanting. (Commission of inquiry has been set up, and unlike Brezhnev Gorbachev does not have reputation for whitewashing the guilty.) It is also conceivable that over reaction of USA administration (and media) had counterproductive effect of inhibiting more forthcoming Soviet reaction once error had been recognized. This is all speculation, of course, but it suggests we not jump to premature conclusions until we know more.
4. Second consideration is that both accident and government's response point up weakness not only in Soviet regulatory arrangements, but also in international régimes governing safety of nuclear power reactors, and international environmental catastrophes. Public pillaring of Soviet Union for its failings might be emotionally satisfying for some in East/West context. But it will not help (and could well hinder) common effort which will be required among large number of countries on both sides of East/West divide in improving international mechanism and channels for enhancing nuclear safety and environmental programs. Course of wisdom, therefore, would be to try to prevent Chernobyl incident from becoming political football, and to take high road in promoting cooperative approach designed to prevent a repetition.

Section 56

Coup d'éclat du Canada

Parmi les incidents ayant impliqué un diplomate canadien, l'attaque de 1979 contre l'ambassade des États-Unis à Téhéran compte parmi les plus mémorables. À la suite du renversement du shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi en février 1979, un fort sentiment antioccidental, et particulièrement antiaméricain, régnait dans l'Iran révolutionnaire. Le 4 novembre de la même année, la plupart du personnel et des diplomates américains à Téhéran ont été pris en otage par des étudiants iraniens. Toutefois, six Américains se sont échappés et ont trouvé refuge à l'ambassade du Canada. Après avoir réussi à les faire sortir du pays en douce, l'ambassadeur canadien, Kenneth Taylor, est considéré comme un héros aux États-Unis.

The Canadian Caper

Among the most famous incidents involving a Canadian diplomat was the 1979 attack on the American embassy in Tehran. Following the overthrow of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in February 1979, anti-Western, and especially anti-American, feeling was strong in revolutionary Iran. On November 4 of that year most of the American diplomats and staff in Teheran were taken hostage by Iranian students. However, six Americans escaped and sought refuge at the Canadian embassy. After the Americans had successfully been smuggled out of the country, Ambassador Kenneth Taylor became a hero in the United States.

Le Premier ministre Joe Clark et
l'ambassadeur Kenneth Taylor,
1980.

Prime Minister Joe Clark and
Ambassador Kenneth Taylor,
1980.

SOURCE: THE CANADIAN PRESS /
DREW GRAGG



[Ottawa,] November 9, 1979

Safe Haven for Members of U.S. Embassy In Iran

The Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Teheran, who with five other Embassy members (including two wives) were outside the Embassy grounds at the time of the attack, are in temporary safe haven elsewhere in Tehran but may soon have to move. They have asked our Ambassador if he could somehow accommodate them. He recommends that we concur, given the state of jeopardy in which these Americans find themselves; alternatives are the Embassy chancery, the Ambassador's residence, or residences of staff members.

I recommend that we urgently authorize the Ambassador to accommodate these people. There would be a certain risk to our premises and personnel, because if the Americans' presence became known, groups of students or undisciplined "revolutionary guards" might possibly seek to break in and get them. This possible risk, however, is outweighed in my view by the very serious danger in which these U.S. personnel find themselves. I think that in all conscience, we have no alternative but to concur.

The risk might be somewhat reduced by accommodating the Americans at the official residence. Although unlike the chancery, it is less physically secure and has no Canadian military guards, it is in a calmer quarter of Tehran, has less local staff, and enjoys the same degree of diplomatic immunity, for what that is worth. Accommodation with Embassy staff members would be much less desirable; their quarters do not enjoy immunity and the Ambassador points out they would be defenceless.... Telegram GAM-1357

NOTE: This document is a copy of a letter from the Ambassador to the Secretary of State, dated November 9, 1979, and is part of the file 20-1-2-IRAN.

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 8745,
DOSSIER 20-1-2-IRAN

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 8745, FILE 20-1-2-IRAN

Ottawa, November 9, 1979

USA Embassy Staff Iran

You are authorized by SSEA to accommodate USA Embassy staff. We leave location to your judgement depending on circumstances but believe official residence might be best because of its location and fact that like chancery (but unlike staff quarters) it enjoys full diplomatic immunity, for what that is worth. Guards at either location would be of little use in face of determined mob incursion. We think accommodation with staff members least desirable solution for reasons you give.

2. Next of kin informed re your paragraph 1.
3. Separate telegram follows regarding implications for Canadians.

Flora MacDonald

Telegram GAM-1359

Ottawa, November 9, 1979

USA Embassy Staff Iran: Implications for Canadians

There is concern at topmost levels here about possible implications for our embassy staff and other Canadians if and when accommodation is given to USA embassy members. We assume that staff will be warned to take all feasible precautions and that emergency measures to assist other Canadians if necessary are in full working order.

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 8745,
DOSSIER 20-1-2-IRAN

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 8745, FILE 20-1-2-IRAN

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 8745,
DOSSIER 20-1-2-IRAN

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 8745, FILE 20-1-2-IRAN

[Ottawa,] February 21, 1980

Iranian Protest In U.N.

Note destinée à
Flora MacDonald

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 8745,
DOSSIER 20-1-2-IRAN

Memorandum for
Flora MacDonald

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 8745, FILE 20-1-2-IRAN

Attached for your approval is a draft reply to the Iranian Note (also attached) circulated in the U.N. and protesting Canada's actions in helping the 6 U.S. Embassy officials to leave Iran.

2. The draft reply attempts to provide the necessary legal rebuttal to Iran's charges against Canada without entering into detailed argumentation and without provoking any further polemic. If you agree, it will be dispatched immediately to New York for transmission to the Secretary-General and circulation by him.

L.H. Legault

[Ottawa,] February 21, 1980

pièce jointe/enclosure

The Canadian Department of External Affairs is constrained to reply to the Note dated February 14, 1980 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, circulated to members of the United Nations at the request of the Ministry.

The Department of External Affairs regrets that the Ministry views unfavourably Canada's assistance to six officials of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. Canada's actions in this matter were exclusively humanitarian in their objectives. They were founded on, and they upheld rather than violated, ancient and universally held principles of international law, which have been reflected in international conventions to which Iran is a party, and which were specifically reaffirmed in a unanimous decision of the International Court of Justice ordering the release of the U.S. hostages in Tehran and the restitution of their full diplomatic rights, freedoms and immunities, including their right and freedom to leave Iran.

Canada's actions were in no way directed against Iranian sovereignty or the Iranian Government. Canada has always respected and will continue to respect the sovereignty of all countries, exercised in accordance with the fundamental principles of international law and of friendly relations between states.

The Department of External Affairs is gratified to note, in the communication of February 14, the assurances provided by the Iranian Foreign Ministry regarding the safety of all the U.S. hostages, and gratified also that the Foreign Ministry itself has recognized the need to provide "asylum" for three of the U.S. Embassy staff. In particular the Department notes with satisfaction indications of progress being made towards resolving all the issues related to this matter, under the auspices of the United Nations.

A copy of this Note is being filed with the International Court of Justice.

Section 57

Perspective incertaine au Moyen-Orient

Le processus de paix au Moyen-Orient est entravé par la situation politique et militaire. Les négociations de paix sont bloquées par la situation politique et militaire. Les négociations de paix sont bloquées par la situation politique et militaire. Les négociations de paix sont bloquées par la situation politique et militaire.

An Uncertain Outlook in the Middle East

The peace process in the Middle East is hampered by the political and military situation. The negotiations are blocked by the political and military situation. The negotiations are blocked by the political and military situation. The negotiations are blocked by the political and military situation.

Baghdad, February 17, 1982

Rapport de

Witold Weynerowski
(ambassadeur en Iraq)

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 9035,
DOSSIER 20-IRAQ-2-2

Report by

Witold Weynerowski
(Ambassador to Iraq)

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 9035, FILE 20-IRAQ-2-2

Impressions from a visit of Kurdistan

1. This despatch attempts to throw some light on the troubled situation in Western Kurdistan, which is Iraq's northern region comprising the governorates of Erbil, Sulamaniyyah and Kirkuk, where the country's Kurdish population is concentrated. Our information, necessarily impressionistic, is based on a three-day trip that took my wife and me to the principal Kurdish cities. This visit was the first time a Canadian diplomat accredited in Iraq was granted a travel permit to this region.
2. On February 12, the first day of our journey, we reached Erbil after a 5-hour drive. We passed by Kirkuk, the site of Iraq's largest oil field and installations feeding the northern pipelines to Turkey and Syria. The entire area is surrounded by anti-aircraft artillery batteries with gun crews at the ready. A mile or two past Kirkuk, we were obliged, on account of "modifications to the road," to take a bumpy 10-mile detour. We learned later that, several days previously, a bridge on this major Kirkuk-Erbil road, had been blown up by Kurdish saboteurs. The same bridge had been similarly sabotaged last year.
3. At Erbil we explored the magnificent fortress-domed hill in the centre of the town. The predominant majority of the people looked determinedly Kurdish, the men and boys in wide baggy pants, shawl around the waist, and fierce-looking head-dresses, and the women and little girls in black dresses, occasionally overlaid by highly colourful sheer silk gowns. Our hotel was not comfortable, but warm in atmosphere. Two local security police followed us unobtrusively until we left the city limits the following day. The town appeared calm and everyone went amicably about his business. Children in numerous groups were absorbed in games of marbles. Popular Army soldiers holding machine guns were seen at only a few major traffic corners. Most striking, perhaps, was the ubiquitous new construction in the town.
4. After making yet more photocopies of our travel permit (for handing out at various checkpoints) during our last, lingering tour of the charming Erbil souks, we drove back to Kirkuk and then turned due east to Sulamaniyyah city, a centre of Kurdish resistance since Ottoman times, near the Iranian border. After following the closely patrolled road past the first ridge of mountains that marks the entry point of Sulamaniyyah province we were suddenly driving by snow-capped mountains that remained with us until Sulamaniyyah city, surrounded by mountains on three sides. The weather was cold and sunny, with ice in the flower pots guarding the hotel entrance. There were few Arab Iraqis to be seen in the town. We felt we had arrived in the capital of Western Kurdistan. The atmosphere was peaceful yet tense.
5. During the next twenty hours or so, I had several discreet discussions with two young and educated Kurds. One was, most reluctantly, entering army service on the next day. The other, a twenty-six year old graduate of Sulamaniyyah University ... assured me he would "go to the mountains" if he were called up.... In Sulamaniyyah we were not accompanied by security police, possibly because the town and souks were particularly well guarded by the Popular Army.

6. ... I learned that, in Sulamaniyah alone, some 26,000 designated conscripts, over fifty percent of all those called up since the beginning of the war, had either fled to the mountains to join the internal opposition or had continued on to Teheran where they were given employment, a passport and freedom to travel abroad. The main motivation of these draft dodgers was probably a concern to save their own lives, considering that the physical hazards of the mountains or of flight were less than fighting the Iranians as soldiers in Iraq's regular army. The people of Sulamaniyah had, moreover, been deeply incensed by the return of bodies from the front accompanied by official notices that the fallen had died as cowards. (To a Kurd this would indeed be the ultimate insult.) This clumsy act, possibly designed as a form of punishment or else reflective of a Commander's inability to urge his men forward in a suicidal operation, had accelerated the exodus of the young men.
7. The situation in Erbil, I was told, was quite different. The people there speak a distinct Kurdish dialect. Situated in the middle of a plain, the people of the town are more easily surrounded and coerced and lack easy access to guerrilla-type terrain. For such and other reasons, Erbilites had chosen to support the Iraqi war effort. Desertions there were very few. The two cities were now on bad terms, all the more so as, unlike Sulamaniyah, Erbil was reaping Government rewards in the form of new construction and improved services and utilities.
8. In other Kurdish cities, my informants said, the situation was again different. In Kirkuk, which after the 1974–75 Kurdish war had had most of its native population evacuated and resettled to various points in southern Iraq, the opposition among the Kurds, who were now only twenty percent of the town's population, was not active. In Mosul, however, a city of 500,000 with a sizable Kurdish minority, the Baghdad government had committed a serious mistake. One month ago, in attempting to bolster its forces at the most heated sectors of the front (at Dezful and Susangerd), the Government had launched in Mosul an appeal for volunteers willing to go to these two sectors. In return, the government promised various financial inducements, a tactical error in dealing with the proud Kurdish mentality. From the date of that appeal most of the Kurds of military age in Mosul simply fled the town and disappeared. Many joined the Kurdish internal opposition.
9. Wet snow fell heavily on Sulamaniyah on the morning of our departure. The police phoned to offer an escort car for our trip to Kirkuk since the road was now more precarious on account of the poor visibility that might facilitate a guerrilla or kidnapping operation. In the event, no such an escort materialized or was needed. Huddled in their parkas, soldiers on both sides of the road were stationed every two hundred metres. After two hours of driving in falling snow, we reached the limits of the governorate. After this point the gun emplacements and soldiers became extremely sparse.
10. Our two hours of prowling through the souks of Kirkuk on that same day were pleasant but uneventful as was the remainder of our drive home.

11. *Conclusion*

It is clear that Iraq's control of its north is a partial affair. The government controls only part of the Kurdish population and only part of the northern territory. For example, my young Kurdish friends advised us against visiting Dokan, a village north of Sulamaniya, notwithstanding the fact that we were permitted by the authorities to join a military convoy going there. The government exerts effective control only during daylight hours. The traffic curfew on government-controlled roads is from 4.00 to 8.00 a.m.

12. Broadly speaking, the 2 million Kurdish minority in Iraq is effectively neutralized from the all-important perspective of the war against Iran. For those Kurds who do opt for regular military service, an approximately equivalent number of Arab Iraqis are deployed to patrol and secure the towns and country-side against Kurdish opposition. Thus, Iraq disposes of a manpower reservoir of only some 10 million on whom the Government can count for effective military service. This fact is not unknown to Iran and must encourage that country, with its four-to-one numerical superiority over Iraq, to pursue the war of attrition for as long as possible in the comfortable knowledge that time must be on its side.

Witold Weynerowski

Resserrement des relations canado-américaines

Les relations canado-américaines ont connu une période d'apogée dans les années 1970. Cette période a été marquée par une coopération étroite dans de nombreux domaines, notamment en matière de sécurité, de commerce et de culture. Cependant, les tensions ont commencé à apparaître à la fin des années 1970 et au début des années 1980, en raison de divergences d'intérêts et de valeurs. Ces tensions ont été exacerbées par des événements tels que la crise des otages au Iran et la guerre du Vietnam.

On Closer Terms: Canada-U.S. Relations

Canada-U.S. relations have reached a high point in the 1970s. This period was characterized by close cooperation in many areas, particularly in security, trade, and culture. However, tensions began to emerge in the late 1970s and early 1980s, due to diverging interests and values. These tensions were exacerbated by events such as the Iran hostage crisis and the Vietnam War.

Le Premier ministre Brian Mulroney et le président Ronald Reagan, Québec, mars 1985.

Prime Minister Brian Mulroney and President Ronald Reagan, Quebec City, March 1985.

SOURCE: REAGAN LIBRARY ARCHIVES
C27748-18



[Ottawa,] March 20, 1985

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 8717,
DOSSIER 20-USA-9-REAGAN, R.

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 8717, FILE
20-USA-9-REAGAN, R.

According to a U.S. spokesman (Rick Burt), the Quebec Summit was the most productive Canada/United States meeting in history. Measured against Canadian objectives, the visit was a solid success. Significant achievement was realized in all four primary agenda subjects: trade, environment, defence and arms control. The government delivered on its pledge to refurbish relations with the United States, in a manner that will serve Canadian interests and enhance Canadian sovereignty.

Going into the visit, there were relatively few other leaders with whom President Reagan had shown as much personal affinity as with the Prime Minister. At Quebec City, the two leaders entered into a new partnership based on genuine friendship and respect. Two hours of formal talks were stretched into three, much of it one on one. Many other hours were spent together during the social program, travelling to and from the airport, and at the signing ceremony. Canada's leader has won an influential friend in the Oval Office.

Only discordant notes were (a) an unfortunate remark in a CTV interview by U.S. Defense Secretary Weinberger who, in responding to a hypothetical question with a hypothetical answer, left the impression that Canada could be obligated to station nuclear weapons on Canadian soil in times of crisis (Weinberger also made a helpful comment that Canadian sovereignty would be respected) and (b) the strong anti-Soviet rhetoric in the President's main speech at noon on March 18 which seemed somewhat out of place. These did not, however, detract from the clearly evident overall success of the Summit in organizational as well as substantive terms.

Attention being devoted to Canada in official Washington and in the U.S. media is unprecedented and uniformly positive. The Embassy has reported that every U.S. Cabinet Secretary participating in the visit characterized it as a success, and most commented in superlative terms. White House chief of staff Regan added that the President was deeply touched by the spirit of the visit – that the sense of North American solidarity was a moving experience for Reagan.

A more specific account of Summit accomplishments follows.

General

The most significant accomplishments are:

- (a) an even closer rapport between the Prime Minister and the President which will anchor, at the most senior political level, the credibility and validity of the commitments featured in major declarations on trade and security.
- (b) closer political consultations and tasking on major international as well as the main bilateral themes.
- (c) evidence that a joint desire for cooperation can produce tangible results.

Backing up these general accomplishments are a long list of concrete and specific achievements.

Trade

The most important advance at Quebec was the political commitment in the Summit Trade Declaration to halt protectionism in cross-border trade. This commitment was anchored by President Reagan's personal assurance to go to bat for us on measures in Congress which would seriously affect Canada. As three million jobs are dependent on our access to the U.S. market, and in face of increasing U.S. protectionist sentiments, this commitment was an overriding priority in the run-up to Quebec.

The Declaration also contains a pledge to give the highest priority to finding mutually acceptable means to reduce and eliminate existing barriers to trade. This pledge gives the added predictability and confidence for investors and exporters that can lead to jobs and economic renewal.

The Minister for International Trade and USTR [United States Trade Representative] Brock were charged to establish a mechanism for this purpose, to report in six months, and to take action over the next twelve months to improve cooperation with respect to government procurement and funding programs, trade regulatory requirements, air transport, energy trade, tariffs, business travel, high tech trade, and intellectual property rights.

A package of bilateral trade irritants was formally resolved at Quebec to give added credibility to the political commitments entered into.

Right up front in the Declaration is a joint reaffirmation of the need to make the open, multilateral trading system work better, including a clear call for an early new MTN [multilateral trade negotiation] round.

To cite USTR Brock, this was the most substantive Summit he had ever participated in, with a trade program that is "awesome in scope."

Environment

A principal Canadian objective at the Summit was to break the three year deadlock on acid rain. This proved to be a major uphill struggle against strong domestic budgetary pressure in the United States against any weakening of the Administration's position that more research was needed before any action could be contemplated.

In the end, the Administration did make a significant concession, less than our maximal objective but credible. They agreed to the appointment of special envoys - former Ontario Premier William Davis for Canada and former Secretary of Transportation Drew Lewis for the United States - to take hold of the problem, to develop common ground, and to report by the next Summit. Included in their agreed mandate is a charge to pursue consultation on laws and regulations bearing on acid rain and to identify efforts to improve the Canadian and U.S. environment.

Two factors give special significance to these appointments. The first is the national reputations of the personal representatives, both men of influence with direct access to the top. The second is the unexpectedly forthcoming comments of President Reagan following the announcement: "Together we'll find an answer to this problem;" "The problem belongs to both of us;" "Entrusted

to us is the care of this continent;" "We must protect it for generations of Canadians and Americans yet to come."

A new political process to resolve this major issue for Canada has been firmly launched.

Defence and Arms Control

One of Canada's main objectives at the Summit was to reinvigorate the defence partnership with the United States. This objective was achieved, through the signing of the North Warning Agreement and through a Declaration on International Security in which both leaders pledged to consult more closely on defence and arms control issues.

The timing of the meeting was particularly opportune in that the Geneva talks had just begun March 12, and both the Prime Minister and Secretary Shultz were just back from meeting with Gorbachev at Chernenko's funeral. As a result, East/West relations played a prominent part in the private discussions at Quebec.

Delicate and detailed negotiations right up to the eve of the visit on the highly sensitive topic of the U.S. strategic defence initiative (SDI) yielded, in the end, a formula fully consistent with the Canadian government position announced on January 21.

Special recognition was accorded to the importance of Canadian access to the U.S. defence market. Responsible ministers were directed to give priority attention to defence trade issues and report to the Prime Minister and the President over the next four months.

Other Highlights

On bilateral economic issues, the principals held a good discussion on their respective domestic economic priorities including deficit control and budgetary concerns, and also exchanged views on the crisis in Africa, human rights, the world economic situation, and preparations for the Bonn Summit.

In addition to the talks themselves, the Quebec Summit saw the signing of a Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance and an exchange of instruments of ratification for the Pacific Salmon Treaty. Both were done by the Prime Minister and the President themselves. They also witnessed the signing of the North Warning Agreement. Lastly, the Prime Minister took the occasion to announce Canadian participation in the manned space station.

In summary, Quebec was a powerful Summit in which the top leadership of both North American nations drew inspiration from a new vision of partnership. There has been a genuine change. The rhetoric is backed up by action, in what may have been the busiest twenty-four hours ever spent on the Canada/United States relationship.

Separate reports are being prepared on ministerial bilaterals held in conjunction with the Summit, and on each of the main meetings in Quebec.

Section 59

Le problème de l'apartheid

La question de savoir s'il faut ou non appliquer des sanctions économiques contre l'Afrique du Sud fait l'objet d'un constant débat entre le milieu et la fin des années 1980. Jusqu'en 1986, les États-Unis ont poursuivi une politique d'« engagement constructif » destinée à encourager l'élimination progressive de la discrimination raciale systématique en Afrique du Sud. Les États-Unis ont opposé leur veto aux sanctions proposées par les Nations Unies. Le Canada a imposé des sanctions en 1985 et le Premier ministre Mulroney a vivement prôné l'adoption de mesures semblables par d'autres pays membres du Commonwealth – une politique à laquelle s'oppose son homologue britannique, Margaret Thatcher. Les sanctions canadiennes sont levées en 1993, à la demande de Nelson Mandela.

The Problem of Apartheid

The question of whether economic sanctions should be used against South Africa was debated throughout the middle and later years of the 1980s. Until 1986, the United States followed a policy of “constructive engagement,” intended to encourage the gradual elimination of systematic racial discrimination in South Africa. The Americans vetoed proposed sanctions by the United Nations. Canada imposed sanctions in 1985, and Prime Minister Mulroney was a strong advocate of similar actions by other Commonwealth members – a policy opposed by Britain's Margaret Thatcher. The Canadian sanctions were lifted in 1993 at the request of Nelson Mandela.

Pretoria, December 19, 1986

South Africa: Quo Vadis?

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 11088,
DOSSIER 20-1-2-RSA

- ...
2. As 1986 draws to a close we are aware that you are reflecting further on Canadian policy towards South Africa in the coming year and beyond. The purpose of this telegram is to share in that reflection by reviewing prospects for change in South Africa and presenting some alternatives for Canadian (and other Western countries) action to be taken in 1987 and 1988 in support of positive change. The past six months have seen most Western countries impose economic and political sanctions against South Africa. As Hague telegram YWGR-0788 08 December indicated, it is now time to look beyond recently imposed measures to begin developing principles to guide future Western approach to change in South Africa.
 3. Imposition of international sanctions has of course coincided with period of intense political activity within South Africa, characterized by growing polarization between black community and nationalist government. The moderate centre is under intense pressure and is increasingly ignored by both right and left. Furthermore there is only limited common ground to be found between moderate blacks and whites: priority issues to white reformers are irrelevant to blacks and vice versa. Furthermore, as respected black leader Dr. Motlana made clear in his statement to PFP Congress there are few political organizations where blacks and whites can even make common cause. The only national non-racial organization left, the UDF, may soon be banned. Looking beyond the moderate constituency we see a white community which is moving only slowly and reluctantly to an understanding of the need for meaningful concessions, and a black community especially its youth which is increasingly radicalized by repression and determined to enjoy the fruits of power in near future. Recent polls have confirmed there still remains remarkable fund of good will towards whites and commitment to non-violence on part of majority of black community. Nevertheless, one of most haunting prophecies about South Africa, Alan Paton's prediction in *Cry the Beloved Country* that by the time the white community comes to love, the black community will come to hate, appears to be coming true. In short, time is running out for moderate non-violent solution to political crisis in South Africa.
 4. There are three objectives to international sanction: (a) psychological i.e. signalling to white South Africans just how much their policies are detested; (b) economic i.e. imposing economic sacrifices on the white community and (c) political, i.e. signalling our support for black community who believe sanctions will force SAG to bargaining table. The psychological impact is already being felt among whites, but as we have reported in past not necessarily in positive manner. It is possible that given time sanctions will force white leaders to rethink their policies, but in near terms sanctions are benefiting SAG, which will use them as launching pad for decisive electoral victory. Most white South Africans see sanctions as cruel, undeserved and self-serving. This has played into hands of SAG which has always preferred to blame internal trouble on outside forces.

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG25 VOLUME 11088, FILE 20-1-2-RSA

Barbara McDougall, secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures de 1991 à 1993, en compagnie de M. Nelson Mandela.

Barbara McDougall, who served as secretary of state for external affairs from 1991 to 1993, with Nelson Mandela.

SOURCE: AP //JOHN PARKIN



5. It is still too early to determine economic effect of sanctions. Some time will have to pass before effects on balance of payments, employment and growth can be evaluated. Even then, it will be hard to separate out impact of sanctions from effects of cyclical factors. Worthwhile to recall that present malaise was precipitated in part by hard-nosed international banking decision that because of internal instability South Africa was no longer credit-worthy. The first months evidence seems to indicate that there is sufficient investment capital within South African community to buy out disinvested companies and retrenchments will be made on strict market reasons. It seems clear that economic effects will be primarily longer-term ... The only scenario which could potentially bring South African economy to its knees more quickly would be imposition of effective sanctions on South African gold and rare metals ... 48 percent of world's gold comes from South Africa; it accounts for 50 percent of South Africa's exports, 11 percent of its GNP, and employs directly or indirectly 20 percent of the employment force. Given high demand, potential costs to consumers, and relatively easy transportability of precious metals, it is doubtful such an export ban could be imposed or enforced.

6. There is no question that imposition of sanctions has heartened the leadership of the black community (with important exception of course of Chief Buthelezi) and has probably made them better-disposed towards the West. Hard to say what their reaction will be when it becomes clear that sanctions are impacting essentially on blacks and despite their hopes have not brought SAG to the bargaining table. Sector of the community which needs to be pushed hardest if meaningful negotiations are to begin, the nationalist party leadership and their Afrikaner supporters, are insulated by guaranteed employment in the public sector from the impact of sanctions. The black community may say West has not done enough, and ask us to redouble our efforts; or key black leaders may conclude that last non-violent option has failed and there is no option but violence. We would then be faced with much more difficult request to provide support to violent struggle by black community.
7. Even with Western assistance, it is unlikely that black community could "win" a civil war with SAG. Most they could hope for (and even that is very doubtful) would be war of attrition which would sap white community's will to fight and force whites eventually to bargaining table. In meantime much of country's social and economic infrastructure would be destroyed (business sector is privately very worried about industrial sabotage) and thousands of lives (mostly black) would be lost.
8. If present trends persist, we will see continued political polarization and radicalization of the black community; increased repression and bloodshed; economic decline; and destruction of the country's infrastructure. At the end, all parties would be forced to the bargaining table and any black government emerging would be seriously radicalized. It is surely in Western countries interests to avoid all this and get the parties to bargaining table sooner rather than later.
9. Among the measures available to Canada and other Western countries the first, and probably simplest, is to accede to pressure group demands and withdraw progressively from South Africa, imposing additional sanctions along the way. This policy has the dual attraction of pleasing major interest groups in West, who tend to see sanctions as moral end in itself, as well as consistency with our earlier warnings to SAG. It will not however fix our interest with South African black community, who have always seen sanctions as means to end and are now counting on West for further engagement in South African conflict through aid, military assistance, recognition of ANC etc. as they will admit, they view sanctions as measure of despair, in absence of other non-violent alternatives. They would welcome any Western action that broke present logjam. In terms of Canadian strategic interests there seems little merit to disengagement since we have economic and political reasons to cultivate new leaders of South Africa. Despite claims of ANC these new leaders are far more likely to be found in South Africa rather than in exile.
10. In practical (and non-violent) terms, however, what more should we do? We are sceptical that additional sanctions would be helpful in the present environment unless/unless these were very carefully designed e.g. were designed to influence very specific policies – the rifle rather than shotgun approach. It would be more helpful to consider ways of improving the carrot we offer, both to the black community and to whites. In the case of black community additional

assistance, possible in multilateral context, would be welcome: for instance, one definite need in coming months will be for emergency medical and ambulance services for township residents, a program being initiated by International Red Cross.

11. Since our major objective should be getting white representatives to bargaining table, we should also consider measures for them. In short and medium term they will have to be enticed rather than forced to negotiations. Two of their great fears could be eased by measured support for their concern for group rights, and offers of international assistance to upgrade black social infrastructure so that existing white quality of life need not be destroyed. Specifically, we could spell out in much more detail our vision of new South African society endorsing mechanisms such as federalism (but not Bantustans), charters of human rights and possibly transitional protected parliamentary arrangements as were applied in Zimbabwe. Secondly, we could undertake to provide significant development assistance to a new/transitional government to upgrade the education, health, housing and social facilities available to blacks. Research has indicated that appropriate policies, combined with 4 percent real economic growth, could ensure blacks achieve white standards of living by year 2000; realistically, there will certainly be need for foreign assistance if urgent black expectations are to be met. The bill will be much less expensive if paid now, rather than at the end of long and debilitating internal struggle. Relatively modest multilateral initiative could be marketed as marshal plan for Southern Africa if desired. Finally, Western countries could break the negotiations impasse by becoming third party/chairman of such talks. Mechanisms such as shuttle negotiations, Lancaster house/Geneva negotiations are all worth exploring. Concentrating on an immediate and realisable goal, such as release of Nelson Mandela, might well be place to start. Given bitter feelings of many Afrikaners towards British Empire/Commonwealth and UN, an alternative sponsor, such as EC or economic summit, should probably be considered....
13. Given polarization of situation in South Africa, it is hard to hold out great hope that major breakthrough could be made. Skilful international intervention has however scored important successes in the past in Middle East and in Africa. Given alternative – bloody internal strife – it would be worth making an effort to get all the parties to negotiating table in 1987 or 1988 rather than the year 2000.

MacLean

Section 60

Fin de la guerre froide

Événements d'une incomparable importance, la chute du mur de Berlin et la tentative de coup d'État en Union soviétique ont été décrites par les diplomates canadiens sur les lieux dans des rapports qui font honneur aux normes établies lors des décennies précédentes. Le troisième document de cette partie examine les incidences probables qu'ils ont eues dans des domaines moins connus de l'ancien empire soviétique.

End of the Cold War

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the attempted coup in the Soviet Union were incomparably dramatic events, described by the Canadian diplomats on the spot in reports which live up to the standard set in earlier decades. The third document in this section considers the likely impact on the less well-known areas of the former Soviet empire.

West Berlin, November 11, 1989

Rapport de l'ambassade
du Canada à Bonn

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 21987,
DOSSIER 20-BRLIN

Report from Canadian
Embassy, Bonn

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 21987, FILE 20-BRLIN

Berlin: The Festival Continues

Festive air which prevailed for most of day on Friday in Berlin continued late into the night with Kurfuerstendamm, Brandenburg Gate, Checkpoint Charlie having become totally impassable. City has never been as alive and vibrant as yesterday, with kind of overflow of emotions seen only on occasion of momentous events. Early this morning (Saturday) things seem to be a little quieter, but judging from long lines in front of every available bank in the city, it's safe to assume that this will be another exuberant day for Berliners on both sides of the wall, but for East Berliners in particular. Reason for long lines in front of banks (which apparently started forming around 5 a.m.) is that each East German crossing to the West is entitled to receive 100/100 DM (once a year), compliments of FRG Government.

2. From what we have seen, flow of East Germans through various exit points in the wall continues unabated. Since this is still done on simply showing of ID card, it is expected that visitors in West Berlin will continue to pour into the city throughout weekend. Late last night it was announced that two additional exit points would be opened into the wall over weekend and four more at beginning of next week. Also last night, it was rumoured that traffic might be reopened between 17 of June Street which faces Brandenburg Gate in the West and Unter Den Linden, which is its continuation in the East. So far have seen no confirmation of this.
3. Berlin's media are all in buoyant mood and words used, do not seem sufficient to describe feelings. "Incredible days in Berlin" "Historic days, not only for Berliners, but for all Germans" "Impulses which resulted in these historic days are so elementary that they cannot be stopped any more." These are just a few examples of expressions used. It was felt that events of Thursday night and Friday would remain unforgettable for those who lived through them, or only watched them on TV. The wall still exists, but it has many holes and more will be made, thanks to the courage of the people from the East. One commentator says "whoever feels the pulse of the city during historic hours, feels without sentimentality, but very moved, how this pulse of German sensibility comes out, how much Berlin, even though not the capital, is the political metropole." Same commentator says "one thing is certain: Berlin, Germany, Europe, will never be again like in the past 28 years. And it can only be for the better."
4. Press talks at length of how Socialist Union Party's Central Committee was forced to face reality, which gives reason to hope that interim steps that have been reached so far, will only be the beginning. In this respect, there are three points worth mentioning with regard to events that happened in East Berlin on Friday:
 - Egon Krenz had to meet with another heavy rebuff. After three of his suggested candidates for politburo had not been elected last Wednesday, yesterday, three of the new members that had been suggested by Krenz had to resign. That had never happened in any Communist Party anywhere in the world.

- Central Committee meeting was followed by large demonstration in which several thousand SED members participated. On that occasion, not only Egon Krenz was loudly booed, but speakers that asked in the name of other party members for extraordinary party meeting, during which newly Central Committee would be elected, were applauded loudly.
 - Minister of Interior, probably under stress of situation, felt obliged to give population assurances on TV that new travel regulations were there to stay and that everyone could rely on that assurance.
4. Amongst all the rejoicing, emotional outbursts, hope for the future, there was one incident which was considered to be totally undignified. Chancellor Kohl who had cut short his visit in Poland, to be in Berlin on Friday, was loudly booed when he spoke in front of Rathaus Schoeneberg, seat of Berlin Senat. Press comments that what happened there was not projecting positive image of Berlin, particularly on such a day. However, comments stress fact that boos were not so much directed against the speech, but mostly against speaker for reasons of party politics. Relations between Berlin Senat and Federal Government remain strained and even on occasion such as yesterday, party politics came to the surface. "Boos were not worthy of occasion. One should have left out party politics on a day like that." But papers also blame Berlin CDU leaders who had organized separate rally next to remembrance church in center of Berlin while Kohl was speaking almost at the same time, several kilometres away, in front of Rathaus Schoeneberg. This showed poor organizational skill at a very inopportune moment.
 5. Since starting drafting this message crowds in streets have begun to swell considerably and another day of bright sunshine should contribute greatly to a continued festive mood. And maybe this weekend words once used by Willy Brandt that "there beats the heart of a nation" will take full significance.

Moscow, August 25, 1991

USSR: Post Coup Policy Issues For Canada

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 16010,
DOSSIER 20-1-2-USSR

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 16010, FILE 20-1-2-USSR

USSR has had only one other week this significant in its history this century, in 1917, when Lenin and CPSU seized power from weak and indecisive democratic institution of Duma (Parliament). This week, CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union] stands dissolved and its reputation blackened for its traitorous attempt at staging coup against its own leader. Gorbachev has resigned as Secretary-General of CPSU, but his action is probably too late to save him. Defence of democracy in USSR was both rapid and decisive, led by Yeltsin and new democratic politicians and structures, with apparent complicity of most of CPSU Central Committee secretariat and Cabinet of ministers either directly in coup or in unprincipled compliance with coup leaders. Today it is difficult to say if USSR actually has government or not. For all intents and purposes, Government of Russian Federation has taken over management of day to day issues of Central Government in post-coup, as inheritor of popular legitimacy. This is significant change for country, but even more significant is Yeltsin's almost instantaneous recognition of independence for Latvia and Estonia. Lithuanian independence recognition is part of RSFSR-Lithuania Treaty signed 29 July. Recognition of Ukraine independence, democratically voted at 24 August meeting of Ukraine Parliament, is expected.

2. Shape of country is changing literally before our eyes and not all implications of these changes are yet clear to us. Stability is a major worry.
3. On macro policy front, some things are clear:
 - (a) Dissolution of CPSU marks end of major ideological conflict in West's relations with USSR. While dialogue of glasnost and new thinking in foreign policy have been high point of Gorbachev's leadership, his inability to make perestroika work has been result of lack of interest (and even opposition) of CPSU apparatchiks at working and executive level positions in USSR economy. Commitment of successor régime, to draw from Yeltsin and Silayev statements over past year, suggests rapid move to market economy, legal structure based on private property and massive structural change in economy. IMF/IBRD study and other PGM's outline nature of problems and path to their resolution. How country will absorb unemployed nomenklatura is unclear. These represent a major factor of instability, since group represents significant portion of trained managers.
 - (b) Dissolution of USSR underway as we write has both reassuring and worrying aspects: both Baltic representatives and Ukraine will soon realize long term goal of self determination, under strengthened democratic institutions. Fate of other Republics is less clear. Moldova is hardly likely to continue on its own and may well join Romania. Armenia and Georgia may further their independence, but historically transcaucasian area has been unstable, either as independent states or as clients of Russian Empire or USSR. Central Asian republics are highly dependent on Moscow and are therefore unlikely near term candidates for independence but they cannot be pleased by strong Russian orientation of new revolution

and this will likely reinforce their earlier efforts to establish mutual support. All this suggests that even in the short term Soviet Union may be reduced to Russian Federation, Belorussian and five central Asia representatives. Longer term could see its complete disappearance.

(c) New definition of economic and political relations. Union treaty is gone. As noted above, how existing parts of USSR will interrelate is yet to be determined, but there will have to be some form of economic cooperation, if only to facilitate structural transformation of their interdependent economies. Political relations will be more dicey. Stability is not a given. There are boundary disputes between all/all republics of USSR and even within republics (particularly RSFSR). While there is exhilaration today, within short while, we expect that RSFSR and Ukraine, for example, could be defining discordant economic or even defence policies.

4. Russia, once and future state: Hero of moment is Boris Yeltsin. He has led a popular resistance to this failed coup, and he has inherited mantle of legitimacy. He is vulnerable though on many fronts. Personally he is now target for either vengeful communists, for army or KGB counter coup, for a people power revolution (after all, he has led top-down movement which has popular support, but is without strong grassroots organizations) or finally, from loony anarchists of which Russian history is well-endowed. Whether and how mantle of state legitimacy for USSR will remain with Russia/Yeltsin is not clear in medium and longer term, but clearly, for next two weeks (our short term) and even for next two/three months (our medium term) we see Russia to be driving force in maintaining country as operating entity. Both Russian and Ukraine have announced impending creation of national guards.
5. Announcements like these raise number of questions: Do republics particularly Russia accept all current Soviet Union treaty responsibilities? ... and membership in international organizations (will Russia want its own UN seat?), what are foreign policy intentions of Russian and other republics? Key consideration which should be reinforced by Western leaders is need to guarantee internal and external USSR borders as envisaged under Union Treaty.
6. Contact at USA embassy Moscow has told us that their reporting was still (surprisingly) focussed on Gorbachev and his prospects. As USA Ministerial Counsellor and Head Political Section put it (please protect) "Gorbachev has finally woken up after two disastrous days," citing formation of committee under Silayev. When Canadian embassy representative suggested that committee was made up of individuals whose services Yeltsin was allowing Gorbachev to use, USA contact did not disagree, adding that they had had reports that Gorbachev had wished to nominate RSFSR Foreign Minister Kozyrev as Union Foreign Minister, but that Yeltsin had refused, wishing to retain him in his present position. Not surprisingly, USA embassy is preoccupied with military/security implications of recent events and their possible implications in near term. (e.g., Baltic independence has traditionally been strategic neuralgic point for USSR).
7. Military/security situation is issue of absolute importance. We believe that Prime Minister should underline concerns with both President Bush and President Yeltsin. It is not clear yet how republics will define their security policy or their military needs, but as noted

above there are significant potential causes for concern. For the Soviet army is today huge organization with national extent but it has lost its primary purpose (defence of state and party) as results of their dissolution. Ukraine is historically source of large proportion of Soviet army's professional officer and NCO corps, thus call for creation of Ukraine national guard is potentially significant drain for Russian national guard of its potential leadership, while its lower levels of Russian guard would lose current high numbers of central Asian conscripts. Outcome is unclear, but potential exists for strong Ukraine armed forces but with no nuclear force (policy of current government) while Russian armed forces would be smaller with weaker land force, but with USSR strategic missile force. We consider it therefore essential to maintain close contact with all military players in this situation to determine their intentions....

8. How should Canada react?

(a) Canadian interests in short term (next 2 weeks) are to ensure that situation remains stable and peaceful, that transition is characterized by dialogue among partners and reference to courts and investigative commissions of inevitable calls for vengeance and retribution. We must recognize that there has been essential change in management, with little power to be exercised by Central Government structures in short term. In medium term, this may/may change. We must be prepared to communicate decisively and authoritatively with republic leaders and their parliamentary partners. Popular legitimacy of these persons and structures is high now, and our recognition – through messages, visits at ministerial level, programme of assistance and cooperation – will be key to maintaining open doors to future....

(c) Baltic republics independence presents particularly sensitive and urgent issue. We must accept, even welcome, that first to establish relations will be Scandinavians, for reasons of history and geography. Canada will wish to be in second rank – with ECL2 countries and Eastern Europeans. As home to many Baltics who escaped communist domination and ravages of World War Two, we have rich human experience to assist these small states to recover their place in Western community of nations.

(d) Issues to consider re Baltics:

– *Diplomatic Representation*: We will seek local views in Baltics on location of eventual non-resident representative, but we assume Baltics will prefer that in medium to longer term it not be Moscow based. Possibilities include covering Tallinn from Helsinki (excellent communications and strong cultural links), Riga from Copenhagen or Stockholm and Vilnius from Copenhagen or Warsaw. Another possibility would be to open one person office (viz Hanoi) in Riga, to cover all three on itinerant basis.

– *Economic Cooperation*: Strong consensus in each republic on national goals suggests that governments will be able to impose strong and harsh economic measures on their small economies with better results than can be expected in Russia. Poland or Hungary are models. Canadian expertise in transition arrangements, legal structures, business administration, etc. would be useful.

(e) Upcoming Sherpa meeting in London will be opportunity to shift focus, which at London summit was exclusively on USSR Central Government, to dealing with republics. Whether

present process continues or there are some central functions maintained eventually, economic power of republics is clearly achieved and G-7 will have to widen its angle of focus. Creation of contact group to be dialogue mechanism for G-7 discussion with republics and ex-republics of USSR seems highly desirable. We understand that Yeltsin has created new economic planning group, which includes Silayev and Yavlinsky, charged with updating plethora of economic plans, to put one forward for action. This document will not be ready in time for Sherpa meeting, but could be discussed with contact group to define details of Western assistance....

11. We will be maintaining heavy contact schedule with representatives of power structures (old and new) including Arbatov, Yakovlev, Silayev, Yavlinsky, Volsky, Bakatin, Korotich, Shevardnadze, Sobchak, and visiting Ukraine, Baltics and Kazakhstan. Please dispatch any special talking points soonest.

Islamabad, December 23, 1991

Canada and Central Asian Republics

In wake of revolutions in central and eastern Europe, and as process of disintegration of Soviet Union nears completion, the concept of the "second world" can be considered dead and nothing seems likely to come into being to replace it. Rather, European elements of former second world have or will gravitate towards first world while its central Asian components will probably coalesce with third world, given their Islamic heritage and affinities, as well as their level of economic development. This suggests that our approach to relations with the republics of central Asia should be re-focussed.

2. Does Canada have any real interests at stake in relation with central Asian republics? Our interests are probably limited, but nonetheless real. On one hand, given their political history, ethnic makeup and boundary issues, the central Asian republics are unlikely to be politically very stable. Their relations among themselves and with outside powers may well create situations which pose threats to regional and international peace and security. Inherent tension may also be exacerbated as Turkey, Iran and Pakistan pursue their politico-religious ambitions in central Asia. On other hand, with total population in excess of 60 million, central Asian republics will offer interesting commercial prospects as they escape maw of Soviet economic system. Finally, as traditional linkages with Russian federation dissolve still further, central Asian republics can be expected to turn to West, including Canada, for economic and/or technical assistance.
3. While I am not arguing for early recognition of central Asian republics (see reference telegram), I do believe that time as come to start thinking about our interests in region and how we intend to pursue them. As first practical step, consideration might be given as to how in first instance we would want to be represented in these republics, e.g. by cross accreditations from missions in Ankara, Tehran, or Islamabad in addition to Moscow, or again by establishment of new mission in one of republics which could initially cover them all.
4. Grateful in due course for an indication of your thinking on this subject, as it may affect operations of this and other missions in countries bordering central Asia.

Delvoie

SOURCE : BIBLIOTHÈQUE ET ARCHIVES
CANADA, RG 25, VOLUME 16010,
DOSSIER 20-1-2-USSR

SOURCE: LIBRARY AND ARCHIVES CANADA,
RG 25, VOLUME 16010, FILE 20-1-2-USSR

Section 61

Une nouvelle génération de conjoints chez les diplomates

A New Generation of Diplomatic Spouses

“What Goes Around, Comes Around”

My father often quoted the old adage, “What goes around, comes around.” At the time I thought it meant that, if your friend had chicken pox, sooner or later you were bound to get it too. As the years went by, I realized there are broader interpretations. One such interpretation challenged me a few months ago.

SOURCE : BOUT DE PAPIER, ÉTÉ 1992

At a clan gathering in the guise of an Embassy Coffee Morning which I was hostessing at the Residence, discussion had turned, as it often does, to the difficulty of being a Diplomatic Spouse – family separation, lost jobs, elderly parents, adjustment trauma, and posting anecdotes. By this time, I had advanced on my husband’s coat tails to the heady status of Wife of the Head of Mission and I, perforce, was living in the Official Residence, referred to as the O.R. Hence, I cannot say, “a coffee morning at my home.” I suppose I could have but it never felt that way.

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SOURCE: BOUT DE PAPIER, SUMMER 1992

“Oh, Lord,” I thought, “here we go again.”

Resigned to listening to the same old complaints created by a rotational career as expounded by a crop of recent arrivals, I nearly choked on my biscuit when one of the as yet unbloodied proclaimed with a sidelong look in my direction (apology, dare, insensitivity?) that, “Of course, it is different for the Older Wives. They never expected to have a Career. And the Ambassador’s Wife is Too Busy To Work anyway.”

It was a toss-up whether to laugh, cry or leap shrieking onto my chair. I was readying for the fray when the really sobering reality of the statement kicked my consciousness awake – the speaker considered me unequivocally one of the Older Wives. What had gone around, had come around. What’s more, they thought the battle for departmental support for rotational spouses and families was *their* invention and that nobody had ever railed against the world’s injustices before; that those who preceded them were guilty of passive acceptance. Worse, the implication was that we Older Wives had not even seen the injustice.

Surprise! Did they think it was Treasury Board who decided that more family-oriented Foreign Service Directives were needed? That the Under-Secretary forced the Department to accept spousal employment as a valid issue? That the Department founded the Foreign Service Community Association?

The thought that saved the Official China Pattern for C Posts cup and saucer from becoming airborne was that *I* had been where they were and *they* would someday be here. I said a mental thank you to that forbearing Older Wife who had not thrown her cup at me in my brasher days of windmill tilting. So I opted for the devil’s advocate role and settled to find out what were the concerns of the new community members.

It should come as no little surprise that there were actually no new concerns. The conversation could have occurred during any of a hundred mornings over the last quarter century. How discouraging. I had expected more of the Liberated and Politically Correct generation of Younger Spouses; more dynamism and less passivity; more constructive activity and less waiting for something to be done for them. During an ebb in the conversation, I realized what I had unconsciously been doing and another turn of the wheel came round. No longer interested in

manning the barricades, I was endeavouring to prod the younger generation into activity, to nudge them into broadening personal gripes into more generic problems and to generate some practical solutions.

Had someone done this to me twenty-five years ago? Had I been the manipulated instead of the manipulator all these years?

The Foreign Service Community Association did not exist in those days. Instead, there was the External Affairs Officers' Wives Association which had a loose, big sister arrangement that took all the Young Wives under the maternal wing and attempted to show us by example How It Should be Done. The name says it all. The dividing line was between those wives (and they were all wives) who, when abroad, would have an Official Representational Role to play versus those who would not.

While the employee posted abroad received a smattering of information related to the job, it was accepted that accompanying dependants would be self-sufficient enough to ferret among the community for such support and information as they required when departing or returning to Canada. Self-reliance and a sense of marital and patriotic duty were highly prized attributes in those days and smiling, stiff-lipped and silent acquiescence to the Exigencies Of The Service was expected.

There were no pre-posting briefings, re-entry workshops or résumé writing seminars. These were not the issues that concerned the Older Wives when I was a Young Wife. Instead, it was whether or not the Younger Wives would be able to meet the demands of Representation and Protocol. In the early days, anyone becoming a Canadian diplomat came from the upper class (yes, Canada had and has an upper class); but about the mid-sixties, entry was democratized and attendance at Upper Canada College was no longer a prerequisite. Even the odd Newfoundlander could get accepted into the ranks. This meant that, tsk-tsk, their wives might not have attended Havergill or Bishop Strachan and, consequently, would probably be unfamiliar with the placement of crystal stemware in a formal table setting. The response to this Potential Situation was a series of coffees, lunches, teas and, once before a posting, a dinner with the Divisional Head.

So it was that I left my young babies in the hands of an unknown babysitter, donned my best togs and assailed the stone fences of Rockcliffe Village for my first lunch lesson.

At the time, we were living in a third-floor walk-up off Bank Street swamped in student loans and diapers, so I will admit that the stained glass double front doors and wall-to-wall dove-grey plush carpeting was a sharp reminder of my position. For an eon I sat between two stalwart ladies from the Soviet Embassy (remember, those were the days of Russophobia). Thank God the Protopopovs had just won Olympic gold. Every few minutes one could say, "Protopopov," and smile. At the summons to partake of the buffet luncheon (lesson no. 1, "luncheon," not "lunch"), I carefully placed my crystal coupe d'importé champagne on the silver coaster and sought the tail end of the line. I figured that it was a safe bet I should stand behind everyone else.

With discouragement, I eyed the silver casserole holders, Wedgwood dishes and cut crystal stemware. How could I ever afford such things? Clearly, it was presumptuous to think I could ever entertain Important People in Adequate Style.

Then I looked at my plate and began to laugh. Tuna casserole! Despite the sterling silver fork, it was still only tuna casserole with canned peas. I had learned my lunch-lesson all right, even though it may not have been the one intended.

Instead of fretting about the trimmings, I started listening to the conversation – family separation, lost jobs, elderly parents, adjustment trauma, and posting anecdotes. I listened and learned.

What goes around, comes around. A quarter of a century later, I found myself sitting in my Official Living Room as a Senior Wife dispensing wit and wisdom on the same topics. I wonder if the Younger Spouses realize that only the quality of the tuna casserole is important?

Section 62

Une journée dans la vie du Ministère : le 2 juin 1994

A Day in the Life of the Department: June 2, 1994

Day 58 of the Rwandan Crisis

It is one minute past midnight in Ottawa. It is eight o'clock in the morning in Kigali, Rwanda.

In Kigali ...

The Deputy High Commissioner has been up for four hours. A particularly noisy mortar barrage and the crackling of machine guns have shaken him out of an uneasy sleep in three United Nations Armed Mission in Rwanda's (UNAMIR) headquarters. The noise provides counterpoint to the eerie howls of the packs of dogs that prowl the deserted streets of Kigali and feast on the corpses.

Following a rooftop briefing from the UN Commander, Canadian Major-General Romeo Dallaire, it is on to Faisal Hospital, where hundreds of Rwandan refugees shelter under UNAMIR protection. The closed Armoured Personnel Carrier does not give much of a view to the visiting Canadian contingent which includes the Deputy Minister of National Defence, the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, and their aides. Theirs is a view through a periscope.

For those who knew the city from before the civil war, Kigali has a surreal air. There is practically no one on the streets or in the green African fields surrounding the city. Abandoned vehicles, with their windows shot out, litter the approaches to the city centre. It is a city silenced, a silence periodically shattered by the sounds of mortars and machine guns.

At the hospital located close to the dividing line between government and rebel forces, the displaced cut up furniture for fuel wood to boil their meagre supplies of maize and lentils supplied by relief agencies. The adults seem resigned and apathetic. The many children who aren't injured bounce boisterously around the wazungu VIPs.

Meanwhile back in Nairobi ...

The High Commissioner begins her day, as usual, with a briefing by the Commander of the Canadian air force unit on the situation at Kigali Airport. Yesterday the Canadian Hercules had been fired upon. There is a breakthrough this morning: for the first time since the crisis began, the airplane has been cleared to land at Kigali Airport for the entire day. Usually the clearance is only received a half an hour before the plane departs. There is a heads-up that a substantial number of wounded children will be evacuated in a few days.

This is an exceptionally busy day for the military contingent, who operate out of a conference room in the mission. A new unit had arrived the day before and the old 48-person crew will be leaving for Canada. Briefings at the mission and the airfield are scheduled for the entire day. In addition, there are three other military units in town: a military police team, investigating security in Nairobi; an administration team, looking for ways to improve living conditions and make some savings on the cost of the airlift operation; and a signals team. Our administration and security officers with the office manager work with the visiting missions all day, showing them the ropes at the airfield, the hotel, the bank, and the office.

The immigration officer working on refugee cases for Rwanda receives some bad news about the convent of the Soeurs du Bon Pasteur in Kigali. At the request of the mother house in

Canada, we had agreed to issue Minister's permits for all the sisters to be evacuated to Canada. Unfortunately, due to fighting near the convent, the United Nations forces have been unable to carry out the evacuation. UNAMIR has now confirmed a report that the Interhamwe militia had invaded the convent and ordered all the nuns to leave for Western Rwanda. At a roadblock outside the city, all the Tutsi nuns had been separated and killed. We urgently try to find out the whereabouts of the surviving nuns.

The political officer has an appointment to meet the local representative of the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) at nine o'clock. There are a number of issues on the agenda: the RPF battle plans and the prospects for a ceasefire; their attitude to the deployment of an expanded United Nations contingent; humanitarian assistance for displaced people; and Kenyan President Moi's call for a regional summit on Rwanda on June 6. The RPF representative becomes very emotional and angry when he discusses the killing of civilians by the Hutu militia. The RPF had repeatedly warned the world community that the Hutu militia were plotting the massacre of the Tutsi population. As far as he is concerned, the UN intervention is too little, too late. The case of a Canadian nun, working in Northern Rwanda, whom we have been told has been denied permission to leave Rwanda, is raised. We warn him that Canada is deeply concerned and wants her exit facilitated as soon as possible.

In Kigali

Mid-morning, the Canadian defence team sits down to a meeting with the Commander of the Rwandan government forces in the deserted Hotel des Diplomates. A few minutes into the discussion, a mortar round lands a hundred yards away. The whoosh sound of the secondary splatter effect injects a pause in the conversation.

And in Nairobi

The development section working on humanitarian aid for Rwanda and Burundi is able to reach two Canadian nuns in Kabale, Uganda, who have recently visited the sister in Northern Rwanda. They confirm that she attempted to leave Rwanda for Uganda, accompanied by a number of Rwandan nuns and two infants who are destined for adoption in Canada. The entire party was blocked from leaving Rwanda. The RPF reportedly wants the Canadian nun to remain in order to run a large orphanage for victims of the civil war which they are setting up. The nuns further report that their colleague is sick.

The High Commission immediately calls the International Red Cross office to arrange for a doctor to visit the missing Canadian sister. Advice is sought on the easiest means to evacuate her from Rwanda. An officer may have to go to Northern Rwanda next week to escort her to Uganda.

Carnet de voyage en Mecklenbourg-Poméranie Occidentale

Alors que les collègues de l'Ambassade peuvent mettre de l'ordre dans leur bureau dans la quiétude relative d'un congé férié, la Fête-Dieu pour les Allemands, je me trouve en tournée en Mecklenbourg-Poméranie occidentale, Fédération pointilleuse, l'Allemagne établit ses congés (une quinzaine par an) sur une base géo-religieuse. Les Protestants du nord ne sont pas toujours en congé en même temps que les Catholiques du sud (ça réduit les risques d'embouteillage!). Les Poméraniens sont donc prêts à recevoir ce diplomate canadien (« mais que veut-il bien vouloir savoir? »)

Voici quelques notes dans un carnet de voyage.

Le trajet qui m'amène là où moins de cinq ans plus tôt sévissait un sévère régime

communiste ... le vol sur Lufthansa avec une place parmi les 4 seules rangées classe touriste contre 23 rangées classe Affaires... la gare de trains de Hambourg, où ne fait pas que s'imaginer le supermarché de la drogue qui prolifère à ses portes ... le train, direction Schwerin, quasiment neuf mais probablement de l'ex-Reichbahn (les mesures de sécurité sont en quatre langues dont le russe).

Le directeur d'un institut de formation à la démocratie et à « l'histoire objective »

de l'ex-RDA ... Notre interlocuteur, un ex-« Wessie » (l'Allemand de l'Ouest parti faire de l'aide au développement dans l'est de l'Allemagne) se fait un point d'honneur d'indiquer qu'il ne se fait payer qu'au même tarif moyen que les « Ossies, » c'est-à-dire à 85% de la moyenne des « vieux Laender fédéraux. » Parmi les sujets passionnants discutés, le « mal de vivre » de plusieurs Allemands de l'Est ordinaires dans cette nouvelle société qui leur est tombée dessus, à leur grand plaisir. Ils n'y retrouvent toutefois pas le « safety net » mur-à-mur de l'ancien régime, dans lequel on n'avait pas à se soucier de quoi que ce soit, pas même de la politique.

Les bureaux de plus important parti du Land, (les socio-démocrates) ... Il s'agit d'un îlot dans la mer de béton qui sert d'habitation à la moitié de la population de Schwerin (60,000 habitants). Il y a vingt ans, on venait y vivre avec plaisir pour y trouver le « tout-à-l'égout. » Aujourd'hui on se retrouve dans une banlieue avec le ciment qui se décompose et dans un Land avec le plus haut taux de criminalité en Allemagne unie. Pour notre interlocuteur, les perspectives de succès des socio-démocrates à l'élection du Land en septembre sont bonnes et on se répartit déjà les sièges de ministres, entre autres selon l'origine des candidats (i.e., on préfère les « Ossies »).

Le directeur local d'une fondation politique allemande ... Un « Wessie » laisse sa famille à Hambourg durant la semaine qu'il passe à Schwerin.

Un dirigeant du PDS (fier héritier de l'ex-parti communiste est-allemand) ... Chez ces « re-born » communistes, on vise le vote de protestation de ceux pour qui, « au fond, ce n'était pas si pire que ça en RDA. » Les chances de réélection ne sont pas négligeables.

Le Parlement du Land ... Le Parlement loge dans un magnifique château modelé sur Chambord.

Le train pour Rostock ... On ne peut s'empêcher d'avoir quelques appréhensions suite aux événements de l'été 1992 où des néo-nazis, appuyés en cela par la population locale,

SOURCE: BOUT DE PAPIER,
PRINTEMPS 1995

SOURCE: BOUT DE PAPIER, SPRING 1995

attaquèrent des étrangers. Le paysage bucolique où paissent les « Hosteins » (puisque l'on n'est pas loin du pays du même nom) me rappelle le plus mon enfance à Bellechasse.

Rostock. Ville hanséatique, Rostock a souffert des bombardements alliés en 1945 (50% de la ville détruite en quelques heures) et de la déprime institutionnalisée de l'ère communiste. Malgré tout, et peut-être à cause de la détermination de ses habitants, c'est resté une ville très attrayante. Bien sûr la ville a perdu quelques milliers de ses jeunes cerveaux (à la chute du Mur) et la fermeture des chantiers navals (de 50,000 à 5,000 travailleurs) a donné un dur coup au tissu social. Malgré ça, on sent un vent d'enthousiasme mercantile et de rénovation architecturale dont l'appui financier de l'ouest allemand (à coups de 180 milliards de Deutsche Marks par an pour l'ensemble des nouveaux Länder) pourrait faire rêver bien des Lettons et des Bélarusses. Les élus locaux espèrent que le Canada prendra sa part du gâteau de la reconstruction en Mecklenbourg.

Fin d'un Premier Voyage en Libye

DÉCORS: Hôtel El Mehari, Tripoli. Hôtel moderne à la « Intourist » des années soviétiques où le personnel a certainement été formé par un des Comités révolutionnaires du peuple. Chambre spacieuse où les traces du dernier occupant sont omniprésentes mais où, heureusement cette fois, l'air climatisé fonctionne car les vents du Sahara ont amené sur la ville une chaleur accablante de plus de 40 Celsius.

SOURCE : BOUT DE PAPIER,
PRINTEMPS 1995

Il est sept heures. Je paresse un peu au lit, profitant de ce moment de paix pour repenser à tout ce que j'ai fait au cours des derniers six jours passés en Libye. Moi qui craignais un peu cette visite au pays de Kadhafi, me voici conquise par le charme de ce grand peuple du désert. Tandis que je rêve, mes collègues de Tunis entament leur journée à l'ambassade. Leur matinée se passera probablement avec le train-train habituel.

SOURCE : BOUT DE PAPIER, SPRING 1995

Dernier coup d'oeil par la fenêtre de ma chambre sur cette belle ville baignée par les eaux turquoises de la Méditerranée. Dans le port, une des principales voies d'accès depuis l'embargo aérien-pétrolier, cargos et traversiers continuent leur va-et-vient. Pour un instant j'oublie les tas d'ordures au coin des rues, les édifices décrépis et les portraits décolorés du « Grand Chef de la Grande Jamahiriya arabe libyenne du Peuple Socialiste, » et imagine l'arrivée en rade des navires phéniciens, grecs, romains, égyptiens, turcs, italiens puis britanniques. Dès l'antiquité, l'ancienne Oea et ses villes-soeurs de Sabrata et Leptis Magnus étaient de grands centres de commerce méditerranéens d'où partaient des bateaux pleins de vin et d'huile d'olive puis d'or et d'esclaves. Des trois villes (« tripolis ») fondées par les Phéniciens puis rebâties par les Romains, seule Tripoli a survécu jusqu'à nos jours et les bateaux qui quittent maintenant son port sont pleins de pétrole, cet or noir qui permet au pays de survivre économiquement.

DÉCORS: Ambassade des Pays-Bas où se trouve la Section des intérêts canadiens. À l'entrée s'agglutinent des jeunes de toutes les contrées du continent venus chercher une demande de visa pour les Pays-Bas ou le Canada : bout de papier sans valeur mais symbolisant l'espoir d'une vie meilleure, d'une vie ailleurs. Au premier étage se trouve le bureau de Fatima, une dame extraordinaire qui s'occupe depuis près de quinze ans des intérêts canadiens en Libye.

Pendant la matinée, je discute avec Fatima des nouvelles procédures pour les demandes de visas, les examens médicaux que doivent faire les étudiants libyens et les directives à suivre pour l'émission des passeports aux quelque deux mille Canadiens travaillant sur place. Nous finalisons les derniers papiers concernant le rapatriement de la dépouille d'un Canadien. Nous perdons un peu le fil de nos idées car plusieurs Canadiens, profitant de la présence d'un représentant officiel de l'ambassade de Tunis, téléphonent ou viennent en personne pour des questions de visa ou de passeport ou simplement se rassurer qu'à Tunis on ne les oublie pas.

Le Chargé d'affaires et le Consul des Pays-Bas viennent également nous saluer. Je m'amuse intérieurement à comparer mes impressions du pays avec les leurs : encore sous le charme de la découverte ma vision est naturellement plus rose que celle un peu désabusée des habitués.

DÉCORS: *Un petit salon dans les bureaux du Service protocolaire du Ministère des Affaires étrangères avec quelques sofas confortables et l'éternel café de bienvenue. Ce qui retient surtout mon attention c'est une grande carte de la Libye sur le mur. Moi qui en ai cherché une en vain, je peux enfin mieux saisir l'immensité du pays.*

Il est midi. Nous sommes cinq dans le petit salon : Fatima et moi qui attendons ma carte d'accréditation diplomatique, deux jeunes hommes et une dame qui semblent simplement attendre que le temps passe. Après quelques instants, nous lions conversation avec cette dame qui s'avère être une diplomate libyenne en poste au Rwanda. Rapatriée depuis un mois, elle attend impatiemment son retour dans ce pays qu'elle décrit avec chaleur et attachement.

Après à peine vingt minutes d'attente, le Directeur du services des immunités diplomatiques m'apporte ma carte diplo. Après un préambule de mise pour ce type de rencontre, la conversation devient vite beaucoup plus animée et personnelle et, une heure plus tard, c'est avec regret que nous devons nous quitter. Comme avec nos autres interlocuteurs libyens, il aura simplement suffi d'exprimer une curiosité sincère envers leurs pays pour que la conversation s'anime, qu'on nous parle de la famille, des études que font les enfants, de l'histoire et la géographie du pays.

Section 63

Nouveaux problèmes, nouvelles solutions

Il y a eu une grande discussion à propos de la question de la responsabilité des entreprises. Les uns ont dit que les entreprises ont le droit de faire ce qu'elles veulent, tant qu'elles ne font pas de mal à personne. Les autres ont dit que les entreprises ont une responsabilité sociale et qu'elles doivent agir de manière éthique. La question est de savoir si la responsabilité sociale des entreprises est une obligation ou une option.

New Problems, New Solutions

There has been a great deal of discussion about the question of corporate responsibility. Some people have said that companies have the right to do what they want, as long as they do not harm anyone. Others have said that companies have a social responsibility and that they should act ethically. The question is whether corporate social responsibility is an obligation or an option.

Zagreb, June 6, 1995

Former Yugoslavia: Hard Choices, Hard Truths

SOURCE : DOSSIER 2990-01/YUGO

SOURCE: FILE 2990-01/YUGO

2. ... The current reviews and restructuring of UN peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Croatia, the continuing detention and vulnerability of UN personnel on the ground and NATO plans to deploy a rapid reaction force in Bosnia are forcing us to confront head-on the difficult questions that we hoped we would not have to face. In so doing, we must also examine whether our perceptions of these conflicts are correct and if the tools we are using (or can use) are appropriate.
3. Speaking plainly, we are no closer now to a negotiated settlement in either Bosnia or Croatia than we have been at any time during the past four years. Milosevic, Karadzic and Martic still want a greater Serbia, although Milosevic is prepared to wait a little longer to achieve this. Croatia is determined to regain control over all of the territory within its internationally-recognized borders, by negotiation if possible, but by force if necessary. The Bosnian Government has chosen the military option and still hopes to draw us into the conflict on its side.
4. As it has from the beginning, the key to a solution is in Belgrade. For all of the tinkering around the edges, Milosevic's dream of a greater Serbia remains unchanged. For tactical reasons, he will wait until the timing is more propitious, but he has no doubts that, in time, much of Bosnia and parts of Croatia will be linked to Serbia, whether they form an integrated state or not. Recognition by Milosevic of Bosnia's borders will do nothing to end that conflict and would only make explicit his implicit (through endorsing the contact group plan) recognition of a Bosnian entity within its existing borders. Nevertheless, international diplomacy is desperate for some signs of progress and has embraced Serbian recognition of Bosnia as a key step along the road to peace, offering a substantial easing of sanctions in exchange. Much more critical is his refusal to recognize Croatia's borders and his ongoing support for the Krajinan Serbs. His rejection of the Z-4 plan is based primarily on his refusal to grant a similar degree of local autonomy to the inhabitants of Kosovo and Sanjak....
6. Ethnic cleansing and countless atrocities have made remote the idea of co-existence and tolerance among the various communities in Bosnia (and to a lesser extent in Croatia). This has been recognized grudgingly in Bosnia, as successive peace plans increasingly drew the internal divisions along lines mirroring the results of ethnic cleansing. Long gone are the complicated and unworkable series of flyovers and corridors put forward under the Vance-Owen plan. The emphasis of late has been on creating sustainable territories for the Muslim-Croat Federation, linked in some way to Croatia itself, while acknowledging a similar, if not identical, right for the Bosnian Serbs to have their own links with Serbia. In the eyes of many, the principle of not rewarding aggression is being sacrificed in the fields and cities of Bosnia (not to mention Chechnya).

7. It is a myth that what is happening today is merely an extension of a conflict that began several centuries ago. Those who argue the historical intractability of this conflict are hard pressed to provide examples of Serb-Croat fighting before the kingdom of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs was created in 1918. This is, in fact, a conflict with fairly recent origins, fuelled by a lack of respect for minority rights on all sides. A combination of circumstances in the late 1980's, not least the demise of the Soviet Union and the growing nationalism of Milosevic's supporters, led to the decision of Ljubljana and Zagreb to make the break with Yugoslavia, in full knowledge that this would be resisted by Belgrade.
8. The Slovenes were fortunate; their war lasted 10 days. The Croats were less so; their war continues to this day. In the resulting fighting, more than 10,000 Croats were killed and over 300,000 were displaced from their homes (out of a population of 4 million), and one-quarter of Croatian territory was occupied by the Serb minority that made up about five per cent of the population. This is what motivates Slovenes and Croats to resist any talk about a reconstituted Yugoslavia or any other idea that could put Serbs once more in a position of control over them. It is a fundamental issue for them, and one that they are prepared to sacrifice for and, if need be, to fight and die for.
9. Bosnians have an even greater motivation to resist Serb domination. Since their war began in April 92, more than 150,000 Bosnians have been killed, two million more have been displaced and the country is in ruins. "Doing a deal" with the Serbs, at a time when the Bosnian army is getting stronger and the Serbs are getting weaker, is not a realistic option for Sarajevo ...
10. These are the fundamentals that underlie the continuing conflicts in Bosnia and Croatia: the Serbs want to live together, taking with them some territory of both countries; the Croats are determined to keep all their territory; the Bosnians acknowledge they cannot have all their territory but want a more viable deal than has been offered by any of the peace plans.
11. In the middle of all of this is the United Nations. None of the parties respect the UN and all have tried to use it to serve their objectives. As we saw in Sector West, the presence of UN troops is not a deterrent to Croatian action when Zagreb believes the circumstances are right to move militarily. The Bosnian Government and the Bosnian Serbs also do not respect the presence of UN troops as they launch their offensives and counter-offensives. The UN does not have the capability to act without the consent of the parties, and will not have that capability even with the deployment of the rapid reaction force.
12. The UN Secretary-General has asked for clear decisions by the Security Council about the future role of UNPROFOR, but will not get them. He favours option D (traditional peacekeeping), but this is politically unacceptable to member states, particularly the abandonment of the safe areas and Sarajevo. They are not prepared to provide the level of troops needed to enforce peace, so UNPROFOR will be left to muddle along, albeit with a bit more firepower. If we accept that there is not likely to be negotiated settlement in the near future, this "reinforced muddle through" will simply postpone the need to make the difficult decision about whether to withdraw UNPROFOR to more defensible positions.



Personnel du Ministère aidant à évacuer les Canadiens du Liban, pays déchiré par la guerre, en juillet 2006.

Department employees help to evacuate Canadians from war-torn Lebanon in July 2006.

SOURCE: DAVID FOXALL

13. In Croatia, meanwhile, the changed reality on the ground following Croatia's offensive in Sector West has clouded UNCRO's future, with less than four weeks to go before its forces should be redeployed in the remaining three sectors. Their exact functions are still to be worked out, particularly in light of the deep mistrust between Zagreb and Knin that will make implementing the existing ceasefire and economic agreements that much more difficult. The planned movement of ARGBAT [Argentinian battalion] from what was Sector West to Sector South (next to CANBAT I) is on indefinite hold following the objections of the Krajinan Serbs who believe the Argentinians did nothing to stop the Croatian army and police sweeping through Sector West. Even if UNCRO can be redeployed by 30 June, it is highly questionable whether there will be enough progress in restoring Croatian control over the occupied territories during the following five months to prevent Zagreb threatening yet again not to renew the mandate when it expires at the end of November.
14. Canada does not have any significant influence on any of the parties to the conflicts in Bosnia or Croatia, nor do we have the potential military or economic clout to acquire that influence. Rather, our influence is on the International Community and how it seeks to address the unresolved issues that are the foundation of the fighting, derived through our stature as respected, credible peacekeepers on the ground, and as members of some of the key organizations involved in these conflicts (United Nations Protection Force, United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation, NATO). As we have seen before, however, it is a constant

struggle to be heard against the more vocal and emotionally-charged rhetoric coming out of places such as Washington and Paris. Major powers consider Canada to be a good team player, the quiet workhorse of the peacekeeping operations. They seek to placate us when we raise concerns, but always tell us what a good job we are doing and why we have to stay the course (particularly those countries without troops on the ground). The fact that we continue to maintain our troops in Bosnia and Croatia, for perfectly valid national interests, does not help us to gain further influence in the decision-making process that has a direct impact on our personnel on the ground. Ironically, the one thing we could do to get that influence – withdraw from UNPROFOR and/or UNCRO – would, in fact, eliminate our influence. It is our trump card, and our last card. Once played, we are out the game and relegated to being a spectator. Unless we are prepared to deal ourselves out, it is not very useful to threaten to leave, as this takes on an increasingly hollow ring each time it is raised.

15. Our options, therefore, are limited. First and foremost, we must make a realistic assessment of what is likely to happen on the ground in Bosnia and Croatia (as we have indicated above, the likely scenarios are not encouraging). Second, we must decide whether we believe there is a role for the International Community at this point in time. If so, we must determine what we think that role should be and whether Canada has the capabilities to be a part of that. Then we need to convince the various international organizations of the merits of our views. If we cannot, and the shape of the international response is different from our own, we must decide whether we want to remain a part of these efforts, given the potential threat to the lives of Canadian military and civilian personnel deployed in what used to be Yugoslavia.
16. Our peacekeepers (and UN civilian employees) continue to do exceptional work throughout the former Yugoslavia, as we have witnessed on many occasions during our travels in Croatia and Bosnia. All they ask is that we give them clear direction of what we are trying to achieve and provide them with the means to carry out their difficult duties.

[Ottawa,] July 3, 1997

Madrid Summit: APM Language

SOURCE : DOSSIER 3936-01

MILITARY

HUMANITARIAN

SOURCE : FILE 3936-01

Thanks for reference message and your continued perseverance. Grateful if you would return to the charge with the new proposals listed below which we believe should go part of the way to responding to the concerns/dismay of allies vis-à-vis our initial proposal on APMs. You will note that our proposals are stripped down to accommodate obvious concerns among allies for brevity and are even prepared to drop specific reason to Ottawa as venue for signing of treaty.

2. What is not acceptable to us is return to December 1996 language as price for consensus given fact that terrain has changed fundamentally since then. 13 of 16 allies categorically endorsed Ottawa process less than one week ago in Brussels. More than 100 countries are now on board and NATO should recognize, if not express support for, this fact. On this point you should approach Norwegians who can be expected to offer strong support for any tough language we put forward. FYI, Norwegian colleague contacted us today to express dismay at weakness of language proposed by Canada, particularly the reference to the complementary efforts of the conference on disarmament and the "negotiations in Brussels." They are correct in noting that Brussels Conference was not a negotiation. Were we to include reference to Brussels conference, we could well face request from Germans to include reference to Bonn meeting of late April. Better to have language look forward to what lies ahead, i.e, Oslo and Ottawa. For this reason, while we would like to respond to Belgian request for including reference to Brussels Conference, we are prepared to see it drop as reference was both technically incorrect and was in the past.
3. Grateful if you would propose following new Canadian language: "We support a comprehensive ban on anti-personnel mines, and note the negotiations to take place in Oslo in September with the objective of signing such a ban in December."

The above is less than 30 words, contains no reference to Ottawa process or Ottawa. We could even live without the reference to Oslo but would not wish to be the ones to offer this up given strong Norwegian support. While we should not be the ones to suggest it, we could accept adding to the above any or all of the following:

- (a) the UNGA language as contained in first sentence of our original proposal (i.e. we support the vigorous pursuit of an effective legally-binding agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel mines,
- (b) the language taken from IMS option I, i.e. we urge all states to ratify the second protocol of the convention on inhumane weapons, and/or
- (c) reference to the efforts in a variety of other fora, including the conference on disarmament.

4. We believe the above proposal shows that we have gone considerable distance to accommodate concerns of other allies. Our text is brief and succinct and deals with one of

the only "hot" issues on the arms control agenda. If others wish to add to our language, it is up to them. Furthermore, we are comfortable in standing firm on the above. Even were the above language to be accepted, it would mean that NATO language offered less explicit recognition to Ottawa process than virtually every other major forum, including the OAU, OAS, Denver Summit, and even the upcoming ASEAN PMC, a forum which has been traditionally the furthest behind in terms of recognizing Ottawa process because of presence of so many reluctant countries (e.g. China, Vietnam) in that region. Certainly, NATO can do better. As a result, were it to come to it, we are prepared to see this issue put to ministers.

Best of luck.

Jakarta, February 2, 2005

Courrier de l'ambassade
du Canada, Jakarta
FRENCH SOURCE MISSING

E-mail from the Canadian
Embassy, Jakarta
ENGLISH SOURCE MISSING

Establishing a Canadian Presence In Banda Aceh – First Report – 31 January 2005

On behalf of Ambassador Mank:

I arrived in Banda Aceh yesterday (Sunday, 30 Jan 05) on a mission to establish a Canadian presence here.

Enroute, I made a brief stop in Medan for a tour of the trans-shipment facilities there with the One-Star in charge, Brigadier General Irawan Supomo. Fortunately, Medan was quiet compared to what it was a few weeks ago and the main warehouse, which had been overflowing, is now almost empty – meaning that the relief operation has for the most part moved to the front lines where it is needed. Arrival in Banda Aceh was a stark contrast. The airport scene looked like something out of an action movie: helicopters of all variety flying in tight formations of two's and three's, in and out in rapid succession and in many directions, fully laden with supplies going out. Standing there amid the din of it all felt like being in a violent windstorm. Around that part of the airport, I saw an encampment of tents from the many countries that have deployed military here: Australian, Japanese, German and Malaysian markings were particularly evident, as were those of the UN.

2. I had a half-hour meeting at the airport with General Bambang Darmono who continues to help lead TNI relief efforts here, although a Three-Star has just been put in above him. He seems a young, capable and certainly amiable man, but also exhausted like everyone else. I let him know that we would be establishing a Canadian presence and that we were, in fact, the third Canadian group to visit since the 26 December disaster, following our Recce team and our CIDA Minister visits. He recalled Minister Carroll and sent his regards. I introduced my six-person Embassy delegation – Karen Foss, GR, who will be staying up here for a couple of weeks at least; Hari Basuki, Development, also staying for the better part of a week; Paul Cunningham, Consular, Sgt. Albert Martineau, Defence; Jennifer Hart, Media; and Harkiran Rajasansi, Trade – all of whom will be returning with me to Jakarta on Tuesday, 01 February 05. The conversation focussed on two things: his desperate desire to know who was doing what among the international community – he admitted that he is constantly caught unawares and can't answer his superiors when they ask him this simple question. And, second, we talked about TNI capabilities and immediate tasks. On the latter, he said they were focussed on restoring the Banda Aceh highway between here and Meulaboh (a section of which I told him was built with Canadian assistance when I last visited in 1989), so that supplies could get through with the use of helicopters. He wouldn't give numbers but he did say they had enough engineers and equipment to do it themselves. He admitted that rebuilding the twenty or so bridges would be a particular challenge, however.
3. From there, I went for a visit to the destroyed Manulife office and then to the nearby "ground zero" of the tsunami-hit section of Banda Aceh. I thought I was prepared for it, having seen the footage over and over again on TV for the past month. But nothing can prepare you for standing on the high point of one of the few surviving (but badly damaged) bridges at the old port, turning 360 degrees and seeing the sheer scope and magnitude of the wreckage and

carnage. I understood immediately why even the likes of Colin Powell and Kofi Annan were shocked upon seeing it. Imagine standing on Rideau Street in Ottawa and seeing nothing but flattened buildings and houses south down Bank Street, Alta Vista, east beyond Beacon Hill and West beyond Island Park, debris piled everywhere, newly formed ponds of brackish water dotting the landscape, twisted wreckages of cars improbably perched on top of the skeletal remains of the few buildings left standing. Imagine then the same scene continued all the way to Toronto with entire towns on the way erased from the map. That would give you some idea of the scope and scale.

4. I still saw body parts in one area, the stench was overwhelming, and the fly and mosquito populations have grown to a point where disease has to be a real concern, though apparently under control for the moment. The destruction stretches all the way to the mountains, some ten kilometres in the distance. I talked to one young man in front of a pile of rubble that had once been his home. His story, a typical one, was of being blasted end-over-end by the wave and carried several kilometres into town, surviving only by some miracle. The other five members of his family are all gone and he is walking in a daze with no idea what to do next. There were many others like him.
5. My last stop of day one was at Acting Governor Abubakar's home (recall that the real Governor is up on corruption charges). His office was too damaged to receive visitors. He himself lost two brothers. His Deputy, who was taking notes, lost his youngest son of 14 years. Yet, no time for grieving, these are the men in charge at the front. I got from this meeting two impressions: the Acting Governor seems impatient with the pace of planning from Jakarta; and he wants foreign partners to take on sectoral recovery planning. He said that, so far, the Germans had taken on the task of planning for the reconstruction of the health system. The Malaysians had taken on education. He talked about the need for 50,000 houses and wondered if Canada would be able to play a part in this. I pointed out the need for a land use and urban plan from the government, so that everyone would know where to place the houses, schools, hospitals and other infrastructure. A fair point, he admitted.
6. I was scrummed in Bahasa by TVRI on leaving the last meeting and was able to convey our basic messages. Hopefully, that will help make our presence and contribution here better known. We are not very visible otherwise, especially compared to others. I think we can take some comfort, however, from knowing that, not only are we the seventh largest donor, but we were among the first that had a development Minister visit Aceh and are now among the very first to establish an Embassy presence here. Other nationals will be watching this closely and may follow our lead.

July 24, 2006

Turkish Assistance with Evacuation of Canadians from Lebanon

FRENCH SOURCE MISSING

ENGLISH SOURCE MISSING

Turkish government has provided invaluable assistance at all levels in Ankara, Adana, Mersin and elsewhere. This brief report is to provide a general picture and specific examples of Turkish assistance to the evacuation. Of course this continues and we may have more to report in the coming days. It is fair to say that without the high level of cooperation and spirit of good will demonstrated by our Turkish colleagues, the transit of thousands of Canadian evacuees would have been much more onerous and the delays in returning them to Canada much longer. Canadian-staff here and in Mersin/Adana are unanimous in our praise and gratitude for the cooperation of the Turkish authorities. Thanks to my colleagues in Mersin, Adana and Ankara for their input to this.

- (1) *Mersin Port* - as the first few ships arrived, it became rapidly apparent that standard customs and disembarking procedures and levels of staffing by Turkish port officials would result in significant delays faced with such large numbers of entrants. As a result, Turkish staff levels were quickly increased and machine-readers brought to the port. This greatly facilitated getting the Canadians (and others) off the ships, through Customs and Immigration and on to buses for transit to Adana; The Mersin Governor was present on many occasions at dockside, greeting Canadians and supervising operations. Due to his personal intervention drinks were given to evacuees and air conditioning was put in place in the sweltering reception hall. This dramatically increased the comfort level for evacuees and Canadian staff.
- (2) *Adana Airport* - Adana Governor ordered all border police (responsible for immigration), customs, and airport staff to facilitate the exit of Canadian evacuees. He specifically instructed that all such staff be on-call for the duration of the crisis. This was particularly important given that arrival and departure times for aircraft changed at short or no notice. Attitude of police and other Turkish officials has been exemplary/professional and inter-agency coordination very effective (not always the case here!)
- (3) *Borders* - MFA gave specific instructions to all borders to facilitate the entry of Canadian staff and evacuees. We saw first-hand the effect of this when communicating with border posts across the country, including on the Syrian-Turkish border and at Ankara and Istanbul airports. All interlocutors repeated to us that they had been instructed to cooperate, to issue evacuees with visas at the border, and waive all fees; The Turkish Embassy in Ottawa and others around the world issued visas to Canadian staff in record time and with minimal procedure thus facilitating the transport of key personnel to Turkey; With one exception due to a miscommunication, incoming Canadian staff were able to enter Turkey without visas due to MFA instructions.

Lectures complémentaires

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Annan, Kofi, secrétaire-général des Nations Unies (1997–2007).

Arthur, prince, duc de Connaught, gouverneur-général du Canada (1911–1916).

Atlee, Clement, premier ministre du Royaume-Uni (1945–1951).

Baldwin, Stanley, premier ministre du Royaume-Uni (1923–1925, 1924–1929, 1935–1937).

Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa, premier ministre du Nigeria (1960–1966).

Balfour, Arthur, Foreign Secretary, Royaume-Uni (1917–1919).

Batista, Fulgencio, président du Cuba (1940–1944, 1950–1959).

Beaudry, Laurent, sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures (1935–1947).

Beaulne, Yvon, ambassadeur canadien au Brésil (1967–1969).

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Bundy, McGeorge, conseiller à la sécurité nationale auprès du président des États-Unis (1961–1966).

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Byrd, Richard, explorateur polaire américain.

Cadieux, Marcel, chef, Direction du personnel, ministère des Affaires extérieures (1949–1951); sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures et conseiller juridique du Ministère (1956–1960); sous-secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures (1960–1964); sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (1964–1970); ambassadeur aux États-Unis (1970–1975).

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Carter, Thomas LeM., haut-commissaire canadien au Nigeria (1960–1964).

Castro, Fidel, premier ministre du Cuba (1959–1976); président (1976–2008).

Chamberlain, Austen, homme d'État britannique; député (1892–1937); a occupé plusieurs postes ministériels, notamment celui de secrétaire aux Affaires étrangères (1924–1929).

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Green, Howard C., ministre des Travaux publics, Canada (1957–1959); secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (1959–1963).

Greene, Lorne, acteur canadien.

Grey, earl, gouverneur-général du Canada (1904–1911).

Haig, feld-maréchal Douglas, commandant du Corps expéditionnaire britannique, Première Guerre mondiale.

Haldane, lord, Secretary of State for War, Royaume-Uni (1905–1912); Lord Chancellor (1912–1915, 1924).

Harding, E.J., sous-secrétaire d'État permanent des Dominions, Royaume-Uni (1930–1940).

Head, Ivan, conseiller en politique étrangère auprès du Premier ministre Pierre Trudeau (1968–1978).

Heeney, A.D.P., représentant permanent canadien auprès du Conseil d'Atlantique Nord et de l'OECE (1952); ambassadeur aux États-Unis (1953–1957, 1959–1962).

Hellyer, Paul, ministre de la Défense nationale, Canada (1963–1968).

Henry, brig.-gén. Stephen W., United States Air Force.

Herter, Christian, sous-secrétaire d'État, États-Unis (1957–1959); secrétaire d'État (1959–1961).

Hitler, Adolf, chancelier d'Allemagne (1933–1945).

Hull, Cordell, secrétaire d'État, États-Unis (1934–1944).

Hymans, Paul, président, Assemblée générale de la Société des Nations (1920–1921).

Hyndman, James, ambassadeur canadien au Cuba (1975–1977).

Ilsey, James L., ministre des Finances, Canada (1940–1946); ministre de la Justice (1946–1948).

Jaruzelski, général Wojciech, ministre de la Défense, Pologne (1969–1985); premier secrétaire, Comité centrale du Parti ouvrier unifié polonais (1981–1989); président de la République populaire de Pologne (1989); président de la République de Pologne (1989–1990).

Johnson, Lyndon B., président des États-Unis (1963–1969).

Joxe, Louis, ministre de la Justice, France (1967–1968).

Keenleyside, Hugh, premier secrétaire, légation canadienne au Japon (1929–1936); secrétaire canadien, Commission permanente canado-américaine de défense (1940–1944); ambassadeur au Mexique (1944–1947).

Kellogg, Frank, secrétaire d'État, États-Unis (1925–1929).

Kennan, George, sous-chef de Mission des États-Unis en Union soviétique (1944–1946); directeur de planification des politiques, département d'État (1947–1949); ambassadeur en Union soviétique (1952).

Kennedy, John Fitzgerald, président des États-Unis (1961–1963).

Khan, Ayub, président du Pakistan (1958–1969).

Khrushchev (Khrouchtchev), Nikita S., premier secrétaire, Comité central du Parti communiste, Union soviétique (1953–1964).

King, Martin Luther, chef de file américain en matière de droits civils.

King, William Lyon Mackenzie, premier ministre du Canada (1921–1926, 1926–1930, 1935–1948) et secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (1921–1926, 1926–1930, 1935–1945).

Kirkwood, Kenneth, deuxième secrétaire, légation canadienne au Japon (1930); chargé d'affaires en Pologne (1947–1948); ministre en Pologne (1948–1950).

Kitchener, lord, ministre de la Guerre, Royaume-Uni (1914–1916).

Kohl, Helmut, chancelier, République fédérale d'Allemagne (1982–1998).

Krenz, Egon, chef de la République démocratique allemande (1989).

Laberge, Paul, conseiller canadien, CISC, Vietnam 1968.

Lall, Arthur, représentant permanent de l'Inde auprès des Nations Unies (1956–1967).

LaMarsh, Judy, secrétaire d'État, Canada (1965–1968).

Lansing, Robert, secrétaire d'État, États-Unis (1915–1920).

Lapointe, Ernest, ministre de la Justice, Canada (1924–1926, 1926–1930, 1935–1941).

Lascelles, sir Alan (« Tommy »), secrétaire privé du roi George VI (1943–1952).

Laurier, sir Wilfrid, premier ministre du Canada (1896–1911).

Legault, L.H., conseiller juridique, ministère des Affaires extérieures, 1980.

Léger, Jules, sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, Canada (1954–1958); représentant permanent auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord et de l'OECE (1958–1961); ambassadeur en Italie (1962–1964); ambassadeur en France (1964–1968); sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (1968–1972); ambassadeur au Luxembourg et en Belgique (1973–1974); gouverneur-général du Canada (1974–1979).

Leopold III, roi des Belges (1934–1951).

Lesage, Jean, premier ministre du Québec (1960–1966).

Lett, Sherwood, premier commissaire canadien, CISC Vietnam (1954–1955).

Lippmann, Walter, journaliste américain.

Lloyd George, David, premier ministre du Royaume-Uni (1916–1922).

Lloyd, John Selwyn, Foreign Secretary, Royaume-Uni (1955–1960).

Lodge, Henry Cabot Jr., représentant permanent des États-Unis auprès des Nations Unies (1953–1960).

Lothian, marquess de, ambassadeur britannique aux États-Unis (1939–1940).

MacArthur, général Douglas, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan (1945–1951); commandant des Forces des Nations Unies en Corée (1950–1951).

MacCallum, Elizabeth, chargé d'affaires canadien au Liban (1954–1956).

MacDonald, Flora, secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, Canada (1979).

Macdonnell, R.M., commissaire canadien, CISC Cambodia (1954).

MacEachen, Allan, secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, Canada (1974–1976).

Mackenzie, George P., commandant, Patrouille de l'Arctique oriental (1925).

MacLean, P.S., ambassadeur canadien en Afrique du Sud (1986–1990).

MacMillan, Donald, explorateur polaire américain.

Macmillan, Harold, chancelier de l'Échiquier, Royaume-Uni (1955–1957); premier ministre (1957–1963).

Mailer, Norman, écrivain américain.

Mandela, Nelson, chef du Congrès national africain, Afrique du Sud; président de l'Afrique du Sud (1994–1999).

Mank, Randolph, ambassadeur canadien en Indonésie (2003–2006).

Marler, sir Herbert, ministre canadien au Japon (1929–1936); ministre aux États-Unis (1936–1939).

Martin, Paul, secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, Canada (1963–1968); leader du gouvernement au Sénat (1968–1974); haut-commissaire au Royaume-Uni (1974–1979).

Mary, reine, épouse du roi George V.

Massey, Vincent, ministre canadien aux États-Unis (1926–1930); haut-commissaire au Royaume-Uni (1935–1946); président, Commission royale d'enquête sur l'avancement des arts (1949–1951); gouverneur-général (1952–1959).

McCarthy, Joseph, sénateur, États-Unis (1947–1957); président, United States Senate Committee on Government Operations (1953–1954).

McCloskey, Agnes, directrice des services comptables, ministère des Affaires extérieures (1929–1943).

McCordick, J.A., Direction européenne, ministère des Affaires extérieures (1949–1950).

McKenzie, Marjorie, secrétaire au O.D. Skelton (1925–1941) et au Norman Robertson (1941–1946), ministère des Affaires extérieures.

McNamara, Robert, secrétaire à la Défense, États-Unis (1961–1968).

Measures, Howard, chef canadien du Protocole (1930–1951).

Meighen, Arthur, premier ministre du Canada et secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (1920–1921, 1926).

Merchant, Livingston, ambassadeur américain au Canada (1956–1958, 1961–1962).

Milosevic, Slobodan, président de la Serbie (1989–1997).

Moi, Daniel Arap, président du Kenya (1978–2002).

Mollet, Guy, premier ministre de la France (1956–1957).

Montagu, Edwin, ministre d'État pour l'Inde, Royaume-Uni (1917–1922).

Moran, Herbert, haut-commissaire canadien au Pakistan (1957–1960); ambassadeur au Japon et en Corée (1966–1972).

Motlana, Nthato, militant sud-africain anti-apartheid.

Mulroney, Brian, premier ministre du Canada (1984–1993).

Mussolini, Benito, premier ministre de l'Italie (1922–1943); Duce de la République socialiste italienne (1943–1945).

Nasser, Gamal Abdul, président de l'Égypte (1956–1958); président de la République arabe unie (1958–1970).

Nehru, Jawaharlal, premier ministre de l'Inde (1947–1964).

Nehru, R.K., secrétaire-général des Affaires extérieures, Inde (1961–1964).

Nkrumah, Kwame, premier ministre du Ghana (1957–1960); président (1960–1966).

Norman, Herbert, chef, Direction des Amériques et de l'Extrême-Orient, ministère des Affaires extérieures (1950–1953); haut-commissaire en Nouvelle-Zélande (1953–1956); ambassadeur en Égypte et au Liban (1956–1957).

Oliphant, sir Lancelot, ambassadeur britannique en Belgique (1939–1940).

Paton, Alan, romancier sud-africain.

Pearkes, George, ministre de la Défense nationale, Canada (1957–1960).

Pearson, Lester B., premier secrétaire, ministère des Affaires extérieures (1928–1935); conseiller, haut-commissariat du Canada au Royaume-Uni (1935–1941); sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures (1941–1942); ministre-conseiller, légation aux États-Unis (1942); ministre aux États-Unis (1944); ambassadeur aux États-Unis (1945–1946); sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (1946–1948); député (Lib.-Algoma East) et secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (1948–

1958); chef du Parti libéral et de l'Opposition (1958–1963); premier ministre du Canada (1963–1968).

Perley, sir George, haut-commissaire canadien par intérim au Royaume-Uni (1914–1917); haut-commissaire (1917–1922).

Phillips, William, ministre des États-Unis au Canada (1927–1929).

Pineau, Christian, ministre des Affaires étrangères, France (1956–1957, 1958).

Pope, sir Joseph, sous-secrétaire d'État, Canada (1896–1909); sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (1909–1925).

Powell, Colin, secrétaire d'État, États-Unis (2001–2005).

Rae, Saul, deuxième secrétaire, ambassade canadien en France (1944–1946).

Rapacki, Adam, ministre des Affaires étrangères, Pologne (1956–1968).

Read, John, conseiller juridique, ministère des Affaires extérieures, Canada, et sous-secrétaire d'État suppléant aux Affaires extérieures (1928–1946).

Reagan, Ronald, candidat républicain présidentiel, États-Unis (1976); président des États-Unis (1981–1989).

Reston, James (« Scotty »), journaliste américain, New York Times (1939–1989).

Reza Pahlavi, Mohammed, schah de l'Iran (1941–1979).

Ritchie, A.E., ambassadeur canadien aux États-Unis (1966–1970); sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (1970–1974); ambassadeur en Irlande (1976–1980).

Ritchie, Charles S.A., membre, délégation canadienne à la Conférence des Nations Unies au San Francisco (1945); conseiller, ambassade en France (1947–1949); ambassadeur en République fédérale d'Allemagne (1954–1958); représentant permanent auprès des Nations Unies (1958–1962); ambassadeur aux États-Unis (1962–1966); représentant permanent auprès du Conseil de l'Atlantique Nord (1966–1967); haut-commissaire au Royaume-Uni (1967–1971).

Rive, Alfred, haut-commissaire canadien en Nouvelle-Zélande (1946–1952).

Robertson, Norman A., sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, Canada (1941–1946); haut-commissaire au Royaume-Uni (1946–1949); greffier du Conseil privé et secrétaire du Cabinet (1949–1952); haut-commissaire

au Royaume-Uni (1952–1957); ambassadeur aux États-Unis (1957–1958); sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (1958–1964).

Robinson, H. Basil, adjoint spécial au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, Canada (1958–1962); sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (1974–1977).

Röhm, Ernst, chef d'état-major de la Sturmabteilung (S.A.), Allemagne (1931–1934).

Roosevelt, Franklin D., président des États-Unis (1933–1945).

Rowell, Newton, président du Conseil privé du Canada (1917–1921); délégué auprès de la Société des Nations (1920).

Roy, Philippe, commissaire-général canadien en France (1911–1928); ministre (1928–1938).

Sakharov, Andreï, scientifique et dissident politique russe.

Salisbury, marquess de, Lord président du Conseil, Royaume-Uni (1922–1924).

Schultz, George, secrétaire du Trésor, États-Unis (1972–1974); secrétaire d'État (1982–1989).

Seaborn, Blair, commissaire canadien, CISC Vietnam (1964–1965).

Siegfried, André, géographe et journaliste français.

Sifton, sir Clifford, ministre de l'Intérieur, Canada (1896–1905).

Silayev, Ivan, premier ministre de la République socialiste fédérative soviétique de Russie (1990–1991).

Skelton, O.D., sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, Canada (1925–1941).

Small, C.J., délégué commercial canadien à Hong-Kong (1958–1961); représentant permanent auprès de l'OCED (1965–1969); haut-commissaire/ambassadeur au Pakistan (1969–1972); ambassadeur en République populaire de Chine (1972–1976); ambassadeur au Vietnam (1973–1975); haut-commissaire en Malaisie (1983–1984).

Smith, Arnold, conseiller canadien, haut-commissariat au Royaume-Uni (1956–1958); ambassadeur en République arabe unie (1958–1961); ambassadeur en Union soviétique (1961–1963); secrétaire-général du Commonwealth (1965–1975).

Smith, Sidney, secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures, Canada (1957–1959).

Smuts, général Jan, premier ministre de l'Afrique du Sud (1919–1924, 1939–1948).

Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr, écrivain russe.

Southam, G.H., ambassadeur canadien en Pologne (1960–1962).

Spring Rice, sir Cecil, ambassadeur britannique aux États-Unis (1912–1918).

St. Laurent, Louis, ministre de la Justice, Canada (1941–1945); secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures (1945–1948); premier ministre du Canada (1948–1957).

Steele, H.E.R., secrétaire auprès du commandant, Patrouille de l'Arctique oriental (1925).

Stimson, Henry, Secretary of State for War, États-Unis (1940–1945).

Stone, Thomas, deuxième secrétaire, légation canadien en France (1932–1933); Chargé d'affaires aux gouvernements alliés en exil (1944–1945); ministre aux États-Unis (1945–1948); ministre en Suède et en Finlande (1949–1952); ambassadeur aux Pays-Bas (1952–1958).

Taylor, Kenneth, ambassadeur canadien en Iran (1977–1980).

Thatcher, Margaret, premier ministre du Royaume-Uni (1979–1990).

Trudeau, Pierre, premier ministre du Canada (1968–1979, 1980–1984).

Truman, Harry S., président des États-Unis (1945–1953).

Tyrell, sir William, ambassadeur britannique en France (1928–1934).

Urrutia, Dr. Manuel, président du Cuba (1959).

von Pflügl, baron Emmerich, délégué permanent d'Autriche auprès de la Société des Nations.

Walesa, Lech, chef du syndicat Solidarité, Pologne (1980–1990); président de la Pologne (1990–1995).

Wallace, Henry A., vice-président des États-Unis (1941–1945); secrétaire du Commerce (1945–1946).

Weinberger, Caspar, secrétaire de la Défense, États-Unis (1981–1987).

Westmoreland, général William, chef d'état-major de l'Armée, États-Unis (1968–1972).

Weynerowski, Witold, ambassadeur canadien en Irak (1980–1983).

Wilgress, R. Dana, ministre canadien en Union soviétique (1942–1944); ambassadeur (1944–1947).

Willingdon, viscount, gouverneur-général du Canada (1926–1931).

Wilson, Sir Horace, fonctionnaire britannique détaché pour services spéciaux auprès du Premier ministre Neville Chamberlain (1937–1940).

Wilson, Woodrow, président des États-Unis (1913–1921).

Wrong, Hume, conseiller canadien auprès de la Société des Nations (1937); délégué permanent auprès de la Société des Nations (1938–1941); ambassadeur aux États-Unis (1946–1953).

Wyszynski, cardinal Stefan, primat de la Pologne (1948–1981).

Yeltsin, Boris, président de la Fédération de Russie (1991–1999).

Yevtushenko, Yevgeny, poète russe.

List of People

Allard, Hector, Canadian Ambassador in Cuba (1957–1959).

Amery, Leo, First Lord of the Admiralty, United Kingdom (1922–1924).

Andrew, A.J., Director-General, Asia and Pacific Bureau, Department of External Affairs, Canada (1970–1974).

Annan, Kofi, Secretary-General of the United Nations (1997–2007).

Arthur, Prince, Duke of Connaught, Governor-General of Canada (1911–1916).

Atlee, Clement, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (1945–1951).

Baldwin, Stanley, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (1923–1925, 1924–1929, 1935–1937).

Balewa, Abubakar Tafawa, Prime Minister of Nigeria (1960–1966).

Balfour, Arthur, Foreign Secretary, United Kingdom (1917–1919).

Batista, Fulgencio, President of Cuba (1940–1944, 1952–1959).

Beaudry, Laurent, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada (1935–1947).

Beaulne, Yvon, Canadian Ambassador in Brazil (1967–1969).

Bennett, R.B., Prime Minister of Canada and Secretary of State for External Affairs (1930–1935).

Bentley, Elizabeth, an alleged former courier for a Soviet spy ring who gave hearsay testimony regarding L.B. Pearson to United States Senator William Jenner's sub-committee on intelligence in 1951.

Bonar Law, Andrew, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (1922–1923).

Borden, Sir Robert, Prime Minister of Canada and Secretary of State for External Affairs (1911–1920).

Brady, Sean, Third Secretary, Canadian Consulate-General, Hong Kong (1972–1973).

Brezhnev, Leonid, General Secretary of the Communist Party, Soviet Union (1964–1982).

Brock, William, United States Trade Representative (1981–1985)

Brockdorff-Rantzau, Count Ulrich von, Foreign Minister of the Weimar Republic (1918–1919); leader of German delegation to Versailles Peace Conference.

Brook, Sir Norman, Secretary of the Cabinet, United Kingdom (1947–1962).

Brooke, Edward, first African-American in United States Senate (1967–1979).

Bryce, James, British Ambassador in the United States (1907–1913).

Bryce, R.B., Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet (1954–1963).

Bulganan, N.A., First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, Soviet Union (1953–1958).

Bundy, McGeorge, National Security Advisor to the President of the United States (1961–1966).

Burns, Lt.-Gen. E.L.M., Commander, United Nations Emergency Force (1956–1959); Advisor to the Government of Canada on Disarmament.

Buthelezi, Chief Mangosuthu, Leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party, South Africa; Minister of Home Affairs (1994–2004).

Byng of Vimy, Viscount, Governor-General of Canada (1921–1926).

Byrd, Richard, American polar explorer.

Cadieux, Marcel, Head, Personnel Division, Department of External Affairs, Canada (1949–1951); Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and Departmental Legal Advisor (1956–1960); Deputy

- Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (1960–1964); Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (1964–1970); Ambassador in the United States (1970–75).
- Carroll, Aileen, Minister of International Cooperation, Canada (2004–2006).
- Carter, H.H., Counsellor, Canadian Permanent Mission to the United Nations (1947–1951).
- Carter, James Earl (“Jimmy”), President of the United States (1977–1981).
- Carter, Thomas LeM., Canadian High Commissioner in Nigeria (1960–1964).
- Castro, Fidel, Prime Minister of Cuba (1959–1976); President (1976–2008).
- Chamberlain, Austen, British statesman; Member of Parliament (1892–1937); held several ministerial posts, including Foreign Secretary (1924–1929).
- Chamberlain, Neville, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (1937–1940).
- Chilton, H.G., Chargé d'affaires, British Embassy in the United States (1925).
- Chipman, Warwick, Canadian Ambassador in Chile (1942–1945).
- Chou En-Lai, Prime Minister of the People's Republic of China (1949–1976).
- Christie, Loring, first Legal Adviser, Department of External Affairs, Canada (1913–1923); Canadian Minister in the United States (1939–1941).
- Churchill, Winston, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (1940–1945, 1951–1955).
- Clark, Joseph (“Joe”), Prime Minister of Canada (1979–1980); Secretary of State for External Affairs (1984–1991).
- Clemenceau, Georges, Prime Minister of France (1917–1920).
- Collins, Ralph, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada (1972–1974).
- Coolidge, Calvin, President of the United States (1923–1929).
- Cooper, Alfred Duff, British statesman; Member of Parliament (1924–1929, 1931–1945); First Lord of the Admiralty (1937–1938).
- Crawford, Sir Richard, Commercial Advisor to the British Embassy in the United States (1915–1919).
- Crerar, Lt.-Col. (later General) H.D.G., Canadian army (1910–1946); Commander, First Canadian Army (1944–1946).
- Currie, General Arthur, first Canadian commander of the four divisions of the unified Canadian Corps of the Canadian Expeditionary Force in World War I.
- Curzon of Kedleston, Marquess, Foreign Secretary, United Kingdom (1919–1924).
- Daladier, Édouard, Prime Minister of France (1938–1940).
- de Gaulle, Charles, President of France (1959–1969).
- Dallaire, Maj.-Gen. Roméo, Canadian Commander of United Nations Forces in Rwanda (1993–1994); Senator (2005–).
- Delvoie, Louis, Canadian High Commissioner in Pakistan (1991–1994).
- Désy, Jean, Counsellor, Canadian Legation in France (1928); Minister in Belgium and The Netherlands (Dec. 1938–Oct. 1940); Minister/Ambassador in Brazil (1941–1947); Ambassador in Italy (1947–1952); Ambassador in France (1954–1957).
- Devonshire, Duke of, Colonial Secretary, United Kingdom (1922–1924).
- Diefenbaker, John G., Prime Minister of Canada (1957–1963) and Secretary of State for External Affairs (June–Sept. 1957); Leader of the Opposition (1963–1967).
- Dixon, Sir Pierson, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom at the United Nations (1954–1960).
- Doumergue, Gaston, President of France (1924–1931); Prime Minister (1934–1935).
- Drapeau, Jean, Mayor of Montreal (1954–1957, 1960–1986).
- Drury, Charles M. (“Bud”), Liberal Member of Canadian Parliament (1962–1976) who held various ministerial positions, including Industry and Defence Production.
- Dubček, Alexander, First Secretary of the Communist Party, Czechoslovakia (1968–1969); Speaker of the Federal Assembly (1989–1992).
- Dulles, John Foster, Secretary of State, United States (1953–1959).

- Duplessis, Maurice, Premier of Quebec (1936–1939, 1944–1959).
- Dupuy, Pierre, Canadian Chargé d'affaires in France (1940–1942); in Belgium and The Netherlands (1940–1944); in Norway, Poland, and Yugoslavia (1943–1944); Minister/Ambassador in The Netherlands (1945–1952); Ambassador in Italy (1952–1958); Ambassador in France (1958–1963); Commissioner of Expo 67 (1963–1967).
- Eden, Anthony, Lord Privy Seal, United Kingdom (1934–1935); Foreign Secretary (1935–1938, 1940–1946, 1951–1955); Prime Minister (1955–1957).
- Elbrick, Burke, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Department of State, United States (1957–1958).
- Elgin, Lord, Colonial Secretary, United Kingdom (1905–1908).
- Elizabeth, Princess, duchess of Edinburgh; later Queen Elizabeth II (1952–).
- Ford, Robert, Canadian Ambassador in the Soviet Union (1964–1980); Special Adviser on East-West Relations (1980–1985).
- Forsyth-Smith, Max, Canadian Trade Commissioner, Hong Kong, 1961.
- Foster, Sir George, Minister of Trade and Commerce, Canada (1911–1914); delegate to the Versailles Peace Conference (1919); head, Canadian delegation to the League of Nations (1920); Senator (1921–1931).
- Fraser, Peter, Prime Minister of New Zealand (1940–1949).
- Geddes, Sir Auckland, British Ambassador in the United States (1920–1924).
- George V, King of Great Britain and the British Dominions and Emperor of India (1910–1936).
- George VI, King of Great Britain and the British Dominions (1936–1952); Emperor of India (1936–1947); Head of the Commonwealth (1950–1952).
- Glazebrook, George P. de T., Special wartime advisor to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (1942–1946).
- Goebbels, Joseph, Reich Minister of Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, Germany (1933–1945).
- Goering, Hermann, President of the Reichstag, Germany (1932–1945); Reich Minister of Aviation (1933–1945); Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe (1935–1945).
- Gomulka, Wladyslaw, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party (1956–1970).
- Gorbachev, Mikhail, General Secretary of the Communist Party, Soviet Union (1985–1991); President of the Soviet Union (1989–1991).
- Gottlieb, Allan, Canadian Ambassador in the United States (1981–1989).
- Green, Howard C., Minister of Public Works, Canada (1957–1959); Secretary of State for External Affairs (1959–1963).
- Greene, Lorne, Canadian actor.
- Grey, Earl, Governor-General of Canada (1904–1911).
- Haig, Field Marshal Douglas, Commander of the British Expeditionary Force during World War I.
- Haldane, Lord, Secretary of State for War, United Kingdom (1905–1912); Lord Chancellor (1912–1915, 1924).
- Harding, E.J., Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Dominions, United Kingdom (1930–1940).
- Head, Ivan, Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Trudeau (1968–1978).
- Heeney, A.D.P., Canadian Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council and OECD (1952); Ambassador in the United States (1953–1957; 1959–1962).
- Hellyer, Paul, Minister of National Defence, Canada (1963–1968).
- Henry, Brig.-Gen. Stephen W., United States Air Force.
- Herter, Christian, Under Secretary of State, United States (1957–1959); Secretary of State (1959–1961).
- Hitler, Adolf, Chancellor of Germany (1933–1945).
- Hull, Cordell, Secretary of State, United States (1934–1944).
- Hymans, Paul, President, General Assembly of the League of Nations (1920–1921).
- Hyndman, James, Canadian Ambassador in Cuba (1975–1977).
- Ilsley, James L., Minister of Finance, Canada (1940–1946); Minister of Justice (1946–1948).
- Jaruzelski, Gen. Wojciech, Minister of Defence, Poland (1969–1985); First Secretary, Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party (1981–1989); President of the People's Republic of Poland (1989); President of the Republic of Poland (1989–1990).

- Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States (1963–1969).
- Joxe, Louis, Minister of Justice, France (1967–1968).
- Keenleyside, Hugh, First Secretary, Canadian Legation in Japan (1929–1936); Canadian Secretary, Permanent Joint Board on Defence (1940–1944); Ambassador to Mexico (1944–1947).
- Kellogg, Frank, Secretary of State, United States (1925–1929).
- Kennan, George, Deputy Head of United States Mission in the Soviet Union (1944–1946); Director of Policy Planning, Department of State (1947–1949); Ambassador in the Soviet Union (May–Sept. 1952).
- Kennedy, John Fitzgerald, President of the United States (1961–1963).
- Khan, Ayub, President of Pakistan (1958–1969).
- Khrushchev, Nikita S., First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, Soviet Union (1953–1964).
- King, Dr. Martin Luther, American civil rights leader.
- King, William Lyon Mackenzie, Prime Minister of Canada (1921–1926, 1926–1930, 1935–1948) and Secretary of State for External Affairs (1921–1926, 1926–1930, 1935–1945).
- Kirkwood, Kenneth, Second Secretary, Canadian Legation in Japan (1930); Chargé d'affaires in Poland (1947–1948); Minister in Poland (1948–1950).
- Kitchener, Lord, Minister of War, United Kingdom (1914–1916).
- Kohl, Helmut, Chancellor, Federal Republic of Germany (1982–1998).
- Krenz, Egon, Leader of the German Democratic Republic (1989).
- Laberge, Paul, Canadian advisor, ICSC Vietnam (1967–1969).
- Lall, Arthur, Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations (1956–1967).
- LaMarsh, Judy, Secretary of State, Canada (1965–1968).
- Lansing, Robert, Secretary of State, United States (1915–1920).
- Lapointe, Ernest, Minister of Justice, Canada (1924–1926, 1926–1930, 1935–1941).
- Lascelles, Sir Alan ("Tommy"), Private Secretary to King George VI (1943–1952).
- Laurier, Sir Wilfrid, Prime Minister of Canada (1896–1911).
- Legault, L.H., Legal Adviser, Department of External Affairs, Canada, 1980.
- Léger, Jules, Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada (1954–1958); Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council and OECD (1958–1961); Ambassador in Italy (1962–1964); Ambassador in France (1964–1968); Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (1968–1972); Ambassador in Luxembourg and Belgium (1973–1974); Governor-General of Canada (1974–1979).
- Leopold III, King of the Belgians (1934–1951).
- Lesage, Jean, Premier of Quebec (1960–1966).
- Lett, Sherwood, first Canadian Commissioner, ICSC Vietnam (1954–1955).
- Lippman, Walter, American journalist.
- Lloyd George, David, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (1916–1922).
- Lloyd, John Selwyn, Foreign Secretary, United Kingdom (1955–1960).
- Lodge, Henry Cabot Jr., Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations (1953–1960).
- Lothian, Marquess of, British Ambassador in the United States (1939–1940).
- MacArthur, General Douglas, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan (1945–1951); Commander of United Nations Forces in Korea (1950–1951).
- MacCallum, Elizabeth, Canadian Chargé d'affaires in Lebanon (1954–1956).
- MacDonald, Flora, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada (1979).
- Macdonnell, R.M., Canadian Commissioner, ICSC Cambodia (1954).
- MacEachen, Allan, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada (1974–1976).
- Mackenzie, George P., Commander, Eastern Arctic Patrol (1925).
- MacLean, P.S., Canadian Ambassador in South Africa (1986–1990).
- MacMillan, Donald, American Arctic explorer.

Macmillan, Harold, Chancellor of the Exchequer, United Kingdom (1955–1957); Prime Minister (1957–1963).

Mailer, Norman, American writer.

Mandela, Nelson, Leader of the African National Congress, South Africa; President of South Africa (1994–1999).

Mank, Randolph, Canadian Ambassador in Indonesia (2003–2006).

Marler, Sir Herbert, Canadian Minister in Japan (1929–1936); Minister in the United States (1936–1939).

Martin, Paul, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada (1963–1968); Leader of the Government in the Senate (1968–1974); High Commissioner in the United Kingdom (1974–1979).

Mary, Queen, wife of King George V.

Massey, Vincent, Canadian Minister in the United States (1926–1930); High Commissioner in the United Kingdom (1935–1946); Head, Royal Commission on the Arts (1949–1951); Governor-General (1952–1959).

McCarthy, Joseph, United States Senator (1947–1957); Chair, Senate Committee on Government Operations (1953–1954).

McCloskey, Agnes, chief accountant, Department of External Affairs, Canada (1929–1943).

McCordick, J.A., European Division, Department of External Affairs, Canada (1949–1950).

McKenzie, Marjorie, secretary to O.D. Skelton (1925–1941) and Norman Robertson (1941–1946), Department of External Affairs, Canada.

McNamara, Robert, Secretary of Defense, United States (1961–1968).

Measures, Howard, Canadian Chief of Protocol (1930–1951).

Meighen, Arthur, Prime Minister of Canada and Secretary of State for External Affairs (1920–1921, 1926).

Merchant, Livingston, American Ambassador to Canada (1956–1958; 1961–1962).

Milosevic, Slobodan, President of Serbia (1989–1997).

Moi, Daniel Arap, President of Kenya (1978–2002).

Mollet, Guy, Prime Minister of France (1956–1957).

Montagu, Edwin, Minister of State for India, United Kingdom (1917–1922).

Moran, Herbert, Canadian High Commissioner in Pakistan (1957–1960); Ambassador in Japan and Korea (1966–1972).

Motlana, Dr. Nthato, South African anti-apartheid activist.

Mulroney, Brian, Prime Minister of Canada (1984–1993).

Mussolini, Benito, Prime Minister of Italy (1922–1943); Duce of the Italian Socialist Republic (1943–1945).

Nasser, Gamal Abdul, President of Egypt (1956–1958); President of the United Arab Republic (1958–1970).

Nehru, Jawaharlal, Prime Minister of India (1947–1964).

Nehru, R.K., Secretary-General of External Affairs, India (1961–1964).

Nkrumah, Kwame, Prime Minister of Ghana (1957–1960); President (1960–1966).

Norman, Herbert, Head, American and Far Eastern Division, Department of External Affairs, Canada (1950–1953); Canadian High Commissioner in New Zealand (1953–1956); Ambassador in Egypt and Lebanon (1956–1957).

Oliphant, Sir Lancelot, British Ambassador in Belgium (1939–1940).

Paton, Alan, South African novelist.

Pearkes, George, Minister of National Defence, Canada (1957–1960).

Pearson, Lester B., First Secretary, Department of External Affairs, Canada (1928–1935); Counsellor, Canadian High Commission in the United Kingdom (1935–1941); Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (1941–1942); Minister-Counsellor, Legation in United States (1942); Minister in the United States (1944); Ambassador in the United States (1945–1946); Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (1946–1948); Member of Parliament For Algoma East and Secretary of State for External Affairs (1948–1958); Leader of the Liberal Party and of the Opposition (1958–1963); Prime Minister of Canada (1963–1968).

Perley, Sir George, Canadian Acting High Commissioner in the United Kingdom (1914–1917); High Commissioner (1917–1922).

Phillips, William, first Minister of the United States in Canada (1927–1929).

Pineau, Christian, Minister of Foreign Affairs, France (1956–1957, 1958).

Pope, Sir Joseph, Under-Secretary of State, Canada (1896–1909); Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (1909–1925).

Powell, Colin, Secretary of State, United States (2001–2005).

Rae, Saul, Second Secretary, Canadian Embassy in France (1944–1946).

Rapacki, Adam, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Poland (1956–1968).

Read, John, Legal Adviser, Department of External Affairs, Canada, and Deputy Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (1928–1946).

Reagan, Ronald, Republican candidate for President of the United States (1976); President (1981–1989).

Reston, James ("Scotty"), journalist, *New York Times* (1939–1989).

Reza Pahlavi, Mohammed, Shah of Iran (1941–1979).

Ritchie, A.E., Canadian Ambassador in the United States (1966–1970); Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (1970–1974); Ambassador in Ireland (1976–1980).

Ritchie, Charles S.A., Member, Canadian delegation to United Nations Conference in San Francisco (1945); Counsellor, Embassy in France (1947–1949); Ambassador in the Federal Republic of Germany (1954–1958); Permanent Representative to the United Nations (1958–1962); Ambassador in the United States (1962–1966); Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council (1966–1967); High Commissioner in the United Kingdom (1967–1971).

Rive, Alfred, Canadian High Commissioner in New Zealand (1946–1952).

Robertson, Norman A., Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada (1941–1946); High Commissioner in the United Kingdom (1946–1949); Clerk of the Privy Council and Secretary to the Cabinet (1949–1952); High Commissioner in the United Kingdom (1952–1957); Ambassador in the United States (1957–1958); Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (1958–1964).

Robinson, H. Basil, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada (1958–1962); Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs (1974–1977).

Roehm, Ernst, Chief of Staff of the Sturmbteilung (S.A.), Germany (1931–1934).

Roosevelt, Franklin D., President of the United States (1933–1945).

Rowell, Newton, President of the Privy Council of Canada (1917–1921); delegate to the League of Nations (1920).

Roy, Philippe, Canadian Commissioner General in Paris (1911–1928); Minister (1928–1938).

Sakharov, Andrei, Russian scientist and political dissident.

Salisbury, Marquess of, Lord President of the Council, United Kingdom (1922–1924).

Schultz, George, Secretary of the Treasury, United States (1972–1974); Secretary of State (1982–1989).

Seaborn, Blair, Canadian Commissioner, ICSC Vietnam (1964–1965).

Siegfried, André, French geographer and journalist.

Sifton, Sir Clifford, Minister of the Interior, Canada (1896–1905).

Silayev, Ivan, Prime Minister of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (1990–1991).

Skelton, O.D., Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada (1925–1941).

Small, C.J., Canadian Trade Commissioner, Hong Kong (1958–1961); Permanent Representative to the OECD (1965–1969); High Commissioner/Ambassador in Pakistan (1969–1972); Ambassador in the People's Republic of China (1972–1976); Ambassador in Vietnam (1973–1975); High Commissioner in Malaysia (1983–1984).

Smith, Arnold, Counsellor, Canadian High Commission in the United Kingdom (1956–1958); Ambassador in the United Arab Republic (1958–1961); Ambassador in the Soviet Union (1961–1963); Commonwealth Secretary-General (1965–1975).

Smith, Sidney, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada (1957–1959).

Smuts, General Jan, Prime Minister of South Africa (1919–1924, 1939–1948).

Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr, Russian writer.

Southam, G.H., Canadian Ambassador in Poland (1960–1962).

Spring Rice, Sir Cecil, British Ambassador in the United States (1912–1918).

St. Laurent, Louis, Minister of Justice, Canada (1941–1945); Secretary of State for External Affairs (1945–1948); Prime Minister of Canada (1948–1957).	Wallace, Henry A., Vice-President of the United States (1941–1945); Secretary of Commerce (1945–1946).
Steele, H.E.R., Secretary to the Commander, Eastern Arctic Patrol (1925).	Weinberger, Caspar, Secretary of Defense, United States (1981–1987).
Stimson, Henry, Secretary of State for War, United States (1940–1945).	Westmoreland, General William, Chief of Staff, United States Army (1968–1972).
Stone, Thomas, Second Secretary, Canadian Legation in France (1932–1933); Chargé d'affaires to the Allied Governments in Exile (1944–1945); Minister in the United States (1945–1948); Minister to Sweden and Finland (1949–1952); Ambassador in The Netherlands (1952–1958).	Weynerowski, Witold, Canadian ambassador in Iraq (1982).
Taylor, Kenneth, Canadian ambassador in Iran (1977–1980).	Wilgress, R. Dana, Canadian minister in the Soviet Union (1942–1944); Ambassador (1944–1947).
Thatcher, Margaret, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (1979–1990).	Willington, Viscount, Governor General of Canada (1926–1931).
Trudeau, Pierre, Prime Minister of Canada (1968–1979, 1980–1984).	Wilson, Sir Horace, British civil servant seconded for special service to Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain (1937–1940).
Truman, Harry S., President of the United States (1945–1953).	Wilson, Woodrow, President of the United States (1913–1921).
Tyrell, Sir William, British Ambassador in France (1928–1934).	Wrong, Hume, Canadian advisor at the League of Nations (1937); Permanent Delegate to the League of Nations (1938–1941); Ambassador in the United States (1946–1953).
Urrutia, Dr. Manuel, President of Cuba (1959).	Wyszynski, Cardinal, Primate of Poland (1948–1981).
von Pflügl, Baron Emmerich, Austrian Permanent Delegate to the League of Nations.	Yeltsin, Boris, President of the Russian Federation (1991–1999).
Walesa, Lech, Leader of Solidarity trade union, Poland (1980–1990); President of Poland (1990–1995).	Yevtushenko, Yevgeny, Russian poet.

